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AUSTRALIA'S NEW GOVERNMENT
Keith D. Suter

BRITAIN AND AMERICA: PROMOTION OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
Kenneth Lindsay

HI-JACKING AND THE BARBARY PIRATES COMPARED
Viscount Samuel

KATHERINE MANSFIELD AND WILLIAM GERHARDIE
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THE WORLD OF JOHN FLAXMAN
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*Editor:* ROSALIND WADE

*Business Manager:* DENIS MCCARTHY

*Associate Editor:* BETTY ABEL

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*Editorial Advisers:* PROFESSOR SIR HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT

*Fine Arts Correspondent:* ERNLE MONEY

*Music Correspondent:* DAVID FINGLETON


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## PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: AN ANALYSIS

### by Sharif Mohammad Shuja

PAKISTAN was right, is right and the concept of the state remains valid irrespective of the failures of its rulers. To make Pakistan a progressive and developed state, the first essential step is to adopt a more realistic image of the past and a new vision for the future. Pakistan felt completely isolated and helpless in the 1971 crisis. 'It was more due to the mishandling of the foreign policy by the Pakistani leadership than due to the change in world politics'.[1]

Properly speaking, national interest should mean the achievable goals of the nation as they are conceived of and enunciated by the persons or groups 'best representing'[2] the nation. Pakistan is achieving an independent position in world affairs and this policy is governed by a conception of national interest.

A second primary goal embodied in Pakistan's national interest is world peace in general, and peace in South Asia, in particular.

The major elements constituting Pakistan's national interest may be summarised as follows: independence, territorial integrity, peace, Kashmir solution, and external support for economic development.

The 'national interest' of Pakistan suggested that Pakistan must follow

the policy of bilateralism in relation with the Big Powers. Z. A. Bhutto, years before, as Foreign Minister, had enunciated the principle of bilateralism in the context of a changing world in which powers could no longer be grouped in clearly identifiable ideological camps. As Prime Minister, he gave the policy of bilateralism a more definitive aspect and new focus of meaning to resuscitate the country's fortunes. And he posited its independence and integrity as a source of strength to the international community and a factor of stability in Asia. Pakistan's 'national interest' demanded that it should refrain from participating in multilateral pacts directed by one power block against another. With the dissolution of bi-polarity and the emergence of an increasingly decentralised milieu of global power relationship, this is 'the only policy which responds to the demands of the present historical phase of international affairs'.[3]

Experience has taught us that over-commitment to any one power is not good. The interests of Great Powers keep on changing. The process of adjustment for a small country like Pakistan becomes difficult if it is over-committed. So, logically, we should try to have balanced relations with Big Powers and should not solicit the friendship of one at the expense or to the exclusion of the other. Thus, only the policy of bilateralism can help us to have friendly and cordial relations with the Big Powers, viz, USA, USSR and China. 'The best course for Pakistan would be not to get involved in a conflict with a Great Power or into a conflict between the Great Powers, for this would mean the end of her independence'.[4]

After the fall of Dacca in December, 1971, the New Pakistan came into being—a Pakistan new in the extent of her territory and population, in her leadership and in the methods of operation of her new leaders.

Mr. Bhutto in his very first televised address to the nation on 20 December, 1971, immediately after assuming office, said:

> Foreign policy has to be recast and redone. It will naturally be an independent foreign policy motivated towards the higher interest of Pakistan. We want good relations with all the great powers. We want to have a foreign policy which is positive and which is constructive.

The first essential for the New Pakistan was to remove the pall of gloom, frustration and despondence that hung over the nation. In the field of her international relations, it was sought to achieve this by working towards the attainment of the following objectives:

1. Restoration of the confidence of friendly countries in the future of Pakistan;
2. Restoration and maintenance of friendly relations with all the big powers;
3. Elimination of the consequences of the 1971 war and seeking an honourable peace with India through negotiations, not as a vanquished state but on equal terms;
4. Arriving at a settlement with the authorities in Bangla Desh;
5. Helping to restore economic assistance from abroad which was vital not only for our immediate needs, but also for our future development; and finally
6. Refurbishing the image of Pakistan which has been badly tarnished, most notably in the Western World, due to the reckless policies and irresponsible actions of the previous authoritarian regimes.[5]

To achieve these objectives, Mr. Bhutto set out the 'Journey of Renaissance', in the Middle East and Africa.

The American relationship with Pakistan stemmed from the cold war

alliance diplomacy being pursued by Washington during the first Eisenhower administration. At its origins, the military assistance agreement was more political than strategic; the United States wanted political friends in the Third World to offset the Soviet 'national liberation' plan. Military aid as such was less important than the security 'guarantee' that the US relationship implied, and was also less important than the large amounts of grants and loan-economic-assistance that flowed to America's 'ally'.

The reasons for Pakistan's joining the US defensive alliances was to secure economic and military aid with a view to meeting a threat from any quarter, particularly from India. In other words, the geo-political imperatives of her location compelled Pakistan to seek security against her hostile neighbour.

American influence in Pakistan was at its height in the middle and late 1950s. American advisers (a Harvard group under Ford Foundation sponsorship) helped the Planning Commission with formulating the nation's 5-year plans. American military personnel advised Pakistan's armed forces on matters of equipment, organisation, training and tactics. Pakistan participated in the air and naval exercises organised under CENTO and SEATO auspices. In civil government, American advisers sat in virtually every ministry, department and bureau.

In foreign affairs Pakistan followed the American lead on almost all major international issues: she supported the American position in Korea; opposed China's entrance into the UN; condemned the Russian suppression of Hungary; favoured, much to Nasser's annoyance, the Dulles proposals for a 'users' association' during the Suez crisis, denounced China's suppression of Tibetan revolt; endorsed the American 'two-China' policy; answered the USSR Prime Minister Khrushchev's threats of raining rockets on Peshawar (from where the American U-2 spy plane had taken off in 1960) with defiance; and adopted a generally anti-communist and pro-American posture in the cold war. 'Pakistan became an enthusiastic member of America's anti-communist crusade'.[6] Siddique concludes that 'Pakistan joined the US system of client states on the periphery of the Soviet Union and China on the premise that it was better to survive as a client state than not to survive at all'.[7]

Professor Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri concludes that:

> By joining the defence pacts, Pakistan has virtually become a camp follower of the West and was taken for granted by the United States. This ultimately led to a situation which posed a threat to the security of Pakistan.[8]

Pak-US relations remained cordial until Sino-Indian conflict broke out. Despite Pakistan's protests, Kennedy offered military aid to India on a massive scale and Nehru accepted. Pakistan's alliance with the US (honeymoon period!) was virtually at an end.

Pakistan then turned to China. China's response was positive. China no doubt was acting on the precept that the 'enemy's enemy is a friend'. Pakistan also tried to initiate normal relations with Russia.

During the 1971 crisis, American policy towards Pakistan was sympathetic. Bhutto himself visited America after the fall of Dacca. His visit to

America appeared to have manifold purposes:

1. To achieve better understanding with the American Government;
2. To enlist diplomatic help for the settlement of disputes with India;
3. To impress upon Washington Pakistan's needs for sophisticated weapons; and
4. To seek financial assistance for Pakistan's war-ridden and flood-shattered economy.[9]

The visit helped to improve understanding between the two Governments. The joint statements issued on 20 September at the conclusion of talks between President Nixon and Premier Bhutto expressed 'strong US support for Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity', which she 'considered a guiding principle of American foreign policy'. Also pledged was economic aid to help Pakistan in her flood recovery programme.

Pak-US relations are not directed against USSR or China. In fact, Pakistan has been able to make good relations with both China and the USSR. Again Pakistan has maintained a good relation with Britain, despite she has withdrawn from the Commonwealth on 30th January 1972. British attitudes towards the 1971 crisis was unfavourable for us which, ultimately, compelled Pakistan to withdraw from the Commonwealth.

During the early period of the East Pakistan crisis, British official attitude was ambivalent. On the one hand, the British Government viewed the crisis as an internal matter of Pakistan and, on the other, it resorted to pressure tactics to prevail upon Pakistan to reach a political settlement of the conflict. However, with the changing situation and increasing public pressures at home, British official stance also shifted from ambivalence to that of support to India and the East Pakistan secessionists. Illustrative of this were: Britain's role in the UN[10] during the war which helped strengthen India's position vis-à-vis Pakistan; its continued supply of arms[11] to India throughout the period of the conflict; its move for a concerted action by the Commonwealth and European countries on the recognition of 'Bangla Desh'[12] and its recognition of the 'Dacca regime' on 4 February 1972 when the Indian Army had not yet withdrawn from 'Bangla Desh'.[13] The reasons for London's leaning towards India were obvious. British investment in Pakistan, which is reported to be £50 million, is negligible in comparison with its vast investment in India.[14] The same is the case with trade.[15] Despite Britain being the third largest importer of Pakistan's goods after the US and West Germany, the fact remains that India's exports had received favourable treatment from Britain.

Apart from these economic factors, one of the pre-disposing political considerations influencing Britain's attitude towards India was its desire to keep the Indian Ocean free from the Soviet monopoly so as to protect its western trade routes and oil supplies from the Persian Gulf. That the growing Soviet naval power in the ocean caused much concern in Britain was obvious from its modified decision not to withdraw from East of Suez and its constant reference[16] to Soviet penetration there. Britain, by upholding the cause of India and 'Bangla Desh', sought to neutralise the growing influence of Moscow in the area. In the New Delhi-Dacca axis was seen the strong possibility of the emergence of a viable naval Power in the Indian

Ocean operating in coordination with London. Pakistan, because of its differences and disputes with India, did not fit in with the British strategy. 'Actually, what Britain sought by its policy was the protection of its economic interest in India and Bangla Desh and its trade routes in the Indian Ocean'.[17]

All these disputes and British strategy did not suit Pakistan, resulting in the Pakistani withdrawal from the Commonwealth. This could affect the Pakistanis living in Britain. But Prime Minister Bhutto himself visited Britain and settled the outstanding disputes including the status of Pakistanis living in Britain.

Since 1962, Sino-Pakistan relations have become increasingly cordial. For Pakistan, China serves as a balance of power vis-à-vis India. The Indo-Pak wars have already proved that China is a friend in need. Pakistan also wants to make good relations with the Soviet Union. In fact Ayub Khan tried to pursue a policy of bilateralism with regard to the relations of Super Powers. Since no great power was wholly reliable and since each great power could be useful to Pakistan, it was necessary to cultivate good relations with all. The United States was necessary for continued economic and military assistance; China was useful as a source of strategic support that had the function of deterring the Indians from major military action towards Pakistan; and the Soviet Union could possibly be useful if Pakistan could normalise relations and exert some influence on Moscow to reduce its level of support for India, or, conversely, increase support for Pakistan. 'But the diplomacy was directed toward India rather than toward the bilateral relationships with the great powers, all of which Pakistan basically feared'.[18]

Russia always supported Indian policy and even in the 1971 crisis Russian policy was pro-Indian. But Pakistan has tried hard to clear up any misunderstanding with the Soviet leaders. Bhutto's personal meetings with the Kremlin leaders were successful, resulting in Russia providing aid for the Karachi steel mill.

In 1973, the Soviet press praised the domestic and foreign policies of Mr. Bhutto. In particular, Soviet commentators welcomed:

1. The nationalisation of enterprises in key industries;
2. Other socio-economic reforms;
3. The adoption of a new constitution;
4. Pakistan's decision to withdraw from SEATO;
5. Her recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and Prince Sihanouk's government in Cambodia;
6. Her raising of the level of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Korea; and
7. Her efforts to compose her differences with India by signing the Simla Agreement and by holding official-level talks.[19]

Pak-Soviet relations are not directed against China. Pakistan is also maintaining a cordial relation with China by the spirit of bilateralism.

The dominant and most important factor in Pakistan's foreign policy has been and still is the constant fear of her security with regard to India. An analysis of the course of Indo-Pakistan relations reveals that the causes of the recurrent crises between them fall into the following main categories.

First there are specific quarrels such as Kashmir, border incidents, eviction of the Muslims from Assam and Tripura, the problem of the religious minorities, and the Indus Water disputes. Behind the political and economic quarrels lie the more dangerous tensions based on prejudices, myths and age-old hatreds. The Indo-Pakistan conflict on Bangladesh was not a regional conflict between the two countries, rather there was a power struggle between China and the Soviet Union and a strategic struggle between Moscow and Washington.[20]

Although diminished in size and numbers and altered in relative emphasis in regard to its geo-political position, Pakistan, since 1971, is more than ever resolved to build a progressive modern society. 'A new Pakistan—new not only in form but in vision and inspirations' has emerged and is keen to play a meaningful and constructive role in world affairs.

The policy and approach of Bhutto's Government, both in domestic and international relations, is guided by the firm belief that primarily our objectives should be in tune with the interests of the common people of our country.

Our government has fully realised that if we are to alleviate the conditions of our masses, we cannot continue a policy of confrontation against India. This recognition was reflected in the Simla Accord between India and Pakistan which spoke of 'The establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people'.

Raja Tridev Roy concludes:

> The establishment of amicable ties between India and Pakistan does not require that they forsake their friendship with other countries, be it China, the United States or the Soviet Union. We believe in the concept of bilateralism, relations between India and Pakistan or any other countries should not be influenced by their relationships with the great Powers. This is a cardinal principle of our policy, and is, we believe, in accord with the currently evolving pattern of international relations.[21]

Judged against any reasonable criteria, Pakistan's new foreign policy has been creative and successful. Its governments have consistently mobilised external support for domestically defined goals. This does not, of course, mean that Pakistan has attained all its objectives. The success of the foreign policy lies in the fact that it brought to Pakistan more economic and military support than Pakistan's resources, power and importance in the world would appear to justify.

Since its creation, the state has operated under very great constraints and yet has been able to produce quite remarkable gains. Whether this will be possible in the future awaits on tomorrow's opportunities. What is clear, however, is that Pakistan will continue to prove to be a dynamic state in world politics. Its setting, structure, domestic politics and need for external resources are too great for it to become 'isolationist'. And the wars and clashes between India and Pakistan do not appear to make a foreign policy of 'subordinate reconciliation' possible. Neither peace nor war, but cold war will most probably continue to divide the two great countries of South Asia in the next decade.

NOTES

[1] See Safdar Mahmood, *A Political Study of Pakistan*, (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1972), PP(193-94).

[2] 'Best representing' must be interpreted according to one's own philosophy of governmental representation. In Pakistan, representation through democratic parliamentary processes is generally considered 'best'.

[3] Bhutto's speech to National Assembly, quoted in *The Age*, vol. 1, July 1974, Karachi, p. 19.

[4] See Z. A. Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969), PP (158-59).

[5] From a lecture captioned: Pakistan's Foreign Policy since her withdrawal from the Commonwealth, delivered by Zafarul Islam, Pakistan's Ambassador to Nigeria at the Institute of Administration, University of IFE, Nigeria, on 4th June 1974. Cited in *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. xxvii, No. 2, 1974, (Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs), PP (6-7).

[6] See Kalim Siddique, *Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan*, (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 160.

[7] Kalim Siddique, 'Pakistan's external environment,' *Asian Review*, vol. 2, No. 2, January 1969, London, p. 122.

[8] See Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Great Powers*, (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1970), p. 104.

[9] Mehrunnisa Ali, *Pakistan and the US*, in *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. xxvii, No. 1, 1974, (Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs), p. 73.

[10] Britain abstained on all the UN resolutions on the India-Pakistan War of 1971 except the Security Council Resolution of 21 December 1971.

[11] President Bhutto's (Now Prime Minister) statement in *The Daily Telegraph*, London, 20 December 1971. See also *DAWN*, Karachi, 9 December 1971 and *The Sunday Times*, London, 19 December 1971.

[12] The British Foreign Secretary stated on 18 January 1972 in the House of Commons that Britain was in touch with the Commonwealth countries regarding the recognition of 'Bangla Desh'. That Britain's persuasive methods succeeded was evident from the simultaneous recognition by eight European countries of 'Bangla Desh' on 4 February 1972.

[13] The Indian troops officially withdrew from Bangla Desh on 12 March 1972.

[14] *Pakistan Economist*, Karachi, in its issue of 28 August 1971 (p. 6) reported that British investment in India is about £8,000 to £10,000 million.

[15] Britain imports 48 per cent of India's unmanufactured tobacco, 37 per cent of its tea, 26 per cent of its woollen carpets, 24 per cent of its cotton goods and 21 per cent of its leather and sugar. These items till January 1973 enjoyed duty-free entry. See *The Times*, London, 2 January 1973.

[16] The British Prime Minister Mr. Heath's speech at the Singapore Commonwealth Conference in January 1971, Sir Alec's speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society on 8 February 1971 and the British Defence White Paper published on 16 February 1972 all highlighted the growing Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean.

[17] See Mehrunnisa Ali, *Pakistan's Withdrawal from the Commonwealth*, in *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. xxv, No. 4, 1972 (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs), p. 42.

[18] See Wayne Wilcox, *Pakistan*, in Wayne Wilcox, Leo E. Rose, Gavin Boyd, (eds) *Asia and the International System*, (Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop Publishers Inc, 1972), p. 106.

[19] For Soviet Press Comments, see *Morning News*, Karachi, 1 April, 29 May, and 14 August, 1973.

[20] *New York Times*, 17 December 1971.

[21] From a lecture captioned: Some Foreign Policy Problems of Pakistan, delivered by Raja Tridev Roy at a meeting organised by the Pakistan Council of Asia Society, New York, on 27 September 1972. Cited in *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. xxv, No. 3, 1972, (Karachi: P.I.I.A.), p. 22).

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[S. M. Shuja is a Research Scholar and Editor of *The New Generation*, Karachi.]

# AUSTRALIA'S NEW GOVERNMENT (Part One)

## by Keith D. Suter

NOT since 1918 has there been a Remembrance Day in Australia like November 11, 1975. A political crisis had been simmering for weeks because the conservative Opposition-controlled Senate had decided not to pass the Budget. The Senate has this power in the Constitution but has never before exercised it. By midday it had been assumed by political commentators that a truce would shortly be called on the basis of a formula that the Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, was about to give the Governor-General. All the politicians were suffering from combat fatigue, while the average Australian—who usually has minimal interest in politics—had become weary of the dismal predictions of what would happen to a Government with no money to spend.

The bombshell exploded soon after midday. The Governor-General, ignoring Whitlam's proposal, sacked him—the first Prime Minister to be sacked since William IV sacked Lord Melbourne in 1834. The Australian Broadcasting Commission broadcasts the Parliamentary debates, which most people rarely listen to, but now suddenly the ABC had become far more popular than any commercial radio station as the 'Government's' bizarre antics were broadcast around the continent. The Senate, believing that Whitlam was out, immediately passed the Budget. The House of Representatives was in fact still sitting and Whitlam, noting that the Government was once again with funds, proposed a motion of no confidence in the caretaker Prime Minister (Malcolm Fraser) and called upon the Governor-General to ask Whitlam to form a new Government. With the Australian Labour Party (ALP) in control of the House, the motion was carried. It seemed that Australia would have three Prime Ministers in a day—not even the Italians can beat that. The Governor-General ignored this motion and went ahead with calling the Federal Election for December 13. It was a futile gesture on Whitlam's part, but well in keeping with the fantastic and unprecedented atmosphere of the day.

Within an hour pro-ALP demonstrations were arranged throughout Australia. The people knew where to congregate since they had done so often enough during the Vietnam war. Indeed, even the Vietnam slogans were soon to reappear: 'Stop work to stop the war' now read 'Stop work to stop Fraser' (the following day, Fraser's caretaker Ministers had to be driven around Canberra in private cars because the Government drivers were holding political meetings). Fraser had done something which few other men have done—he had united the warring factions of the ALP. Meanwhile, the Stock Exchange was euphoric and most Liberals and Country Party people were pleased with the sacking.

At the eye of the storm were three men: Kerr, Fraser and Whitlam. Sir John Kerr, born in a working class Sydney suburb, had a brilliant educational career and a very profitable legal career, which culminated as Chief

Justice of New South Wales. He began as a socialist but over the years his political opinions became increasingly conservative and he dropped out of active ALP politics in the mid-1950s to concentrate on his legal career, though it is evident that he kept in touch with right-wing politicians. Whitlam made a fatal political error in believing that the New South Wales Chief Justice was apolitical, when he recommended Kerr to the Queen as Governor-General in February 1974.

Ironically, if the ardently nationalistic Whitlam had reverted to the discontinued tradition of having a member of the Royal Family as Governor-General, he probably would not have been sacked. For despite all the republican feelings which the sacking generated, the mere fact that the previous example was back in 1834 is indicative of how rare this act is within the Commonwealth. Whitlam's sacking was more an act of a president rather than a sovereign. Once the dust settles, this will be recognised and Australia is certain to remain a monarchy.

Malcolm Fraser is the fifth Liberal leader in 10 years. Sir Robert Menzies, the Party's founder and first Leader, was Prime Minister from 1949 to 1965 and his shadow hangs heavily over his successors. The successors—the late Harold Holt, John Gorton, William McMahon, Bill Sneddon and now Malcolm Fraser—have all been men of varying political abilities, intellects and personalities. The central problem of all the conservative parties in Australian history is that they have been based on one man: when he goes the party crumbles. The post-Menzies leaders of the latest conservative party have had one further problem: Gough Whitlam. Fraser, who receives advice from the aged but alert Menzies, may well be the man who both manages to hold the Liberal Party together and drives Whitlam out of the ALP Leadership.

Fraser, a rich landowner from Victoria, is very much part of the Liberal establishment. While lacking the brilliant intellect of Menzies and Whitlam, he has shown administrative skill as Minister for the Army and then Minister for Defence and most recently Minister for Education. He also has tremendous resilience; if Whitlam had won the 1975 Election, Fraser knew that his career as Liberal Leader would be over since his Party would have sacked him as ruthlessly as his three immediate predecessors. His political views are well to the right of the Australian political spectrum. His public image is that of a correct country squire.

However, Fraser is no gentleman in backroom politics. Following Harold Holt's surprise death in December 1967, with no obvious successor in sight, Fraser strongly supported the comparatively unknown John Gorton in the scramble for the job. He was rewarded with the job of Minister for Defence. Fraser later quarrelled with the colourful, erratic, autocratic and generally moderate Prime Minister. He resigned and significantly contributed to the Party's sacking of Gorton. (Gorton's brief successor, the amiable William McMahon, made Fraser Minister for Education.) Therefore, Fraser has been at the centre of the plots to remove the last two popularly elected Prime Ministers: Gorton and Whitlam. His third victim came

between the two Prime Ministers. Bill Sneddon, who took over the Liberal Leadership from McMahon following the December 1972 Federal Election defeat, is an industrious person of working class origins and moderate political views, who was a poor performer in public and no match for Whitlam. An unsuccessful coup in November 1974, after Sneddon lost the May 1974 Election, was followed by a better organised one in March 1975. Having at last become Liberal Leader, Fraser set out with equal determination to get Whitlam.

Gough Whitlam became the leader of the Australian Labour Party following the 1966 Federal Election, which was the ALP's worst ever Electoral defeat. He comes from a comfortable middle-class background and his ties with the workers have been rather tenuous, while his haughtiness prevents any simulated proletarian mannerisms. But having been soundy thrashed again, the ALP was willing to gamble on him. Whitlam introduced sophisticated political sales techniques, overhauled the ALP's image to attract more suburban middle-class voters in Sydney and Melbourne, and shifted the ALP's attention from international affairs to domestic issues which have more direct impact on voters. Three years later, he almost won the Federal Election because of a 7.1% swing from the Gorton Government. However, it is worth noting that even with a Government as poor as Gorton's, most voters were still unwilling to vote for the ALP. This is an indication that although the ALP has an approximately faithful 40% of the voters, it lacks just enough votes to get regularly into office. In 1972, there was a further swing against the Government of 2.4% —a total swing of 9.5% in two Elections—which still gave the new ALP Government only an 8 seat majority (in a House of 125 members).

The ALP Government's performance has already been examined in this journal (May 1975). Undoubtedly in only three years it became the most reformist in Australian history—partly because the previous Government had been so conservative that almost every aspect of the Government's ambit had to be updated. Unfortunately for Whitlam, his Government was brought to an abrupt end because of three features in the way that the Government operated.

First, the central feature of nearly all the reforms was Federal Government expenditure. The ALP entered office when the economy had had an expanding money supply that needed to be controlled. Instead of dampening down the economy, the Government poured more money into it to finance its reforms. Wages quickly rose so that at the peak, in 1974, the annual increase in wages was 28%. During 1975 the Government began reversing its policies so as to control inflation by slightly cutting back on its expenditure but the changes came too late to save the Government from worried voters who were suffering from a very high rate of inflation, with unemployment at its highest since the 1930s.

As to the wisdom of embarking upon such an extensive expenditure programme in 1973 and 1974, three points should be noted. First, the economic collapse was not entirely due to the Government's reforms. All

western countries have of late undergone economic problems and Australia, as an important trading nation, could not remain immune from external factors. Second, the Government gambled. If it had embarked upon fewer reforms, it could still have lost the following Federal Election because of not fulfilling its 1972 pledges. Third, despite all the expenditure, it is difficult to identify areas of wasted or unpopular expenditure. Minute sums may occasionally have been badly or even illegally spent, but overall most people have liked what the money bought.

Second, from the Prime Minister down, members of the Government displayed unpleasant qualities. Whitlam was one of the most arrogant Prime Ministers in Australian history, with an overwhelming belief in his own infallibility which meant that when mistakes were made for which he had some blame, he refused to accept the blame and passed it on to his Ministers—the customary method being to sack them. As a corollary, he liked to be involved in everything; nothing was too small to warrant his attention—except the economy. For example, towards the end of last year, the economy was removed from the headlines for a couple of days because of Whitlam's involvement in a dispute over the correct pronunciation of the latest addition to the Australian vocabulary: 'kilometre'. He gave a brilliant impromptu account at a press conference of how it is pronounced in various classical and modern European languages; all very impressive but irrelevant to Australia's economic problems. Another detail which attracted exorbitant attention was the British connection: the national anthem was changed, an Australian system of honours was introduced and he changed the name of the Federal Government from 'Commonwealth Government' to 'Australian Government'. Since most Australians know even less about economic matters than Whitlam, these matters attracted much attention throughout the country since they were issues which people could understand and felt strongly about.

The Ministers displayed other distasteful qualities. Having been denied the perquisites of office for 23 years (1949 to 1972), they were afraid of having to wait another 23 years before luxuriating in chauffeur-driven cars, first-class aeroplane seats, generous foreign travel, extensive obsequious staff, jobs for friends and relations. The cost to the country of these not necessarily illegal activities was minimal but Puritanical Fraser knew that the average Australian with his low opinion of all politicians could be counted on to dsapprove of them and so hammered at these activities during the Election. More important, having been in Opposition for 23 years, the Ministers were the most inexperienced Government in Australian history, with no one having been a member of the previous ALP Government. They had difficulty in getting adjusted to being administrators and occasionally tried to conduct the affairs of State in the same way that they conduct backroom intra-Party disputes. The 'overseas loans affair', which helped bring down the Government, involved the attempted borrowing of $4,000m (about £2,500m) by irregular channels (the commission for the middleman was to be $100m) rather than doing it on a Government to Government basis with the Arab oil States. The apparent intention of the loan was to

finance some Government projects but it was an operation fraught with difficulties; the money could have been used to keep the Government solvent if the Senate refused to vote the Government the money it needed (i.e. an illegal raising of funds) and it could have led to corruption by people trying to make money out of the borrowing. The whole affair has still not been fully explained and much of it remains unclear, but the overall impression that it conveys is one of considerable naivete on the part of the Government.

Also, it was an individualistic and unrestrained Cabinet. Having spent so long in Opposition, members had become accustomed to giving their opinions on issues which went beyond the confines of their respective Ministries. The profusion of press secretaries meant that a variety of views on any single issues would come from the Government. For example, Whitlam, who retained his interest in international affairs, Senator Willesse, the conservative Member for Foreign Affairs, and Jim Cairns, one of the most radical members of Cabinet, all often simultaneously expressed differing views on the same issue. The cruel irony of all the problems with the Ministers' inexperience is that the only way that they could acquire Governmental experience is by being members of a Government, but because they made mistakes in office, the voters did not trust them in office for more than three years. The next ALP Government will have the same problem.

The third feature concerns the speed, extent and effects of the reforms. The ALP, one of the world's oldest labour parties, has only been in office for 20 of the Federation's 75 years. For most Australians, it is a 'socialist' party and therefore is generally only voted into office when the ruling conservative Government has proved to be useless. Unlike the British Labour Party, the ALP is viewed not so much as an alternative Government but as a stop-gap Government; a party to be voted into office for a short period while the conservative party reforms itself and is ready to assume its usual function of running the country. Whitlam and his colleagues knew this and so introduced a wide range of reforms, partly because the previous Government had been so bad and partly because there was the constant risk that it would not be in office for long.

The late 1950s and most of the 1960s constituted a soporific period for Australians, broken only by occasional economic problems (mild by British standards). The tranquility was broken by the increasing opposition to Australian involvement in the Vietnam war, with political demonstrations as rough in Australia as anywhere else in the world. The original issue was conscription, which had been a sensitive political issue in the two World Wars, but opposition gradually expanded to a more radical critique of American foreign policy and capitalism generally. By the December 1972 Election, Australian involvement in Vietnam had virtually ceased. But tranquility was not to return. For three years, the country was rocked by reforms, determined conservative Opposition to the reforms and stories of high living among the Government members.

However, it should be emphasised that the stories which have appeared

in conservative British newspapers are widely distorted. For example, on December 14, 1975, The Sunday Express, commenting in an editorial on the Election results, stated that 'Australia has emerged from three years of nightmare—a nightmare in which Mr. Gough Whitlam's socialists brought a prosperous, contented country to the edge of ruin and anarchy'.

It is nonsense to claim that Australia was on the edge of ruin and anarchy. Australia did undergo severe problems—though not as bad as those which have plagued Britain for 30 years. These were partly caused by the ALP Government. But a great deal of the blame for the unrest should also go to the Liberal-Country Party Opposition, the most inexperienced Opposition in Australia's history because no member of it had ever been in Opposition before. Having ruled for 23 years, the L-CP thought it had an automatic right to govern and refused to accept that it was the Opposition. In early 1974, the L-CP decided to threaten to 'block Supply' (i.e. stop the Government's finance Bills) in the Senate so as to force the Government into a Federal Election. An irate Whitlam pre-empted the L-CP, called the Election and just about won it. Sneddon was sacked by his Party for his failure to win the Election. Fraser, who became Liberal Leader partly on the basis of his pledge to oppose the ALP on everything at every turn, ignored the public's electoral verdict, given twice in 18 months, and began planning to force the Government into yet another Election. In late 1975, the L-CP again decided to stop the finance Bills; the Government began running out of money; Kerr sacked Whitlam and called the December 13, 1975 Federal Election.

The 1975 Election was rough and vigorous. Whitlam's problem was that of having to maintain his dismissal as the main issue for four weeks. Constitutional lawyers are still divided over the Governor-General's decision. This was not his only option, for example, he could have asked the Senate to pass the Bills or he could have continued with his original policy of declaring that it was a 'political' crisis and not a 'constitutional' one and so of no concern to him. He sought the advice of only one person, the Chief Justice of the Australian High Court (Sir Garfield Barwick), who is, coincidentally, a former Liberal Minister. Barwick's advice was that the Senate certainly has the power to refuse Bills—in other words, who ever controls the House of Representatives only holds power providing the Senate agrees. Now that this precedent has been set, any Government with an Opposition-controlled Senate faces the threat of an Election every six months, when the Senate is called upon to vote for the finance Bills.

Meanwhile, there is the additional problem of the future selection of Governors-General. Even former state Chief Justices are evidently no longer to be trusted as politically neutral. Therefore, each new Government upon taking up office will be tempted to immediately sack the Governor-General and replace him with one of its own political hacks who can be trusted—otherwise he could follow the Kerr precedent and sack the Prime Minister if he believes that some situation demands it. In other words, the Governor-General would become a 'presidential' figure head of the ruling Party. Alternatively—especially because of the lack of trust among politic-

ians for their colleagues (after all, Kerr had been an ALP man)—Governments could try to import members of the Royal Family. This would both boost the monarchy's standing in Australia—which is already higher than it was, say, a century ago—and would put a non-political person in the Governor-General's mansion.

This example of a highly specific, historically-based, complex issue is Whitlam's favourite type of problem. The committed ALP voters soon agreed with Whitlam; the non-ALP voters supported the Governor-General; no amount of speeches would change anyone's mind. After a few days, most Australians had made up their minds on the issue and did not want to hear any more about it. But Whitlam did not forget it. He pounded away at it for much of his campaign, bemusing and boring his audiences, who were more concerned with everyday issues, especially inflation and unemployment.

Meanwhile, the superb ALP Election-winning machinery had almost collapsed. The main slogan was 'Shame Fraser shame'; this said nothing, it was negative and avoided the issues which worried people. Indeed, the ALP was devoid of policies for reassuring people about these worries. Ironically, probably the biggest boost to the ALP came from outside itself—John Gorton, still annoyed with Fraser, urged people to vote for the ALP. Many ALP stalwarts believed that all was lost from the beginning. Even history was against them—no ALP Government has been re-elected twice.

Across the Tasman Sea, the November 29 New Zealand Election resulted in an overwhelming 8% swing against the Labour Party Government. This Government had been elected to office only days before the 1972 ALP victory and its victory was a good omen for the ALP. Its stunning defeat was now a good omen for the L-CP. The conservative National Party Government was pledged to reduce Government expenditure, halt inflation and improve the deteriorating economy—ideas similar to those in Fraser's campaign.

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[Dr. Keith D. Suter is Lecturer in Government at the University of Sydney. Part Two of Australia's New Government will appear in the August issue.]

# SYSTEMS THEORY:

## The Theory of International Relations and the Theory of International Conflict

by Benno Wasserman

SYSTEMS theory describes the theory of international relations as opposed to conflictology which describes the theory of international conflict. The explanation of the problem of international conflict requires a theory of international conflict, but a theory of international conflict may presuppose a theory of international relations. The problem of international conflict is to explain how the interaction of interest policies results in contrary to interest or dysfunctional conflict.

Contrary to interest or dysfunctional conflicts arising out of the interaction of interest policies are due to policy-makers' misinterpretations or misperceptions of their own and one another's policies. These misperceptions are of two types—the policy-maker's misinterpretation of his own disinterest policies as interest, which constitutes self-deception, and the policy-maker's misinterpretation of his adversaries' interest policies as disinterest, which constitutes illusion. Moreover, self-deception and illusion have a tendency to feed off one another so that misperceptions may be cumulative, mutually stimulating and self-generating.

Misperceptions are symptomatic of structural maladjustments in international society—i.e. of disequilibrium in the international system. The international system consists of the totality of decision-makers who compose international society, be they coalitions, states, international institutions, multi-national corporations or individuals. Decision-makers are linked in international society because of the unequal distribution of natural resources and climate. This necessitates the international division of labour and international trade according to the law of comparative advantage. Thus each decision-maker is the variable in the situation constituted by the rest of the world or the other decision-makers, and the rest of the world or the other decision-makers is the constant in the situation confronting the individual decision-maker.

The international system is the result of international interdependence. This interdependence explains the international transmission of crises just as it does the international transmission of inflation and unemployment. In times of conflict the decision-makers which constitute the international system can be divided into three categories—belligerents, third parties and independent observers. The relationship between the conflict (belligerents) and the outside world (independent observers) is regulated through intermediaries (third parties). The process of escalation consists of the transformation of independent observers into belligerents via third parties, while the process of de-escalation consists of the transformation of belligerents into independent observers or neutrals also via third parties.

Misperceptions are, therefore, the cause of dysfunctional conflict on the micro-level, while structural maladjustments are the cause of dysfunctional conflict on the macro-level. The link between the two, between the micro-level and the macro-level, between misperceptions and maladjustments is given by the break-down of communications. The break-down of communications consists of the imposition by one policy-maker of his *Weltanschauung* upon another, and the break-down of the latter *Weltanschauung* under pressure from the former.

The imposition by a decision-maker of his *Weltanschauung* on a foreigner is usually due to the decision-maker being unconscious of his *Weltanschauung*—i.e. to his taking it for granted or as given. The break-down of a *Weltanschauung* occurs when the decision-maker is faced with more pressure, difficulties and problems—internal or external—than he can cope with. The imposition of a *Weltanschauung* or framework arouses resentment. The break-down of a *Weltanschauung* or framework results in anomie or lack of adequate response and provokes hostility.

A system consists of three components—inputs, outputs and the relationship between them which is governed by feed-back. The process of transforming the inputs into outputs can result in value creation, if the outputs are worth more than the inputs, or in value destruction, if the outputs are worth less than the inputs. The system may be said to be in equilibrium if the outputs are equal to the inputs.

Almost anything can be analysed as a system—organisms, machines and Governments. If one feeds swill into a pig it produces muck. If one feeds hay into a cow it produces milk. If one feeds corn into a hen it produces eggs. If one feeds nectar into a bee it produces honey. If one feeds mulberry leaves into a silk-worm it produces silk. Similarly, if one feeds cotton into a loom it produces cloth. If one feeds grapes into a press it produces wine. If one feeds wine into a still it produces brandy. If one feeds petrol into an internal combustion engine it produces carbon monoxide gas and if one feeds problems into a computer it produces solutions. Finally, if one makes demands of a Government it makes decisions. Thus one man's output is the other's input.

The use of the systems approach can be seen, for example, in medicine or in economics. The doctor analyses and dissects the human anatomy in terms of various systems—a skeletal system, a nervous system, a respiratory system, a reproductive system, a circulatory system, a digestive system, an excretiary system, etc. Illness is diagnosed as a malfunctioning of the system and a cure is effected when the system returns to homeostasis. Similarly, the economist analyses the economy in terms of the circular flow diagram, which is a system. The economy is in equilibrium when income is equal to expenditure and this results in injections (Investment, Government Expenditure and Exports) being equal to leakages or withdrawals (Savings, Taxes, and Imports). If injections are not equal to withdrawals then the economy is in disequilibrium, i.e. it suffers from Balance of Payments deficit, unemployment or inflation and changes must be made in income and expenditure in order to bring injections and withdrawals into

equilibrium again.

The international system is also in equilibrium when inputs are equal to outputs. This means that each decision-maker must put into life as much as he gets out of it. If one decision-maker attempts to get more out of life than he puts into it then another decision-maker will have to put more into life than he gets out of it. In this way a disequilibrium will arise.

Negative feed-back results in the restoration of equilibrium. Positive feed-back results in the destruction of the system. The concept of feed-back refers to the strengthening or weakening of a tendency already in motion. It can best be illustrated by the self-fulfilling and the self-negating prophesy. Thus Keynes' conviction that unemployment could be cured was a factor in controlling unemployment and may also in future be a factor to bring it about apart from what his theory of employment said. Similarly, Marx's belief that revolution was inevitable was a factor in bringing it about in some countries and a deterrent to its occurring in others apart from what his analysis of capitalism said. Thus a foreign currency dealer speculating against the pound may force a devaluation and make a profit or he may so undermine business confidence that he brings about a collapse of the currency and looses his investment. Similarly, a property developer speculating on a rise in rents may help to bring this about and make a profit, or he may arouse such an antagonistic reaction from the community, that the property market collapses.

Sub-systems are components of systems—a cylinder in an engine, an organ in a body, a department in a Government. A system can be taken apart and analysed in terms of its component sub-systems. The totality of the parts constitute the whole, and a deficiency or malfunctioning of the whole may be traced back to a flaw in one or more of the parts, for in analysing international relations and international conflict, we are usually dealing with collective decision-makers, which are aggregates of individuals.

The international system, or the totality of decision-makers, can be divided into three categories or sub-systems—belligerents, third parties and independent observers. The rest of the world or the other decision-makers is the constant in the situation facing the individual decision-maker while the individual decision-maker is the variable in the situation facing the rest of the world or the other decision-makers. The other decision-makers without the third parties (i.e. the independent observers) are called the outside world to distinguish them from the rest of the world, while decision-makers or belligerents are called the conflict to distinguish them from individual decision-makers.

In times of conflict belligerents may constitute a sufficiently important sub-system or part of the international system to dominate the system. In that case they become the constant and the independent observers or the outside world becomes the variable. In times of peace, however, the rest of the world tends to dominate the individual decision-maker, so that the individual is the variable and the rest of the world is the constant. Thus in times of peace, international relations tends to be system dominated, while in times of war it tends to be sub-system dominated.

Peace may be regarded as analagous to perfect competition, while war may be regarded as analagous to monopoly. In perfect competition the individual firm is a price-taker, i.e. it is the variable and the market is the constant. In monopoly, the monopolist is a price-maker—i.e. he is the constant and the market is the variable. Similarly, in times of war the conflict determines the political climate, while the outside world is passive. In times of peace, world opinion determines the political climate while the individual decision-maker is relatively passive.

The system-sub-system relationship is a question of sovereignty. The notions of sovereignty arose with the absolute monarch of the medieval, dynastic state. With the English Civil War the sovereignty of the monarch and the divine right of kings was successfully challenged by Parliament and in its place was substituted the notion of the Sovereignty of Parliament or popular sovereignty. Thus sovereignty can be shared, divided or disputed. The sovereignty of the nation state reflects the immaturity of International Government.

The break-down of the international system may be due either to an individual misperception or to a structural maladjustment. In explaining the delay or loss of a letter in the post, we may, after examining the whole system—from posting, to routing, to sorting, to transportation and to delivery—say that the letter was delayed or lost because it was wrongly addressed. We may also, on the other hand, find that the letter was delayed or lost because the whole postal service broke down, perhaps due to overloading at Christmastime, or to a postal strike or mail train robbery. The former is a mistake on the micro-level analagous to a misperception. The latter is a structural maladjustment on the macro-level equivalent to a break-down of the whole system. Both are causes of disequilibrium.

Examples of structural maladjustments in international society were the cornering of the majority of the world colonies and, therefore, of the world's natural resources by the Entente Powers, Britain, France and Russia, prior to the First World War; the unrealistic, vindictive and rapacious reparations demands made by the victorious Allies, Britain, France and the U.S.A., on the defeated Central Powers, notably Germany, which gave rise to the Great Depression, prior to the Second World War; and the Arab oil blackmail on the oil-importing countries, since the Yom Kippur War.

Prior to the First World War, Britain, France and Russia secured the major part of the world's colonies and therefore of the world's natural resources. Bismarck had pursued a reluctant colonial policy because he preferred to use colonial issues to foster rivalries among his opponents. Germany and Austria-Hungary were, therefore, left behind in the scramble for colonies at the end of the nineteenth century. After the fall of Bismarck in 1890 they entered the colonial field but by that time all the colonies had been taken by Britain, France and Russia and they were not prepared to give any to Germany or Austria. Germany and Austria could only gain colonies at the expense of the Entente and they made the First World War in an attempt to win their place in the sun.

The reparation demanded of Germany and the defeated Central Powers

after the First World War was beyond their capacity to pay. Not only was Germany expected to make good her own losses suffered in the war but she was also expected to make good the losses suffered by the victors. This was like trying to make a bankrupt pay one's own bad debts, which can only drive him either to crime or to suicide. The result was that when Germany defaulted on reparations in 1923, France occupied the Ruhr and Germany adopted a policy of suicide or passive resistance by inflating the currency. Thereafter, the reparations were financed by American loans under the Dawes (1924) and Young (1929) Plans and when these loans were recalled, reparations payments and the inter-allied war debt payments ceased. This brought about the Great Depression, which brought Hitler into power in Germany, and massive unemployment in Britain and the United States, which was only cured by the outbreak of the Second World War.

The Arabs, unable to defeat Israel militarily, quadrupled the price of oil to the oil importing countries following the Yom Kippur War. This caused widespread inflation in the Western World, with huge balance of payments deficits in the Western countries and large balance of payments surpluses in the Arab countries. The Arabs clearly want the rest of the world, particularly Russia or America, to do their fighting for them, but failing this they want them to put pressure on Israel to make unilateral concessions. The danger in this situation is that the oil-importing countries will succumb to the Arab oil blackmail and put pressure on Israel, which will place Israel in a position of suicide or fight.

International relations, like personal relations, are a matter or system of give-and-take. All take and no give or all give and no take will result in the destruction of the system or the break-down of a relationship. A man who seeks to get more out of life than he puts into it is a knave and a man who accepts less from life than he puts into it is a fool. If a man gets more out of life than he puts into it, this will result in another man getting less out of life than he puts into it. Structural maladjustments in international society are therefore the result of policies of something for nothing or nothing to lose.

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[Dr. Benno Wasserman is Tutor in International History at Richmond College and teacher of Economics at the Central Foundation School.]

# MUSLIMS MEET IN LONDON

## by Peter Mansfield

THE 1976 World of Islam Festival in Britain is certain to be regarded in retrospect as an important milestone in the relations between Islam and Christianity. The effect that it has had in awakening Europeans to the significance of Islamic civilisation is already apparent. But an event which coincided with the opening of the Festival may turn out to have equal importance. This was the International Islamic Conference—the first of its kind in any western country—which was organised by the Islamic Council of Europe and held in London from April 3 to 12.

The idea of holding this conference is of much more recent origin than that of the Festival for which the first plans were made several years ago. It was intended as a supplement, and in no way as an alternative, to the Festival, and it was considered necessary for two reasons. First the Festival concentrated mainly on exhibiting the arts and artefacts of Islamic culture rather than explaining the moral and intellectual principles of the Islamic religion and secondly the Festival dealt only with the classical period; it virtually stopped at 1700. The Islamic Council of Europe, on the other hand, may have a strong traditionalist element in its outlook, but is very much concerned with the present day. It was established in London in May 1973 as a result of a Conference of Islamic Centres and Organisations in Europe which was held here under the auspices of the Islamic Secretariat, a body which was created on the initiative of the late King Feisal of Saudi Arabia and has its headquarters in Jedda.

The May 1973 Conference was concerned with the needs of the large and growing Muslim population of Western Europe. The Islamic Council of Europe's Secretary-General is Mr. Salem Azzam, Minister at the Saudi Embassy in the UK (and a nephew of Azzam Pasha, the first Secretary-General of the Arab League) and it is based in London, although Britain is not the member of the EEC which has the largest Muslim minority. The first is France where they are mainly North African Arabs and the second is Germany—Turks and Arabs. In Britain, where they are approaching one million, they are mainly from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, but an important difference from West Europe is that most of them acquire the nationality of the host country. (The importance of the fact that the UK will before long have one million Muslim voters has not dawned on many British politicians.)

The Conference this April had the twofold aim of demonstrating and discussing the relevance of the Islamic religion to contemporary society—whether Muslim or non-Muslim—and of stimulating the morale and self-confidence of Britain's Muslim minority. It opened with what the Conference organisers hoped would be a mass meeting in the Albert Hall and was followed by a series of seminars in the Royal Commonwealth Society addressed by a galaxy of distinguished Muslim scholars, including several European converts.

Since no event of this kind had taken place in London before, the organisers had no idea how many to expect for any of the meetings. On the advice of the Albert Hall administrators, who had never known the building to be filled for anything except entertainment, they considered curtaining off a section of the Hall. As it was, they need not have worried. By the middle of March most of the seats had already been allocated. Pakistanis who were telephoning from the Midlands to ask for thirty tickets for a coach party they were bringing, had to be content with five or six. Similarly, the conference hall at the Royal Commonwealth Society, which holds 300 to 400 at a maximum, was besieged by a thousand eager, and mainly youthful, Muslims on the first day. Even when arrangements were made for the conference proceedings to be relayed to some of the overflow in separate rooms, many hundreds had to be turned away.

The initiative behind the Conference was primarily Saudi and the guest of honour at the inaugural meeting was Prince Muhammad Al-Feisal, a younger son of the late King. But in his keynote speech the Prince (a Harvard graduate who is in charge of his country's water research programme) went out of his way to emphasise the international and interracial appeal of Islam: 'I have come to this historic Conference and am speaking to you this evening from the deepest recesses of my heart simply in one capacity—that of a Muslim. I am an Arab and a Saudi, and I sincerely thank Allah for these blessings, but I am speaking to you neither as an Arab nor as Saudi, but simply as a Muslim—as a member of that universal community of faith that knows no geographic boundaries or barriers of colour, race or language. Islam is neither of the East nor of the West—it is the message of God, the Lord of the Universe, Lord of the East and Lord of the West, a message sent to the whole of mankind through all the prophets of God and finally through the Prophet Muhammad . . . '

This theme of the universality and colour-blindness of Islam was taken up by nearly all the other distinguished speakers throughout the Conference. (It was, of course, a mere coincidence that Mr. Enoch Powell chose the same week to make his notorious speech in which he identified the introduction of the word 'mugging' into our language with the racial problems of immigration; but the response of the Home Secretary when he commended the Pakistani community of Birmingham for their civic virtues was widely noted at the Conference.)

In his paper 'Islam Today, Problems and Prospects', Dr. Tawfiq Es-Shawi, Professor of Law at Cairo University, admitted that 'the deviations of nationalism' had introduced racialist tendencies which at one time had been eliminated by Islam, but which now threaten the unity and integrity of the Muslim 'ummah' (i.e. Islamic world community). But he claimed that these deviations remained confined to the bourgeois classes 'which were dominated by foreign influence' while the exploited masses remained steadfast in defence of their Islamic identity and principles. He acknowledged that the desire to remain independent from foreign domination and influence was not confined to Muslims alone because it was evident among all the emergent peoples of the Third World. But the fact that Islam was 'the

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spirit which nourished Muslim aspirations' had given Muslims an historic opportunity to provide a lead to the developing world to liberate themselves from all forms of foreign domination and influence practised by international power blocks. He said Muslims were moving towards the construction of their own economic, intellectual and cultural independence so that they may stand on an equal footing with the great nations of the world.

This was another underlying theme of the conference: that the centuries of Christendom's material domination of the World of Islam were now emphatically over. Some speakers either explicitly or implicitly acknowledged that the new financial power of certain Muslim nations—Arab and Persian—was the major factor behind the growing self-confidence of the Islamic Ummah in the present day. (Dr. Osman Nebioglu, a delegate from Turkey, suggested half humorously that the gift of oil wealth was a demonstration of the love of God.) But there could be no mistaking the fact of the self-assurance; the Conference itself was a manifestation of it.

Some delegates went further than claiming that the World of Islam could now face Christendom on equal terms, to suggest that, in view of the manifest failure of Christianity to stem the growth of secularism, Islam could provide an appropriate answer to the needs of all mankind. The philosophical basis for this view was expressed most forcefully by Dr. Umar Austin, of Durham University, a British Muslim convert, who said that Islam synthesised and gave final expression to the divine truths expressed in different ways by the two preceding religions of Judaism and Christianity. The Judaic concept of God, he said, is to emphasise His role as divine Lawgiver and Judge of his people, while man is regarded primarily as a collectivity rather than as an individual. Christianity, on the other hand, began its career as an intensely individual mystical religion. In Christianity God is regarded primarily not as a lawgiver to the community but rather as the loving Lord and Father of his servant and child. It remained for Islam and its Prophet Mohammad to draw together these two strands in a single synthetic whole in which God speaks to both communal and individual man and in which man relates to God as Ruler of men and as personal Lord. In a similar vein, Mr. A. K. Brohi, an Advocate of the Pakistani Supreme Court, said that at a time when modern man is in a state of such complete confusion that he is prepared to sell his soul to anyone who attempts to enable him to enjoy the good things of life, Islam emphasises the supreme importance of the respect for human rights and fundamental freedom. In the strict theory of Islamic law there is no conflict between the authority of the state and the individual since both have to obey the divine law. Islam presents the man with a 'Charter of Liberty' and at the same time stresses the necessity of his being aware of his responsibility and accountability.

Such a view of Islam would be of startling novelty to most non-Muslim westerners and many of the delegates to the Conference stressed their belief that the image of Islam has been distorted by ignorance and prejudice. As Prince Feisal said in an address to Birmingham Muslims, 'Islam is the most misunderstood religion in the West'. At the same time they could

hardly fail to be conscious that the younger generation of Muslims—especially the many millions who are now living, being educated or working in a western secular society—are sometimes almost equally ignorant of their own religion. In Birmingham Prince Muhammad proposed that the Muslim community in the UK should give top priority to the Islamic education of Muslim children and one of the practical results of the Conference was that the Islamic Council of Europe is to establish a Commission to look into the problem.

Some of the more fundamentalist delegates were apt to deny that what they frequently referred to as 'modern secular civilisation' presented a serious challenge to the Islamic Ummah. In their view it has so patently failed that it cannot provide any attraction to Muslim youth. Others were less confident. Professor Hamid Algar of the University of California said: 'Modern civilisation is indeed posing an intellectual challenge to Islam which has not yet been met'. There are two areas in particular in which contemporary Muslims can hardly afford to ignore the challenge merely by reaffirming traditional principles: one is the question of the position of women in society and the other is economics, at a time when Muslims are wielding immense financial power throughout the non-communist world. Two of the most interesting sessions of the conference were on the subject of 'Woman in Islam' and 'Economics System of Islam'. The views expressed at the first would certainly be anathema, as they could hardly fail to be, to western advocates of complete sexual equality. They confirmed the Muslim view that the duty of a wife and mother is to accept the authority of the husband in the running of the family but they also emphasised that the rights of women, including the right to education, were defined and strengthened by the Prophet and the Tradition. The implication that the traditional Muslim pattern of family life and relations between the sexes results in at least as much personal happiness as in the contemporary western world was strongly made.

In the economic discussion the Algerian Minister of Religious Affairs spoke of the Islamic Concept of Social Justice and Dr. Ahmed al-Najjar of Egypt on 'Banking in Islam'. The concept of an international banking system without interest, prohibited by Islam, would seem unreal to most westerners. Another result of the Conference is that the Islamic Council of Europe is to hold a special conference this year to consider 'a system of banking free of interest as envisaged by the Islamic law'.

The organisers of the Conference were delighted with its success and the spirit that it revealed among the Muslim community in Britain. The Islamic Council of Europe knows that it is undertaking a formidable burden of practical work. Apart from the educational commission, another is being set up to study the manifold problems of Muslim migrant workers in Europe. The other aim of combatting the ignorance and prejudice about Islam in the West is inevitably a long-term struggle. In this year of the Festival, the right climate has been created. But everyone knows this is no more than a beginning.

# BRITAIN AND AMERICA: PROMOTION OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

## by Kenneth Lindsay

T. S. ELIOT used this somewhat prim title for an article written in 1944. I have repeated it for two reasons, partly because it conveys in clear-cut language what I want to say and partly because he referred very kindly to an earlier article of mine in the same journal, which was entitled more precisely *British-American Relations; Towards an Educational Link.* The opening paragraph of my piece read as follows:

> After travelling some 10,000 miles in the United States, visiting schools and colleges and after an intensive month spent in the State of New Jersey, at the invitation of the Commissioner of Education, I am impressed by the complete absence of liaison between the two great structures of education in Britain and the United States.

Forty years later this statement is not only out-of-date but also untrue. There has been a revolution, especially among the academic fraternity and also among the professions, a revolution in mutual understanding, based mainly on educational links and fostered by hundreds of scholarships, fellowships and exchanges. One has only to add the names Harkness, Fulbright, Marshall, Kennedy and Churchill to the original Rhodes Foundation to appreciate the momentum. The yearly inter-change of about 100 teachers from the State school-systems in our two countries has obviously made its own contribution—about 5,000 in all. Moreover, there are now in our Universities a striking number of professors and lecturers on specifically American subjects and themes. On the other hand, the state of British studies in America is very flourishing. The teaching group has a membership of over 1,200 and its own journal, *The Journal of British Studies.* Indeed, most professions have their own arrangement, doctors and lawyers, scientists and social workers, agricultural economists, town-planners and environmentalists. There is in my personal experience a 'special cultural relationship', which does not exist on anything like the same scale with any other country.

There is, of course, no direct connection between visiting and understanding. *Coelum non mentem mutant qui trans mare currunt* or, as Tawney used to say: 'some people travel and think they are broadening their minds, whereas they are only elongating their conversation'. What is unusual about the Anglo-American relationship and especially in the field of education is that a common language enables students of all kinds to examine their differences. 'Give me your difference', cried Goethe, 'it is the highest compliment you can pay me'. In 1922 I took the first debating team from the Oxford Union; teams have been going ever since and books have been written about their tours. Here again you could cut with a knife the difference between our two styles of debating. But after a moment's thought the reasons for the difference were apparent and like many others stemmed from the nature of our two Constitutions. It is not generally assumed that in

the narrower field of *education* Britain and the United States have learned much from each other; this again is untrue, although the origins and development of our two systems have had interesting differences, again partly due to our respective Constitutions.

The American system, involving the separation of powers, also declares that unless authority is given to the Federal Government, it rests with the States and Municipalities. The basic unit of educational structure was and is the local board of Education; there are thousands of them and the Superintendent (our Director or Chief Education Officer) was and often now is an elected person. In the U.S.A. there has always existed a basic commitment to education; the village schoolhouse is part of the American dream. Secular schooling takes over tasks which were in England the responsibility of the Church. Thus it was the Supreme Court which decided on such matters as segregation or the legality of prayers in schools. Harvard College in 1636 continued the tradition of the English dissenting Academics within a few years of the settlements in the Bay Colony.

On the other hand English education derives from the church. For nine hundred out of the last 1,000 years the State has had little concern with schools and given them little support. The year 1939, when war broke out, marked the centenary of a Central education department (which had few powers) and the fortieth birthday of the Board of Education. It is only between 1870 and 1970 that secular schools have grown to their present and now ever-changing structure. Today, *education* is the biggest single service provided by about 150 Local Authorities and although central powers are growing, it is not the duty or the role of the Department of Education to foist textbooks or syllabuses on schools. Schools themselves are not allowed to teach the formularies of any religious denomination (Roman Catholics have their own arrangements, though they differ fundamentally in the United States), but a daily assembly is still required.

During the last thirty years both countries have been forced to make concessions to national policies and social tensions. In the United States thirty years ago the Office of Education in Washington was unimportant; the arrival of Sputnik in 1956 changed much and today due to the calls of National defence and the hard social facts of poverty, the same office is part of a Federal Ministry. The late American Ambassador to the Court of St. James's once held that portfolio, as Minister of Health, Education and Social Welfare. To quote a phrase of Professor Jerome Bruner—'a brotherhood of troubles' has brought our two systems closer together and emphasised special and common problems. We have been forced to 'spell out' a number of tensions which exist in our multi-racial societies, including the role of the school itself. The same processes are at work, in Old England and in New England, in Cornwall and California; we talk more about equality, the Americans about race. Perhaps the Supreme Court is more effective as a unifying force than our confused social services and schools council.

Both countries are moving reluctantly towards a national pattern—such is the power of national finance—but at every step we are watching each other's progress and willy-nilly learning from each other's mistakes, especial-

ly in the schools themselves, which are the real workshops of democracy. There are now thousands of teachers on either side of the Atlantic who know that what we loosely call *Comprehensive Schools* are in the U.S.A. neighbourhood *High Schools* which from their location reflect the social backgrounds of parents. There is in Britain far more knowledge of the education system in the United States than of the systems in Canada, Australia, Scandinavia or Western Europe. In my opinion both Americans and British have become more critical of their own systems and are searching for a structure which will combine variety of choice, equality of access and standards of excellence.

What is true of secondary education applies equally to higher or tertiary education. Others may try their hand at comparisons between the British and American systems. This is always a dangerous procedure especially if statistics are quoted to clinch the argument. Colleges, even more than schools, are the product of history and social development and they cannot be re-assembled like factories. There is no equivalent in Britain of the Liberal Arts College in America. One and only one reason is that our tax system does not encourage large gifts to education and now the whole basis of our Charities Commission is in risk. There is no equivalent here of the two-year Junior College which again is an American invention, though Community Colleges are on the increase. There is no equivalent of the Land Grand Universities, which are to be found in every State and are over a hundred years old in origin.

Although the number of students in American Higher Education exceeds those of any other country in the world, it is difficult for a Britisher to grasp that the impact of numbers and expansion is forcing up standards. I have known two heads of the famous California Institute of Technology, Dr. Millikan and Dr. du Bridge, and they were both proud of their highly selective system of entrance. America has no one pattern; variety of courses and institutes is the order of the day. To quote Dr. du Bridge: 'The problem of teaching science in America goes far beyond the training of engineers—it is a problem of helping citizens to understand the world in which they live. They should have basic courses in literature, history, government, mathematics and science, so that they learn not necessarily all the current practices, but the basic principles on which modern civilsation is based.' It was a surprise to find Sir Richard Livingstone, our distinguished classical scholar, lecturing on Greek Tragedy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.). The concept of General Education arose from a book written by a Harvard classical scholar and called *General Education in a Free Society*: this in turn inspired Lord Lindsay to create Keele University and break with certain English traditions. Dr. Conant, President of Harvard, not only sponsored this book, but himself taught the science section when the General Course was initiated at Harvard. Later in his career, after relinquishing his duties as U.S. Ambassador to Federal Germany 1957, he returned home to make a vast study of the American High School and published a report which reached millions of people. Where else could this happen?

In 1816 Jefferson said: 'If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a

state of civilisation, it expects what never was and never will be.' In the United States the 'making of a nation' belonged to the schools. What is more, the American public was prepared to pay for this making of a nation. Happily this sense of responsibility continued into the realms of higher education. There have always been myths and stereotypes, supposed to represent Britain to the United States and vice versa, but both countries are always changing and need constant re-interpretation. This involves endless patience and understanding, but also personal contacts both ways. The bicentenary offers a golden chance to re-affirm the common principles which Britons and Americans jointly hold.

# HI-JACKING AND THE BARBARY PIRATES COMPARED

## by Edwin Samuel

HI-JACKING may be defined as the infiltration with hidden arms of a ship or plane. There are several possible aims:

A: The extortion of political concessions.
B: The extortion of money for private or political ends.
C: The search for asylum abroad.
D: A desire for publicity.
Or hi-jacking may be the result of a deranged mind.

As far back as the 1930s, hi-jacking was used for the extortion of money by professional criminals in the United States (Aim B). In March, 1961, the Portuguese General Delgado hi-jacked an ocean liner in his campaign against Salazar's police state; i.e., the extortion of a political concession (Aim A). More recently, hi-jacking has been used by Arab terrorists. For example, passengers are held as hostages until fellow terrorists in Israeli prisons are released. In February, 1972, Arab terrorists hi-jacked a Lufthansa plane, forced it to fly to Aden and extorted £2,000,000 from the airline in exchange for the lives of the passengers and crew. But, in May, 1972, 'Black September' Arab terrorists seized a Sabena Boeing 707 plane. At Lod airport in Israel, they demanded the release of all Palestinian Arabs then held in Israeli gaols as the price of the passengers' lives (Aim A). In this case, however, Israeli soldiers disguised as maintenance engineers climbed on board the aircraft, burst in, shot dead the two male terrorists and captured their two girl companions.

In April, 1972, a leader of the Chicano-Mexican-America movement hi-jacked a plane to force the television and radio corporations to put his people's case for civil rights and economic justice (Aim D). A month later, Turkish People's Liberation Fighters hi-jacked a plane to Bulgaria where they sought—and received—asylum (Aim C).

The numbers of aerial hi-jackings between 1948 and 1974 are as follows:[1]

| | Total | Of which in the Middle East | Percentage of all aerial hi-jackings successful |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1948-57 | 15 | — | 87 |
| 1958-67 | 48 | — | 65 |
| 1968 | 38 | 1 | 87 |
| 1969 | 82 | 3 | 86 |
| 1970 | 72 | 14 | 64 |
| 1971 | 61 | 5 | 39 |
| 1972 | 64 | 5 | 28 |
| 1973 | 22 | 3 | 50 |
| 1974 | 29 | 3 | 28 |

The gradual decline since 1969 in the number of incidents and in the success rate is due to better security, safeguards both in the air and on the

ground; and a decline in the number of countries willing to grant asylum to hi-jackers landing on their territory.

Three international conventions (Tokyo, 1963; The Hague, 1970; and Montreal, 1971) have outlawed hi-jacking and have established international rules for the treatment of hi-jackers.

The damage done by hi-jacking at its peak has, however, been quite modest when compared with piracy between the 16th century and the 19th century, inclusive. At its peak, piracy became a series of full-scale engagements between pirate fleets and combined national navies. They sometimes involved hundreds of ships and tens of thousands of men.

Webster defines a pirate as 'a robber on the high seas; one who by open violence takes the property of another on the high seas, especially one who makes it his business to cruise for robbery or plunder; a freebooter on the seas; also one who steals in a harbour.'

Here, a distinction must be drawn between a privateer, who has a commission for the crown, and a freebooter, who has not.

Piracy was known in classical times. It declined with the end of the Roman Empire and Mediterranean trade. That trade revived after the Crusades, thanks to Venetian and Genoese enterprise. But, as trade follows the flag, so does robbery follow trade.

Fourteenth century piracy in the Mediterranean developed in three well-defined stages. It was at first conducted by a few individual inhabitants of the poorer coastal lands. They worked in isolation, each operating one or more vessels and confined their attacks to the weakest merchantmen. Such pirates were regarded as outlaws who could be killed at sight.

In the second stage, the bigger pirates swallowed up the smaller, or drove them out of business. No fleet of trading ships, no matter how heavily armed, was immune from attack by the pirate fleets.

In the third stage, pirate organisations operated almost as independent states. Some such pirate organisations formed alliances with other pirate organisations and carried out large-scale naval operations against national fleets. Their activities were centred on the Western Mediterranean—from Egypt to the Pillars of Hercules (the Straits of Gibraltar). Hence they were known as Barbary Corsairs.[2]

The first determined effort to suppress the corsairs came in 1390, when the Genoese organised a combined English and French attack on the pirate lair at Metridia, on the Tunisian coast. The English contingent was led by their future king, Henry IV; but it was not strong enough to assault Metridia, and had to lift the siege and withdraw after two months. However, they left the corsairs intimidated.

The corsairs were immensely strengthened a century later, after the Moors expelled from Spain in 1492 moved back into North Africa. That barren land could support few of the 100,000 proud and ambitious Moslem refugees. Many of these war-like men were out for revenge against Spain: they knew its language well and also its trading habits.

Few of them, however, knew much about the sea and needed first to learn navigation. But, in the end, they bred a new race of corsairs, owning bigger

and faster vessels, where oars supplemented the sails. They usually paid one-tenth of the value of their booty to the Moslem rulers along the north coast of Africa. In return, they were provided with protected harbours. They also found purchasers in North Africa for the captured Christian crews and passengers who were sold as slaves.

Another century later, in 1504, two of the biggest and most heavily armed war galleys, owned by Pope Julius II and carrying valuable consignments out of Genoa, were captured by Arouj and taken to Tunis. Arouj was one of two pirate brothers with red beards (hence known as Barbarossa) who were the sons of a Greek Christian potter of Mitylene. When that city was conquered by the Turks, the family adopted Islam. They acquired Turkish vessels in the Aegean, where they operated as pirates, at first under the protection of the Bey of Tunis: later, they acted on their own. Their crews were composed of adventurers and renegades from the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean.

In 1509 and 1510, Ferdinand of Spain, then the acknowledged leader of Christendom and head of the greatest maritime power of his day, blockaded the Moslem ports of Oran, Bougie and Algiers. He forced the Algerians to pay him tribute and established a Spanish fortress at Peñon, opposite Algiers, to keep that city under control. In 1512, and again in 1515, Arouj attempted to retake Bougie, but failed.

After the death of Ferdinand in 1516, the siege of Peñon by Moslems was resumed: it eventually fell in 1529. Arouj became the ruler of Algeria as a vassal of Turkey; but the Spaniards attacked once more and Arouj was killed. He was succeeded by his brother Khayr ed Din, the more famous of the two Barbarossas, who became the Ottoman Governor of Algiers.

Enrolling other Barbary corsairs, Khayr ed Din attacked Christian ships, most of which had Moorish Moslem slave crews, which he released. The corsairs roamed all over the Western Mediterranean as far as the Balearic islands, and even out into the Atlantic, through the Straits of Gibraltar. On one occasion, they captured a convoy of seven Spanish ships making once more for Peñon. The pirates took 2,700 Christians prisoner, as well as acquiring many guns and much ammunition and provisions.

By this time, Khayr ed Din had become almost an independent naval power. In 1534, he built 61 galleys to his own design and attacked Reggio harbour. Hundreds of Christians on the ships there were taken prisoner and later sold as slaves, while eight hundred Moslem prisoners were released from Reggio castle. Khayr ed Din (Barbarossa) then captured Tunis.

In retaliation, Charles V assembled a fleet at Barcelona with contingents from Spain, Italy, Genoa and the Knights of St. John at Malta. In 1535, over six hundred ships under Admiral Doria attacked Tunis and drove out the Moors. Thousands of Christian slaves broke out and sacked the city.

Barbarossa then moved to Bona with 27 galliots[3] and attacked Minorca. He took no less than six thousand men captive and cannily presented them to the Sultan. In return, he was made High Admiral of all the Ottoman fleets.

In this war with Spain, the Algerians attacked Corfu with 25,000 men

and thirty cannon (including an enormous 50-pounder which was fired 19 times in three days). But the attack failed and Khayr ed Din withdrew.

Later, he attacked some of the towns along the Adriatic coast and from the booty taken sent symbolic gifts to the Sultan—two hundred boys dressed in scarlet, carrying gold and silver bowls; another two hundred with rolls of fine cloth, and thirty loaded with purses.

At the peak of his career as a pirate, Khayr ed Din met Doria's fleet off the Albanian coast. Khayr ed Din had no less than 150 ships at his disposal. But Doria had two hundred, including eighty from Venice, thirty-six from the Pope and thirty from Spain. They carried in all 60,000 men with 2,500 guns. Nevertheless, on September 28th, 1538, the Christian fleet was decisively beaten.

Three years later, a Christian fleet attacked Algiers. But a gale destroyed many of their 500 ships. Not only were the Spanish defeated but they lost some 300 officers and 8,000 soldiers, either through drowning or from wounds.

In 1546, Khayr ed Din died and was succeeded as pirate chief by Dragut, a Moslem born in Asia Minor, opposite the Island of Rhodes. In his youth he was captured by a Christian fleet and served for four years as a galley-slave until he was ransomed by Khayr ed Din. Dragut led raids against Christian shipping in the Western Mediterranean until, in one of them, in 1565, he was killed.

His successor was a Catholic from Calabria who had been enslaved by Moslem raiders. He became a Moslem with the name of Uluj Ali (known to Christians as Ochiali) and rose to be an officer in the Moslem navy. He received the title of Beglerbey of Algiers, and, in 1570, captured three galleys of the Knights of Malta. In that battle, sixty knights and serving brothers were killed.

The following year, Uluj Ali captured Cyprus; but Spain, Venice and England counter-attacked with a fleet of 206 galleys and 48,000 men. The Christian and Moslem fleets met at the Battle of Lepanto in the Gulf of Corinth. The guns of the West were more modern; many of the Moslem soldiers were still using bows and arrows. The West won, and the Ottoman maritime empire was crushed. But, for centuries, African-based corsairs continued to harass and plunder Christians in the Mediterranean. The corsairs now operated as outlaws and were never again to become auxiliaries of the Ottomans, who were still a first-rate sea-power. In the nineteenth century, the corsairs were finally suppressed.

It now looks as if, in the twentieth century, the hi-jackers will meet with the same fate.

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NOTES

[1] Strategic Studies, 1974; International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

[2] 'Barbary' is derived from 'berber'—the inhabitants of North Africa; while corsair is derived from the Latin word *cursus*, meaning a course or running.

[3] A Dutch or Flemish type of trading vessel.

# KATHERINE MANSFIELD AND WILLIAM GERHARDIE

## by Gladys Mary Coles

IN the summer of 1921, Katherine Mansfield was in the Swiss Alps, writing some of her finest stories—and seeking a cure for the consumption from which she was slowly dying. William Gerhardie, having recently returned from military service in Russia (awarded an O.B.E. in 1920 for his work in the British Military Mission to Siberia), was now, at twenty-five, an undergraduate at Worcester College, Oxford, and had already embarked on his true vocation, literature. Seeking a publisher for his first novel, *Futility* (begun in Siberia but written mainly at Oxford), he had decided, after thirteen rejections 'without comment', that 'a passionate recommendation' from an established writer might secure, if not a publisher, at least a comment.[1]

Gerhardie had approached first Hugh Walpole and Arnold Bennett, both of whom declined the invitation to read *Futility*. Then it occurred to him that Katherine Mansfield, a Russophile and ardent admirer of Chekhov, might like to read this novel on Russian themes. She agreed to do so, and within a fortnight of reading it, had enthusiastically found it a publisher.

So began Gerhardie's public career as an author and his friendship by correspondence with Katherine Mansfield.

The series of seventeen letters from Katherine Mansfield to William Gerhardie reveals a great deal both of literary and biographical interest concerning these two writers. K.M.'s husband, John Middleton Murry, editing the posthumous volumes of her letters, included this series to Gerhardie, but not in its entirety, and some of the letters only in extracts.

The complete, unabridged series,[2] however, yields a particularly vivid impression of K.M. in her last eighteen months of life, from that fruitful, hopeful phase in Switzerland, to the desperate days in Paris receiving X-ray treatment from the Russian doctor Manoukhin (another of the hoped-for 'miracles' that failed), her brief visit to London in September 1922 and urgent return to Paris to enter the Gurdjieff Institute at Fontainebleau. Then silence as she withdrew during her final three months into an inner spiritual realm, guided by Gurdjieff towards harmony and radiance of the innermost self, and hoping still for ultimate physical renewal.[3]

Throughout her letters to Gerhardie, K.M.'s inimitable quality, her characteristic blend of gaiety and pathos, is very much in evidence. She is seen typically extending to life ('I'm in love with life terribly', she told him), her letters expressive of her 'pure receptivity' to beauty and vitality in all forms. It is clear that she was drawn to young Gerhardie whom she had never met, but whose humour, charm and refined sensibility greatly appealed to her both in his novel and in his letters.

Gerhardie had opened the correspondence by writing to tell K.M. how profoundly he admired her story *The Daughters Of The Late Colonel*. Only

recently he had come upon her work for the first time, prompted by hearing John Middleton Murry at a literary club make 'some shy allusion to the work of his wife'. After *The Daughters Of The Late Colonel,* Gerhardie read *Je Ne Parle Pas Français,* the 'kaleidoscopic exuberance' of which deepened his admiration for her ('What dash! How supple—acrobatic').

K.M.'s first letter to Gerhardie (June 23rd, 1921), thanked him for his 'wonderfully generous appraisal' of *The Daughters Of The Late Colonel*'—his appreciative comments were especially pleasing to her because this story, which she regarded as one of her best, had not been well received generally and was, she affirmed, 'misunderstood', thought to be 'cruel' or 'drab'. She went on to explain to him something of its conception and composition, telling him 'while I was writing that story I lived for it'. To her work she gave herself totally and her ardour in writing matched her ardour for what she called 'the beauty of truth'; so it was that, having the 'idea' of the sisters Jug and Constantia, she saw beyond the 'amusing' aspect and, as she expressed it to Gerhardie, 'bowed down to the beauty that was hidden in their lives and to discover that was all my desire'.

Doubtless encouraged by this letter, Gerhardie wrote to her again in the early autumn of 1921, tentatively enquiring whether she would read the typescript of *Futility.* Her reply (previously unpublished) was written at the *Châlet des Sapins,* Montana (21st October):

> Dear Mr. Gerhardi,[4]
>
> I am very honoured by your request. The *trouble* is I live so far away. Would you dare to send a new-born child all this distance? I would read it with pleasure and tell you just what I think. That's what you want isn't it? But I think the distance will frighten you and I shall *perfectly* understand if it does. Swiss postmen are honest creatures, once it gets to Switzerland. That's true. Do what you think best.
>
> Yours sincerely,
> Katherine Mansfield.

The 'new-born child' was promptly packaged and posted, and K.M. sent a quick thoughtful acknowledgement of its safe arrival, assuring Gerhardie, 'I am going to read it this weekend'. A week later (November 14th), she was writing a long critique, full of frank and lucid comment. She spoke first of what she admired in *Futility* before proceeding to point out the defects:

> First of all, immediately, I think your novel is awfully good. I congratulate you. It is a living book. What I mean by that is, it is warm; one can put it down and it goes on breathing.

She considered 'the best moment' to be at the end—'there you really are discovered—a *real* writer'. And she liked particularly 'the play of humour over it all. That makes it flexible, warm, easy as it should be'. Praising Gerhardie's 'excellent use' of his 'opportunities' in the second plot, she found the situation 'immensely attractive' and the 'principal characters . . . painted to the Life—They are almost too good to be true.'

With the same trenchant honesty with which she wrote reviews of novels in *The Athenaeum,*[5] K.M. indicated what she thought were the weaknesses of *Futility*: occasions, for instance, when it seemed to her, the tone was falsified or an incident not sufficiently convincing—and she advised Gerhardie 'to take out a good many of the Russian expressions and single

words. . . . They will put people off'. But nonetheless, she assured him 'All the same if I were you I would publish it more or less as it stands', Anxious in case her frank criticism had offended him ('It's not easy to talk man to man at a distance'), she concluded with a typically generous flourish:

> At that moment I lit a cigarette and re-read what I have written with dismay. In trying to be honest I sound carping and cold. Not a bit what I feel. Let me end where I began by warmly, sincerely congratulating you.

Gerhardie tells us that '*Futility* was then overhauled thanks to K.M.'s helpful advice'.

To his next 'delightful' letter, she replied by return (November 21st), enquiring whether he had found a publisher for the novel, and offering to write on his behalf to Cobden-Sanderson whom she knew 'very well' and who 'produces his books excellently'. Middleton Murry, she said, would also write. Shortly afterwards in an unpublished letter informing Gerhardie that she had, in fact, written to Cobden-Sanderson on 28th November, she urged the grateful young author not to think her 'kind', stressing 'I feel so strongly that writers ought to have a real claim on each other'. And of course Richard Cobden-Sanderson did take up *Futility,* coming to Oxford to meet Gerhardie and discuss publication.

Subsequently, K.M. accepted Gerhardie's light-hearted proposal that she should be 'god-mother' of the 'new-born child'. Now in Paris, she wrote (8th February, 1922):

> I have the warmest feelings towards your little *nouveau-né* and shall watch its first steps with all the eagerness a parent could desire. I cast about in my mind as to what to send it. Not a silver mug. No, not a mug. . . . The matter I see, demands time for consideration. But very seriously, I am most happy Cobden-Sanderson liked your book. I am sure it will be a success. And I look forward to reading it again and making other people read it. All success to you and many, many thanks.

Having helped to launch Gerhardie, K.M. continued to be interested in his progress, encouraging him to write to her about his literary work, recommending to him her own agent, Mr. Pinker, telling him not to abandon his novel *About Love* (later *Of Mortal Love*), and offering to introduce him by letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell: 'She is a personality and her house is exquisite and one meets there people who might "interest" you. I'm thinking of the literary point of view as well as the other' (unpublished letter, 4th February, 1922.)

And when *Futility* came out (June 1922), she did indeed 'watch its first steps'. She was delighted when Gerhardie sent her a copy:

> I've read it again from beginning to end. How good it is (Here as you don't believe in such a thing as modesty, you will say 'Yes, isn't it?'). But I can only agree. Don't change Mr. Gerhardi. Go on writing like that. I mean with that freshness and warmth and suppleness, with that warm, emotional tone and not that dreadful glaze of 'intellectuality' which is like a curse upon so many English writers. . . .

K.M.'s interest in Gerhardie ('my Oxford undergraduate') deepened with each successive letter. And she liked his photograph in which he looked 'musical' (she herself was a fine musician and had at one time considered a career as a professional cellist). Even more, she was fascinated to hear of his

projected book on Chekhov which brought from her the following perceptive comments (July 10th 1922):

> It's just the moment for a book on Tchehov. I have read these last weeks *Friday Nights* by Edward Garnett which contains a long essay on him. Garnett seems greatly impressed by the importance of T's scientific training as a doctor, not the *in*direct importance (I could understand that) but the *d*irect. He quotes as a proof *The Party* and T's letter in which he says 'the ladies say I am quite right in all my symptoms when I describe the confinement'. But in spite of T's letter, that story didn't need a doctor to write it. There's not a thing any sensitive writer could not have discovered without a medical degree. The truth of that 'importance' is far more subtle.

She went on to express her own ideas about Chekhov, whose letters and work she had studied closely:

> People on the whole understand Tchehov very little. They persist in looking at him from a certain angle and he's a man that won't stand that kind of gaze. One must get round him—see him, feel him as whole. . . . And when you say you don't think T. was really modest. Isn't it perhaps that he *always* felt, very sincerely, that he could have done so much more than he did. He was tormented by time and the desire to live as well as to write. 'Life is given us but once'. . . . Yet when he was not working he had a feeling of guilt; he felt he ought to be. And I think he very often had the feeling a singer has who has sung once and would give almost anything for the chance to sing the same song over again—*Now* he could sing it. . . . But the chance doesn't return. I suppose all writers, little and big, feel this, but T. more than most.

K.M. resisted the temptation to write more about Chekhov ('I could go on and on . . . ') but there can be no doubt that had she lived, she would have had a great deal more to say on the subject when Gerhardie's book, *Anton Chehov*, was published. This brilliant critical study, still regarded as a classical study of the Russian Master, appeared in 1923, a few months after K.M.'s death. Certainly Gerhardie's intimate knowledge of Russia—born in St. Petersburg of English parents, brought up and educated in Russia, steeped in the works of the great Russian writers, becoming even more fluent in the language as a result of his recent military service there during the war and after—impressed and attracted K.M. who was magnetically drawn to all things Russian. And Gerhardie, on his part, admired K.M.'s understanding of Chekhov: in his autobiography he says that he 'had never known anywhere, Russia not excepted, two souls more sensitively appreciative of Chehov's work than Katherine Mansfield and Middleton Murry, though both could read him only in translation'.

As Middleton Murry has said, Katherine Mansfield's letters are an extension of her art, stories and letters forming a single whole, conveying her very essence. This is certainly borne out in the letters to Gerhardie, some of which are among her most fluent and brilliant, invaluable to an understanding of her. She wrote to him with utter joy, spontaneity and simplicity, obviously, as she said, 'in love with life terribly', her comments frequently revealing the intimate relationship between her life and art: for instance, in this extract from her letter of 21st November, 1921:

> You know if I may speak in confidence, I shall not be 'fashionable' long. They will find me out; they will be disgusted; they will shiver in dismay. I like such awfully unfashionable things—and people. I like sitting on doorsteps and talking to the old woman who brings quinces, and going to picnics in a jolting little

> wagon, and listening to the kind of music they play in public gardens on warm evenings and talking to captains of little steamers and in fact to all kinds of people in all kinds of places. But what a fatal sentence to begin. It goes on for ever. In fact, one could spend a whole life finishing it.

And clearly she reveals her humility, the humility of an artist, conscious of her talent yet aware of her responsibility to that talent:

> Please do not praise me too much. It is awfully nice to be praised, but at the same time it makes me hang my head. I have done so little. I should have done so much more. There are these rows of stories, all waiting. . . . I take writing too seriously to be able to flatter myself. I've only begun. The only story that satisfies me to any extent is the one you understand so well, *The Daughters Of The Late Colonel* and parts of *Je Ne Parle Pas.* But Heavens, what a journey there is before one!

Middleton Murry has pointed out that no real distinction can be made between Katherine Mansfield's 'living self' and her 'writing self'. In his words: 'The art corresponds to the human experience'. Of this inseparability of her life and work, she gives direct evidence in a scintillating letter to Gerhardie in which she speaks of being 'in the middle of a very long story written in the same style—horrible expression!—as *The Daughters Of The Late Colonel*'. This was to be the unfinished *The Dove's Nest* (posthumously published), considered by some critics to be the height of her achievement; and K.M.'s own words about it to Gerhardie are of central relevance (14th June, 1922):

> I enjoy writing it so much that even after I am asleep I go on. The scene is the South of France in early Spring. There is a real love story in it too, and rain, buds, frogs, a thunderstorm, pink spotted Chinese dragons. There is no happiness greater than this leading a *double life.* But it's mysterious too. How is it possible to be here in this remote, deserted hotel and at the same time to be leaning out of the window of the Villa Martin listening to the rain thrumming so gently on the leaves and smelling the night-scented stocks with Milly? (I shall be awfully disappointed if you don't like Milly).

The last of K.M.'s books published while she was alive, *The Garden Party and Other Stories,* came out on February 23rd, 1922,[6] and Gerhardie wrote to her about it, admiring in particular *The Voyage.* His comments on *The Voyage* brought the following reply from K.M. (March 1922), which gives a valuable insight into her creative process:

> I've been wanting to say—how strange, how delightful it is you should feel as you do about *The Voyage.* No one has mentioned it to me but Middleton Murry. But when I wrote that little story I felt that I was on that very boat, going down those stairs, smelling the smell of the saloon. And when the stewardess came in and said 'We're rather empty, we may pitch a little', I can't believe that my sofa did not pitch. And one minute I had a little bun of silk-white hair and a bonnet and the next I was Fenella hugging the swan neck umbrella. It was so vivid—terribly vivid—especially as they drove away and heard the sea as slowly it turned on the beach. Why, I don't know. It wasn't a memory of a real experience. It was a kind of *possession.* I might have remained the grandma for ever after if the wind had changed that moment. And that would have been a little embarrassing for M.M. . . . But don't you feel that when you write? I think one always feels it, only sometimes it is a great deal more definite.

Although she composed feverishly, virtually in a state of creative 'possession', Katherine Mansfield's artistic control was superb, and it is now accepted that she extended the frontiers of her art, that of the short story.

Highly individual and original in style and form, her stories are brilliant, oblique, impressionistic: with delicacy and precision of detail and observation, she penetrates to the core of an emotion or an attitude in her characters, conveying by subtle implication the inner reality. An explanation she gave Gerhardie of *The Garden Party* is important as a statement of conscious artistic intention:

> And yes that is what I tried to convey in *The Garden Party*. The diversity of life and how we try to fit in everything, Death included. That is bewildering for a person of Laura's age. She feels things ought to happen differently. First one and then another. But life isn't like that. We haven't the ordering of it. Laura says 'But all these things must not happen at once'. And Life answers, 'Why not? How are they divided from each other ' And they *do* all happen, it is inevitable. And it seems to me there is beauty in that inevitability.

She was determined to see the beauty in everything, even the beauty in ugliness, despair, suffering—what she called 'the snail under the leaf'. To see this was to see 'the truth' of things; and she desired ever more intensely to find 'the truth' of her own self. At this period she was becoming increasingly preoccupied with her own inner purification: the search for an utter clarity and radiance of vision which she intended ultimately to bring to her work. It was because of this self-searching, and her extreme sensitivity to criticism, that she confided to Gerhardie (March 1922) her reaction to an unfavourable review of *The Garden Party and Other Stories* (although most of the London reviews were enthusiastic):

> I wonder if you happened to see a review of my book in *Time and Tide*. It was written by a very fierce lady indeed. Beating in the face was nothing to it. It frightened me when I read it. I shall never dare to come to England. I am sure she would have my very blood like the fish in Cock Robin. But why is she so dreadfully violent? One would think I was a wife beater, at least, or that I wrote all my stories with a carving knife. It is a great mystery!

The reviewer was Mary Agnes Hamilton, and her words cut deep into K.M., accusing her of 'the finest, cruellest art. Cruellest—yes, she is unrelentingly cruel . . . there is something almost rancid about it'. Another reviewer (*The English Review*) thought her 'cruel for the most . . . cynical . . . the mirror of humanity seen through the unsentimental eye of a very clever woman'.

K.M.'s uncertainty about herself was deepening: such criticisms helped to bring her a step nearer the Gurdjieff group, the search for health of soul rather than health of body.

Although she was not satisfied with either her work or herself as a person, nevertheless K.M.'s deepest joy was in writing—'that mysterious compulsion'. And her heartfelt wish for Gerhardie—'I hope you will write wonderful stories; numbers of them. One would not wish anyone greater happiness than that'—was to be splendidly fulfilled, Gerhardie going on to write seven more novels, plays, works of criticism and biography, and today enjoying a revival of his work; at more than eighty years old still writing, working on a new play and a long novel, *This Present Breath* (a tetralogy in one volume).

K.M. appreciated Gerhardie's 'very keen, very delightful sense of humour', and while warning him not to 'give it full rein' in his writing, nonetheless admired this aspect of his personality, and felt him to be a kindred

spirit, endowed, as she herself was, with a deep feeling for life, innate poetry, gaiety, and sensitivity to pathos. Hearing 'golden opinions of *Futility* from everyone' she wanted very much to meet 'the author of so successful a god-child' hoping to do so when she came to London in August 1922: he would be a refreshing change from the 'stupider intelligentsia' whom she disliked intensely (and caricatured in stories such as *Bliss* and *Marriage A La Mode*). 'You see I am not a highbrow', she wrote, 'Sunday lunches and very intricate conversations on sex and that "fatigue" which is so essential and that awful "brightness" which is even more essential—these things I flee from'. In a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell, she again expressed this attitude and her wish to meet Gerhardie:

> I rather look forward to these three months in London, once I have got out of my boxes and into a real corner of my own. I dream of brand new friends—not the dreadfully solemn 'intensive' ones—not the mind-probers. But young ones who aren't ashamed to be interested. Dear little Gerhardi, who wrote *Futility* is one—he *sounds* awfully nice . . .

And to Gerhardie she wrote (26th August, 1922):

> It's very nice to be in London again, rather like coming back to one's dear wife. But I wish the intelligentsia were not *quite* so solemn, quite so determined to sustain a serious conversation only. They make one feel like that poor foreigner arraigned before Mr. Podsnap on the hearthrug in *Our Mutual Friend*. I shall never, while life lasts, be able to take life for granted in the superb way they do.

Yet they were both to be disappointed as the meeting they had hoped for could not be arranged. Unfortunately, K.M., writing from 6 Pond Street, Hampstead, asking Gerhardie 'is there any chance of seeing you?' wrongly addressed the letter, sending it to Yorkshire—Gerhardie was staying with his parents at Bolton, Lancashire. K.M. confessed 'I am very much ashamed of my geography', but the delay was crucial, as by the time he received the re-addressed letter, Gerhardie had himself become ill with a severe influenza and before he was recovered sufficiently to travel, K.M. had returned to Paris, desperately ill, her tuberculosis unchecked by X-ray treatment.

Middleton Murry and her closest friend, Ida Baker, have indicated the severity of Katherine Mansfield's physical suffering: for years she had endured appalling ill-health, not only the advancing consumption but also heart strain, fibrositis and a spinal rheumatism which, at times, almost totally incapacitated her.

Her immense courage and the gay spirit with which she tried to ignore her physical difficulties is reflected in her letters to Gerhardie. K.M. is seen in the midst of the brave, but hopeless struggle of her last two years, determined to live and love passionately, creatively, expending herself with every ounce of vitality. The answer she gave Gerhardie, who enquired about her illness, sums up her attitude to her disease (21st November, 1921):

> Yes, I live in Switzerland because I have consumption. But I am not an invalid. Consumption does not belong to me. It's only a horrid stray dog who has persisted in following me for four years, so I am trying to lose him among these mountains. But 'permanently compelled'. Oh no!

She had, in fact, no permanent home anywhere, not since leaving New Zealand in 1908 to live in London at the age of twenty. Whereas previously

her travels had been made in spite of her illness (for instance, journeys to the South of France and back, under dreadful conditions during the war), now in the last eighteen months, it was her illness—the desperate need for treatment—which dictated her moves. In a hitherto unpublished letter to Gerhardie, written at a Paris hotel, (4th February 1922), she told him: 'I have come down from my mountains and am living in Paris until May'. The reason for this visit to Paris is revealed in her next letter (8th February):

> I am here undergoing treatment by a Russian doctor, Ivan Manoukhin who claims to have discovered a cure for tuberculosis by the application of X-rays. It is a mystery. But it sounds marvellous. . . . The only real trouble is it's terribly expensive. So much so that when I read the price I felt like Tchehov wanted Anna Ivanovna to feel when she read his story in a hot bath—as though someone had stung her in the water—and she wanted to run sobbing out of the bathroom. But if it all comes true it means one will be invisible once more—no more being offered chairs and given arms at sight. A close season for ever for hot-water-bottles and glasses of milk. Well, people don't realise the joy of being invisible—it's almost the greatest joy of all. But I'll have to write at least a story a week until next May, which is a little bit frightening.

K.M. tried to conceal her growing despair, refusing to be brought down by this 'stray dog' and infusing into her letters a characteristic lightness and lustre, referring to her treatment in offhand comments such as 'Just at the moment I'm having rather a struggle with the rayons X', and humorously comparing herself to 'a deep sea fish'. And in an unpublished part of another letter, there is a vivid glimpse of her in Paris (2nd March 1922):

> Is it spring yet in Oxford? Here, as the taxi hurls me to the clinic and back I look everywhere for signs. But the March lion is still prowling after the March lamb and now it rains now it's sunny.

Rather poignantly, in the same letter, she apologised to Gerhardie for not having written. She began humorously:

> Please do not think of me as a kind of boa-constrictor who sits here gorged and silent after having devoured your two delightful letters without so much as a 'thank you'.

She had been too ill to write and admitted something of this to Gerhardie:

> I have been—I am ill. In two weeks I shall begin to get better. But for the moment I am down below in the cabin, as it were, and the deck, where all the wise and happy people are walking up and down and Mr. Gerhardi drinks a hundred cups of tea with a hundred schoolgirls, is far away. . . . But I only tell you this to explain my silence. I'm always very much ashamed of being ill; I hate to plead illness. It's taking an unfair advantage. So please let us forget about it . . . '

The treatment was not a success, but back in Switzerland in June she experienced a brief renewal on feeling the countryside around her after 'Paris—horrid Paris'. Her fresh surge of creative vitality overspills into her letters. She looked forward to London, but the X-ray treatment she received there was less effective than Manoukhin's, and she soon cut short her visit, ostensibly to return to Paris for a second course from the Russian. But in fact she had already decided to abandon all treatment of this kind and, leaving friends and husband, to enter the Gurdjieff Institute for the Harmonious Development of Man, impelled by the ideas of this Russian thinker, desiring above all else, the growth of her inner being to harmony and 'crystal clarity'

and believing that by psychic control she could eventually cure her sick body.

Before joining Gurdjieff at Fontainebleau, she wrote, from Paris, what was to be her last letter to Gerhardie (October 1922), and in the closing sentences there sounds a perhaps not unconscious note of farewell:

> Bonjour Mr. Gerhardi. I am so sorry we have not met in England. . . . Perhaps we shall not meet until you are very old. Perhaps your favourite grandson will wheel you to my hotel then (I'm doomed to hotels) and instead of laughing as we should now, a faint, light, airy chuckle will pass from bath chair to bath chair. . . . People went on asking me about Mr. Gerhardi. His past, his present, his future, his favourite jam, did he prefer brown bread for a change sometimes. I answered everything. I hope to have a rather better book out in the Spring. I am glad you are staying with Cobden-Sanderson. Goodbye. Are you quite well again? The weather is simply heavenly here.

She died of haemorrhage at Fontainebleau on January 9th, 1923, at the age of thirty-four.

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[Gladys Mary Coles, Editor of poetry magazines, *Sphinx, Meridian,* etc., is Poetry Critic for B.B.C. Radio Merseyside. Her collections of poetry are *The Sounding Circle; Sinerva and other Poems.* Future publications include *The Flower Of Light: A Biography Of Mary Webb* (Duckworth) and *A Mary Webb Collection* (Wildings).]

# CHRISTIAN SENTIMENT AND CLASSIC ART: THE WORLD OF JOHN FLAXMAN

## by Ernle Money

**An exhibition of drawings by Flaxman and connected works of art of contemporary origin has been on view at the Heim Gallery, Jermyn Street, London during March and April.**

'THE finest modern imitations I know of the elegance and beauty of the ancient Greek attire and furniture, armour and utensils', wrote Thomas Hope, himself no mean judge of neo-classic art, of the Flaxman drawings illustrating Homer and Aeschylus which he had purchased. That Thomas Hope when still in his early twenties had singled out Flaxman from among the many and varied artists in Rome in 1792, writes Mr. David Watkin, Hope's biographer, was a strong indication of his precocious sensibility as a connoisseur. The artist himself was equally enthusiastic. 'I have refused to execute any other commissions in Rome', he told his parents in a letter, 'but I have taken one to execute in England and perhaps the noblest ever brought by an English artist to his own country, it is the restoration of the Torso Belvidere which is believed to have been anciently a group; its restoration is to be the marriage of Hercules and Hebe, it is to be the size of the original . . . it is ordered by Mr. Thos. Hope of Amsterdam (the Hopes did not quit Holland, where they were leading bankers, until the Revolution of 1795). I have bargained to make the model here and execute the marble in England'. This commission was never in fact carried out in marble but a plaster model of Flaxman's composition for it is now in the Slade School.

Flaxman's journeyings in Italy between 1787 and 1794, from which most of the present collection of drawings date, were due to the financial aid of Josiah Wedgwood and various other of his patrons. Like his father, who was also used as a designer by the Wedgwood factory, he had begun to do work for Etruria in 1775 on leaving the Royal Academy Schools. He had modelled in 1779 a head of Doctor Priestley, Wedgwood's intimate friend, for the potter as well as producing much other decorative work for him. In 1784 he designed elaborate paintings for the ceilings and cornices of Wedgwood's drawing-room. In 1786 he wrote to the artist in connection with some designs for medallions to commemorate the Anglo-French treaty: 'Nothing in my opinion can more properly or more forcibly express the ideas which we wish to bring forward, than the group of figures you gave me . . . we must take care not to show that those representations were invented by an Englishman; as they are meant to be conciliatory, they should be scrupulously impartial. The figures which represent the two nations, for instance, should be equally magnificent and important, in their dress, attitude, character and attributes, and Mercury should not perhaps seem more inclined to one than the other, but shew a full front face

between them, and if you think that there is no impropriety in it, I would wish France to have her helmet and shield as well as Britannia, and the Fleur-de-Lis upon the latter'.

It was no doubt in return for services of this kind that Wedgwood assisted Flaxman with his Italian trip and there seems to have been a genuine respect and friendship between them. 'Unfortunately I must lose the advantage of Mr. Flaxman's assistance', Wedgwood wrote to Sir William Hamilton in July 1787, 'as he is preparing to go to Italy for two years . . . but (he) has promised to employ for me all the time he can spare at Rome, and to superintend a modeller, whom I have engaged to accompany him, and to employ the whole of his (John Devaere, who later succeeded Webber as Flaxman's chief modeller in 1790) time for me at Rome'. In February 1790 he wrote to Flaxman himself at Rome: 'I am much obliged to you for your kind attention, and the employment of your good taste, in the choice of subjects for Mr. Devaere's modelling; and amongst them, the last model, the discovery of Achilles, I admire very much, for the spirited action and beauty of the figures as well as the interestingness of the story itself'. He also says, in the same letter, 'as I well knew that the purpose of your going to Rome was to study, and not to keep up a correspondence with your friends in England, I avoided interrupting that study by troubling you with anything that was not necessary'.

That Flaxman put his time in Rome to good account is shown by the variety of his drawings in the exhibition. As well as illustrating Homer and Aeschylus, he also did a set of drawings interpreting Dante as well in Mr. Christopher Powney's words 'a great many sketches from nature, drawings of peasant women with their children, which have a spontaneous charm and a delicate line that sets them apart from the "working drawings".'

His subsequent career, after his return from Italy, was to be a successful one as a monumental sculptor (his work is still to be seen in many cathedrals and churches throughout the country). His work attracted enormous acclaim, even on an international level. He was friendly with and accepted as an equal by European sculptors like Canova. He became a Royal Academician in 1800 and Professor of Sculpture at the Royal Academy Schools. His designs caught exactly the spirit of the new piety which was growing up in the establishment world in England in the first quarter of the nineteenth century and he was regarded by many people as a very great artist indeed, Walter Savage Landor even going as far eventually as to claim that he was a greater artist than Michelangelo. As Mr. Powney puts it: 'His work perfectly embodies the artistic spirit of (his) age'.

As the Heim Gallery exhibition also showed, he embodies some of the complexities and complications that grew out of the contemporaneous emergence of neo-classicism and evangelical piety. He was, on the one hand, a close friend of William Blake and a precursor of what developed subsequently from the Nazarenes and the Pre-Raphaelites later in the century. On the other hand he was one of the most expert practitioners in the school of art which evolved from the rediscovery of Pompeii and Herculaneum

towards the end of the eighteenth century. Both these Imperial Review cities had been inundated in the eruption of Vesuvius which took place in A.D. 79. The systematic excavation of each of them was started in about the middle years of the eighteenth century. The interest which the excavations stimulated, the influence of Winckelmann and other precursors of Neo-Classic art and the styles which were involved on the basis of a new development of classical themes as a result of the collections formed by Sir William Hamilton, the Duke of Portland and others were to create a wholly new approach to artistic standards which had been respectively dominated by baroque and rococco forms, the landscapes of Claude, Poussin and Salvator Rosa and the history paintings of Benjamin West and his contemporaries in their particular fields. Flaxman lay directly in the mainstream of the development of neo-classic art in historical terms and it was to prove the alternative and, in fact, more profitable side to his artistic development.

Both sides of his art have been represented in exhibitions which have taken place in London in recent years. In the Arts Council's *The Romantic Movement* in 1959 he was seen in drawings like *Thomas Chatterton Taking The Bowl Of Poison From The Spirit Of Despair* and *Visiting The Sick*. In the Council of Europe's *The Age Of Neo-Classicism* in 1972 he was seen both in sculpture and in a variety of drawings at the Royal Academy.

In the very perceptive catalogue to the latter exhibition, John Kenworthy-Browne wrote: 'Eclectism remained a chief characteristic of his style both in drawing and modelling. . . . Among his early friends were Romney and Blake. It was probably Blake who introduced him to the Gothic style, besides imparting to him many of his ideas and forms. But unlike Blake, Flaxman was no mystic; nor did he strain beyond the accepted limits of Christian teaching, the establishment of the conventional technique of his art. Greek art remained his supreme ideal. . . . Flaxman's outline drawings provided a flexible formal basis for imaginative recreation by artists with widely differing intentions: Blake, David, Goya, Ingres, Koch, Ouai and Runge. J. L. David perceptibly exclaimed *Cet ouvrage fera faire des tableaux* on seeing Flaxman's Homer and Aeschylus engravings. . . . Romney shared the esteem in which the Homeric engravings were held, in writing: "They are simple, grand and pure, I may say very fine. They look as if they had been made in the age when Homer wrote".'

The Heim exhibition, covering as it did basically the period 1787-1794, exemplified both the catholicism and the quality of John Flaxman's work. Some of the drawings, like the illustrations to Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, the marvellous *Creation Of The Heavens* and the *Mother And Child Leaning From A Window* exemplify the style of Blake at its strongest, though as Mr. Powney rightly says, it is only rarely that Flaxman, although technically a greater draughtsman, achieves Blake's artistry. Others like the illustrations to the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, Hesiod and his funereal reliefs are purely classical in feeling. Amazing among these are an *Anthony's Oration Over The Dead Caesar*, drawn when Flaxman was only thirteen years old

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

### by Rosalind Wade

*The Sun's Net*. George Mackay Brown. The Hogarth Press. £3.75. *The Former Miss Merthyr Tydfil*. Alun Richards. Michael Joseph. £3.95. *The Mandrake Root*. Joy Cowley. Hodder and Stoughton. £3.50. *Lost Profile*. Françoise Sagan (translated by Joanna Kilmartin). Andre Deutsch. £2.75. *You're Not Alone*. William Cooper. Macmillan. £3.95. *The Day Before Sunrise*. Thomas Wiseman. Jonathan Cape. £3.50. *The Ninth Man*. John Lee. Cassell. £3.95. *The Rainbow Men*. Douglas Sheldon. W. H. Allen. £4.50.

No doubt that it has been the season of the short story. A literary form which was always difficult to define, and constantly said to be nearing extinction has suddenly re-emerged with new vigour in a number of Collections. As Elizabeth Bowen once said, the short story is 'a young art, a child of this century', particularly vulnerable to the pressure of editorial prejudices. It is interesting to note that although some of the short sories have already been seen in magazines, the bulk of them are appearing now for the first time. However, freedom from such inhibiting requirements as the 'snap' ending and 'angle' character does not absolve the author from contriving a story which stands up in its own right, leaving the reader satisfied that everything essential has been said.

An example in this category is George Mackay Brown. *The Sun's Net* is his fourth collection of short stories set in the Orkneys, where he lives and works. Restricted communication with the outside world makes of Njalsay and the other islands a 'closed' society in which tough, uncompromising natives work out their problems against a hostile if scenically majestic backdrop. *A Winter's Tale* is an excellent example of indigenous islanders joining in a mystical experience with the partly alien professional men—doctor, teacher and minister. These three have met together in a pleasantly civilised Christmas celebration, marred only by the conflict of their own unyielding egos. On his way to the festivities, the doctor is called upon to attend a 'birth' in a derelict building and the Rector receives a late evening call from the prospective 'father'. But before help can be given or records taken, the young 'family' simply vanishes into thin air. What does it all amount to in theological debate? Nothing very much, for it is the interplay of personality between the three strikingly dissimilar individuals which really captivates the reader's attention, combined with the effect of seemingly endless winter months, during which the island is battered by gale force winds and shrouded with early twilight when anything might happen—even a re-enacting of the nativity.

Alun Richards also knows a particular region through and through—the Wales of spacious valleys and small towns inhabited by men and women with narrow minds and big conceit of themselves. He understands the motives and reactions of these people as thoroughly as if they were insects under a microscope. Two stories in addition to the title one, *The Former Miss Merthyr Tydfil*, stand out for special attention: *Hon. Sec.* and *Groceries*. The Honorary

Secretary of the local football club is Elgar Davies, a passive misfit who lives in cloying comfort with his bridge-playing mother, surrounded by her cronies. These Dylanesque characters have a low opinion of Elgar and he finds his compensation in directing the affairs of the club. The scope of this modest but highly entertaining story is Elgar's attempt to bolster the morale of members while playing an 'away' match. So spectacular is his success in particularly testing circumstances that Elgar ends up in a position of strength, rather than as a figure of fun. In fact, ' . . . having learned to bite . . . ' ,there is from then on no end to the ways in which he will assert authority in his speech at the annual dinner.

*Groceries* is altogether more subtle and ambitious, for it digs deeply though sensitively into an all too common problem for the middle-aged. The local Medical Officer of Health, Dr. Hugh Pugh Davies, is seen at the outset as reasonably contented with Nanw, his 'well-preserved' wife and unexacting programme of work and golf; until a family rift develops from their daughter Beth's chance meeting with the son of Hugh's former fiancée. From then on, the two women contrive to needle him into feeling that he has done something shameful. The situation blows to a crisis when Beth arrives on a motor-cycle with the ultimate in drop-outs. The pair 'take over' the household routine and create general havoc, as a result of which Nanw retires to bed. Beth seems to have little of the traditional father-daughter orientation. She takes the doctor at a cruel disadvantage while he is having a bath (no locks apparently on the Davies' doors); lectures him mercilessly about his shortcomings and then makes an abrupt exit with the boyfriend. Completely shattered by the total upset of a lifetime's values, Hugh and Nanw eventually come together again—physically and spiritually, the mutual need for reassurance promising an Indian summer for their flagging married relationship.

The scenes and situations portrayed in these two collections are freshly normal and have a pleasing 'outdoor' quality, but there are writers who turn to the shadowed world of the psychiatry ward for inspiration. By her freshness of approach Joy Cowley, a young New Zealand writer, creates the illusion in *The Mandrake Root* that we are hearing about shock treatment and analysis for the first time. Her main character, Elizabeth, is a tragically maimed personality who, throughout the novel, discusses herself objectively as a separate person. Certainly, she has suffered outrageous misfortune. Gifted, attractive, the adored daughter of well-to-do parents, she found solace from an inborn sense of inferiority in an incestuous relationship with her brother, Harvey; only to be rudely jolted by charges against him of homosexuality and drug-peddling. His death in a road accident was never properly explained, but it culminated in her own gruesome attempt at suicide by slitting her wrists.

On Elizabeth's discharge from hospital the sorely tried family do everything possible to assist her return to the normal world. But under strain of her waywardness and sulks, their own idiosyncrasies come uppermost; the father is a petty bully; the mother a fritterer of time and cash. Nonetheless, like bored adults trying to enter a children's play world, they encourage Elizabeth to take up painting. One of her pictures wins a prize in an exhibition which seems to augur well for a new career. Alas, a second psychological breakdown is all but precipitated when she discovers that in order to give her the illusion of independence her father purchased the picture anonymously for an exorbitant sum. Here is a poignant and unusual situation of family internecine war, yet it is not the distraught parents or their frustrated offspring who steal the thunder in *The*

*Mandrake Root,* but strange 'off-beats' from Harvey's past who persist in treating Elizabeth as a mentally stable person.

An unfailing ability to invest the most commonplace incident with freshness and relevance is Joy Cowley's strongest asset. Her only concession to convention is the finale in which Elizabeth flies off to Australia to marry a faithful suitor. This mental cripple, with her ugly mutilated wrists, is unlikely to achieve a miraculous cure by a mere change of environment.

Françoise Sagan is another writer who specialises in the neurotic, even if most of her characters just manage to keep clear of the asylum. When she broke in upon the literary scene at the age of eighteen some twenty years ago with her first novel, *Bonjour Tristesse,* she was at once acclaimed for the delicacy and precision of her prose; as well as a startling insight into what used to be termed the 'erotic' in literature. *Lost Profile* is about Josée, a handsome, unintellectual young woman who is handicapped by a pathologically jealous husband. Thus, she is ripe for a platonic affair with Julius Cram, a bachelor millionaire with considerable influence in the art world. He finds her a job on the staff of a magazine so that she can be independent while awaiting a divorce. In fact, he is financing the modest periodical and his money provides her with a generous salary and luxurious flat. When she discovers the deception she is faced with an awkward dilemma; whether to continue working at a status she cannot command on her own merit, or to break free and rely on her limited resources. Fortunately, she meets a handsome, virile young veterinary surgeon who loves her for herself and not for what she might achieve in the world of art. And so, after some not very formidable ups and downs, she settles for life in the country with him, cheerfully abandoning all pretentions to independence. It is all rather too smooth and easy and the reader is left with the unhappy suspicion that Françoise Sagan was not seriously involved with Josée and her problems—or that in the translation the allusiveness of the original French somehow failed to come over in the English text.

From the gloomy, limited world of the depressed and frustrated it is invigorating to move on to a situation in which doctors and their patients enjoy a cheerful working relationship. William Cooper is renowned for his witty, urbane yet always penetrating commentaries on events which are never quite so placid and ordinary as they seem. In *You're Not Alone* he has succeeded brilliantly in investing sixty-two year old Gerald with more appeal than the usual fashionable 'consultant'. The secret of Gerald's success is his knack of convincing the patient that he has himself endured similar problems to their own; thus engendering a pleasant mutual confidence. However, Gerald is destined to learn about life the hard way when he falls deeply in love with the daughter of one of his colleagues, twenty-two year old Liz. The progress of their courageous experiment is very sensitively conveyed against the background of the changing seasons on the Isle of Wight, and every angle of the problem of their difference in age is explored and dealt with. And so it comes as something of a disappointment when Liz announces that after all she would prefer to marry a man of her own age. An insufficient build-up to this *volte-face* inevitably contributes to a rather 'rushed' ending, which is a pity and inconsistent with the steady satisfying rhythm of the novel as a whole.

There was a time when the 1939-45 War seemed unlikely to generate its own mystique as a source of inspiration for novels and short stories. Now, that is long past and a spate of espionage and 'suspense' fiction concerning World War II threatens to outclass books about the 'cold war' and the aberrations of East/

West diplomacy. Among the most successful and compelling in the present season is *The Day Before Sunrise* by Thomas Wiseman, who brings all his narrative skill and experience to the task of constructing a documentary thriller.

In the vast theatre of war, few people can have detailed knowledge of more than a limited section of the operations. And so this squalid portrait of life in Berlin immediately before the German surrender provides some interesting and authentic information, very little of which has so far been released. The weavings of American diplomacy, centred in Berne, are conducted by the American representative, Allen Welsh Dulles. He picks as an intermediary a policeman named Scholler, a conscientious regular officer who prides himself on being a cut above the Gestapo. Scholler knows the location of a secret file of vital importance to the War Crimes Commission. Acquiring it will involve a return to the tottering seat of the German High Command. To receive the file and watch Scholler for possible double-crossing or defection a young American, Howard Elliott, is appointed unofficial gaoler and travelling companion. Their hazardous journey from Berne to Berlin and back again is the scope of the novel and despite every kind of setback and disaster, the goal is accomplished, while a grudging kind of trust and liking grows up between the two men. In the process, Howard Elliott becomes toughened by experience and is in the running for an important official position in post-war America. But it is not interest in Elliott or his future career which dominates *The Day Before Sunrise* but the 'special investigator' Scholler, with his heavy gait and inbred cunning—a real life type to be found in all countries and at all periods of history.

The immense value to the suspense novel of at least one wholly credible character is demonstrated by the lack of one in *The Ninth Man* by John Lee. Here again is an unusual war story—the daring plan personally devised by Hitler for the assassination of the President of the United States. The killing was to have been carried out by a team of German sharp-shooters set down by submarine on an unfrequented sector of the American coast. Eight men were known to have landed, but it was later admitted that there could have been a ninth. The story of the 'extra' man, never publicly acknowledged by U.S. Intelligence, is graphically conveyed in the form of a day-to-day diary. It should be—it *is* exciting—and lacks only any conviction that the characters involved were real people, with a life of their own, apart from their role in the murder plot.

Finally, in distinct contrast, a war story about the Air Force. *The Rainbow Men* is a first novel by writer, singer and poet, Douglas Sheldon. Although far too young to have experienced the dangers and stresses of air warfare in World War II, the now remote events of those years have captivated his imagination, mainly through the recorded exploits of his father. This may have been the original inspiration—but Douglas Sheldon has drawn from his own imagination an interestingly vivid interpretation of events he could not personally have experienced. The novel slides backwards and forwards in time, spanning two generations, and if the author is understandably more at home in the contemporary scene, his grip of war-time strategy and conditions never falters. The novel suffers from excessive length—nearly five hundred pages—yet despite this handicap it stands out as one of the most original and human fictional accounts of the Second World War.

**Also received:**

*The Navigators*. Anthony Burton. 'Troubadour Books'. Macdonald and Jane's. £3.95.

*The Navigators* is very much more than the 'good read' promised by Troubadour Books. This day-to-day account of constructing an eighteenth century waterway has historical accuracy as well as a compelling story about the social reformer, Nick Tatlow, and the woman with whom he has the misfortune to fall in love. The ugly deprivation of the workers' lives, together with the unthinking opportunism of the managers and landowners involved, underlines the tragedy of the present derelict state of English canals, constructed with so much blood, pain and sweat.

*Beauty's Daughter.* Mollie Hardwick. Eyre Methuen. £3.95.

Mollie Hardwick is an experienced biographer and of Emma Hamilton in particular, and so in *Beauty's Daughter* her promise of hitherto unrevealed information about Lady Hamilton's two 'lost' daughters is rewarding to pursue. And indeed, much of this lively, garrulous novel is satisfying for its authentic domestic detail and a thorough understanding of the characters involved. It is too much to hope that the first-born, Emily, will be anything but a foil to her flamboyant mother. What troubles the accurate minded reader is uncertainty, prompted by Mollie Hardwick's own proviso, as to where the dividing line between fact and fiction has been drawn.

*Harry Bleachbaker.* N. F. Simpson. Harrap. £2.95.

Theatregoers addicted to N. F. Simpson's work will not expect a straightforward or even a comprehensible plot structure in the dramatist's first novel. Which is as well, for this fragmentary story of a man who attempts a kind of solo marathon by submerging himself up to the neck in water is scarcely acceptable, even within the realms of fantasy. There is a message—there must be—concerning the futility of conventions and the manner in which mindless people quickly become involved with any kind of unusual spectacle, but the moral of this fable is not easy to assimilate.

*Wild Grow The Lilies.* Christy Brown. Secker and Warburg. £3.90.

Not everyone will enjoy this uncompromisingly Irish story for its general waywardness and unclear story about a young journalist, Luke Sheridan, and his amorous encounters with Babysoft and Rosie, mingled with some bemused pride in his own efforts as writer and journalist. It is all rather long and unnecessarily complicated but nevertheless, a picture of a way of life in unpredictable Dublin comes through.

## NON-FICTION

### THE QUALITY OF IMAGINATION

*Imagination.* Mary Warnock. Faber and Faber. £6.50.

Mrs. Warnock is distinguished in philosophy and teaching, in the upbringing of children and in the Arts, especially music. All her insights are mobilised to produce this fascinating book which carries us a long way forward in an understanding of the imagination, while leaving many implications to be worked out later.

She brings the whole argument into focus in a final chapter which could, however, have been twice as long for our total enlightenment. She concludes that the 'power in the human mind' to which she gives the name imagination is not only intellectual. 'Its impetus comes from the emotions as much as from the reason, from the heart as much as from the head'. Certainly her own heart and human understanding and love of beauty combine with a logical acuteness to give this book a practical value beyond that of a purely academic treatise.

Her analysis is highly individual. But if the book has a hero it is William Wordsworth, alike for his principles and practice. She quotes him frequently and effectively. But other notables are closely examined, among them Hume, Kant, Coleridge, Merleau-Ponty and the phenomenologists generally, Ryle and Wittgenstein.

Coleridge wins approval second only to that accorded Wordsworth. 'Coleridge was the vehicle for the introduction of German philosophy into England and (more specifically related to our purpose) the theory of imagination to be found in his work contains features which, wherever they recur, seem to contribute to a true view of the imaginative function'.

It is difficult to argue against that conclusion; or this one: 'For my part I have no doubt that what we may call the phenomenological tradition, and this includes Ryle, offers a better way of describing mental images than the empiricist, or Humean, tradition before it, but has not, even so, got it completely right'.

The power in the human mind which she calls imagination is found according to her in at least four distinguishable activities; in our everyday perception of the world and in our thoughts about what is absent; in our vision of the world as significant and in our capacity to present this vision to others. None of the authors discussed has traced so complete an identity.

Mrs. Warnock acknowledges that the thread of connection between the various activities coming under the head of the imagination 'can be conceived just as a series of similarities'. But if that were all, the interest of the book would be primarily semantic which would make it altogether less important. It is by no means all her doctrine.

'What I have tried to do', she says, 'is to bring together some of the ways in which this capacity to look beyond the immediate and the present manifests itself'. And she continues: 'The interest of the subject seems to me to lie precisely in the degree to which an identity or close similarity can be shown to exist between what I have thought of as the various uses of imagination'. The book derives its significance, therefore, from a double source; the one just mentioned linking the four distinguishable forms of the imagination and the one referred to earlier which finds in each case an impetus from the emotions as well as from the reason. Fortified with the double message she points the way towards far-reaching consequences for education.

'If we think of imagination as a part of our intelligence, universally, then we must be ready to admit that, like the rest of human intelligence, it needs educating; but this will now entail, if we are right, an education not only of the intelligence but, going along with it, of the feelings'. What does this amount to in practice? As a former headmistress of a famous girls' school, Mary Warnock is well qualified to spell out the implications for actual curricula and teaching. She does not attempt anything of the kind on this occasion though she clears away at least two possible misunderstandings. She does not wish children to be 'specially encouraged' to be creative or express themselves . . . the fact is that if imagination is creative in all its uses children will be creating their own meanings and interpretations of things as much by looking at them as by making them'. And again: 'I do not hold that children should be told what interpretation to place upon their experience. What, if it is taken as symbolic, it is symbolic of. It is the emotional sense of the infinity or inexhaustibleness of things which will give point to their experience'. But otherwise she is general rather than particular.

She quotes with approval C. S. Lewis on the highest sense of the imagination, the joy which comes from moments of 'extreme imaginative intensity'. Lewis himself minimises the importance of such experiences on the grounds that they are not religious. But here Mrs. Warnock parts from him. The faculty of producing such feelings, 'such love and fear' she boldly announces is 'quite literally what gives value to our world'. Here again one regrets the brevity of her crucial exposition. The difference between her and Lewis is all the more tantalising because she herself is known to be a religious woman.

Many of us complain that our philosophers, possessing perhaps the brightest intellects among us, make little or no effort to help us with our innumerable problems in personal and social life. Mrs. Warnock makes a much-to-be-valued start towards removing such a reproach.

FRANK LONGFORD

## CONSTABLE IN HIS BICENTENARY

*John Constable,* 1776-1837. John Lloyd Fraser. Hutchinson. £6.95.
*Constable And His World.* Reg Gadney. Thames and Hudson. £3.50.
*Constable And His Country.* Alistair Smart and Attfield Brooks. Elek. £6.50.

With the six volumes of the late R. B. Beckett's edition of Constable's correspondence available there does not seem much that can be added, by way of new material, on the painter's life. Each of the books under review has been published in connection with the bicentenary of his birth which falls this year and each in its own way does a workmanlike and worthwhile job, although none of them is likely to replace Graham Reynold's *Constable: The Natural Painter,* published in 1965 and currently reissued in paperback, which is the best short study available. Taken collectively, however, they produce an excellent antidote to the sententious and tiresome nature of many of the introductory remarks and catalogue entries in the Tate Gallery's exhibition catalogue, which, apart from the queues, is the only thing which marred, to my mind, that otherwise admirable event.

'Painting is but another word for feeling' wrote Constable himself to his close friend Archdeacon Fisher. Although he was never in doubt of the lasting value of the work which he was doing, he might have been somewhat surprised at the amount of critical attention which his not very eventful life, as well as his pictures, now attracts. Inevitably each of these three books draws to some extent on the same corpus of background material. Out of them Mr. Lloyd Fraser's is the nearest to a straight biography of the artist and is very well done, though it is spoiled by the poor quality of the illustrations, indefensible in a book at this price and by the adoption of a rather silly sub-title, 'the man and his mistress', based on Constable's statement 'Landscape is my mistress—'tis to her I look for fame'. Mr. Lloyd Fraser deals carefully and sensitively with the painter's protracted but eventually successful courtship of Maria Bicknell and with his comparatively few close friendships of which those with John Fisher and the academician Charles Robert Leslie, who wrote the first life of the artist, were by far the most important. He also shows Farington in a more agreeable light than we are sometimes used to seeing that pillar of the artistic establishment.

It would be hard to overestimate the value of Fisher and Leslie to Constable. Mr. Lloyd Fraser quotes his moving statement to the former: 'I should almost faint by the way when I am standing before my large canvasses was I not cheered and encouraged by your friendship and approbation'. Mr. Gadney

quotes Geoffrey Grigson on the same subject: 'Is it fanciful to suggest that without the Archdeacon's friendship the painter's achievement would never have been so thorough?' If that is so, then the Archdeacon in his Dorset parsonage or in Salisbury Close had this moiety of influence upon a hundred years of European painting! The close connection with Leslie came later in his life at a time when both Fisher and Maria Constable were dead and when the younger painter and his wife became among Constable's closest associates. 'You, my dear Leslie, what matters to me, are there', he wrote to him and he was devastated by the Leslies' decision to return to the United States in 1833, although happily, as it turned out, this was to be of short duration. 'The loss of you', he wrote, 'is a cloud casting its shade over my life, now in its autumn. I never did admire the autumnal tints in nature, so little of a painter am I in the eye of commonplace connoisseurship—I love the exhilarating freshness of spring'.

These friendships and his devotion to his family show that he was by no means a cold man. His affection for his wife is one of the most moving in the life of any artist and makes it the sadder that the long sought-after and delayed act of recognition, his election as a full R.A., did not take place until the year after her death from tuberculosis in 1828. That there was another and more forbidding side to his character is suggested by his apparently insensitive treatment of some would-be patrons like Fisher's friend the lawyer John Tinney and from the evidence of the Redgraves. 'The landscape painter', they wrote in their *Century Of British Painters*, 'though of a manly nature, was eminently sarcastic and was very clever at saying the bitterest things in a witty manner. This had no doubt been increased by the neglect with which the would-be connoisseurs had treated his art, and by the sneers of commonplace critics'. The front which Constable built up to the disappointments that he suffered does much to explain the apparent contradictions in his character. He was, as Mr. Gadney points out, a High Tory who revolutionised art, he was a countryman who had to live and work mostly in London, he came from a solid and prosperous family background but was perpetually involved in money worries, he could inspire close affection among a circle of close friends and yet in part his troubles with the Academy stemmed from his inability successfully to play artistic politics.

It is true that a pure natural landscape painter was bound to have a difficult path to follow in any case in an age that was still dominated by the theories of Sir Joshua Reynolds and Benjamin West. Constable, as the Redgraves suggest, may have been born a little too early for full recognition in his own time. 'Pictures' were still appreciated more than nature and a Dutch finish was regarded as indispensable for a *fine* work. Gainsborough, through portrait painting to which he subordinated his natural feeling for landscape, Turner, by blazing his own particular trail in a context of historical and literary allusions, each solved this problem in their own way. Others concentrated on watercolour. Constable remained obdurate in his allegiance. 'There is little or nothing', he wrote in 1802, 'in the Academy worth looking up to—there is room enough for a natural painter'. In particular his imagination turned to and his inspiration was drawn repeatedly from his own particular area of country, the twelve square miles of south-east Suffolk where he was born and grew up.

It is in this particular context that Professor Smart and Colonel Brooks seek to interpret him. Their book is a sequence of connected essays rather than a strict collaboration since Professor Smart deals with the development of the great series of canal paintings and Colonel Brooks, who has made a special and

devoted study of the subject, is concerned to relate the Suffolk pictures to their topographical background. The result is an interesting and attractive book, though some of the photographs go to prove that, although it has thankfully remained comparatively unspoilt, the Constable country has changed in appearance to a greater degree than we might have supposed as an outcome of the techniques of intensive farming which have developed in recent years. For the student of Constable's work who has the time and the inclination to visit his own countryside *in situ* this will prove an enthralling companion and guide and Professor Smart's account of the background to the artist's creative processes is illuminating. He draws less, however, on Kurt Badt's pioneer study *John Constable's Clouds,* which came out as long ago as 1950, than I would have expected in a work of this sort. There is also room for a study of Constable's links with purely East Anglian artists such as George Frost and Thomas Churchyard. He is, after all, part, albeit a very distinguished part, of a living tradition in this school going back to Gainsborough and still continuing to flourish with such distinguished painters as Mr. Cavendish Morton.

Mr. Gadney's book is one of the well-known series of Thames and Hudson monographs and maintains their standard excellently in terms of both text and illustrations. Surprisingly, since the author was responsible for the Fitzwilliam Museum's catalogue of watercolours and drawings, he deals here comparatively little with these two subjects but he provides a good general framework for his work. The choice and the quality of the illustrations are excellent and he has cast his net wide to obtain new material.

Hopefully Gainsborough will be as fortunate in the books which are published to celebrate the 250th anniversary of his birth next year. In the meantime, Constable has been well served.

ERNLE MONEY

## SHAKESPEAR OF ARABIA

*Captain Shakespear—A Portrait.* H. V. F. Winstone. Jonathan Cape. £4.95.

Mr. Winstone has produced a committed biography and this is as it should be. His subject, William Henry Irvine Shakespear, has been forgotten mainly because, his biographer argues, he opposed the 'settled and collective view of the government of the day' and was proved correct in his opposition by later events.

Briefly, Shakespear was Britain's Political Agent in Kuwait, after a military training and career in India. During his stay in Arabia he was well known for his adventuresome spirit and his numerous treks into the heartland of Arabia. By these journeys he familiarised himself with the various tribes, their leaders and their long-standing disputes. In time he developed strong friendships with Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait, a powerful figure in Arabia and with the potentially more powerful Ibn Saud, the Amir of Najd. Both were friendly to the idea of British protection.

Unfortunately Shakespear found himself at odds with British Imperial policy in the Middle East. Official Government policy was to support Ottoman rule to counter increasing German influence and to protect Egypt and India. Through his friendships, however, Shakespear was able to lay the ground for a positive assertion of British influence. But, this would require a change of policy and a definite support for Ibn Saud against Turkey and its principal ally, the Sharif of Mecca. When the war came in 1914, Britain founded her hopes on Mecca, only to see her precariously built structure collapse after the war when Ibn Saud established what is now Saudi Arabia. Had Britain clearly established her

hegemony over Kuwait and 'Saudi Arabia' before 1914, it is not unreasonable to say that Middle Eastern history would have proved rather different than it has.

The author makes as much out of his subject as he can but it does not seem unfair to say that Shakespear was too typically British to be a fascinating character. He was sturdy, hard-working, intelligent, loyal and dull. He and his kind were the backbone of Britain's imperial rule, both in India and elsewhere. It is more as a class than individually that they are interesting.

Mr. Winstone has made good use of those manuscript sources available to him; his research is thorough and his style of writing direct and pleasant. He has produced a readable study of interest to anyone concerned with the achievements and blunders of Britain's imperial past in the Middle East.

J. E. B. MUNSON

## A SHORT STUDY OF WALPOLE

*Sir Robert Walpole.* Betty Kemp. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £4.25.

In 1778, shortly after France had joined the rebellious American colonies in the war against Britain, Horace Walpole wrote of his father: 'England will one day recollect it had a Minister, to whom it owed twenty years of prosperity and happiness, and who left it a motto that would have preserved such halcyon days. *Quieta non movere*. . . . I do not know whether it is true, what has been said, that my father, on being advised to tax America, replied: "It must be a bolder Minister than I am." But that motto of his spoke his opinion.' In spite of this proud filial boast, England has long neglected the greatness of Sir Robert Walpole. This is not to say that he has not been the subject of numerous biographies, histories, and monographs. A large scale biography is being written by J. H. Plumb and consists of two volumes. We are waiting for the third. However, what has long been needed is a short study that considers the significance of Walpole in the development of the Constitution and of the office of Prime Minister. This need has now been splendidly filled by Miss Kemp.

Although this is a volume in the British Prime Ministers Series edited by A. J. P. Taylor, it is unlike most other volumes in the series. This is no mere popularised account of selected features of a man's life but a careful and considered assessment of his role in Government and of his influence on the development of the Constitution. Miss Kemp has been acknowledged as an authority on the Constitution, particularly in the eighteenth century, since the publication of her excellent study *King and Commons 1660–1832*. She rejects the textbook aphorism that Walpole was the first Prime Minister. She shows that the title, or rather the insult, was used before Walpole. Indeed it was suspect because many felt it to be a French import. She accepts that Walpole became a Prime Minister in the midst of his long ascendancy (1721-1742). However, it is quite inaccurate to see him as the first of an unbroken line of descent down to Mr. Callaghan. Indeed, as late as the 1770s Lord North would not allow his family to use the term, even in private.

Miss Kemp sums up the reasons for Walpole's long dominance: 'He owed his continuance in office to the King's continued favour, to his own continued ascendancy in the Commons, and to his withdrawal of unpopular measures.' In addition Walpole had, at least for most of his career, that essential attribute of genius according to Napoleon: luck. Walpole had the luck to see his early rivals die or be disgraced by the South Sea Bubble or Jacobitism. He also had the luck to come to power when his particular skills were most needed. He had a mastery of finance and of the arts needed to manage the House of Commons.

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He was essentially a peace Minister and he had the luck to have a man of similar inclinations, Cardinal Fleury, occupying a similar post in France.

Miss Kemp places great stress upon Walpole's relations with the Commons. Walpole was the first minister to appreciate the great power of the Commons. He chose to spend his active career there rather than following the precedent for ministers to go to the Lords. It is indeed his contribution to the House of Commons that is the most enduring of Walpole's legacies. Unlike many historians, Miss Kemp sees Walpole as more than a competent politician. She sees him as the cultivated art collector and as a Constitutional thinker. She follows Burke in admiration for Walpole's synthesis of Whig Constitutional theory in the Sacheverell trial.

Sir Robert Walpole played an essential role in the development of the Constitution and it is fitting that he should have such an excellent study to commemorate him. This book can be well recommended to both scholars and to the general reader. It is obviously the product of careful thought on Walpole's significance. Unlike many modern historians, Miss Kemp has realised that in history thought is as important as research. It is a well written book free of any sociological jargon that disfigures much historical writing today. One cannot but think that Horace Walpole would have approved both the content and the style of this delightful book.

R. F. MULLEN

## SHORTER REVIEWS

**The General Strike** (Penguin Books. UK £1.50; USA $5.95). A new and comprehensive study of the British General Strike by Margaret Morris, lecturer at the Central London Polytechnic, comes fifty years after that nationally and individually traumatic crisis of nine days, May 4 to 12, 1926, still vividly in the memory of millions. It was called by the TUC in support of the miners' strike and collapsed after nine days. Miss Morris's book is the result of years of research and is carefully documented. Probably the most valuable part of the study is the attention she gives to the trade union side, its organisation and rank and file support. She writes that 'in May 1926 nearly all trade union members who were asked to strike, did strike', namely between one and a half and two millions. She has chosen 'nine trade unionists to represent rank and file reactions and initiative, and their reminiscences are used extensively in the first part of this book' which is concerned with the strike itself. They were or became trade unionists of distinction, namely Bill Ballantyne, Bob Edwards, Vic Feather, the late James Griffiths, Betty Harrison, the late Sir Will Lawther, the late Abe Moffat, Charles Spraggs and Harry Watson. The question of the strike's legality was a matter which greatly affected the TUC. There was Mr. Justice Astbury's dictum *obiter* that the strike was illegal, and Sir John Simon's opinion to the same effect. The latter was particularly insistent. Miss Morris considers that this had little effect on the rank and file. She quotes Vic Feather, then working in the Bradford Co-operative Society, 'His claim that the strike was illegal didn't bother us, we knew that what we were doing was right'. None of the other eight trade unionists 'remembers having any qualms that their actions were unconstitutional or that the strike was illegal'. The better legal view was that the strike was legal, although Sir John Simon had the highest reputation as a lawyer. The book has a number of special studies by other contributors. Dr. Stuart Mews has a useful short piece on the church's reaction. Others include G.

W. McDonald on the role of British industry in 1926, and Patricia Ryan on The Poor Law in 1926. This is a valuable addition to the literature on the whole subject.

**Oscar Wilde** (Eyre Methuen. £6.95). This biography by H. Montgomery Hyde follows many years of interest in Wilde's life and work. He has met many of those associated in some form or another with him and he has taken a prominent part in the centenary celebrations of Wilde's birth in 1954. Furthermore, Mr. Hyde has already written *The Trials of Oscar Wilde* and *Oscar Wilde: the Aftermath*. In this full length life, he balances fairly successfully Wilde's literary achievements and conversational brilliance with his life of sexual perversion. In this present day of sexual permissiveness, Oscar Wilde would not have attracted so much hatred and have been forced into exile. Mr. Montgomery Hyde points out that Wilde was not convicted of corrupting youths. They were already homosexuals. He argues, with Wilde himself, that his ruin was brought about by his young friend Lord Alfred Douglas who hated his father, the Marquess of Queensbury. It was Lord Alfred who persuaded Wilde, against all the best advice, to bring the disastrous proceedings for criminal libel against Lord Queensbury. The latter instructed Edward Carson who destroyed Wilde in one of the most brilliant examples of cross-examination known in legal history. Mr. Montgomery Hyde summarises this duel between Wilde and Carson to good effect and also the following two trials of Wilde himself leading to the maximum two years' imprisonment with hard labour in Reading Gaol. The tragedy continued into exile and extreme poverty. This is a sympathetic biography in which Mr. Montgomery Hyde makes every allowance possible for Wilde. No doubt he had many endearing qualities and of course has achieved dramatic and literary works of permanent recognition. On the other hand, the author would probably accept that Wilde, by self-control, could have avoided hurting so much so many people, including his wife who was devoted to him, and the corruption of others over so many years. Even today he would have risked prosecution.

**China: the Quality of Life** (Penguin Books. U.K. 90p; U.S.A. $3.95). This is a useful study on conditions in China by two travellers, Wilfred Burchett and Rewi Alley. Mr. Burchett writes: 'What follows represents a synthesis of results of independent travels and investigations carried out in a planned and co-ordinated manner by Rewi Alley and myself in 1973. This is grafted onto the unique experience of Rewi Alley in forty-six years of almost unbroken residence, work and travels in China, as well as intermittent residence and frequent travels by myself over thirty years.' In **The Chinese Literary Scene** (Penguin Books. 95p), Professor Kai-yu Hsu, who is Professor of the Comparative Literature Department at San Francisco State University, has compiled in this volume 'the most influential and best examples of new Chinese writing that I found during my six-month stay in the People's Republic in 1973, my first visit in thirty years'. Professor Kai-yu Hsu concedes, of course, that 'Chinese literature is political propaganda.' On the other hand he notes that 'Chinese playwrights are learning techniques and modes of expression from a wide range of world literature, including the capitalist literature of capitalist America.' One moviemaker in Wuhan told the Professor, 'Without losing ideological purity, we are going to cultivate our own Marxist Shakespeares; who is ever tired of Shakespeare?'

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# Contemporary Review

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## AUSTRALIA'S NEW GOVERNMENT (Part Two)

### by Keith Suter

FRASER in 1975, like Sneddon in 1974, fought the Election on economic issues. But Sneddon damaged his own case by being mauled by journalists and the ALP, who were able to find faults in Sneddon's policies which made him look foolish and which scared the voters because of the proposed cuts. Fraser learnt from that mistake. He said nothing. He must be one of the few political leaders in any country at any time to be elected to office while promising the people precisely nothing. The 'policy' statements said nothing, the L-CP candidates said very little, and during the campaign Fraser was taken ill for a few days without damaging his campaign.

His press conferences were baiting sessions with angry journalists. While the media barons supported Fraser, most journalists were sympathetic to Whitlam—if only because he did at least talk to them. Rupert Murdoch (who also owns *The Sun* newspaper in Britain) was previously pro-ALP but for unclear reasons (probably including Whitlam's refusal to make him High Commissioner to Britain), he supported the L-CP to such an extent that his journalists went on strike—Australia's first journalists' strike—and one even resigned because his stories on Whitlam's campaign were not being published. On several papers as well as Murdoch's, journalists asked that their bylines be removed because of the substantial sub-editing that was done to bring them into line with the owner's views. Fraser, meanwhile, could confidently refuse to answer questions, knowing that the papers would not publish anti-Fraser articles.

Fraser was being honest in his refusal to give detailed answers. He gave the impression of having no specific policies. Since being elected, it is clear that he has no specific policies. This adds still more to the animosity against him in the ALP. If he had been elected and introduced policies to improve the economy, this would have won him a grudging acceptance from the ALP. However, since it is clear that he wanted to become Prime Minister solely because he wanted to become Prime Minister, his grab for power has meant that many people have more doubts about him than about most of

his Liberal predecessors.

The Federal Election was the worst defeat for the ALP in Australia's history. Having brought the Party up from its 1966 disaster, Whitlam made it very briefly Australia's most reformist Government and then went down with it to the ALP's nadir. The L-CP has a record 55 seat majority in the House and it has retained control of the Senate so that, unlike Whitlam, Fraser has no worry about an Opposition-controlled Senate blocking his policies.

In the exciting days, full of promise, in December 1972, with some results from Australia's complicated electoral system yet to be announced, Whitlam formed his first Government consisting of himself, with 13 portfolios, and the Deputy Leader, Lance Barnard, with 14. This Government lasted about a month, until the full Government could be sworn in. A whirlwind of policy changes was announced in that month. Whitlam began as he meant to carry on.

Fraser, by contrast, in December 1975 and January 1976, spent far less time in Canberra and made very few important decisions. Instead, there was only a daily diet of minute expenditure cuts to reduce the anticipated Budget deficit of $4,500m. Inevitably, there have been the cuts in Ministerial 'perks' and Ministerial staff—which will save $2m. Fraser, knowing that he won the Election partly because he said as little as possible, wants to maintain that policy and so has cut back on press secretaries. Whitlam's policy of not controlling press statements from his Ministers, has been replaced with a policy that major statements may only emanate from Fraser. Whitlam's promised 'open' Government never quite occurred; Fraser's will be 'closed' from the outset. One disadvantage of this policy is the boost that it gives Australian antipathy towards politicians in general by implying that all Governmental statements are a waste of money. Public service overtime has been cut; saving about $30m and providing public servants with a good excuse for why they will take even longer to do their work. Also, Government gardens are receiving less attention, fewer paper clips are to be issued, and public servants may not use taxis so often while on official business. The cuts have gradually increased in intensity, with defence expenditure the only area not to be touched. Altogether about $360m has been cut—out of a Budget of $22,000m.

Meanwhile, Fraser has also set about altering Whitlam's petty policies on style. Instead of simply reversing them, he has temporarily reintroduced the previous styles and kept Whitlam's. Australia now has a choice of four national anthems, two honours systems and four official titles for the Federal Government. This may also indicate a return to the Union Jack as an alternative to the Australian flag. These gestures imply that Fraser is indecisive.

After December 13, the country reverted to its traditional apathy towards politics. The annual threat of a beer strike had been averted by the annual increase in pay; the West Indian cricket team had arrived and—despite *The Sunday Express's* description of Australia—Christmas was to be as

materially pleasant for most Australians as previous ones. Moreover, December and January are the months when nature reminds Australians of just how tenuous is their hold on Australia. In December 1973 rain flooded an area the size of Europe; on December 25, 1974 Darwin was totally destroyed by a cyclone; December 1975 was marked by a mixture of winds, floods and bush-fires. John Nash, clairvoyant and house-painter, predicted that Adelaide would be destroyed by an earthquake on January 19, 1976. Some people sold out, others had a short holiday away from Adelaide, many more arrived in Australia's most beautiful city to stand with the state Premier at the expected epicentre. The hour of doom passed, the city was untouched, the crowds went away. But at least it took people's minds off politics.

The summer holiday has already ended. Politics again fill the newspapers—no matter how much Fraser and most Australians would prefer to have a more restful time. Fraser's desire for a return to the safe, somnolent Menzies years cannot happen. One reason for the turmoil of the ALP Government was simply that all western countries are undergoing a turbulent period and Australia cannot avoid this. For example, women's liberation is now beginning to hit hard in Australia but Fraser is trying to ignore it; his attitude to it is summed up in his statement supporting the presence of women in Parliament (there are currently no women MPs) as 'brightening the place up a bit'. A few years ago that sort of remark would have been accepted; now it annoyed a good many women, some of whom are supporters of his Party.

The economy will dominate politics for most of this year. Present indications suggest that the worst has passed and that the economy, like most of those in western countries, is on the mend. But Fraser is determined not to rush the recovery. The Government is safely in power for three years and he will ensure that it will be a gradual recovery. Fraser wants the recovery to come through increased investment in the private sector—rather than by consumer demand—and this means that the 1976 Budget will need to restrict Government expenditure in a big way to reduce inflation and encourage businessmen to invest. In short, there will not be a rapid reduction in unemployment.

If Fraser persists with this tough strategy, 1976 will be a politically rough year. Unfortunately for Australia, the turbulence will come from outside Parliament, rather than inside it, because the ALP is no longer the vehicle for left-wing activism.

Whitlam's political career, on present indications, is finished. On December 13, 1975, as soon as the Election results started to come in with the signs of an ALP defeat, the ALP's accumulated resentment against him gushed out in a startling flood. Many of his colleagues were willing to tolerate his assurance, autocracy and political pragmatism just so long as he kept winning Elections. Once he faltered, he was finished.

At the January 27 meeting of the ALP Parliamentary Caucas, it was decided that all the Shadow Cabinet would be elected for only 18 months,

thereby allowing the Party to use the second period of 18 months to prepare for the 1978 Election. Whitlam was re-elected Leader but not so much for his qualities as Leader as for two negative reasons. First, not to have re-elected him would have been to accept the Kerr-Fraser verdict on him as Prime Minister and the ALP as a Government. Second, the ALP has no one immediately to hand to replace him. The strategy is to use the next 18 months to find his replacement.

One likely person is Bob Hawke, social-democratic President of the Australian Council of Trades Unions. He is a middle-class Rhodes Scholar who, unlike Whitlam, works hard on his 'worker' image—his beer-drinking propensity once earned him a place in the *Guinness Book of Records* and he is a fine cricket player. His main quality is as a very skilful negotiator, who disdains Whitlam's perpetual confrontation approach to politics. Since November 11 he has taken a moderate line on the sacking and subsequent developments, and this has boosted his standing with moderate Australians but has enraged left-wingers. Another person to watch is the suave reformist Don Dunstan, ALP Premier of South Australia.

And now, despite recent attempts to entice him into federal politics, he evidently prefers his present position both because if he left Adelaide the ALP would probably lose the next state election and his private life would be endangered in the vindictive Canberra political fishbowl.

Whitlam's last 18 months will be spent leading a Party of political hacks. The MPs who survived the Election are the old-stagers, who came up through the blood and back-stabbing of the ALP machine. Most of the bright young MPs who should now be reforming the Opposition lost their seats. 43% of the electors voted for the ALP in 1975, only 6% less than in 1974. Owing to the way that they are concentrated in only some constituencies, they elected only about 28% of the MPs. The ALP has been heavily defeated in terms of MPs but not in terms of voters. This adds to the frustration of the more politically active left-wingers, who see that the ALP has solid support but not quite enough to get into office. Even when they do get into office, ALP Governments do not last long.

Therefore, Australia is ruled by a Government which, because of its Parliamentary majority and paranoia for secrecy, will probably be reluctant to take the people into its confidence and which says that it will introduce in 1976 one of the toughest Budgets in Australian history. Meanwhile, the Opposition is more esoterically concerned with reforming itself—always a messy job when the ALP does it.

It is inevitable that the political struggle will be conducted outside Parliament. First, the ALP Government constantly embarrassed the extreme left. It was a 'reformist' Government, rather than a 'socialist' one and so it failed to introduce policies (such as the expulsion of American bases and the nationalisation of foreign companies) which the left wanted. Moreover, when the ALP was elected, most ALP supporters from extreme left to the centre, simply dropped out of politics because they felt that they could leave it all to the Government. This annoyed the extreme left activists both

because they lost members and because the State became the accepted vehicle of social change and it was a vehicle that Whitlam made sure that the left-wingers were going to have no chance of steering. Now the L-CP is back in power, the lines of battle are clearer; non-ALP left-wing groups are once again recruiting members; the economy, especially unemployment, gives much cause for social unrest; and the left-wing core of activists have spent three years synthesising a number of issues like destruction of the environment, the arms race, women's liberation and apartheid in South Africa to attract a broad front of supporters once the political climate changed. The climate has now changed.

Second, it has been a fortunate corollary of Australian apathy towards politics, that no one ever gets sufficiently aroused to embark upon political violence. During the last 200 years, only a handful of people have been killed in political conflicts (excluding the extermination of the Aborigines). This political tranquillity is ending. Australia imports most of its ideas, from political constitutions to pop records. Among its recent imports has been the international fashion for letter bombs. During the 1975 Election campaign, a bomb sent to the hyper-conservative Premier of Queensland seriously injured two mail sorters; bombs sent to Kerr and Fraser were identified in time and safely defused. The people responsible for the bombs have not been caught. The mass media reacted hysterically, giving the Queensland bomb the banner headlines reserved usually for World Wars. Fraser, to his credit, did not exploit the issue. But violence has entered the Australian political culture. Overseas examples have shown how useful bombs can be in causing chaos, especially in cities (Australia is the world's second most urbanised country).

Fraser's attitude towards the unions seems to be that a confrontation between them and the Government will occur eventually and so it will be better to get it quickly over and done with. Hawke has been urging restraint but not even his powers of persuasion may succeed against some of the tougher unions, which are still smarting over the November 11 sacking and want to bring down Fraser. With the economy tentatively recovering, businessmen are worried that a bout of union disputes could damage that fragile growth. The unions know this and may try to use this threat as a lever on businessmen to encourage the Government to follow more moderate economic policies, especially in regard to stimulating consumer demand and reducing unemployment more quickly, even at the threat of boosting inflation.

These three factors could mean that not only will Whitlam not be the ALP Leader for the 1978 Election, but neither will Fraser. The Liberal Party is just as ruthless, though not as messy, as the ALP at settling feuds and replacing Leaders. (The Country Party has no direct say in who should become the Liberal Leader.) Fraser is tolerated by his Liberal colleagues because he has recently had a run of successes. If there is political unrest, his colleagues might close ranks behind him to show support for his policies. Alternatively, he could be sacked and become the scapegoat for the

extremist policies which would be partly blamed by his colleagues for inciting the unrest.

The extent of Fraser's Parliamentary majority is, ironically, a potential source of trouble for him. First, the ALP has 36 MPs, the Country Party 23 and the Liberal Party 68. Even without the CP part of the coalition, Fraser could rule in the lower House. (In the Senate, which tends to be a better reflection of Elections, the ALP and LP are tied at 27 Senators each, with eight CP and two Independent Senators holding the balance.) However, Fraser has to give some of the portfolios to the CP, thereby depriving some Liberals of portfolios.

Second, it is an irony that the 'conservative' Liberals should be so eager —compared with the ALP—to recruit young, energetic Parliamentarians. The present Government is not only far younger collectively than the ALP Government was, but it is one of the youngest in Australian history, with an average age of about 46 years. Therefore, the Ministers expect to be around for several years, thereby still further depriving some Liberals of jobs.

Third, some Liberal MPs are in marginal constituencies. In all Federal Elections since 1966, the swing has gone against whichever Party formed the Government. 1978 will be no exception, if only because it is inconceivable that the Liberal and Country Parties could repeat their 1975 victory on the same scale. Thus, the Liberal MPs would like an opportunity in political office so as to prove their worth to selection panels in other, safer constituencies after they get defeated in 1978. Meanwhile, since the electorate, especially the middle-class suburban voters, have shown themselves to be increasingly volatile since 1966, Liberal MPs generally want the Government to cure the economic problems with the least possible industrial chaos and political violence so as to boost their chances of being re-elected.

Already the warning to Fraser has been sounded. In New South Wales, where the L-CP has ruled since 1965, the state Government thought it would exploit the December 1975 ALP massacre by calling an Election for May 1. The state ALP Leader, carefully excluding Whitlam from the campaign, campaigned on state issues and the unpleasant side of Fraser's policies. To almost everyone's amazement, the ALP won, albeit with a small majority but one which would have seemed a miracle on December 14. The controversy over Fraser's proposed withdrawal of the widow's funeral benefit just days before May 1—an unpleasant policy and an example of politically tactless timing—contributed to the ALP victory. Meanwhile, there will be a state election in Tasmania this year, and ones in Western Australia and South Australia and half the Senate come up for election all next year. A succession of swings to the ALP could rattle the Government.

To sum up, political activity in Australia for the next three years will occur outside Parliament and on two levels. The ALP, more concerned with internal politicking and anyway too poorly represented in Parliament to cause the Government any trouble, will be unimportant at both levels.

First, the main political events in terms of trying to influence Government

policy, will come in the form of political violence or at least industrial action. To all left-wing people, both left-wing supporters of the ALP and the various Communist factions which operate outside the ALP, the sacking of the Whitlam Government has added to their lack of belief in social change being brought about by Parliamentary methods. The ALP Parliamentary contingent will do nothing to restore that faith and so they think it is necessary to resort to further direct action. For the various Communist factions, participation at political meetings aimed at electing ALP MPs or to influence the ALP Government, was largely a sham. November 11 provided them with both the opportunity to openly ridicule Parliament—and the present political system—as the vehicle of social change and it has enabled them to recruit other, disillusioned people. The total number of these extremists is very small. But the next three years will show them to have political power disproportionate to their number. They have important places in trades unions, which the majority of apathetic Australians have not bothered about their getting control of; some unions are entirely controlled by them; meanwhile an even smaller number could bring about chaos through letter-bombs, etc.

Second, the main business of running the country will also occur outside Parliament. As in one-party States around the world, the L-CP's main decisions will be made in closed Party committees; its changes in personnel will be achieved by minor coups within the Party; its decisions will be made for as long as possible without regard to the electoral effects since its supremacy in Parliament cannot be challenged by the ALP and even if the ALP wins the 1978 Election, the L-CP will still control the Senate and so can hinder and, if necessary, take steps to remove, the ALP Government in much the same way as it did 1973 to 1975.

The 1975 Federal Election will long remain one of the most dramatic in Australia's history. It is also one of the most disturbing. The way that the media barons overtly supported their friend Fraser raises the question of just how free are the Australian media. More significantly, for the period 1949 to 1978, Australia will have been ruled (except for the period December 1972 to November 1975) by the L-CP coalition. That 26 years of L-CP rule is considerably longer than most one-party dictatorships in other countries, except eastern Europe and China. Finally, there is the resulting lack of faith among many Australians that they cannot expect social change to come about through the present political system and Parliament. When Kerr closed the Parliament on November he accidentally closed it for at least three years.

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[Mr. Keith D. Suter is a Commonwealth Research Fellow in the Department of Government at the University of Sydney. Part One of *Australia's New Government* appeared in Vol. 229, No. 1326.]

# THE PLO AND ISRAEL

## by Mark A. Bruzonsky

NOT for 20 years, since 1956, have there been such apparent strains in the United States-Israel friendship. Prime Minister Rabin during his recent American visit was reduced to telling Jewish audiences in New York that he believes the U.S. will continue to support Israel. Newspapers are filled with reports indicating that 'rarely have Israelis felt more frustrated and alone'—this one from *The New York Times* last December 2nd.

What is in question is not a U.S. reversal of her traditional policy of aid and sympathy for the Jewish State—the reservoir of support remains nearly filled even though some leaks are detectable. Reduction in the amount of that aid and the pressures for territorial and political concessions which might accompany further aid are the primary sources of today's apprehensions and anxieties.

Beleaguered Israel has never before been so utterly dependent upon the United States. And American Middle East policy is at this very time attempting a lasting alliance with moderate Arab regimes as well as with Israel. How this geopolitical development of major world importance will affect the U.S.-Israel relationship in coming years, and how it will colour U.S. perceptions of her own vital interests in coming months are the basic questions troubling Israeli strategists and planners.

Current concerns nearly all focus on U.S. thinking about attempting to resolve 'the Palestinian problem' and consequently on the U.S. flirtation with the PLO. This problem now occupies centre stage in the overall confusion of various national policies, interests and strategies. The fear among many of Israel's supporters is not simply that the U.S. will one day soon recognise Palestinian 'national rights', going beyond today's acknowledgement of Palestinian 'legitimate interests'. After all, nearly the entire world has already legitimised such a formulation of the problem.

The real difficulty for those concerned about Israel's future is that this step might be taken without an unwavering insistence by the United States that the PLO acknowledge co-existence with Israel as an acceptable aim. Recent developments do in fact add up to reasons for fearing that the perceived U.S. need for at least the appearance of diplomatic movement might result in a watering down of this most basic condition. There are as well, fortunately, reasons to hope that Kissinger's State Department is aware how crucial and uncompromiseable this PLO concession really is. This realisation then will continue to necessitate unswerving insistence that the moderates in the PLO take the plunge toward mutual recognition in exchange for the likelihood of a Palestinian state.

The Saunders statement must be the starting point of any attempt to comprehend what is really going on. If there are still those who think the Saunders statement anything less than a new American policy on 'the

Palestinian problem', subsequent events since November 12, 1975, should have dispelled such doubts.

Israeli protests when the statement was first made before a subcommittee of the Congress were immediate and vehement. Indeed, Israel's over-reaction elevated the cautious American change of position to front-page news in the U.S. as well as in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the State Department refused to budge in the face of repeated Israeli challenges.

In fact, the department took the unusual step of underscoring the significance of then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold Saunders' statement by releasing it as an official statement of 'Current Policy'. (Saunders has since been promoted to direct the department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research). And then under the title *Department of State Bulletin*, 'the official weekly record of United States foreign policy'.

Since these publications occurred a number of weeks after the initial furore, it became clearer in December that the department had finally decided to begin the process which might result in acceptance of the PLO along with the formula of 'national rights'. This might lead to discussion of a West Bank plus Gaza Strip Palestinian State. U.S. toleration at the end of last year of the Syrian gambit to link PLO participation in a Security Council Middle East debate with renewal of the mandate for U.N. forces in the Golan Heights became the next red flag for cautious Israelis. And then in January the *London Financial Times* reported the U.S. to be involved in 'clandestine diplomacy' with the PLO through Connecticut State College. As was to be expected, the State Department's perfunctory denial did not prevent this story too from becoming front-page news in Israel.

January's Security Council veto of a resolution which would have actually sanctioned a Palestinian state has not altered this now fundamental U.S. course. American policy continues to be an attempt to influence the PLO toward a position which can be said to warrant some form of U.S. recognition. Then the next step would be to bring about some form of actual negotiations, if necessary, by dragging both the Israelis and the PLO moderates down the road of possible co-existence.

In the ranks of the PLO the debate over a response to U.S. probings has not yet yielded any clearly recognisable response. When the conflict in Lebanon is finally stabilised, though, it is certain that various factions of the PLO will continue to assess the possible implications of U.S. flirtatiousness. The result remains obscured by the considerable disarray within the PLO and by tremendous ideological, political and historical barriers all but preventing any unambiguous concessions which would imply a willingness to accept the legitimacy of the Jewish state.

Some observers have concluded that the PLO's role at the January Security Council debate was influenced by U.S. overtures. *The Washington Post* points out that 'The resolution endorsed an "independent" state, not a secular one; and a state "*in* Palestine" as opposed to "of Palestine"—a formulation meant to leave room for pre-1967 Israel'. According to the

*Post's* analysts, 'The resolution was perhaps the most constructive pro-Palestinian resolution ever to come out of the United Nations'. And the *Jordan Times* implies that the vetoed resolution was actually an attempt to reach out toward a position acceptable to the U.S. if not Israel. 'The Palestinians have taken a major step forward', said the paper which reflects official Jordanian thinking. By accepting the clause that every nation in the region has the right to 'sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence', the paper feels the Palestinians have shown 'an implicit recognition of the right of an Israeli state to exist'.

All this remains, however, highly debatable. The PLO fought the inclusion of the clause on guarantees. And lacking the necessity to vote on the final resolution the PLO cannot be said to have approved of it. Certainly most of the writings by political spokesmen as well as Security Council representative Khadoumi's verbal utterances can reasonably be said to lead to the opposite conclusion, as proclaimed by Abuiyyad.

Even if the more optimistic interpretations of what has been taking place have some merit, the PLO and the U.S. are not anywhere near being satisfied with each other. All that can be said for sure is that the courtship is continuing and may clear a path to Geneva.

Many in Israel are not blind to this U.S.-PLO romance. There was a report in *The Jerusalem Post* a few days after the Saunders earthquake indicating that his boss, Assistant Secretary Alfred Atherton, had told Jewish leaders in Washington that Saunders had 'erred'. Yet more seasoned American watchers know which way the wind is really blowing.

One of the best, M. K. Aharon Yariv, former Minister of Information, recently returned from a U.S. mission to warn Israelis of 'U.S. pressure for an overall settlement which would involve maximal territorial concessions but would be weak on the content of peace. . . . They are getting fed up', he bluntly told Israelis. One day they might just lay down the line to us: take it or leave it'.

What is not agreed upon by even the pro-Palestinian moderates in Israel is how best to respond to all of these developments. Should there be continuing attacks on the PLO, possibly coupled with renewed overtures to West Bank moderates; or maybe quiet diplomacy with the Americans coupled with a more positive Israeli attitude; or an Israeli peace initiative which could turn the U.S.-PLO game of mutual testing into a three-sided affair?

There remains widespread scepticism in Israel that there really are PLO 'moderates' when it comes to the possibility of a lasting and peaceful co-existence with Israel. Still various factions even within the ruling Labour coalition have competing ideas about how to proceed. There is near universal agreement that Israel must make sure the U.S. holds true to the promise, given when Israel agreed to the second Sinai disengagement, that the U.S. will coordinate its Palestinian policy with the Israelis. But how, in view of the Saunders beginning and the likelihood that the U.S. will keep on probing?

More and more within Israel there is support for what is now known as

the Yariv-Shemtov policy toward the PLO. This approach basically offers the PLO a role as representative of the Palestinians at Geneva in exchange for recognition of Israel, renunciation of terrorism, and acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations.

But anyone familiar with internal Israeli politics and with the generally shared Israeli misgivings about any and everything involving the PLO knows that even this seemingly reasonable policy would be one fraught with political traps, domestically and internationally. Movement toward such a policy—and there have been cautious efforts by some since the initial recovery from the Yom Kippur War—is akin to feeling one's way through a minefield. Rabin's coalition has approximately reached the point of no return—there's no going back to the old Golda approach (i.e., 'The Palestinians . . . who are the Palestinians?') but there is no agreement on how to proceed forward either. Domestically the country might explode should Rabin accept the liberal-dovish approach. And internationally Rabin is risking a real tear in the fabric of U.S.-Israeli relations should he hold fast. Then on top of everything else there are basic diplomatic considerations. Once Israel says 'Yes, if' to the PLO, what leverage will the U.S. have if she then maintains her present stance and demands the same concessions as Israel? The U.S. is now supposed to be 'even-handed'. If Israel says one thing the U.S. is at least expected to be more moderate. And finally there are the realpolitik considerations. Once Israel says 'Yes, if' how can she make sure the PLO and the Soviet Union will not force themselves through the open door with waves of diplomatic hot air? Israel might then find herself unable to hold the door only slightly ajar and unable to achieve the minimum conditions thought necessary to risk giving up the territories and contemplating a neighbouring Palestinian state.

While many in Israel quietly acknowledge all these dilemmas and risks, support for easing forward through the political minefield does appear to be growing. And much of this support is traceable to a belief that Israel should be firm but not unreasonable. The Yariv-Shemtov formula has become for many the test of reasonableness. It may as well be the test which Foggy Bottom will use to determine if Rabin's government has the necessary flexibility to continue as a partner in U.S. efforts or if Israel is so paralysed that imposition of terms may be the only way to make progress. This was, after all, the case just last year when the 'reassessment' brought about a more conciliatory Israel after a few months of arm twisting.

Even Chaim Herzog, currently Israel's U.N. Ambassador, and a pre-Yom Kippur War advocate of policies in accord with the Yariv-Shemtov approach, continues to be in favour of an Israeli effort to make the U.S.-PLO dalliance triangular. 'I am not free today', Herzog recently said rather coyly, 'to express my opinion on this issue. But I can mention a recent article by Shafiq al-Hut, a top PLO official in Beirut. In it he wrote that Yariv's proposal came as a thunderbolt to the PLO and caused deep rifts within their ranks. The removal of the proposal, al-Hut added, came as a blessing from heaven'.

To sum it all up, the heat is on in Israel because Yariv is essentially correct in his realisation that the U.S. might soon seriously consider attempts to impose some kind of negotiations upon Israel. Such a day might not be that distant unless Israel shows some signs of being able to take some initiatives of her own.

In Washington meanwhile the previous complete solidarity within the American Jewish community is recognised to be dissolving and this gives the Administration more domestic leeway than ever before. Even a number of Jewish leaders, most of whom seek anonymity, have begun discussing the need for increasing pressure on an Israeli government paralysed by domestic politics and a somewhat myopic vision of Arab and Palestinian attitudes.

One such leader who has publicly spoken out is Rabbi Henry Seigman, Executive Vice-President of the Synagogue Council of America. Writing in *Moment* magazine, Seigman boldly asserts that Israeli attempts to maintain current political positions 'may contain the seeds of disaster'. And he terms as 'mindless dogmatism' the way in which the American Jewish community has traditionally 'suspend[ed] its own critical judgement entirely when it comes to Israeli foreign policy'. There is, according to Seigman, an 'irrational unwillingness to look at new realities'.

Clearly the new realities are becoming impossible to overlook. To many Americans Rabin appears simply to be attempting to 'tough it out'—to use a phrase reminiscent of his 1972 choice for the American Presidency. His coalition is too fragile for any bold policy changes and the November American election makes increased American pressure unlikely, he has probably concluded. Even if pressures do build, both Kissinger and Ford may not be around in a few months.

Yet, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that Rabin will manage to avoid a major debate within his own country, this time with a serious challenge from the doves. And it is increasingly doubtful that the U.S. will tolerate continuing stalemate. Ford and Kissinger mean what they say on this issue. Moreover, the new perception of U.S. interests goes beyond this Administration—a new President and Secretary of State will find the same coalition of forces, pressures and interests.

In Israel, with the Committee for an Israeli-Palestinian Peace (Eliav, Pa'il and Avneri among others) openly advocating a Palestinian State on the West Bank and in Gaza and negotiations even with the PLO 'on the basis of mutual recognition, the Rabin coalition plan to at least wait until 1977 (if not the passing of the 'seven lean years' the Prime Minister used to discuss) is under the greatest internal challenge ever. Even Abba Eban and Itzhak Navon, Chairman of the Knesset's important Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, are increasingly speaking out for policy changes toward the PLO similar to those advocated by then Minister Yariv in 1974.

And while within Israel those pushing for an overall peace initiative remain rather isolated, no matter how articulate, in the U.S., those supporting American determination to push forward are growing in numbers. Returning from a two-week visit to Israel sponsored by the pro-Israeli

American Professors for Peace in the Middle East, Georgetown University's Government Department Chairman, Dr. William O'Brien, recently summed-up American sentiment. 'I'm afraid we're just stuck with the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians', he told a gathering of Jewish students at his university. 'Israel simply has to negotiate even though the odds are against her.'

In short, Yariv did read American attitudes rather well during his visit. The U.S. is moving towards some form of PLO recognition. The State Department has made itself clear that what the U.S. requires is a less ambiguous willingness by PLO moderates to accept a Palestinian State solution. Put diplomatically, this means just what Saunders testified in November. 'What is needed as a first step', he then asserted, 'is a diplomatic process which will help bring forth a reasonable definition of Palestinian interests—a position from which negotiations on a solution of the Palestinian aspects of the problem might begin. . . . It is obvious', he continued, 'that thinking on the Palestinian aspects of the problem must evolve on all sides'. Read together with what the Israelis consider Saunders' greatest blunder—his opening assertion that 'In many ways the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of the conflict'—American willingness to entertain the possibility of a Palestinian State is reasonably beyond doubt. Kissinger's way of preventing a Palestinian state from coming under Soviet domination might be to offer the Palestinians American sponsorship under the right conditions.

Both Kissinger and Ford have been pressuring Rabin hard to allow some form of separate Palestinian presence at Geneva. Rabin's firm 'no' represents his coalition's determination not to open the door to any possibility of a Soviet-backed Palestinian state on Israel's eastern borders. U.S. policy nonetheless appears to be willing to push a process through which both the PLO and Israel would eventually agree to some kind of negotiations that might lead to mutual recognition, *de facto* if not *de jure*—the U.S. stands willing to take credit for any progress. At least this is how one highly influential person in the State Department recently explained it to a group of visiting scholars. Rabin's absolute unwillingness to consider any such scheme is thought to be more and more only a facade attempting to mask how fragile Israel's 'under no circumstances' policy has become.

The recently revealed cut in military aid to Israel is undoubtedly another American way of telling Rabin what's up. This is true regardless whether the premature announcement of the cut was purposeful or by error—recalling Kissinger's back and forths about the Saunders document it's a good bet that the aid cut announcement was more than a printer's goof. And Congressional efforts to restore the aid cannot remove the ever-increasing issue of Israeli dependency.

One reason for the aid cuts and the relentless pressure, beyond Israel's dependency, is that the State Department is reasonably pleased with American reactions to the Saunders approach. Only *The Wall Street Journal* of the major newspapers counselled that 'The U.S. is moving too quickly'.

And even so, the *Journal* noted that Saunders' assertion that the Palestinian dimension is the heart of the conflict is 'indeed true' while correctly adding that it is also true, as Israel insists, that 'the real crux is Arab refusal to acknowledge their state's right to exist'.

What the Israelis have not perceived as yet is that in this election year it may well prove popular to give an appearance at least of strong efforts to force negotiations. *The Washington Post* recently added up the risks and came to the conclusion that 'This new policy emphasis of cautious hospitality to Palestinian moderates holds out considerable diplomatic and political risk to the Ford Administration. So central is the Palestinian question, however, that we think the risk prudent, even essential to take'. Whether there actually are Palestinian moderates and whether they will respond to U.S. overtures, it does seem likely the Ford-Kissinger Administration or its successor will continue the dance, applying ever more pressure upon Israel for similar flexibility.

Amid all this manoeuvring, Rabin came to Washington in late January insisting that 'You cannot achieve peace but from the standpoint of strength. It cannot be done from a standpoint of weakness. With a weak Israel no one will negotiate. Only in a strong Israel can there be a hope for peace'. Yet strength is undebatably more than military might and 'defensible borders'. Politically, Rabin should know better than anyone else how weakened Israel has become in recent months. Now the U.S. cut in aid coupled with unprecedented Arab political, military and economic strength is putting Israel in the kind of position where another Arab attack is thinkable. Since another war would seriously further damage Israel's political, economic and psychological health, this is just the kind of situation which might make war rational in the Arab perspective. Consequently, a major peace initiative designed to improve Israel's overall posture of strength (as well as to test Arab intentions) seems no more risky than continuation of present policies. Support for such a peace initiative has begun coming from those whose preoccupation is realpolitik as well as from the optimists. Such a coalition will have a rather difficult time deciding just what to say, but at least there might soon be enough support to say something new.

Even without a comprehensive initiative, Israeli policies toward the Palestinians and the PLO may not be maintainable much longer. Rabin keeps trying to prop up his sinking policies but he often alienates at least as many as he convinces. Shimon Shamir, head of Tel Aviv University's history department, recently wrote that 'Some of Rabin's statements seem so divorced from the present realities in the Middle East that it was difficult to believe that he meant what he said'.

It is a losing battle continuing to try to deny Palestinian national rights and some legitimacy to PLO claims to representativeness. A new battle, after a tactical political retreat, can however be successfully fought over the absolute necessity for mutual recognition and over what reasonable conditions Israel can rightly expect to be agreed upon during negotiations which could lead to a Palestinian state. Unless ex-General Rabin recognises the

line-up of political as well as military forces and realises the necessity of retreat to more defensible political battle lines, he may lack the strength and forces to do so later.

The greatest danger facing Israel is not internal dissension nor is it possible future discussions with the PLO. More important than everything else is U.S. determination to insist that the PLO acknowledge the aim of co-existence with Israel and consequently be willing to recognise Israel's legitimacy in exchange for discussions about a Palestinian state and Israeli acceptance of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian Arab people. Shamir's warning is the most crucial one for Rabin. 'It may be', Shamir insists, 'that this is the last chance Israel will have to consolidate a position with the US which would exchange PLO participation for meaningful and concrete concessions'. Unfortunately the strain in U.S.-Israel relations may make this consolidation impossible. Already the U.S. is thinking of a formula of conditional PLO participation at Geneva where the PLO would only have to agree that a *possible outcome* of indirect negotiations might be recognition of Israel. To prevent the U.S. from going too far, Israel must make sure, as previously mentioned, to be both firm and reasonable. It is the reasonableness of current Israeli policy which is under challenge and the Yariv-Shemtov formula would do much to undo the damage. If the deterioration of Israel's position continues, however, the movement toward an imposed settlement might become the only option open to the U.S.

A *Washington Post* editorial following the conclusion of the recent Security Council debate perhaps has best summarised the sympathetic but determined American attitude which has developed toward Israel. Rabin, the editorial states,

> will have to display great qualities of leadership to start moving the Israeli mainstream toward a position on the vital Palestinian issue consistent with the world's interest in a Middle East settlement. We think, nonetheless, that this is the direction in which Israeli as well as American policy must move. . . . A Palestinian state . . . will eventually have to be established in the Middle East.

It is as yet too early to decide whether recent dramatic events at Entebbe will materially influence an essentially complex situation. It may be of interest to note that during June the Security Council at the U.N. called for a two-phase programme for the return of displaced Palestinians to their homes, recommending June 1st, 1977, for Israel's withdrawal of occupied territories.

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[Mark A. Bruzonsky, B.A. (Lawrence University 1965), M.P.A. in international affairs (Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University 1973), J.D. (New York University law school 1974) recently returned from a visit to Israel and is now completing a book co-authored with Professor Israel Singer focusing on the possibility of co-existence between Israel and a Palestinian State. The book is entitled *Let There Be Peace*. He published in April a monograph titled *A United States Guarantee For Israel*? at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.]

# MIXING OIL AND POLITICS: THE CASE OF IRAN

## by Keith M. Henderson

THE oil-rich monarchy of Iran provides an interesting case study of a country pursuing an ambitious, long-term development policy which seeks to establish an industrial economy similar to that of leading international powers before its oil revenues are exhausted. Indeed, the stated objective is to become one of the world's leading industrial nations in little more than a decade. Numerous alliances with other countries—some widely publicised; some not—and a mixture of governmental and business enterprise are the cornerstones of development policy. However, flaws which may spell serious trouble have developed in both the planning and execution of policy and these should provide lessons for other ambitious countries.

There are no oil wells in Tehran, the capital city and financial centre of Iran. Oil lies 600 miles to the south on the Persian Gulf where virtually all the revenue is generated which makes Tehran thrive. Decisions are made in Tehran, negotiations between the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the multinational oil companies which buy from NIOC are conducted there, and—in spite of decentralisation plans—most budget expenditures are centred there. Tehran is a city modernising too quickly as its four million citizens cope with sudden progress from the starting point of age-worn traditions concerning family life, rituals of hospitality and courtesy, and the dwindling but still important influence of the Shia Moslem faith. Massive traffic jams, severe air pollution, frenetic activity (many professionals hold down two full-time jobs) are some of the signs of rapid change.

There is only one political force in Tehran as in the rest of the large, arid country: the person of His Imperial Majesty, the Shahanshah Aryamehr Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. He is regarded as not only a Shah, or King, but the Shah of Shahs to whom other Kings must pay court. He is the Aryamehr or Light of the Aryans, and he represents the culmination of 2,500 years of dynastic rule. In the Gulf area; in Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Mashad and other cities; on the caviar-producing Caspian; and in the barren hinterland he is publicly revered. There is no political dissent and criticism of the Shah is not tolerated. Many western journalists, political leaders, and academics —including this one—who have had the uncommon opportunity to interview the Shah, have been impressed with his intellect, grasp of issues, political astuteness, and fortitude. This self-confident monarch is a friend of the West and East, North and South, and has parlayed the new oil wealth of his country into a variety of skilfully-designed enterprises. From his summer and winter palaces—unrivalled in size and opulence anywhere in the modern world — the Shah himself directs his government, involving himself actively in all major decisions affecting creation and expenditure of revenue from the Gulf.

Iran's basic development strategy is encompassed in the Fifth Develop-

ment Plan, as modified, which specifies a variety of targets in industry, mining, agriculture, transportation, telecommunications, electricity, energy, education, health, social welfare, defence, housing, and urban and regional development.

The projected growth rate in Iran's Fifth Development Plan (which began in March 1973) is 17% per year for the industrial sector. If this seems ambitious, it should be noted that in the plan's first year the industrial sector exceeded its target by 2%. Other sectors have also done well and even those which have been relatively laggard appear successful in comparative terms: the food processing industry, for example, just managed to meet its projected 11% growth rate.

In order to avoid exacerbation of what is called sometimes the 'dualistic economy' (a successful, capital-intensive subsector co-existing with a backward, traditional economy—the former usually urban and the latter rural), Iran has established guidelines for industrial dispersion, the nucleus of which is the creation of industrial estates in different parts of the country. In Tehran, where most large-scale enterprises are now located, permits for new industries or expansion of existing facilities are no longer issued. Relocation to nearby centres such as Karaj and into the provinces is encouraged.

Two major industrial estates have already been established near Qazvin and in Ahvaz. One hundred and forty industrial plants are presently housed in Qazvin and a smaller number in Ahvaz. In Rasht and Tabriz work has begun to create estates of the Qazvin type and a similar project is already under way in Saveh, approximately 100 kilometres south of Tehran.

One of the obstacles countries such as Iran face in development planning is a cumbersome, inefficient bureaucracy. Duplication, overlapping responsibilities, excessive delay, and voluminous cross-checking of minor procedural matters are common. Industrial decentralisation, for example, involves the Ministry of Economics and Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Mines, the Industrial Development and Renovation Organisation, the Plan Organisation, and other units of the vast governmental machinery. In the industrial estate near Qazvin all of these agencies are functioning (e.g. the Industrial Development and Renovation Organisation holds shares in the estate) as well as the Organisation for Industrial Estates and Small Industries.

In the past, development policy has been haphazard and incomplete. Reporting on the period between 1958-61, Professor George Baldwin—who was a member of the Harvard Advisory Group formed to organise a planning staff—reported that, 'What I have said, I suppose, is that the attempt to plan in Iran turned into a high-risk investment that did not pay off'.[1] Powerful forces having nothing to do with planning, according to Baldwin, pushed Iran forward.

By the time of the Fourth Development Plan in 1968, the Shahanshah had launched and implemented his 'White Revolution' encompassing programmes such as land reform, and literacy, health, and rural development

campaigns. The Fourth Plan reflects these programmes as well as more sophisticated planning techniques and greater emphasis upon industrialisation. In addition, steps were begun to improve the bureaucracy.

During the five years of this Fourth Plan, the country achieved an impressive growth rate averaging 11.4% per year. Foreign investment was encouraged and adjustments were made in exploitation of natural resources, principally oil. Recognising the problem of a dualistic economy, the Fifth Plan pursues the objectives of the Fourth but stresses a balanced distribution of national development efforts among the country's diverse regions. Steel-making would be concentrated in Isfahan, telecommunications in Tehran, nuclear power on the Persian Gulf.[2]

An enduring problem for Iran as it rapidly modernises is the shortage of skilled labour. It has been necessary to import workers from other Asian countries to satisfy such needs as construction, operation of heavy equipment, and maintenance of technical facilities.

Symptomatic of the efforts to expand the indigenous labour supply is the large number of new technological institutes designed to provide job skills. Early in 1976, work is scheduled to begin on a large educational complex outside Tehran which would train up to 12,000 technicians for the expanding transportation network. Students will be trained for shipping, road, and railway positions as skilled labourers, technicians, and engineering assistants. Other similar ventures are planned.[3]

Education, in general, is envisaged as a critical element in development policy with conscious attention given to improvement in quality, increases in numbers, and the role of public education in the furtherance of the monarchy's goals. Reforms initiated in 1965-66 are being gradually implemented. The basic scheme—made free for all pupils as of February 1974 through nationalisation of private schools—involves 5 years of elementary education, 3 years in 'guidance' schools, and 4 years of secondary education. Elementary consists of three types: ordinary, education corps (in rural areas), and special schools for exceptional children. The 'guidance' schools are designed to guide pupils into various careers and 'build good characters'. Secondary education is either academic, comprehensive, or technical-vocational. The category labelled comprehensive is a middle-ground which permits the student to switch to an academic programme if he passes an examination.[4] The intent is for only the graduates of academic programmes to pursue higher education in the fiercely competitive University of Tehran and other, newer universities within Iran.

Projecting the progress of the early 1970s into the future, at the same rates of growth and with the same degree of success in international affairs, could place Iran among the world's leading powers within a decade.

However, over-ambitious plans often go awry and some signs are already evident of difficulties ahead for a country almost totally dependent upon oil for its rapid rise.

With the economic recession of 1974-75, coincident with suddenly increased prices for oil, demand dropped off in Western countries—particu-

larly for the high-quality Iranian crude which had been pegged above those from neighbouring oil-producing countries. Oil revenues in Iran were down three billion dollars at the height of the recession, causing a 2.4 billion deficit in Iran's current budget (for the year 2535, March 1976 to March 1977) of 45 billion dollars. Revisions were made in development policies and, as one newspaper euphemistically put it, 'Shifts of emphasis in next year's spending'[5] occurred. In early 1976, Iran actually reduced the price of its crude oil by 9½ cents per barrel in order to stimulate sales. This surprise move was a direct response to a drop in production of 11% in 1975 over 1974.

What happens when expected progress does not take place?

Disillusioned young people, educated at great cost in the reformed educational system, may flee the country, depriving Iran of talent it badly needs. Capital investments may seem less secure as arbitrary government policies seek to recoup oil-revenue shortfalls from other sources. Political turmoil may result when signs of economic downturn are evident. The basic lesson is not to raise expectations to such a high level that they can not with high probability be realised, and not to attempt too much too quickly without the proper infrastructure or skills.

A further difficulty lies in the precarious course which Iran has chosen politically by placing so much emphasis upon the role of the Shah. The heir-apparent, Crown Prince Reza, is a teenager. There is no back-up man for the Shah, no single behind-the-scenes elite, no clear locus of alternative power. So successful has the Shah been at fending off potential threats that there is no one who can take his place. Unlike succession in other oil-producing monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, in Iran any disaster befalling the Shah would be a disaster for his country.

Thus Iran walks on slick oil; hopefully, it will not slip.

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NOTES

[1] *Planning and Development in Iran* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1967) p. viii.
[2] Twenty to twenty-five reactors with a total capacity of 23,000 megowatts are planned. *Tehran Journal*, October 26, 1975.
[3] *Kayhan International*, October 28, 1975.
[4] Hassan Besharat and Mehdi Hashemi, *The New System of Education in Iran*, unpublished paper prepared for Deputy Ministry for Instructional Affairs, March, 1974.
[5] *Kayhan International*, February 12, 1976.

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[Professor Keith M. Henderson is Fulbright Lecturer, University of Tehran; on leave as Professor of Political Science, State University of New York.]

# TWO POEMS

## AL-UKHAIDIR

Leaving Kerbela the road becomes a track
and south-westward the deserts of Arabia
stretch all the way to Mecca and Medina.

A few miles out into the lonely waste
stands Al-Ukhaidir, the haunted ruins
of a pleasure-palace built by an early caliph.

Desolate beside a shrunken wadi,
the circular buttresses and vaulted colonnades,
neither Byzantine nor Persian,

are perhaps the first bold step
in the evolution of an Arab style found
from the Bay of Biscay to the Indus.

The massive walls and open-ended hall,
with its elegant archway, created amid
the fierce certainty of a new religion,

still seem to echo with the passing hooves,
the impatient cries of lean fanatic horsemen,
eager for Damascus and the cities beyond.

## KUWAIT

Here oil and water resplendently
combine to create a new Babylon.
Everywhere bulldozers attack
the surrounding desert, preparing the way
for more acres of steel and concrete,
while cars jam the broad avenues.

Yet troubled by the vast possibilities
always the anxious gaze returns to the sea.
The restless mind escapes beyond the city
boundaries to undulating sands.
Down tunnels of regret the memory
drifts back to relics of mud walls,
the fishing fleet of dhows upon the bay,
the nomadic murmurings in the veins.

RAYMOND TONG

# THE DISINTEGRATION OF ENGLISH SOCIETY SINCE THE MIDDLE AGES

## by Lord Sudeley

DURING the Middle Ages small really was, as the topical cliché has it, beautiful. In mediaeval times our ancestors could indeed feel that they were a significant part of the society in which they lived, as the more significant forms of social organisation under which they lived were of a small, direct or local character. First, and above all, there was the institution of marriage, then of an irrefragable character and thereby creating a permanent relationship with your wife's family. By the teaching of the Church the secondary object of such marriage was the emotional character of your relationship with your wife; its principal aim was the procreation of children. The institution of marriage and therefore of the family, thus conceived and beatified by the Church, lay at the root and fundament of the better part of other features of mediaeval society: the whole notion of a kingdom, which had been created through the unification of those extended forms of a family, the tribes; an hereditary kingship; the inheritance of other positions of authority to which loyalty might be owed; and the freedom existing through the hereditary possession of property that might otherwise have been under the absolute control of a totalitarian state. The idea of an hereditary principle which emanated from the sacred character of the family in these ways did as much as Christianity itself to hold mediaeval society together.

There was secondly the region: the local market town with its trade privileges, the parish, and the manor, all flourishing, often with their own particular jurisdictions, owing to the great poverty of communications during the Middle Ages. The Middle Ages were feudal; and if I was asked what was the chief meaning of that feudal character, I would say that it was this intensely local basis to things.

There was thirdly the organisation of industrial work in the guild, under which the ties amongst all the individual members were of a much closer and more personal character than in a modern Trades Union. In mediaeval times men did not work to produce as many shoddy goods as they could as cheaply as possible so as to enrich their employers selling such goods at as high a profit as they could. Members of a mediaeval guild were united, as William Morris later said they should be, in a desire to produce goods of as good a quality, and even beauty, as they could. Moreover, as members of a guild, our mediaeval ancestors used to look on their association as a kind of friendly society. The members of a guild would meet to drink, and take care of their poorer members.

Superimposed above the small and particular forms of social organisation I have described was a national centre of authority, the monarchy. The power of such a monarchy was, however, emphatically not absolute, like

that of the tyrant in Aristotle's *Politics* or the dictator of a modern totalitarian state. In mediaeval times the poor character of communications alone sufficed to prevent the centralised authority of the Crown from exercising any too detailed scrutiny of all the day to day affairs conducted on any local basis. Added to which, the king really was the servant of his own people. Since his authority was sanctified from above, the king in his exercise of such authority really did serve all who were under him; and it certainly was part of the doctrine of the mediaeval church, that subjects had a right to rebel against any king who in this way was disobedient to the law of God.

There were, moreover, the estates within the realm which on a national level might act as a temporal check on the overweening power of the monarchy. Magna Carta demonstrated how, as an estate within the realm, the peers might hold the king to ransom, and later on, in the 15th century, as the king was weak or imbecilic, the peers themselves, around fifty in number, attainted one another and appointed the king. Other estates of the realm acted likewise as a check on the absolute authority of the Crown. Which estates these were to be, and in what chamber or chambers they were to be represented, was at first an open question. There are indications that Edward I wanted a chamber of lawyers, and the clergy might have sat in the House of Commons. As it was, the House of Commons came to represent the two specific communities within the realm of the knights and burgesses; and the clergy, in the wish to preserve their very rich estates from excessive taxation at the hands of these two other powers within the realm, preferred to vote their taxes through their independent body of Convocation.

Such were the secular aspects of the mediaeval body politic, the prime characteristic of which, I would say, was the mutual interdependentness of all the various parts. Whichever may have been the particular niches which any of our mediaeval ancestors occupied in the community, he must always have understood how in his own particular niche—whether as the king who was the servant of his own people, as a baron who held land for the principal purpose of keeping order in his own region, or the members of a trade guild who were concerned with the quality of what they produced—all felt that in their daily vocation they were part and parcel and servants of the larger community to which, in their separate ways, they all belonged.

Such an all-embracing sense of community drew a great part of its strength from religion and the Church. Even at its most cynical level, such religion might be understood as so much social cement; and the Almighty as a fiction for maintaining social cooperation and a proper and privileged order of society (under the Bourbon Restoration reactionaries looked on the revival of religion as the spearhead for the resuscitation of feudal privileges). On a more practical level, I have mentioned how the power of the king himself, in its secular guise, was sanctified from above. There were many ecclesiastics in the government—the mediaeval equivalent of our Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor, was usually an ecclesiastic. Through its own

courts, the Church supervised the workings of the economy, and treated usury, as its parasitical and anti-social concomitant, as no proper occupation for a Christian.

Such was the golden period of the Middle Ages. The gradual departure from that perfect order of things began during the Reformation. It was then that the supervision which the Church had exercised over trade and usury weakened, and a growing secular edifice of usury and contract helped to undermine the corporate basis of mediaeval society.

Although men of religion, the leading representatives of the new contract and usury were of a Puritan inclination; theirs was an individualistic creed; and chief amongst the ways in which the individualistic character of their creed differed from the old corporate religion turned on their attitude towards confession. Under the mediaeval Roman Catholic hierarchy, any man who wronged his neighbours and so sinned against society confessed to the representative of an order of priesthood which I have indicated was not divorced from the established political hierarchy, but very much interwoven with it. The new Puritan, however, who made his profits out of trade and usury, bypassed the priesthood altogether: looking on himself as being in an entirely personal communication with the Almighty, he regarded his conscience as his own private affair. Whether what he did was right or wrong became therefore a matter of his own personal choice, rather than what might have been adjudicated by a priesthood in whose pronouncements all other members of society believed.

During the 18th century, the connection between the growth of individualism and the increasing ascendancy of trade or contract as the basis of society was sustained and fostered. Sometimes the Glorious Revolution of 1688 has been looked on as the turning point at which a united society built up out of *distinctions*, resting in large part on the family and therefore hereditary considerations of birth, was succeeded by a society as yet potentially at war with itself, as it consisted of *divisions* emanating from a mere basis of contract without the backing of any kind of religious sanction. For the Glorious Revolution was the point at which England ceased to be ruled by hereditary princes; she became ruled by *parvenu* merchants. The Whigs who brought over a Dutch king pawned the very government itself to a banking interest through the creation of a National Debt, sustained to fight a war against Louis XIV, who befriended the old Stuart monarchy.

Such an anonymous and highly commercial basis which the English government adopted under the Hanoverians was endorsed by the political philosophy of Locke. The irreligious basis which this philosopher gave to much of his political system—that is to say, his denial that in its origin the state had any divine sanction—enabled him to suppose that a state could be put together, like a joint stock enterprise, for the mutual convenience of all its members wishing to protect their own property, in the ownership of which they were put under no obligation whatsoever towards their neighbours. Such a formal division of religion, and of all the social obligations particularly in the possession of property that it might create from the body

politic as Locke envisaged has survived and grown to this day, in the form of the widespread conviction that the Church should keep out of politics, with the ultimate consequences (with us now) of a permissive society and the weakening of the family.

British politics received its next dose of poison from the political ideas of the French philosophers, especially Voltaire and Rousseau. It is generally true to say that the liberal systems of the philosophers proceeded from a somewhat agnostic basis, like the philosophy of Locke. Like Locke, they denied that we had inherited original sin, and therefore that we might receive any divine grace to relieve our miserable condition; they supposed instead, that if only some beneficent legislator could change the laws and customs under which we live, then society might progress towards the better condition in which the much to be desired result would be achieved of making everybody happy. In other words, they overlooked what any mere observation of the human condition must tell us, that we are not born always to be happy—and that largely because sin, being part of our nature, something which we have inherited, is something which no legislator by any kind of human law can eradicate.

The French envisaged that progress towards an imaginary state of happiness might be achieved through extending the notion of absolute individual rights from the economic to the political sphere. Owing to his conception of the purposes of property, Locke denied, on an economic level, the interdependent character of society: in your absolute rights to property you were not placed under any sort of obligations towards your neighbours, as St. Thomas Aquinas implied that you should be as he declared that in the possession of property you were exercising an office of stewardship. According to the philosophers who promoted the French Revolution, every citizen might enjoy absolute political rights of a completely fictional character: in particular those of equality and liberty. The only sane basis on which men can hang together, that of mutual dependence and of a willingness to be led, came now to be denied as it came to be supposed that we are all entitled to be equal, especially in terms of opportunity, regardless of the reality that though we may be born and die equal, in every other way we simply are not so. The liberty to which it was considered every individual was entitled was now conceived in such general and absolute terms as to have no validity at all. Gone was the real mediaeval conception of liberties as something which might be enjoyed in a particular, and often very limited way, in the form of a particular right or power of some kind, as lord of the manor with its own court of law, or head even of a humble family, with authority to punish your own children—a conception about which it may justly be said without any hint of indulging in any mere verbal quibble that one man's freedom was circumscribed by that of another.

The conception of a state composed out of individuals all equal to one another, so that they might enjoy their freedom absolutely, has been given particular effect in the only form of government which we are allowed to consider nowadays to be a clean one, that of democracy. Since under a

democracy we have all to be equal, all the variety of the distinctions which had been enjoyed by one mediaeval region over another must disappear; likewise, in the abstract name of an absolute liberty, all the particular rights and powers, such as that of the paterfamilias, which during the Middle Ages one citizen might exercise over another tend to vanish. Nodal points of power in the community must, however, rest somewhere. They might rest no longer in the region; nor, as in all our rights we are equal, with a paterfamilias, baron keeping order in his own locality, or even the king, who had all exercised their particular forms of authority out of a sense of obligation towards other people; a great part of the power rested, in point of fact, just as Locke might have wished, with an ascending middle class or bourgeoisie who best enjoyed their new and absolute rights in property. The history of the last century shows that the democracies which came into being, especially in France and England, were really flourishing plutocracies, under which lesser folk who had no absolute rights in property (in England they had been deprived of their mediaeval rights in common) enjoyed rather less liberty of any particular kind than their mediaeval ancestors. By way of illustrating the state which the British body politic had reached now, as it had taken on such a democratic, and therefore plutocratic hue, it may be well to describe a little of the different points of view given by Macaulay, especially in the third chapter of his *History of England,* and by John Ruskin, especially in *The Stones of Venice.*

Under the influence of Locke and the French philosophers, Macaulay maintained that history had been a constant progress towards his own time, in both political and economic terms. Politically, Macaulay thought that the reduction of the monarchy to a cypher at the Glorious Revolution was a good thing; Macaulay approved, likewise, of the Great Reform Bill, presaging the present Rousseau-esque basis of representation in the House of Commons, which in mediaeval times had been a Chamber of particular communities. Concomitant, in Macaulay's view, with such political progress was the growth of trade and communications, which led to such an increase in material prosperity. In the third chapter of his *History of England,* Macaulay maintained that what mattered more than anything else was the growth in the ease of transport and communications (even though, as these things became easier, the old and mediaeval richness and variety of the locality and the region had to disappear). As communications became better, so trade increased, and there was a great increase in the supply of money (multiplied anyway by the Whiggish banking interest which created credit out of nothing)—and such a swelling in the supply of money Macaulay singles out and cites for us as most particular and special evidence of our national progress. In displaying such a shallow outlook on what should be the social nature of things—for Macaulay it was enough that there should be more, and everything went faster—this historian disregarded the very real retrogression of spiritual values which had occurred owing to the material advance, and rather glossed over how such economic growth existed only for the benefit of the moneyed middle class enfranchised by the Great Reform Bill, and so utterly convinced of their own complete entitle-

ment to the economic power which they had that they abused the workers. The expansion of a specious political liberty which Macaulay praised was accompanied by the sad increase of an actual economic servitude which Macaulay preferred to ignore. The bitter Dickensian poverty of the Victorian period is to be ascribed to the lack of any proper exercise of political authority over an economy which the middle classes exploited for their own benefit against their workers.

Most readers would be familiar with Macaulay, not so many perhaps with the superior and reactionary opinions of John Ruskin. Much of what Ruskin wrote is very tough reading; all his writing suffers from a great want of form and he often shifts his point of view. Moreover, Ruskin's Victorian approach to aesthetics, based on morals and religion, is way out of fashion in this agnostic and permissive age, leading such modern authorities on art as Kenneth Clark to declare that Ruskin was a great critic merely in despite of himself.

It is, however, possible to adjudicate that a principal aspect of Ruskin's thought is its kinship with the Middle Ages: his was a mind which perceived the interdependent character of all things. Thus all Ruskin's aesthetic observations consist not in a consideration of art for its own sake, which is the limited, modern approach; but in considering the relationship of art to society and morals, in the sense that artistic expression is subordinate to and flows from the social morality of the artist and of the time in which he lived. Thus Ruskin despised the Baroque in art as an exemplar of a pompous, secular and flesh ridden age. It was showy, false and insincere. By contrast, mediaeval art was good since it displayed the true qualities of feeling which existed in the Middle Ages. (Since the age in which they lived was so religious, the feelings of our mediaeval forbears were guided into all the right channels; and therefore, as expressed in mediaeval art, were pure and sincere.) So much of these excellent qualities of emotion were directed towards the common interests of society and the glorification of its point of union, the Deity. As he contemplated a mediaeval cathedral, Ruskin was stirred by the reflection that all the stone masons engaged to do their own little bit in its construction had been moved to do so through the knowledge that by joining in such a great corporate enterprise they were contributing towards the adoration of the Deity. Such a mediaeval conception of work, as being of a corporate and vocational character, led Ruskin in his celebrated chapter in *The Stones of Venice* on the Nature of Gothic, to deplore the spiritual degradation of the man in the factory, the only purpose and function of which was to make profits for an employer. Purporting to be a work on aesthetics, *The Stones of Venice* was largely a social and political treatise, a critique of the misery created by 19th century capitalism, and as such had the deepest influence on William Morris, and Arthur J. Penty, whose book on the restoration of the mediaeval guilds is regarded as the foundation of guild socialism. The guild socialism which had originated with Arthur J. Penty, and was then propagated by various intellectuals, particularly G. D. H. Cole, sought to divorce work from its purely economic value; to re-establish the corporate character of work (such as had existed in the Middle

Ages during the construction of a cathedral) by placing special emphasis on the degree to which workers should control their own destiny.

To restore to English society the unity which existed in mediaeval times, we should ensure, just as Ruskin envisaged, and as actually happened in the Middle Ages, that workers should participate much more in the government and spirit of the enterprises where they are employed. Such a reversion would be easier to achieve if, as of old, the possessors of property would recognise once more that their ownership creates ample social obligations; and if the government should reassume more of that control over the economy from which it has gradually abdicated.

As, in times past, most governments, the world over, have exercised control over their own economy, so they have looked on it as their business to safeguard the religion and therefore the morals of their own citizens. Today in England it is necessary also that the Church should recover the political authority which it enjoyed during the Middle Ages. In particular, in order to terminate the present immorality and resuscitate the institution of the family, which has been the rudiment of the whole state, the Church should be empowered to restore the significance of confession. Already, in countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain, governed by the pseudo-religion of Marxism, heavy emphasis is placed for political reasons on the confession of crimes against the social order.

Such a reform within our economy, combined with a renaissance of traditional morality, should assist us to arise, like the mythical phoenix, and display new measures of our old greatness.

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[Lord Sudeley is a member of the committee of the Human Rights Society and a contributor to the *Quarterly Review* and *London Magazine*. He has spoken in the House of Lords on such varied subjects as divorce, overseas aid, euthanasia and sex education.]

The September issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Southern Africa* by Richard Luce, M.P., *The Future of Political Theory* by W. J. Stankiewicz, *Japan and the Law of the Sea* by Gene Gregory and *John Stuart Mill and the Future of Liberalism* by J. N. Gray.

*Barbarism and Survival* by David Holbrook has been unavoidably held over for a later issue.

# WEST GERMANY COMES OF AGE

## by Wolfgang J. Koschnick

THROUGHOUT the post-World War II era, West Germany's foreign policy has been assiduously striving to mitigate the traditional image of the Germans as Europe's eternal aggressors. The consequence of such endeavours, to be sure, was a catchall policy that was anxious to please everybody and to hurt no one. West German governments have in the past virtually been fawning especially upon the United States of America and were eager to show that their country is 'the best boy in the class'.

Today, West Germany has eventually grown up to be an economic and, increasingly, a political adult, and its governments are therefore less and less inclined to hasten to obey when Washington deigns to issue a political command. And since mid-1975 the Social Democratic government under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has embarked on a tight-fisted Germany-first policy and seems to be almost over-ready to give offence to its allies.

After 1945 the first West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, placed a higher priority on gaining international respectability and integration into Western institutions than on the reunification of Germany. These policies proved so successful that West Germany soon became the strongest European industrial nation and a bulwark of Western Europe's military, economic and political organisations. While the very degree of this unexpected success became a source of apprehension abroad, it elicited increased misgivings about West Germany's international rôle at home. In fact, the observation that West Germany had meanwhile grown up to be an 'economic giant', but had for all that remained a 'political dwarf', was common talk and had become a sort of classical quotation as early as the late 1950s and early 1960s.

At that time the popular and widespread criticism of this situation was confined to noncommittal lamentation that never tangibly affected the practical policy of the government. Ironically, the popular criticism of this 'dwarf' policy was then voiced by politicians and critics who belonged to the right wing of West Germany's political spectrum and was as vociferously condemned as 'chauvinistic' by the left, while today the alleged right-wing policy of strength is pursued by those who are at least publicly suspected of being hard-boiled left-wingers—to wit, the Social Democrats.

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany made it clear in mid-1975 that it was firmly determined to make a clean break with the postwar era of economic and political relations with its allies. When the West German government concluded a multi-billion dollar agreement in June 1975 that provided Brazil with eight nuclear reactors and a complete nuclear fuel cycle, together with technology for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, this created almost more political excitement all over the world than the explosion of India's nuclear device in 1974.

Even after the US government which for its part had refused to endorse

the sale of a complete nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil in the previous year, (just as it had always refused to permit the export of technology for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation because it feared to carry the proliferation of nuclear materials one step further), had protested vigorously, the Schmidt government stubbornly stuck to its Brazilian A-plant deal. This was indeed a highly controversial deal because Brazil did not sign the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and there was therefore more than just a shred of justification in the US government's fear that Brazil might want to use a nuclear fuel enrichment system to make weapons and so become Latin America's first nuclear power.

Although this was the first time in history that a non-nuclear nation was sold a complete fueling equipment which, of course, can be used both to produce nuclear weapons and peaceful nuclear energy, the West German government insisted that Brazil had promised not to use the technology for nuclear weapons, that it had agreed to international controls for which the United States had pressed and that it had concluded an additional safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Yet, in spite of the West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's dictum that Bonn's Brazilian deal contains more safeguards than the nuclear technology deal with Canada which India had circumvented in 1974 to produce the Third World's first atomic explosion, there is very little doubt that if Brazil, for its part, should ever wish to circumvent the safeguards of this agreement it would have little difficulty in doing so.

All over the world, and especially in the United States, Bonn was at the time harshly condemned for what the *New York Times* termed its 'Nuclear Madness'. In a commentary of unprecedented ferocity the paper wrote, a few days before the agreement was concluded:

> Should Bonn perpetrate this nightmare upon the world, it will put at risk three decades of effort in gaining the high regard of its neighbours and allies. It will pay a political price that will far outweigh economic gains. A far wiser course would be to join the United States in refraining from such sales and in luring other supplier nations to move quickly toward common export rules, rather than the competitive degradation of safeguards in pursuit of profit.

And the Democratic Senator John Pastore from Rhode Island, the chairman of the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, at the time even warned that the NATO commitment of the United States could come into question if Bonn created 'a likely peril in our backyard, while we are heavily engaged in Germany's backyard to defend them against likely peril'.

It has been observed that such heavy fire from Bonn's number one ally would in earlier days at the very least have resulted in a lengthy review of plans and might have caused the cancellation of the agreement. Yet on this occasion, the West German government scarcely bothered to listen to Washington's objections, let alone to heed them, and closed the deal.

The exasperation about Bonn's defiance in this crucial issue had not even abated when the Schmidt government struck another blow, and

again a shadow was cast upon the once harmonious German-American relations. Still in the same month, the federal government flatly refused to continue its 14-year-old policy of paying extra money to the United States to help offset the costs of stationing American troops and their families in West Germany. Since the year 1961, the United States and West Germany had negotiated six of these offset agreements. They were designed to make up for the balance-of-payments deficit the US suffers by keeping 186,000 troops in Germany. Under these offset agreements, the West Germans have paid roughly 10 billion dollars since the year 1961.

These payments had been a bone of contention since their inauguration. In the public debate of the early 1960s, the payments were likened to the occupation costs West Germany had had to pay until the recovery of its sovereignty in 1955.

The course of these events reveals the changed stance of West Germany's present government. After the most recent of these offset agreements had expired at the end of July 1975 (under it, incidentally, W. Germany had paid 2.2 billion dollars), Chancellor Helmut Schmidt tersely notified the US government that he had no intention of agreeing to a further similar arrangement. The West Germans contended that dollar devaluations and the improved US export performance have eliminated the chronic US balance-of-payments deficits that the German subsidies were designed to offset. Indeed, West German officials argued that they believed European purchases of arms from the United States would in future largely fulfil US wishes for offsetting the costs of stationing troops in Europe.

When Washington nevertheless insisted on a new arrangement, Mr. Schmidt bluntly declared that not only West Germany but all the other European NATO states whose military security is strengthened by the American presence should, for their part, pay an adequate share and that in any case the matter would be better arranged by a multilateral agreement between all NATO members. The interesting thing about this stance is that it is anything but a new argument. On the contrary, it has been advanced by practically all West German governments every time they began haggling over a new offset agreement. But unlike its predecessors who had always, albeit grudgingly, renewed the arrangement following a negative reaction from West Germany's allies, the Schmidt government remained firm and refused to conclude a new agreement, since when the issue has been pigeonholed.

Behind this new stance of Bonn's foreign policy, however, is more than just the fact that Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is a self-centered 'Germany-firster' — which he undoubtedly is — who is unwilling to loosen his grip on national treasure; but rather, and predominantly the climate of worldwide economic recession which has left its mark on West Germany's economy. And economic pressure, with German exports down about 11 percent in the year 1975 alone, has dictated the new attitude of West Germany's foreign policy.

This became clearly evident with the somewhat abrupt change of West Germany's rôle within the European Economic Community. Since 1975 the federal government has indicated that it construes its own past rôle as the Community's goose, laying golden eggs. The West German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has said about the EEC: 'We drag the cart, the others sit on it, and we even have to feed them.' A similar utterance would, until the very recent past, have been absolutely unthinkable. However, Bonn's new attitude toward the EEC does not confine itself to verbal strong-man acts. While Bonn's ministers had been acclaimed as the 'Europayers' in Brussels until recently they have within an astonishingly short period gained the reputation of being the Common Market's 'skinflints'.

The extent to which the atmosphere in Brussels has changed since 1975 as a consequence of this new policy is shown by the comment of a high EEC official who observed recently: 'Every issue now becomes a fight between Germany and the others over money.'

In general, the West German government has become increasingly unwilling to put up funds for Common Market projects because of its rising budget deficit. Thus, it gave notice to its EEC partners that it is not prepared to continue contributing some 28 percent to the budget of the nine-member EEC. Repeatedly, the West Germans have complained that, in their view, they are shouldering an unfair share of agricultural subsidies simply to accommodate the less efficient farmers of other EEC countries. It is well known that Chancellor Schmidt feels that the German taxpayer is being asked to subsidise to a disproportionate extent the agricultural surpluses which are mainly produced by French and Italian farmers. Mr. Schmidt and members of his government therefore keep up considerable pressure on the EEC to speed up its proposed reform of agricultural policy, to make it cheaper and more efficient. For in Mr. Schmidt's view, the Community's Common Agricultural Policy is a 'mammoth misguidance of economic resources'.

However, in the very recent past the Germans have even given up their persistence to have their contribution to the EEC budget lowered in view of the bad condition in which the Community anyway is.

Already, the new West German attitude has scaled down the Community spending on numerous cooperation projects. It was Bonn, also, that for a long while put up the fiercest resistance to Greece's application for full-fledged membership in the EEC because it feared that Greece with its under-developed economy would cost the Community, and above all the West Germans, billions in agricultural subsidies and regional aids.

Unfortunately, in many countries this new policy which aims at a thorough reform of the EEC's previous policy of subsidies is increasingly —and falsely—construed as 'anti-European'. However, it became clear during the November 1975 session of the European Council in Rome that the West German government is not embarking on an anti-European policy. During this session, the German chancellor clashed with Sir Harold Wilson and set himself up as the most resolute champion of the

EEC's unanimity in a situation where Great Britain, intoxicated with the success of its North Sea oil project, requested a separate seat at the North-South energy-and-raw-materials conference in Paris. When Sir Harold pointed out that Britain's possible future membership in the Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) was no longer just a joke, Mr. Schmidt retorted that the principle underlying Community policy was one of solidarity. He further said that Britain might enjoy a short spell of oil self-sufficiency, 'but Germany has the money. We have more reserves than the US, Japan and all the assembled nations at this table. We can buy our oil where we want, in any quantities. We are the only country that could thrive without the EEC'.

Moreover, it should for all these verbal strong-man acts not be forgotten that the Germans were the ones who granted Italy a 2 billion dollars credit in 1974. And the Germans have underwritten the 1976 loan to Rome, they gave 100 million dollars to shore up the fledgling democracy in Portugal, they have repeatedly offered financial assistance to Britain — and they have repeatedly made it clear that they are also in the future willing to lend a helping hand to needy EEC partners.

This new self-assurance has inevitably provoked varied reactions in some ally states. Thus, the retired French general, François Binoche, unleashed something like a storm in the teacup when he argued recently in several newspaper articles that despite Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt Germany has remained the same kind of a menace to France that it had once been under Adolf Hitler or Otto von Bismarck. For General Binoche the 'German menace' had already become evident when in the year 1968 the federal government had allegedly forced France to devalue the Franc. And it was only recently that the French economist, Christian Goux, in all seriousness conjured up the horrible vision of a Europe that in the not-too-distant future will have fallen under the yoke of Germany's colonial rule.

And when the Federal Chancellor, who had in his salad days been known as Schmidt the Lip because of his outspokenness, implicitly criticised the governments of states like France and Italy, saying that the communists had no chance whatsoever in countries like the Federal Republic, where the Social Democrats are pushing forward reforms, public opinion of most European countries almost in unison chided Chancellor Schmidt for trying to assume the rôle of Europe's 'sergeant major' (the German word Feldwebel sounds even more horrifying).

It may seem ridiculous to foreigners that a government which pursues such an unambiguously nationalistic Germany-first policy, and in doing so follows rather conservative lines, is, at the same time, preoccupied with its home policy of trying to persuade the Germans that the Social Democrats are not eager to sell out their country. Moreover, this Social Democratic government with its foreign policy follows lines which other Socialist governments all over the world clearly reject. This became obvious at the end of the year 1975, when the federal government frankly admitted that not only was the West German firm *Kraftwerk Union* (KWU) com-

peting in a bid to build an 800 million dollar nuclear plant in Koeberg in South Africa, but that the government would consider favourably the firm's application for an export licence if it won the contract. In earlier days, any West German government would certainly have denied that it had anything to do with a cooperative deal with racially troubled South Africa. What is more, the Minister of State in West Germany's Foreign Ministry, Karl Moersch, curtly stated that in the current economic climate, West Germany simply cannot do without its trade with a country of South Africa's economic potential. However, the new thing is not the policy but its revelation. The Federal Republic has for many years been one of South Africa's most important foreign trading partners.

Ironically, it was only after the South African government had anyway decided to conclude the contract with a French firm, that the West German government began to openly criticise South Africa's apartheid policy again. In this issue, the West Germans returned to the same kind of mendaciousness that had been the hallmark of all previous policies. For all the verbal criticism of South Africa, they have of course not changed their flourishing trade with this country.

The worldwide economic recession is probably responsible for a change of attitude in the most sensitive domain of Bonn's new foreign and economic policy — the international armaments trade. At the present time, there are serious deliberations under way in Bonn to extend arms sales to some Latin American countries, Africa and even to 'nonconfrontation' states of the Middle East. Previously, West Germany exported arms only to its NATO partners and to some trouble-free nations such as Australia, Switzerland or Japan.

The members of the West German Federal Security Council, i.e. the Chancellor, the Defence, Foreign, Finance, Economics and Home Ministers, have not yet made a final decision on this issue and, up to the present time, it is said, they are still inclined to advocate that West German arms exports into 'tension areas' should be prohibited, but they do seem to be willing to interpret the concept of the 'tension area' in a less restrictive way than in the past.

In this context, one should — apart from Germany's historical record which makes the country's arms exports more of a problem than that of any other country's — take into consideration that arms exports at the present time do not amount to more than 0.2 percent of total West German exports, whereas the armament industries of comparable countries such as France and Great Britain, let alone the United States, are heavily export-orientated. In the US, for one, arms exports make up some 20 percent of total exports.

Observers believe that the Federal Republic of Germany will break into the international arms trade in a circuitous way, via the joint projects with its NATO allies. This would even provide the federal government with the easy excuse that it was not geared to the international arms trade by its own initiative. And there is, in fact, more than a fragment of truth in this excuse, for the West German government is under

considerable pressure from those ally governments with which some of the joint armament ventures have been achieved.

Mainly, these joint projects of NATO allies are the British-Italian-German 'Multirôle Combat Aircraft' (MRCA), a swing-wing, Mach-2 aircraft designed to perform various rôles for the three nations involved, the Franco-German aircraft 'Alpha Jet' and the equally Franco-German anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles 'Hot', 'Milan' and 'Roland'.

The traditional European arms-exporting nations of Great Britain and of France are now exerting considerable pressure on the West Germans to give up their opposition to large-scale sales of these arms because they are confident that some of them, such as the much-touted 'Alpha Jet', will turn out to be real bonanzas. Moreover, it seems to be only a matter of time that, under the impact of continuously dropping exports, the Bonn government will arrive at the conclusion that a highly industrialised country like the Federal Republic of Germany should not lag behind its allies in a branch of industry that is as profitable as the international arms trade. Already, the Schmidt government is under heavy fire from a mighty lobby of the arms industry which is persistently knocking at Bonn's door trying to attain at least a partial lift of the ban on arms exports. Furthermore, the industry itself is already using all kinds of ruses to circumvent the ban. Thus, for instance, some firms sent single parts abroad (this is allowed) where they were put together to form complete tanks.

What is more, the nomenclature in this field gets increasingly complicated. While up until the very recent past there was just the dividing line between 'confrontation states' and 'non-confrontation states', the Foreign Minister makes an additional difference between 'confrontation-close' and 'confrontation-far' states. Confrontation-close countries shall not get any German arms (Syria e.g.) while confrontation-far countries, like Qatar e.g., can get them.

The energy crisis has had deep repercussions on traditional loyalties and alliances. In the case of West Germany, it has speeded up the country's progress towards greater self-reliance and assurance and although some rivalry is inevitable with countries that in the past had become used to West Germany's rôle as an 'economic giant' but a 'political dwarf', the new rôle West Germany is obviously about to assume can in the long run, only be in the interest of its allies, for the simple reason that a great power with a collective inferiority complex may, in the upshot, forebode much more political gloom than a self-assured one.

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[Wolfgang Koschnick is a political scientist and journalist living in Southern Germany and contributing European articles to a number of American magazines. He will contribute a second article on West Germany in a later issue.]

# THE SISTERS RETURN

## by Rosalind Wade

NOT so long ago, the prospect of attending a first class theatrical performance outside London would have seemed remote. True, there were exceptions — famous outposts of drama such as the Birmingham Rep. and the Horniman Theatre in Manchester; but for most residents in suburban or rural areas the 'live' theatre was an unattainable luxury. Now, the situation has changed. Local fund-raising enthusiasm combined with Arts and local Council grants have resulted in the founding of a number of professional regional theatres. An example is the Yvonne Arnaud Theatre in Guildford, Surrey, now celebrating its eleventh year of existence, during which period impeccable standards of acting and production have been maintained as well as a programme designed to suit all tastes.

In this connection, it was interesting to consider the appeal of a recent production of *Three Sisters,* afterwards taken on tour with Triumph Theatre Productions before transferring to the Cambridge Theatre, London. For many people, the attraction of seeing once again this most famous of Chekhov's later plays is an opportunity to reassess and re-interpret. Just over fifty years ago 'fashionable' West End audiences journeyed to the London suburb of Barnes to see Philip Ridgeway's production of *Three Sisters* performed in a converted hall. That was a landmark in theatre experience, comparable to the introduction of Sean O'Casey's plays at roughly the same period. It was generally accepted at that time that the characters in *Three Sisters* could be likened to moths caught in the cross beam of Time — unaware that the Revolution was to come and yet by their actions and attitudes making it inevitable.

Now, considered with the advantage of hindsight, the Prozerovs and their circle come across as prototypes of men and women recognisable in contemporary society. It is not unusual today for people to believe that circumstances other than existing ones would be more conducive to happiness and prosperity. The desire of the sisters to return to Moscow is not merely a vague yearning for a different way of life. Chekhov was far too shrewd and realistic to adopt for his last but one play any but a rational basic *motif.* The Prozerovs came from Moscow to the un-named provincial town only eleven years before the action of the play begins because their father was promoted to command a brigade there. After his untimely death the brother and sisters were left stranded in a place unworthy of their high standards of culture and education; although they all found work in the town and two of them have married.

Chekhov's unfailing talent for dramatic construction prompted a supremely simple device for putting a match to the tinder — the arrival of one of their father's former junior officers, Lt. Colonel Vershinin, who had actually been living in the same Moscow street as the Prozerovs' childhood home. However, Vershinin himself does nothing to fan the

flame. Beset as he is by his own marital problems, he sees the family house as definitely desirable with its woods, view of the river, 'a good place to live. . . .' And no doubt he would also see as preferable to his own domestic *maelstrom* the peaceful 'commune', the members of which have, or should have, much to contribute to their mutual well-being.

However, the sisters are not impressed by arguments which run counter to their determination to return to the capital city. As a team in this and other matters, they display plenty of self-confidence; wantonly antagonising Natasha, even though she is about to become their sister-in-law. With her domestic snobbishness and self-absorption, Natasha emerges as the most 'un-dated' character of all, displayed for eternity in a gallery which includes Thomas Hardy's Arabella and Jane Austen's Mrs. Elton. And yet she is condemned more harshly by her creator than either of these antipathetic women, as when her husband, Andreyev, brutally describes her as 'a sort of blind, mean, thick-skinned animal'.

Can such outright condemnation really be in line with Chekhov's original intention?

During his lifetime, the complaint was sometimes made that he offered inadequate guidance on the production and interpretation of his plays, even though his working partnership with the producer at the Moscow Art Theatre, Konstantin Stanislavsky, must rank as one of the major theatrical collaborations of all time. Fortunately, some tangible evidence of the co-operation has come down to us through records and correspondence — as for instance Chekhov's insistence that his two last plays should be regarded as comedies, although this seems to have resulted in a perennial clowning of some of the characters. Were they to be played straight for a change, what new undertones and nuances would emerge?

The version by Elisaveta Fen used at Guildford is undoubtedly among the best available, despite occasional portentous utterances and infelicities of phrase. Jonathan Miller's capable though at times rather slow-moving production allows plenty of time to consider the many thoughtful performances which appear to say the last word on the individual problems and frustrations of the famous family group. It is to the credit of Angela Down's sharp edged interpretation of the neurotic Irina that we find ourselves speculating on her problems and progress after the curtain falls. Would she, in the long years that lie ahead of her, somehow and at some time contrive a return to Moscow?

REFERENCES

The following references may be of interest:

*The Complete Edition of Chekhov's work in nine volumes* edited and translated by Ronald Hingley. (Cambridge University Press)

*Plays from the Russian* translated by Constance Garnett (Heinemann)

*From Chekhov to the Revolution Russian Literature 1900-1917* Marc Jonim (Galaxy Books No. 92)

# L. S. LOWRY (1887-1976)

## by Ernle Money

LAWRENCE Stephen Lowry's was one of the slowest developing talents of our century. He did not really find his natural style until he was already in his fifties. It was 1939 before he held his first full London exhibition. He was sixty-eight before he was made an A.R.A. and seventy-five before he was elected an R.A., in 1962. And yet in recent years his paintings have been among the best-known, most reproduced and highly sought after of any painter working in the English-speaking world.

Despite the apparent simplicity of his subjects and the almost child's eye vision of the curious matchstick figures which he painted over and over again hurrying across a slightly dream-like Northern landscape, it would be a mistake to regard Lowry as a naïve painter. Compared with the genuine naïve artist, Helen Bradley, say, or the ineffable Grandma Moses, his work had a sense of discipline, of starkness and of balance, in both colour and design, that gave it a completely different type of character. He was reticent, both in his own personality and in the way in which he executed his visions of the decaying industrial landscape, usually in his own Manchester and Salford, or set against the hard edges of the Lancashire side of the Pennines, but he knew exactly what he was setting out to achieve. Some critics have purported to find in Lowry's work an unidentified sense of menace, based perhaps on the strange preoccupied manner of the people with which he populated it. Others, referring to the simplified but striking way in which he used colour have stressed the childlike quality of his landscapes. What is very clear is that he had found a métier which was entirely to his own liking and which enabled him, often with the sophistication with which artists of great talent can use very simple subjects, to express his vision of a landscape which he made entirely his own. From the time of his full retrospective at the Tate in 1966, in especially and by added reason of the fact that his paintings with their clean use of colour and simple use of outline, reproduced extremely well, Lowry's vision had become an established part of our national pictorial consciousness.

Although he painted elsewhere, he remained a Northerner in outlook and even during his later years of what must have been considerable prosperity and of great celebrity, he stayed mostly in his home at Mottram-in-Langerdale on the outskirts of his native city. His style, once achieved, varied little with the years, though, as we came to know his pictures better, we tended perhaps to read more into them. Whether Lowry intended many of the things that were read into his work to be there is uncertain since, compared with most leading artists of recent years, he also remained very reticent about his painting.

Although he was at one time a member of the London Group, he remained a wholly separate voice and when the history of British art in the second half of the twentieth century comes to be written he will obviously

demand an entirely separate chapter on his own. Although he had a number of copyists and affected the work of a number of younger artists, he founded no sort of school. In fact, like Douanier Rousseau, his work is very difficult to copy well, perhaps because of its carefully thought out professionalism.

Curiously, the artists whom he himself particularly admired were the Pre-Raphaelites and Rossetti especially, of whom he was said to have a fine collection. Nothing could be more different than the lushness of these masters from the starkness of his own pictures but perhaps it was their originality and sheer artistic competence that he admired. Nothing was more competent and technically assured in fact than a Lowry painting, deceptively simple as it might look.

Most people who are even remotely interested in pictures today or who read the illustrated papers could describe exactly what a Lowry looks like. They would find it more difficult, I think, to bring to mind the detail of any one of his individual pictures. It is the general landscape that springs to mind—rows of terraced, usually sloping houses, set in a devastatingly clean, almost lunar light, with a great feeling of preoccupation amongst even the people lounging on the street corners or scurrying about their business. It would be difficult to say exactly what these people were preoccupied with, but they were very much busied with their own concerns. Even the cripples or the ugly amongst them call not so much for pity as for interest and recognition as individual people. In a mixed collection of British contemporary painting, a Lowry was always immediately recognisable, generally at first sight.

Unlike Stanley Spencer, he was not concerned in any way with pointing a moral or working out a myth. In that sense Lowry's work can be compared with the Dutch painters, like Peter de Hooch or Sanredam, perhaps in that he was concerned wholly with what he saw before him and getting it on to canvas and not with any form of narrative or interpretative quality. The long period that he had spent in and around Manchester, looking again and again at a familiar landscape, before he achieved his particular *métier*, gave him the opportunity of working out for himself both exactly what he wanted to do and exactly how he was able to do it. This combination of a unique viewpoint and a highly accomplished method of painting led not only to the success which his art was eventually accorded in his own lifetime, but mean, I think, that he is one of the artists of our period who is likely to keep his place on a very long-term basis.

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An exhibition of nearly 300 paintings, drawings, pastels and watercolours by the late L. S. Lowry, R.A. will be mounted in the Royal Academy's Main Galleries this autumn. The exhibition, which was being actively planned for some months before L. S. Lowry's death on 23rd February, will be the largest retrospective exhibition of his work ever mounted and will cover every phase of his immensely prolific career.—*Editor.*

# FAIR SAILING IN ROUGH WATERS

## by John Beasant

AT the last General Election more Independent Candidates stood for Parliament than ever before. Is this symptomatic of a widening scepticism that Party Government will never satisfactorily solve Britain's ills? Tintagel, on the north coast of Cornwall, would seem to be as good a place as any to start a Parliamentary revival campaign when one considers that until the Reformation it was responsible for returning two Members to Westminster. Quite obviously, this had been at one time a place positively revelling in Parliamentary consciousness and was thus right to be considered fertile ground in which to plant the seed of an idea that could with careful husbandry result in a bountiful harvest for those who still believe that six hundred years after Simon de Montfort and an awful lot of trying, Parliamentary Democracy is still possible to attain.

Most certainly Dr. Roden Bridgwater believes so—he being an ex-Guy's man and now a research chemist working on his own account at the Arthurian village of Tintagel in North Cornwall and which all good Liberals remember each evening is Pardoe country. Roden Bridgwater has had both the energy and the courage—attributes our leaders tell us we are going to need more and more, although, not, one fancies, do they mean in the direction in which Dr. Bridgwater is channelling his and which aims to make them—the Party leaders—redundant—and to place a long term faith in the good sense of the mass of the British people (which Attlee said was money in the Bank and should be capitalised, or words to that effect) and, at the October 1974 General Election, to put his feet on the highways and by-ways of Cornwall North.

His Independent Candidature was on an 'Anti-Party' ticket which summed up in a spectacular economy of words his political—or apolitical—philosophy. The campaign was embarked upon with degrees of optimism and enthusiasm in sufficient quantities to power the very car in which Roden Bridgwater and his solitary helper used to reach the far-flung electorate of the Constituency and was not without its moment of classic truth. 'The drains are round the back', shouted the lady occupant of 'Paradise Place' on seeing the lone helper's progress up her garden path: not for him the dignity of at least being mistaken as the man from the Prudential. An assembly of farmers at the market town of Launceston listened with a marked attention to the two hundred years old published thoughts of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the iniquities of the British Party Political system: 'The English people believe themselves to be free: they are gravely mistaken. They are free only during an election for Members of Parliament. As soon as the Members are elected, the people are again enslaved'. They received such an indictment from the lips of Roden Bridgwater with a knowing calm that led one to believe that they rarely read anything else but Rousseau.

The count at Wadebridge Town Hall was a bleak affair. Roden Bridg-

water polled one hundred and forty-eight votes and the crowd cheered a lot for Mr. Pardoe. It was very much a case of 'back to the drawing board', or to be literal, 'back to the quarry': that being the habitat of Roden Bridgwater, an area of cliff and sweeping headland and where, in a converted slate cutting shed on the quarry's rim, some of his most interesting chemical experiments have been carried out. His experiment as a purveyor of pure and applied Parliamentary Democracy lost no meaning to him by the modest result achieved at the polls and which he felt, in view of the strength of his 'team' to be 'reasonable'. There were also encouraging aftermath signs of people whose imagination had been captured by that which Roden Bridgwater proclaimed, who harboured a disturbing thought that his quiet message held more than an essence of truth . . . and yet who needed more time than the polls allowed to digest an idea that had been put down with a suspicious energy by the Party Candidates. Indeed, his 'eve of election' message was widely considered—by both those within the media and without—to be the best of those given in the Constituency:

> By standing as an 'Anti-Party' candidate I am positively acknowledging that the Party system has failed the people and betrayed the principles of Parliamentary Government. The Party propagandists have for years said that a vote for an Independent Candidate is a vote mis-spent and yet the opposite is the truth. At a time of slim Parliamentary majorities the pressure on MPs to vote in Parliament on the Party line is greater than ever—such pressure taking no heed of the wishes of the electorate and is thus the very negation of what Parliamentary Government is all about, namely the exercising by individual MPs of the views and aspirations of the people who elected them to Parliament. Perhaps things have never been the same since Disraeli declared 'Damn your principles, stick to your Party'. Most certainly our country could not be in a more sorry state and is so following more than a century of Party Politics—Governments having come from all three Parties over the years. It is often said that it is the leaders who are the prisoners of their Parties, but in truth it is the British people who have become prisoners of the Party system. And who can honestly believe that the Liberals, so completely caught up in the syndrome of Party power, can effectively return the British Parliament to its true allegiance. To vote outside the Party system does require courage, integrity and an independent spirit, but it is these very qualities that the British people need to reassert and this can begin to come about with a Parliament free from the anti-Democratic forces of Party power and the pressure groups that go with them.

It was at the campaign's end that Roden Bridgwater resolved to continue his endeavours toward an alternative to Party power, being prompted to do so by 'the support I have received for the basic principle of Parliamentary Representatives truly reflecting the views of their Constituents; such support has been out of all proportion to the number of votes cast for me as the greater majority of messages of support have come from outside the boundaries of the North Cornwall Constituency'. Thus was discarded the term 'Anti-Party' for the positive Free Association of Independent Representatives—FAIR for short, as masterful a bit of copy as one is likely to find south of the Tamar. The Royal Cornwall Gazette reported on October the 17th that 'Dr. Bridgwater . . . may put forward five West Country Candidates at the next election under the FAIR banner'. A week later the initial meeting of FAIR was held in the small town of Bodmin (why the folk industry has not yet composed a ballad on an autumn evening

in Bodmin is a source of amazement) and during what was by all accounts an extremely light-hearted affair the guiding principles and aims of the Association were drawn up. Basically, and the entire 'constitution' of FAIR takes up not half a page of office foolscap, it has as its aim the return to Westminster of MPs who would be independent, free of any Political Party, political movement, dogma or business interests that would inhibit their true and faithful reflection in Parliament of the views and wishes of their Constituents. So, says Roden Bridgwater and his growing number of supporters, would Parliament be fulfilling its true role, being true to its inherent allegiance, that of being an instrument of the Will of the people and which Party Politics in Government has eroded and made negative, betraying the very principle of Parliamentary Government. Strong stuff and of which revolutions are made. But this is not a revolution seen as bringing blood to the High Street at noon, letting down the tyres of the village bobby's bike or even those of juggernaut lorries. It is seen by Roden Bridgwater as a vitally necessary innovation if Government is to succeed and do so by having the consent and participation of the Governed.

Before standing for Parliament, FAIR Candidates would be expected to accept without reservation the only binding factor: the FAIR ethic that if elected they would accept the majority decision of their Constituents on any given issue and carry it onto the floor of the House in its unexpurgated form, even if it ran contrary to their own opinions. They would also be expected to furnish evidence of their intention and ability to consult the people they seek to represent on a regular and effective basis. An interpretation of 'true and faithful reflection' and 'to consult the people . . . on a regular and effective basis' is given as meaning just that and that each principle is complementary to the other. Comments Roden Bridgwater: 'Such a consultation and involvement is one seen as going beyond MPs' 'surgeries' which all too often are places where the minor cuts and ailments of the community are so heavily dosed with anaesthetic that the 'patients' become oblivious to the wider implications of just what the Party Politicians are up to at Westminster'.

By establishing such a dialogue, having such a consultation, argued Roden Bridgwater throughout his campaign, Parliament would evolve a quality and humaneness of Government that would reflect the integrity, good sense, good judgement and compassion that is inherent in the diverse peoples that constitute the British nation.

FAIR Parliamentarians would, in addition to regular consultation with their constituents—essentially to learn their opinions—keep them fully informed of Legislation being debated by Parliament and what its practical implications would be if enacted. FAIR MPs would, of course, be expected to hold their own views and to advise constituents of them, to offer counsel and guidance when requested to do so, but would accept the majority view of constituents on any given matter and vote in Parliament accordingly. This commitment would seek to promote constituents' effective involvement in the mechanics of Government, in the practical formulation of Policy, to

demonstrate that if Parliamentary Democracy is going to operate well and in everyone's interests it has to be worked at. Says Roden Bridgwater:

> It will be self-evident that certain aspects of such an exercise would attract the attention of greater numbers, if, for example, it was in a rural area that Agricultural Policy was to be discussed, whereas Tax Reform would obviously merit a wider audience and because that would currently appear to be the way of it less if it were an Environmental or Foreign Policy that was under review. It is a process that would gain momentum as MPs learnt from their constituents and were seen to reflect their knowledge and concern in Parliament. It would, I firmly believe, result in a continuity of policy the like of which the continually shifting sands of Party dogma has never been ably to supply.

The third clause of the 'Guiding Principles and Aims' of FAIR reads—'To work towards a Public recognition that the system and nature of Party Politics in Government is not compatible with Parliamentary Democracy'. Accordingly, if FAIR was to have its way the concept of what has always been known as 'the Party line' would not exist, being considered wholly contrary to the fundamental truth of the Association, as would the presence of a Whip in Parliament or the publication of a manifesto which is seen as being essentially a document telling people what is good for them and tightly bound to a series of dogma to which few people subscribe or relate.

It is the clear intention of Roden Bridgwater and his FAIR proposals that MPs would be instruments of the Electorate's Will, would be a means whereby people could be concerned and involved in the decisions of Government that so affect them and that such a facility would give people an attitude of responsibility for the community and the country, would instil into people the conviction that their opinions and aspirations can and must be taken into account and used to a full effect in their good and sound Government. Roden Bridgwater continues:

> Party Politics is not only incompatible with Parliamentary Democracy but is directly responsible for the mass apathy that assails the British people; they know that that which they think and believe is hardly ever heeded by those in power and the resulting apathy is not only a greater danger than inflation, but actually contributes to it. This is seen in the present atmosphere of 'every man for himself and damn the country'. The long journey on the road to a responsible society—not a 'new order' or a return to 'jingoism'—has to be made. It will only be made by vesting the responsibility for Government where it has always meant to be—with the people.

He sees only an Independent MP, of the nature that he prescribes, as being able to make a restitution of power and responsibility to the people. 'The long held and Party nurtured view that an Independent MP lacks power must be stood on its head. It is a fiction and a nonsense. Indeed, it is only an MP free from the anti-democratic forces of the Party Whips, Party machines, that can effectively return power to the people.'

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[John Beasant was formerly assistant to Dr. Roden Bridgwater.]

# KISSING

## by John B. Foley

IT would be interesting to know the origin of kissing. Probably Adam and Eve showed their mutual love by kissing on the mouth. Kissing is a human emotion, by which lovers manifest their desire of union, as if by the breath of their mouths they strive to impart their spirits to each other. Be that as it may. We know that man is the only animal that knows how to kiss.

Apart from the emotion of lovers kisses have been made matters of ceremony both in church and state. To kiss the forehead is the sign of good will especially by elderly people. Fathers seal their blessing with such a kiss.

Kissing the foot is a sign of inferiority, and still more so kissing the ground. The Poles, Bohemians and Russians caught the custom from the Asiatics. Is it too much to suppose that they will never come to much good as long as that debasing custom continues? It is interesting to trace the gradual change of certain customs which, beginning in simple manly respect and end in slavish self abasement. The habit of kissing the ground or foot is one of these. Among the early Romans magistrates gave their hands to be kissed and under the first emperors the monarch did the same. But this was soon thought an act too familiar for true homage.

So only the superior officers kissed the hand. The inferiors were permitted to kiss only the robe or their own hands, unworthy to be admitted to nearer participation. Sometimes the emperor kissed the mouth and eyes of those to whom he wished to give special honour. But this was a very rare privilege and persons he wished to disgrace, he kissed with marked coldness.

Agricola complained that when he returned from overcoming the stubborn Saxons, Domition gave him a cold kiss and left him standing in the crowd unnoticed. The 'cold kiss' has long since passed away. In process of time the Roman emperors, not content by having their hands kissed by men kneeling, demanded to be treated like the gods, and so be kissed on the feet; later, to have the ground kissed before them. Diocletian was the first to demand this manner of salutation and his successors were not slow to follow his example. Christianity, too, did not disdain to borrow from heathendom, even in such things as were opposed to its inner spirit. Thus it seemed to the popes a fine thing for the baser laity to kiss their feet and Pope Constantine the First, on entering Constantinople, caused the emperor Justinian to kiss his feet. Valentine the First made the custom permanent, and ever since 837 the laity have crawled up the steps of St. Peter's chair to kiss the foot of the venerated statue of the first pope. But as the pope wears a slipper with a cross embroidered on it, men assume they kiss the sacred symbol. Protestants are not required to go through this ceremony. Enough if they bow on entering the presence as

they would to any other reigning power. But the late king of Spain kissed the pope's foot notwithstanding his blue blood.

Kissing the pastoral ring has the same meaning. The bishops as well as the popes had their feet kissed in early times. This was afterwards commuted for the hand. Kissing the sovereign's hand at court presentations is also now only a compromise, beginning from the same foundation. Even Charlemagne and his sons required this degrading service from their courtiers and had their feet kissed and knelt to like so many popes or gods.

Kissing, which means in Hebrew, simply adoration, or touching the mouth was always one of the essential parts of the heathen religion without which there was no possibility of piety or virtue, and people were branded as atheists who neglected to kiss their hands, or the statues of the gods when they entered the temple. This custom stood the brave Demosthenes in good stead, for when he was the prisoner of Antipater and was taken by the soldiers into the temple, he raised his hand to his mouth as if in worship. The soldiers thought it was an act of adoration, but it was an act of despair. He did not mean to salute the gods but to take the poison which he had prepared for such an occasion. And did not the people of Cos, when they found Psyche sleeping among the butterflies and roses, treat her as Venus by kissing her right hand? Even today the Mahomedans kiss the ground in the direction of Mecca.

The early Christians had their religious kiss like all the rest. As the initiated into the Eleusian mysteries kissed each other in token of brotherhood and equal knowledge, so did the first disciples in the Agape, or love feast. But in 397 the council of Carthage thought fit to forbid all religious kissing between the sexes, notwithstanding, St. Peter's exhortation 'greet ye one another with the kiss of charity'. It also forbade all lying on couches at mixed meals and finally broke up the Agapes as a possible danger for ordinary humanity.

The practice of the kiss of peace still lingers in both the Roman and Greek churches. Just before the communion in the Roman church some kissing is done. The officiating priest kisses the altar, then embraces the Deacon, saying, *Pax tibi frater/et ecclesiaesanctae Dei* (Peace to you brother and to the holy church of God). The Deacon embraces the Subdeacon with *Pax tecum* (Peace be with you). Then the Subdeacon embraces the inferior clergy, who thus are all bound in a mystic chain of love, the first link of which is the kiss the officiating priest impresses on the altar.

The Bible has many passages full of sweet and tender kisses intervening with some which are terrible and treacherous, for the old Jews when they could not gain their ends by fair means, had recourse to those that were false.

A kiss, as we all know, should be the effect of a deep and sincere emotion of love or of a true feeling of liking for the person kissed. The 'cold kiss' of mere politeness or custom can mark indifference or even contempt as the Roman emperors of old knew so well. Its ultimate degradation is the Judas kiss.

# QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW

## by David Fingleton

**OPERA**

GERSHWIN. *Porgy and Bess.* Cleveland Orchestra & Chorus/Maazel. (3 Records) DECCA SET 609/11. £10.50

VERDI. *Il Corsaro.* New Philharmonia Orchestra/Gardelli. (2 Records) PHILIPS 6700 098. £6.20

PUCCINI. *Madama Butterfly.* La Scala Milan/Karajan. (3 Records) HMV SLS 5015. £6.60

**ORCHESTRAL**

BEETHOVEN. Symphony No. 6 (Pastoral). Munich PO/Kempe. HMV Greensleeve. ESD 7004. £2.50

BEETHOVEN. Symphony No. 7/Coriolan Overture. LSO/Solti. DECCA SXL 6764. £3.25

MAHLER. Symphony No. 2 (Resurrection) LSO & Chorus/Stokowski. (2 Records) RCA ARL2 0852. £5.98

TCHAIKOVSKY. Francesca da Rimini/Serenade for Strings. LSO/Stokowski PHILIPS 6500 921. £3.10

IBERT. Bacchanale/Louisville Concerto/Symphonie Marine/Bostoniana. City of Birmingham SO/Fremaux. HMV ASD 3176. £3.20

**CHAMBER MUSIC**

SHOSTAKOVITCH. String Quartets 7, 13 & 14 and String Quartets 8 & 15. Fitzwilliam String Quartet. L'OISEAU-LYRE DSLO 9 & 11. £3.25 each

TIPPETT. String Quartets 1, 2 & 3. Lindsay String Quartet. L'OISEAU-LYRE DSLO 10. £3.25

BEETHOVEN. Sonatas for Violin and Piano Nos. 4 & 5 (Spring) Perlman & Ashkenazy. DECCA SXL 6736. £3.25

BEETHOVEN. Sonatas for Violin and Piano Nos. 1 & 5 (Spring) Grumiaux & Arrau. PHILIPS 9500 055. £3.10

BACH. Sonatas and Partitas for Solo Violin. Menuhin. (3 Records) HMV SLS 5045. £5.50

**CHORAL AND VOCAL**

PROKOFIEV. *Alexander Nevsky.* Philadelphia Orchestra/Ormandy. RCA ARL1 1151. £2.99

SCHUMANN. *Frauenliebe und-leben/Liederkreis Op. 39.* Baker/Barenboim. HMV ASD 3217. £3.20

SCHUBERT. *A Schubertiad.* Souzay/Baldwin. PHILIPS Universo 6580 111. £1.85

It would be hard to imagine a more fitting celebration of the American Bicentennial than Decca's superlative recording of the one truly American opera, George Gershwin's *Porgy and Bess.* It has over the years been belittled by being treated as a light musical when in fact it is nothing of the kind. In the preface to the booklet accompanying this set Lorin Maazel, its conductor, makes his position entirely clear: 'We performed and recorded it as an opera,

as one worthy of the same care and devotion one would have accorded any operatic masterpiece.' That is precisely what Maazel along with the Cleveland Orchestra and Chorus, an all black cast, and the Decca engineers have achieved. The work is given in its entirety—some of the music virtually never having been heard before—and provides some three hours of rewarding listening. It is most vividly recorded, and amongst the large cast outstanding performances come from Willard White as Porgy—how lucky we are that he has joined the English National Opera—and Leona Mitchell's immensely promising Bess: given time and development she has the makings of a great lyric soprano. Barbara Hendricks as Clara sings an eloquent 'Summertime', Florence Quivar is a moving Serena, McHenry Boatwright a powerful Crown and Francois Clemmons a superbly well defined Sportin' Life. But above all the conductor is the hero, total commitment rings from every bar of this marvellous score. Maazel and Decca are to be thanked for this most memorable recording.

Gratitude likewise is due to Philips and Lamberto Gardelli who conducts their early Verdi series. To follow *I Lombardi, Un Giorno di Regno, Attila* and *I Masnadieri,* they have now issued *Il Corsaro.* This was Verdi's 12th opera, 13th if we include *Jérusalem,* and was first performed in Trieste in 1848. The libretto was by Piave after Byron's *Corsair,* but the composer was sufficiently disenchanted with the opera by the time he completed it to fail to attend the première. Nevertheless, for all its rough hewn sections—and there are several—this again is a work looking forward to the composer's strong middle period of *Trovatore, Ballo* and *Forza,* as well as occasionally backwards to Donizetti. It thoroughly repays hearing in a performance as powerful as this and has its memorable moments: the splendid duet that closes the first act and the eloquent final trio are examples. Gardelli obtains urgency and precision from the New Philharmonia, and three of his singers are outstanding: José Carreras, Montserrat Caballé, who seems to excel in early Verdi, and Jessye Norman, most moving as Medora the Corsair's first love. Gian-Piero Mastromei's Seid is less polished, though adequate, and the supporting cast is strong. On only two records this set is worth acquiring by any lover of Verdi's music who wishes to hear what he is unlikely often to see staged.

EMI are continuing to reissue the great Callas La Scala recordings of the 1950s. Puccini's *Madama Butterfly* has Herbert von Karajan as the committed, and then still unmannered, conductor. The young Nicolai Gedda is a little too cool as Pinkerton, and, even allowing for its age, this is a dry, shallow recording. But such reservations are swept aside by the sheer dramatic conviction of Callas' Butterfly, which is so totally credible and moving as to make me care about the outcome, as I have yet to do in the opera house. That surely is sufficient commendation!

Two attractive recordings of Beethoven symphonies, previously available only as part of complete sets, are now issued singly. The *Pastoral* symphony is one of the initial releases in EMI's new HMV *Greensleeve* Series offering popular classical works in first class performances at medium price. This *Pastoral* is also a fitting memorial to the much lamented Rudolf Kempe whose recent death deprived us of a great conductor. His interpretation here is typical: searching, human and unaffected, and the Munich Philharmonic respond with similar integrity, if with less polish than some orchestras. The recorded sound is excellent. For a performance offering virtuosity at its fullest

one turns to the 7th Symphony played by the Chicago Symphony Orchestra for Sir Georg Solti. Seldom has Wagner's description of this work as 'The apotheosis of the dance' been more completely realised, and there is a warmth in the Chicagoans response which belies their reputation for polished coolness. Perhaps the recording's Viennese location helped—certainly the Sofiensaal affords a remarkly warm sound. The Coriolan Overture which completes the disc is less successful, but I would not be without this recording of the symphony.

At 94 Leopold Stokowski has recently signed an exclusive recording contract for 6 years with CBS. Meanwhile I am happy to recommend two of the veteran maestro's excursions on other labels. Mahler's 2nd 'Resurrection' symphony with the London Symphony Orchestra for RCA is a revelation. Here is a conductor 'taking a view' with a vengeance, and with remarkable success. The first and last movements are unusually slow and create a dramatic framework for the three central movements taken briskly, almost skittishly—very Viennese. The overall effect is to focus fresh attention upon a familiar work in a fine performance. Of the two soloists Margaret Price is markedly superior to Brigitte Fassbaender who sounds disappointingly cool and dry toned. The other Stokowski recording is of Tchaikovsky for Philips, again with the LSO. A dancing Serenade for Strings and a strikingly dramatic *Francesca da Rimini* make exhilarating listening. Finally in the orchestral field, and rather further from the beaten track, is a stimulating record of Ibert's music. Far greater profundity here than one is inclined to associate with the composer of the famous Divertissement. Under their conductor, Louis Frémaux, the City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra produce strikingly idiomatic performances, recorded with the utmost clarity and brilliance. A thoroughly worth-while addition to the recorded repertoire.

Outstanding among recent chamber music issues have been two records of the young, British, Fitzwilliam Quartet playing Shostakovitch's last three string quartets, together with the 7th and magnificent 8th. The 13th, 14th and 15th quartets make a fitting epitaph for this great Russian composer, and if ever a work contained premonitions of death it is the gripping 15th with its six linked adagio movements. The Fitzwilliam Quartet was formed in 1969 when its members were still at Cambridge and has become much associated with Shostakovitch's music. Certainly these two records possess an arresting degree of intensity and conviction. Another young British quartet to become associated with a particular composer is the Lindsay with the music of Sir Michael Tippett. Their recording of Tippett's first three string quartets is persuasive, and valuable in that it demonstrates the grass-roots of the composer's early years. At present there are two distinguished series of the Beethoven Sonatas for violin and piano appearing, and recently each has issued its performance of the 5th 'Spring' sonata. Itzhak Perlman and Vladimir Ashkenazy couple theirs with the 4th in A minor, whereas Arthur Grumiaux and Claudio Arrau offer the 1st in D. I must state my preference for the Decca team; Grumiaux and Arrau though correct and poised, seem to lack the zest and sheer style of Perlman and Ashkenazy. These early Beethoven works require, I feel, an invigorating rather than an introspective approach. To celebrate his 60th birthday, Yehudi Menuhin has recorded the Bach sonatas and partitas for solo violin. This 3 record set at bargain price demonstrates Menuhin's searching singlemindedness in interpretation. It also, sadly, shows how his diversification into teaching and writing seems to have robbed his technique of effortlessness and his tone of purity.

After the recording of Schumann's song-cycle *Frauenliebe und leben* sung by Ely Ameling for Philips which I discussed last quarter, to have Dame Janet Baker singing the same work accompanied by Daniel Barenboim is almost an *embarras de richesse.* Furthermore this issue has the advantage of being coupled with the maginficent Opus 39 *Liederkreis* to Eichendorff's poems. Although devotees of Janet Baker will be delighted with this record —her voice is to be heard at its richest and most authoritative—I found *Frauenliebe und leben* more persuasive in Ameling's performance, as indeed in Baker's own for Saga a decade ago. Somehow Janet Baker today is too strong, too much the supreme singer, for these simple, touching songs of love. Further, I found Barenboim's accompaniment almost negatively unobtrusive: there is wonderful music for piano here as Dalton Baldwin demonstrates in the Ameling recording. Admirers of Gérard Souzay, the fine French baritone, will be pleased that Philips have reissued a selection of Schubert songs on their budget 'Universo' label, though the low price means one must forego texts and translations. This 'Schubertiad' is an uneven selection, but the *Winterreise* excerpts in particular show this singer at his most persuasive.

An interesting choral issue is the Philadelphia Orchestra and Mendelssohn Choir under Eugene Ormandy, the orchestra's eminent conductor, of Prokofiev's dramatic oratorio *Alexander Nevsky.* It was written in 1938 to accompany Eisenstein's film about this Russian patriot and folk hero, and lacks subtlety, but in its direct, primary coloured way it has unquestioned passion and appeal. Ormandy and his forces play it for all it is worth and RCA have given it a suitably vivid recording. *The Field of the Dead* is sung impressively, in Russian, by Betty Page, a mezzo-soprano I had not previously encountered.

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## TWO VIEWS ON ULSTER

*Northern Ireland: The Orange State.* Michael Farrell. Pluto Press. £5.
*The Protestants of Ulster.* Geoffrey Bell. Pluto Press. £2.

Punctuated by Orange doggerel to illustrate the unique mentality of the Ulsterman's response to 'Fenians and Papists', Geoffrey Bell has written a rather unsympathetic portrait of the Sectarian obsession of Ulster's Protestants. He stresses the 'poor White' mentality and the blurring of class in the face of the common fear of Catholicism seen as the agency of the Devil. The stunting of working class organisation through marginal privileges and the brotherhood of religious exclusivism led Ulster's workers into a curious militancy directed towards defence of the Union rather than economic and social advance.

It stresses the contradiction by which Ulstermen cling to the British connection while defying its democratic Parliament. Like Mr. Farrell, Mr. Bell sees the roots in the different economic development of North and South and the use of divide and conquer as a means of keeping militancy in check in the most impoverished part of the U.K. He is easy to read and entertaining, whereas Farrell is full of historical detail, filling the gaps which inevitably affect an English view of Northern Irish history with its cycle of violent response and passivity to Sectarian rule.

Bell concludes 'that the Unionist alliance has been an all-class alliance, that through that alliance the Protestant workers have gained marginal privileges, that within the Orange Order, controlled by the Unionist establishment, provides a social service for the Protestant worker . . . an alternative for the services normally associated with trade unions.'

There are well documented exceptions of united action neutralised as in 1932 by labelling it a Catholic plot and by the conscious use of sectarianism for political ends. Connolly was frustrated by his Irish approach and even Larkin largely failed to penetrate this mentality, whereas the populism of Paisley could overcome the establishment Unionism of O'Neil and the traditional ruling elite.

Michael Farrell traces the history of Ulster—or more accurately the North East Irish State—in detail, backed by much research, although neglecting the English dimension in its interaction and overstressing the 'imperialist' connotation rather than the innate momentum and motivation of Ulster's majority religion.

Farrell covers in detail much of the ground touched upon by Bell, not least in the chapter on the 'violent thirties' when Tommy Geehan was able to say that 'we saw Catholic and Protestant workers marching together . . . and . . . fighting together,' while the Ulster Protestant League's Newsletter saw the strike 'as a cloak by the Communist Sinn Fein to attempt to start a revolution in our province,' deploring the activities of misled Protestant workers and congratulating the Government on its firm steps.

There is an air of *deja vu* about the pogroms and counter terror of the earlier twenties but half the book is devoted to the post-War period, more familiar to recent 'experts' on the Irish question. He covers the 1950s with the 'militant Catholic anti-Communism' IRA campaign and, in tracing developments up to the present day, concludes, as indeed Bell does, that 'every attempt (since 1935) by political groups to unite and mobilise the working class on social and economic issues has foundered, because it has come up against the question

of discrimination and Protestant privilege. His conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that Ireland is a classical rebuttal of the vulgar Marxist emphasis on economic determinism is the choice between a semi-fascist Orange statelet, matched by a pro-imperialist police state in the South, and an anti-imperialist and socialist revolution.

How this can be achieved in the face of the very obstacles so perceptively described by these authors is and never has been spelled out by Michael Farrell and his People's Democracy Group. It is an empty formula after a persuasive, well researched and much needed history of the 'Orange State.' Perhaps Pluto Press would have been better serving the search for a solution by opening its pages to a militant Protestant to begin a dialogue in the most depressed and depressing region of the United Kingdom.

Finally, Farrell's list of persons and organisations is alone a service to those seeking to find their way through the tangled and multi-covered web that enmeshes half a million Catholics with a million Protestants in an ideological battle that ought to have ended two centuries ago when the United Irishman led Orange and Green under one flag.

PAUL ROSE

## GULLIBILITY AND MORALITY

*'Détente,'* edited by G. R. Urban. Maurice Temple Smith. £8.

It is becoming more and more difficult to say anything new about Détente and yet Mr. G. R. Urban has produced 350 pages of dialogue held between himself and fifteen distinguished experts, mostly professors but also Ambassadors and Ministers. I find the method of presentation difficult to *read*, partly because the contributions originate from a close-knit series of Radio Free Europe *broadcasts* conducted by Mr. Urban. The experts do not differ on fundamentals, but there is a wide variety of emphasis, as between Sir William Hayter, former British Ambassador to Moscow; Prof. Claus D. Kernig, University of Trier; Wolf H. Halsti, a Finnish Historian, and Leopold Labedz, The Polish Editor of Survey. The U.S.A. is powerfully represented by two Harvard Professors, Zbigniew Brzezinski from Columbia University and two well-known Ministers of State, Dean Rusk and George W. Ball.

The Russians make no secret of the fact that their objective is the expansion of Soviet power and Communist ideology not only in Europe but all over the world. Some of the experts are concerned with the politics of Western Europe, and/or Atlantic-Nato military power. In a word, this group concentrates on the military, political, economic and cultural divisions between East and West, from Yalta to Helsinki. Call it cold war or détente, it amounts to the same thing. In military terms, it involves detailed analysis of the *Salt* discussions and which side has a war-winning superiority: in political terms, it involves the question whether Europe needs a unifying adversary, the absence of a European policy, the delicate balance of Euro-Atlantic relations and the pluralistic nature of Western and some Eastern countries of Europe, including the special case of Finland: in economic terms, it involves Russia's need for Western technology, financial credit and grain or in a word East-West trade: in cultural terms, it involves completely opposing conceptions of the meaning of freedom, whether in theory or in practice.

I now mention two pertinent questions put by the experts. 'Is Europe a drop-out between two world powers'? and secondly, 'Is Russia doing world peace a service by sitting tight on 100 million Central and Eastern Europeans'? These question I would answer with a direct negative, but others may differ. There is a third question put by the experts and particularly by Solzhenitsyn,

whose name is identified thirty times in the index, 'has *détente* contributed to a growing decay of morale and political will in the West?' Probably no answer to this question makes much sense because we are dealing with imponderables.

What then about Russian expansion all over the world? What about the 'liberation armies'? Here the experts differ. But Prof. Labedz sees Russian policy wholly consistent and successful whether in Czechoslovakia or Cuba, whether in Hungary or Somalia, in Poland or Portugal, except that different methods and techniques are employed. He thinks that the Helsinki talks will lead to the Finlandisation of Western Europe. Others like Francois Duchène doubt whether Russia can chalk up success everywhere. What about Nigeria, Congo, Egypt? Have not many East European countries improved their relations with the West and U.S.A., in spite of Hungary and Czechoslovakia? Is not the growth of nationalism everywhere unhelpful to Russia?

In the end most of the experts are agreed that without some tangible signs of reciprocity 'détente has become a quack medicine hawked by the Soviet leaders everywhere'. Prof. Brzezinski specifies five areas where the U.S.A. must insist on certain forms of Soviet behaviour. They are ideological hostility; the secrecy surrounding Soviet strategic planning; lack of assistance indeed indifference, to global problems, eg food and energy; Soviet disregard of human rights; reciprocity in the treatment of diplomats, businessmen and scholars. These are the areas of strain and according to Brzezinski 'it is here that *we* can use our economic leverage to best advantage'. (*We* of course means the U.S.A.). The West is still a group of states without politically institutionalised links. Dr. Bruno Pittermann former Vice-Chancellor of Austria entitles his contribution 'The moral factor in the conduct of Foreign affairs' and he is by no means alone in stressing that the moral stature of the West and the U.S.A. has been lowered in recent years. 'The preservation of human life and human society are moral values too'. These were Kissinger's words in September (to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 'Cheat me once, shame on you, cheat me twice, shame on me'. (Negro proverb, quoted by Pittermann).

KENNETH LINDSAY

## A FINE STUDY OF RICHARD STRAUSS

*The Master Musicians Series*: *Richard Strauss*. Michael Kennedy. J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. £3.25.

The great advantage of the Master Musicians Series is that each volume encapsulates a composer's life and work into an easily-manageable book, which nevertheless contains appropriate musical examples, generally gives a balanced account of the composer in question, and, through the quality of the authors, despite the book's brevity it will entirely avoid superficiality. These qualities are particularly helpful to a study of Richard Strauss about whom recent works have tended to be either learned and highly detailed, such as Norman Del Mar's excellent 3 volume critical commentary, or confined to a particular aspect of the composer's work, such as William Mann's admirable study of the operas, or else violently partisan, as is George Merek's life 'Of a non-hero'.

Richard Strauss indeed, with his long life of 85 years, his great facility for composition and substantial output, the vast scale of some of his operas and orchestral works, and his easy acquiescence in the Nazi regime when so many of hs contemporaries left Germany and Austria in the 1930s, is the kind of figure to provoke controversy and partisanship. At its worst and most extreme this leads to such misfortunes as Ken Russell's television film about the composer. Michael Kennedy, however, as one had already gathered from his

admirable study of Gustav Mahler in this series, is above all a balanced and realistic commentator. Some may feel he is over generous to Strauss both as to his single-minded pursuit of capital, and as to his, at best, spineless attitude to the Hitler regime. 'I am not a hero, I haven't the necessary strength. I prefer to withdraw.' Which at Garmisch is precisely what the unheroic composer did. He points out that Strauss had a Jewish daughter-in-law, as well as in Hoffmansthal, his greatest librettist, a collaborator who was himself half-Jewish. Perhaps the essence of Strauss's motivation was truly expressed by Otto Klemperer's comment that Strauss remained because in Germany there were 56 opera houses and in America two, and that the reduction of income involved in such a gesture was not to be contemplated. Certainly Strauss himself wrote to his Jewish librettist, Stefan Zweig, in 1935 'For me there are only two sorts of people, those who have talent and those who haven't, and for me the People only begin to exist when they become the Audience. It's all the same to me if they come from China, Upper Bavaria, New Zealand or Berlin, so long as they have paid full price at the box office.'

Aside from such contentious matters, Mr. Kennedy is skilful in his portrayal of Strauss's immense professionalism as a composer, his quality as a conductor, and his deep concern as a dramatist for the theatrical merit of his operas. He also presents a lively, lucid and ultimately rather moving picture of this long-lived German 20th century kapellmeister who 'wanted to give pleasure, to create joy, for he understood the human heart'; the family man, with his strange, volatile wife, Pauline, who, despite her violent rages, her bullying and at times impossible behaviour, in fact adored him.

As is usual in this series, the book divides into two halves, the first biographical of the composer, and the second analytical of his music. If Mr. Kennedy copes well in the biography, his musical analysis is formidable. He deals with the utmost clarity and insight with Strauss's orchestral music and the Lieder, and one would go a long way to find more succinct, objective and enlightening commentaries upon the operas, particularly of the less frequently performed works such as *Intermezzo, Die Agyptische Helena, Die Schweigsame Frau,* and above all in his moving account of Strauss's great final operatic work, written in 1941 when he was 77 years old, the marvellous *Capriccio.*

Mr. Kennedy's evaluations of Strauss's music are well balanced, carefully considered and elegantly expressed. 'There is nothing "pseudo" about *Rosenkavalier;* the Silver Rose is made of sterling silver and the icing on the cake is hard.' It is not often that one finds a study of a composer to be so concise, so useful, and at the same time so eminently readable.

DAVID FINGLETON

## AN INTRODUCTION TO VOLTAIRE

*Voltaire.* John E. N. Hearsey. Constable. £6.00.

Voltaire's reputation has always been a bit ironic. To most people he is identified with two things: Rousseau and the French Revolution. Voltaire detested Rousseau and he would have detested the French Revolution if he had lived to see it. His ideal was the old one of the Philosopher King, not rule by a rabid mob. Voltaire destroyed many of the props of the *Ancien Regime* and thus helped to prepare the ground for the revolutionary tumults. Many historians today believe that too much attention has been given to Voltaire and other intellectuals as a cause of the Revolution. However, intellectual history retains its fascination for two reasons: it is easy to read and, less laudably, it is easier to write.

This latest biography of the 'Sage of Fernay' is rather touchingly dedicated to 'all those who have suffered from the evils of fanaticism and falsehood'. In spite of such lofty intentions, the author is led occasionally to make fanatical attacks upon the Church and other institutions which rouse his ire. Nevertheless, he tells the familiar story of the life of Voltaire in admirable brevity. Although the serious student will prefer Theodore Besterman's superb biography, this one will serve as a good introduction for those who wish to learn the basic facts about Voltaire. Like many similar works of popular history, the book is much better on its subject than on the general background. Thus there are silly little errors such as calling Bolingbroke 'Minister of War' or Newcastle, 'Foreign Secretary' or calling Emperor Charles VI, Charles VII. The author believes that the tyranny of the *Ancien Remie* justifies the horrors of the Revolution. He is not alone in believing this but it would be helpful if he had the correct date for the worst of the Paris massacres which occurred in 1792, not 1791.

R. F. MULLEN

## THOMAS HARDY AS POET

*The Complete Poems of Thomas Hardy*. Edited by James Gibson. Macmillan. £6.50.

It was Hardy's wish that his collected poems should be available 'at a reasonable price so as to be within the reach of poorer readers'. Over the years his wish has certainly been respected. My own copy cost £1.50 seven years ago, which was very reasonable for a bulky volume of over 900 pages. The newly published 'Complete Poems' in the New Wessex Edition costs over four times as much—a melancholy comment on the way inflation hits those who still like to buy books. It also weighs nearly twice as much, giving it the corpulent dignity one likes to see in reference books on a shelf but which can lie heavily on the hands of an assiduous reader. Do poets, who are born in slim volumes, always have to die in fat ones? How pleasant it would be if Mr. Gibson might give us a paperback *Wessex Poems* or *Time's Laughingstocks,* restored to their original individuality.

Certainly no one could do it better, for Mr. Gibson has made the texts of Hardy's poetry very much his own province: the scholarly *variorum* edition that he is so well equipped to do might perhaps be undertaken in this way, by stages. Meanwhile we have this new edition offering a number of satisfactory features: the type and style of printing are a great improvement on the old, the editor's notes are always illuminating and he has added 29 poems and fragments to the standard collection. Some of these additions—notably the verses from *The Dynasts* and the *Woodlanders* epigraph—are familiar, but there are others which have not appeared in any of the standard works. One of these, 'A Jingle on the Times', is a biting comment on the barbarism of war which certainly deserves to be better known. Its date of composition gives it an added interest for it seems to express a mood of 1916 or 1917 but was written as early as December 1914, when the popular tide of romantic heroics must still have been running strongly.

Of the collection as a whole what is there left to say nowadays? That Hardy and Yeats are the two great transitional poets from the Victorians to the present century is surely by now a commonplace; and of the two Hardy has perhaps exerted a stronger influence on subsequent generations of poets. Consider the debt to him owed by Ezra Pound and D. H. Lawrence, by Sassoon and Blunden, by Auden and Day Lewis, by—in our own day—poets so various as Larkin and

Betjeman and Causley. To any lover of poetry who may be hesitating as to whether to find a place for *The Complete Poems of Thomas Hardy* on his or her shelves let me echo Pound's challenging question—'When we come to estimate the "poetry of the period", against Hardy's 600 pages we will put what?'

DESMOND HAWKINS

## THE WHITECHAPEL MURDERS

*A Casebook on Jack the Ripper*. Richard Whittington-Egan. Wildy and Sons Ltd. £3.30.

In his documentation of all known evidence concerning the murders committed in London's East End in 1888, Mr. Whittington-Egan has marshalled an impressive list of authorities whose arguments for and against various suspects have continued to be propounded right up to the present day. The results of his research, devotedly carried out over the last thirty-five years, were partially published, prior to the volume now produced, in the *Contemporary Review* as a trilogy of articles in November and December, 1972 and January, 1973. His scholarly work as a whole appears in an attractively bound book with the distinguished *imprimatur* of Wildy and Sons, of Lincoln's Inn.

Mr. Whittington-Egan does not identify any of the suspects as the legendary Jack the Ripper. Indeed, he is led to the conclusion that no such person has ever been, or perhaps ever will be, conclusively shown to have perpetrated the crimes. He does, however, organise his account of the events themselves and of the theories evolved at the time in such a way that a reader whose knowledge of legal processes is minimal may understand some of the difficulties facing officials and police officers. Not the least of these problems was the mounting fear, attaining panic proportions, of the unhappy citizens of all classes in the crowded, ill-lit Victorian London streets.

Part I of his book deals with the views expressed and the material available from 1888 to 1972. Towards the end of this period came the naming of three new suspects, Montague John Druitt, the Duke of Clarence and James Kenneth Stephen, against each of whom major writers on the subject have built up cases from known habits, social connections and striking coincidences. Against none of them, however, can the case be proven, even if other 'claimants' are dismissed. Part II of the author's thesis brings the story of the Ripper hunt up to 1975 with suspicion being levelled at the painter Frank Miles, the horrifying Dr. Thomas Neill Cream and the aged, infirm Sir William Gull. But still, in spite of an upsurge of literature indicting these, Mr. Whittington-Egan can find no solid case to answer.

The casebook does, however, inspire confidence in the author's ability to present fair and dispassionate evidence whilst sympathetically and imaginatively portraying the characters caught in the spotlight on-stage. It is a careful, critical analysis for the first time of one of the most appalling chapters in criminal history.

BETTY ABEL

## A TELECOMMUNICATIONS PIONEER

*Sir William Freece, F.R.S.: Victorian Engineer Extraordinary*. E. C. Baker. Hutchinson. £6.50.

Introducing this biography, Professor J. H. H. Merriman says Sir William Freece (1834-1913) influenced telecommunications in the U.K. more than any other man, though his initial resources were slender: 'a few men, a few

machine tools, a native wit, a vivid scientific imagination and a strong business-inclined engineering flair'.

Eldest surviving son of the large family of a Carnarvon non-conformist schoolteacher, banker, stockbroker, mayor, he went first to a 'dismal, dark, dreary, dirty' local school, later to King's College School, London. Here he did not distinguish himself as scholar, loved going to parties, diaried 1852: 'Idle and lazy the whole year'. In after years he said he owed to his mother his success in life, habits of industry, love of reading, energy. Looking back, he could recall 4th class passengers on a Scots railway who had to stand like cattle; the first use of a telegraph in 1845 to intercept at Paddington a murderer, John Tawell, who had slain his mistress at Slough; and in 1843, bands of Welsh toughs dressed as women who called themselves 'Rebecca and his daughters' and went about destroying toll gates and toll houses.

Significant for his future career was a visit to the Electric Telegraph Company's Strand, London, office where, daily at 1 p.m., a time-ball in the window was operated by a telegraph signal from Greenwich Observatory; also, a visit to the Royal Institution to hear Tyndall lecture on magnetism. More important was his first job, in 1853, as clerk in the Company, then on the engineering staff. Here he was privileged to work with experts like Edwin and Latimer Clark, John Fuller, G. H. Airy, Thompson (later Lord Kelvin) and, above all, the great Faraday, whose assistant he became—'an experience', Mr. Baker writes, 'invaluable to young Freece, who could not fail to benefit from watching Faraday's imaginative yet logical approach to problems, his dexterity, lucid expression, and open-mindedness in the face of conflicting theories . . .'

Subsidiary work as Telegraph Superintendent for the South Western Railway from 1860, with salary rises to £250, enabled him to marry a Southampton solicitor's daughter; and a Paris honeymoon in a Paris hotel that used electric battery instead of wire-pull bells spurred him on to further steps in applying electricity to everyday life.

Focussing on the technical rather than personal aspects, Mr. Baker, Post Office engineer and archivist, records Freece's achievements in railway signalling, telegraphy, telephony, wireless, street lighting, lighthouse communication, and his business travels abroad. It is an exemplary story of a staunch Victorian who, after 47 years' labour for mankind's 'comfort, happiness and service', was made first freeman of Carnarvon.

TREVOR ALLEN

## SHORTER REVIEWS

**The Crossman Affair** (Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape. £4.95). Hugo Young, political editor and chief leader writer of the London *Sunday Times*, has written the background story of the successful efforts of his paper to publish in serial form part of the now famous Crossman cabinet diaries, in face of objections from the Cabinet Office, followed by proceedings by the Attorney-General to stop publication of the diaries in book form. At the time of his death in April 1974, Richard Crossman had prepared his cabinet diaries for publication, well aware that their disclosure of the 'blow by blow' arguments of named cabinet ministers would be met by strenuous opposition, as breaking the old thirty year rule and undermining the convention of collective responsibility for cabinet decisions. As the author shows, the *Sunday Times* with remarkable astute-

ness and judgment fended off the pressures of the Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir John Hunt, with his definitive parameters, and completed their seven instalments. The Attorney-General, Sam Silkin, Q.C., then brought proceedings in the High Court, before the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery, for an injunction mainly on the ground of breach of confidentiality in order primarily to safeguard the doctrine of collective responsibility. This volume sets out at length the course of this action, including the cross-examination of Sir John Hunt and extracts of affidavits submitted by both sides. There are also the legal arguments, and finally the judgment of Lord Widgery on October 1, 1975. He refused an injunction on the particular facts, on the basis that after nine years the continuing confidentiality of the material could no longer be demonstrated. On the other hand he upheld the right of action for breach of confidentiality and restraint of publication 'when this is clearly necessary in the public interest.' As the author points out, this is at once a victory for publication but also gives the Court control in the future on the particular facts of a case. Moreover, the principles laid down since by the Radcliffe Commission's proposals will continue to inhibit in practice the publication of such matters for at least fifteen years after the events described. This is an important book; it highlights principles of great constitutional importance which the general public ought to appreciate.

**Play** (Penguin Books. £2.75). In this ambitious collection of studies, the Editors, Professor Jerome S. Bruner, Dr. Alison Jolly and Dr. Kathy Sylva, have brought together 71 articles within 700 pages directed to 'emphasising the crucial role of play in the development of the individual human child as well as in the evolution of the primate order.' Many of the articles have already been published in technical journals by experts in child and primate behaviour; on the other hand, 'deeply intuitive accounts of play' are reproduced from writers such as W. H. Auden and J. Huizinga. The Editors optimistically have in mind both the general reader and the technical student of human and animal behaviour for whom the papers contain 'sufficient description of research methods and data analysis.' They fairly state the bias of their selection of papers. They are concerned specially with 'exploring the emergence of evolutionary trends in the primate order as they reflect themselves in the play of human beings,' 'the rich connection that exists between play and human culture' and thirdly parallelism between play and language structure. 'We unashamedly confess to entertaining the plausible hypothesis that the evolution of play might be a major precursor to the emergence of language and symbolic behaviour in higher primates and man.' The papers are followed by references and there are illustrations.

**World Population, Basic Documents Volume 1. What is the Problem?** (Oceana Publication, New York. $40). This is the first of four volumes of source documents on all aspects of the world population problem, selected and introduced by Dr. James Avery Joyce. The documents are preceded by short introductory commentaries by experts in their particular fields. This first volume 'is intended to summarise the present state of knowledge and hypotheses concerning the factors affecting population trends and the influence of these trends upon economic and social conditions.' Included are summaries of relevant writings and attention is given to findings of factual research. Succeeding volumes are to deal successively with Modern Times, the Developing World, and World Population Year.

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## SEPTEMBER 1976

SOUTHERN AFRICA
Richard Luce, M.P.

THE ARTS OF ISLAM
Ernle Money

JOHN STUART MILL AND THE FUTURE OF LIBERALISM
J. N. Gray

JAPAN AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
Gene Gregory

QUARTERLY FILM REVIEW
James Morton

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# Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

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# Contemporary Review

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## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### by Richard Luce, M.P.

FEW would disagree that one of the most difficult and potentially explosive issues in the world today is that of race relations. It is a matter of fundamental importance to the prospects for peace and harmony in the world.

Southern Africa is really the cockpit of the world's racial tensions. It is in that part of the world that the problem is the most acute. Indeed, international peace and stability may well depend to a large extent upon the peaceful evolution of race relations in Southern Africa. Mr. Vorster has said that the alternative is 'too terrible to contemplate'. Alan Paton, in his moving book *Cry the Beloved Country*, expressed the hope of a 'new dawn' in South Africa.

Alan Paton really put his finger on it when he referred to the bondage of fear, from which so many Europeans suffer, and the fear of bondage from which so many Africans suffer. It is this basic dilemma which the Europeans and Africans face in Southern Africa.

A peaceful solution to these problems is an essential African, European and Western interest. A violent solution is one from which only the Soviet Union and other Communist regimes can profit.

What, then, are the prospects for peace and how can Britain and the West facilitate this?

The situation has of course been markedly affected by the withdrawal of Portugal from Mozambique and Angola. For the year or so following the launching of Mr. Vorster's detente policy in November 1974 the outlook for the development of a dialogue—or detente—between South Africa and her black neighbours had seemed more favourable. Pretoria's prompt acceptance of the Frelimo regime in Mozambique was a major contribution to the creation of the right atmosphere for securing the co-operation of the four Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia in the attempts to achieve peaceful settlements in Namibia (South West Africa) and Rhodesia.

However, the civil war and the consequent victory of the MPLA in

developments are worth considering. Firstly there have been changes on the political front. It is significant that the growingly successful Progressive Party and the Reform Group are increasing in strength and pressing the Government to move towards a more multi-racial society. There is equally, however, a danger of a backlash towards the 'laager' attitude following the growing violence in Rhodesia and the Soweto riots.

Secondly, if the South African economy is to continue to grow, then this can only happen if the Africans take on more skilled jobs since the white population is not large enough to sustain that role. It is estimated that by 1980 there will be a requirement for 2 million skilled Africans. This means that Africans will have to assume increasing responsibilities. The pressure of economic events may, therefore, have profound long-term political implications which the Government will not be able to ignore.

Thirdly, the Transkei is due to declare independence at the end of October. The question of recognition has big implications because of its relevance to South Africa's apartheid policy, to which the Homelands are central. The Republic's ambition is that all the Homelands will in due course become independent and every South African black will owe allegiance to his Homeland. The implication of this is that the Africans in the 'white' rural and urban areas of South Africa, now numbering more than 9 million, will have no political rights where they live. Chief Matanimaz of the Transkei claims that Africans in these areas should have a clear choice of citizenship, opting either for the Transkei or the Republic. This, inevitably, is a key factor which other nations will take into account before recognising the Transkei. Even if the normal criteria for recognition are satisfied, the evidence appears to be that the OAU, the U.N. and therefore many other nations will refuse recognition on the grounds that it implies acceptance of the Republic's apartheid policy. The argument, however, is not as simple as that. We should not prejudge the issue and certainly we must show our support for Chief Matanzima's citizenship argument.

Neither the outside world, nor the Africans of the Republic, are likely to leave South Africa in peace until a more just multi-racial society evolves.

The task for Britain in all this must be to work in the closest harmony with the EEC and the U.S. The prospects for peace and for protecting Western European interests in Southern Africa must be enhanced if the EEC is to work in harmony. There should be a common approach on the employment policies of the subsidiaries of EEC companies, on the recognition of the Bantustans, on Rhodesia and Namibia. Indeed, this concerted policy should cover all political, economic and security matters of joint concern.

Our common purpose must be to do everything to foster peaceful change. If we can help to release the African from the fear of bondage and the European from the bondage of fear, then this will be a victory for democracy, freedom and racial harmony.

# VIETNAM REFUGEES IN AMERICA

## by Barry Rubin

JUST over one year ago, Communist forces launched their last major offensive in South Vietnam. Cities surrendered, the South Vietnamese army panicked and was shattered, and thousands of refugees fled from the advancing troops. The decade-long U.S. involvement in South-East Asia was ending in disaster.

The collapse came with surprising swiftness and there had been little preparation for the ensuing refugee problem. In 11 days, however, some 140,000 people, including 1,200 Cambodians, were taken out of the country by plane and ship. U.S. policy was to give priority to 'high-risk' Vietnamese —those who, through their association with the Saigon government or U.S. forces, had reason to fear for their safety under the new regime. The most publicised and controversial part of this programme was 'Operation Baby Lift', which took 2,000 orphans out of Vietnam. Here there was one major tragedy: a cargo plane, loaded with young children, crashed on take-off. Dozens were killed.

A new development in this story is that there have been legal difficulties in the adoption process for some of the children from 'Operation Baby Lift' because of the need to investigate whether they still have living parents in South Vietnam. In a couple of cases, there apparently is evidence of such a surviving family, in others the 'red tape' has prevented any final settlement of the issues. There have been some complaints from foster parents demanding action on completion of the legal process granting them custody.

Harsh reactions and criticisms of the refugee programme came from many sources. The Hanoi government accused the U.S. of 'kidnapping' people, while many Americans were fearful of taking in large numbers of war criminals and prostitutes. With the U.S. in an economic slump, some people wondered whether the refugees would take jobs away from American citizens. There were press stories that some of the 'orphans' had been given up by their mothers, convinced the children would have a better life in America. Some refugees, about 1,600 in all, even decided that they wanted to return home and there were some clashes at the Guam transport camp before their return could be arranged.

Today, American memories of the Vietnam war have just begun to fade. Watergate replaced the debate over the war on the political scene. The South Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, often the target of anti-war demonstrators, has been padlocked and shuttered, since the United States, unlike Great Britain, has not recognised the unification of North and South Vietnam. On some maps, South Vietnam itself has ceased to exist. On June 24th, the first session of the National Assembly of reunified Vietnam opened in Hanoi with 'representatives' of both North and South. Yet many people have decided to leave their homeland without awaiting the outcome and the refugees themselves have been resettled, many thousands of miles away,

with startling speed. Ironically, the handling of the refugee problem here may be the only U.S. success story to come out of the war.

Most of the refugees, whether 'high risk' or not, came from South Vietnam's urban middle class. Of household heads, surveys show, 27.5% had university education and 48% more had some secondary school. In terms of occupation, 43% were white collar or professional, 40% were blue collar (the working class that the Communists claim to represent), and only 5% were peasants, the vocation of the vast majority of Vietnamese. About 40% are Catholic, eight times their proportion of the entire population. These figures profile the most anti-communist sections of the population. There can be no doubt but that they left voluntarily and eagerly.

The refugees also form a very young group: 35% are 18-34 years old, while 46% are under 18. Overall, then, they are a relatively skilled, urbanised and flexible group: they are most likely to be able to adjust to the West because, among all Vietnamese, their lifestyle was closest to ours.

As the Vietnamese arrived in the U.S. last summer they were put into four quickly organised camps, located on military installations. They were interviewed, given physical exams, briefed on life in America and offered English lessons. Given the speed and innovation of this process there was inevitably some confusion and inefficiency. A blistering report by Senator Edward Kennedy in June 1975 charged:

> The President's plan to evacuate tens of thousands' of Vietnamese was, from the beginning, less of a plan than a vague intention, barely stated. As events have shown, whatever plan did exist, it was implemented badly, plagued with disorganisation and undertaken with little command control in the field. Moreover, events rapidly overtook whatever decisions were made.

One decision that was carried through was to move the Vietnamese out of the camps by the end of the year. In general, this seemed a correct choice, aimed at normalising, as rapidly as possible, lives which had been shattered by warfare and a traumatic flight. 'I think they did a very good job getting the refugees out of the camps in seven months,' says Matthew Mitchell, Programme Director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees. At the time, though, he adds, the refugees did not fully understand the importance of the language training. Now, with their need to find jobs and dispersion around the country, more Vietnamese are participating in evening English classes.

There was also occasional friction between the Government and the voluntary organisations involved in finding jobs and homes for the refugees. An official of the U.S. Catholic Conference, which helped over 59,000 Vietnamese here, said, 'We told the government at one point, "Your interest is in one thing—clearing the camps. We're interested in another thing—resettling people".'

Most of the work was actually done by groups like the Catholic Conference, Church World Service, Lutheran Immigration and Naturalisation Service and the (Jewish) United HIA Service. The plan for easing the transition period of resettlement was based on having sponsoring American

families or institutions (usually church groups) help individual Vietnamese families. The private groups, with their connections across the nation, handled the job far better than the government. In fact, while Washington appropriated $500 per refugee, the voluntary, religious-related groups provided an additional $1,000 in donated time and services.

The second phase of the refugee programming is now in full swing. It is designed to help the Vietnamese toward 'self-sufficiency', and full assimilation into American society. This task has been greatly simplified by the high motivation of the average refugee. Despite early misgivings, the great majority of them have proven hard-working and ambitious for advancement. Yet the U.S. is now facing its highest rate of unemployment since World War Two. Actually, the Vietnamese have done better finding jobs than most people expected, with about 82% of those considered employable able to find work.

The short-range problem is underemployment. A government survey shows that 40% of the refugees are earning less than the poverty level, although many are also receiving welfare or private assistance. Most of the Vietnamese have had to take jobs below their level of training and education. Language problems remain a serious barrier.

Hence, current emphasis of aid programmes is on bilingual education, vocational training and upgrading job skills. The American Nursing Association, for example, has helped 45 Vietnamese nurses obtain licenses and find jobs. Another programme seeks to do the same for 350 refugee doctors. Those with marketable skills do the best. Vietnamese fishermen are being taught American techniques and set up in business. A group of textile workers is being trained on modern machinery in another part of the country. At the same time, the former South Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.S. is still unemployed and General Ky, once one of South Vietnam's most powerful figures, has failed in his attempts to become a college lecturer because of demonstrations against him.

Perhaps a more typical story is that of a former Vietnamese Navy captain. He was resettled in the Washington area last June and found a job for himself within one month, working as a cashier in a restaurant. His children are now in public school, working hard to master English, and he attends evening courses. Eventually, he hopes to get into a better-paying job involving more skill, perhaps computer programming. Americans have been friendly, he says, but only a few ask him questions about life and war in Vietnam.

'Resettlement is far more than just having a job or having an income', a relief official explains. Adjustment to radically different cultural styles is the most difficult. But the Vietnamese refugees have made the first key decision in the process: they have no illusions about returning home, they have decided to stay here permanently.

Traditionally, immigrants to the U.S. have gone through a recurring pattern over three generations. The actual immigrants remain heavily influenced by the language, culture and world view of their native land;

their children become fully Americanised, ashamed of their parents' accents and quaint customs; the third generation rekindles its interest in its heritage, developing a sense of ethnic pride. Perhaps the Vietnamese refugees will also follow this cycle.

Already, they are making strong efforts to preserve Vietnamese traditions in their new home. In April, 400 Vietnamese living in the Washington area celebrated Vietnam's national day—the anniversary of the foundation of the Hung dynasty over 4,000 years ago—with a ceremony in front of Washington's Buddhist temple.

Nguyen Ngoc Binh, one of the event's organisers and an English-language teacher, commented:

'It will be very difficult for the Vietnamese to keep their character. That is what the ceremony is about. We must overcome obstacles to keep our Vietnamese character and culture recognisable to ourselves and our children.' Another action toward this end has been the formation of a food co-operative to provide Vietnamese-style foods to refugees at low prices.

Despite all this, the 140,000 refugees are only a drop in the complex multinational U.S. population. They are already becoming invisible, even if the impact of the war that brought them here continues.

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[Barry Rubin is a doctoral candidate in Middle East history at Georgetown University and a journalist specialising in international affairs. He has written for a number of journals in the U.S. and abroad, including *Middle East Review, Wiener Library Bulletin, Columbia Journalism Review, The Nation,* and *Worldview.*]

# THE ARTS OF ISLAM

## by Ernle Money

*The World of Islam*. Edited by Professor Bernard Lewis. Thames and Hudson. £12.50.
*Monuments of Civilisation: Islam*. Umber to Scerrato. Cassell. £7.75.
*The Spread of Islam*. Michael Rogers. Elsevier-Phaidon. £3.95.
*The World of Ottoman Art*. Michael Levey. Thames and Hudson. £5.50.
*The Arts of Islam*. Arts Council of Great Britain. Hayward Gallery. 8th April-4th July, 1976.

IT is hard to say why, until recently, so many people here who would otherwise regard themselves as generally civilised and intelligent, have had such a blank spot with regard to Islamic art. This does not mean that the Islamic world, and in particular the Arabic world, has not had its protagonists, many of them fervent, in Britain among scholars, writers, artists and men of action, over a very long time. But for a variety of reasons, among which language, distance and the lack of a common historical perspective have been of particular importance, an other than superficial knowledge of the Islamic world has tended to remain the prerogative of the specialist or at least of the well-informed amateur who has taken the trouble to make a special study of this field. Now, since the holding of the World of Islam Festival in London this year, there is no excuse for this to be the case. Not only will a good many people have found that they have gained immense pleasure from a more informed awareness of a remarkable area of world achievement but the extension of our horizons in this manner will have added greatly to the sensitivity of our perception of civilisation as a whole.

This is not to say that the discovery of Islamic art has proved altogether an easy task. In the same way that the application of unfamiliar physical exercise in any particular sphere makes one aware of the existence of muscles in the human body with which one had hardly been familiar before one began to use them, so one's mental processes have had to be readjusted by the discovery of a whole new area of mental contact. The eye has had to familiarise itself with entirely different patterns of approach, the subconscious with new standards of appraisal. To take, for example, the wide variety of objects exhibited at the Hayward Gallery, there are subtleties of approach and sophistications of technique which it takes a good deal of getting used to. In some ways it is like learning to read, or indeed to walk, all over again. But once one has grasped certain fundamentals about the nature of Islam it not only becomes simpler to do so but provides a general vocabulary of understanding which makes everything else fit into place.

In the first place, Islam constitutes a total order and an all-embracing way of life. The separation of the world into the religious and the secular, the division of art into the spiritual and the profane which has stamped itself so strongly on the character of Christian civilisation, does not begin

to exist. The Koran and the Sunna not only regulate the theology and the law of the Islamic way of existence but are guidelines to the everyday way of life as well. However various the origins of Islamic art may be, however widely spread its context extending from the Umayyad Caliphate of Andalusia to the Moslem dynasties in India there was a generally embracing background of conformity to a common hierarchy of values. This gave to Islam, and in turn to Islamic art, which is simply a partial expression of the whole, an integration which overrides the diversity of other elements, such as geographical distance, historical change or even differences of racial origin. To quote from the very well balanced introduction to the World of Islam exhibition:

> The Muslim is not fascinated by the drama of individual artistic creation; rather his soul vibrates through the idea of the unity and immensity of God which are reflected in the cosmic order and also in the artifacts shaped by the hand of man—and shaped not according to his imagination alone, but also according to the nature of the object, by the bringing forth of the laws and the qualities which are inherent in the object itself.

One must familiarise onself, therefore, with a wholly different scale of values in order to get the most out of Islamic art. Individual mediums which in the west have tended to play a less predominant role, here become preponderant. Calligraphy is the most essential of all the arts because it is the way in which the Koran itself is continually revealed to the faithful. Architecture takes on a wholly fundamental significance because it provides the function of building the sanctuaries in which the scriptures are read, where prayers are offered and where the spiritual life of the individual Moslem is carried out. The mimbar, the pulpit-like structure in the mosque, becomes a place of adornment and often of great beauty because it is the spot from which the Khutba or Friday sermon is preached. The mihrab, the niche in the mosque which indicates the direction of Mecca to which the worshippers must face when praying, becomes a point of special beauty because of what it represents to the mind of the faithful. But in a rational rather than a sacerdotal world, this art remains objective because it is always intended to provide a realist framework and never intended to create illusory effects. To this way of life all the arts are dedicated and play an integrated but subordinate role.

It is the case, therefore, that although there is a wide variety in Islamic art based not only on differences of ethnic origin but on long continuance of usage, the fundamental unity of identity is greater than that in practically any long-running civilisation. Professor Lewis's *The World of Islam* produces an excellent background account of this culture, dealing not only with the faith of Islam and of the peoples who accepted it, but in some detail with its achievements in individual fields such as art and architecture, literature, music, science and philosophy. Not only is it beautifully produced but Professor Lewis draws on the talents of a number of scholars who are leading authorities in those particular fields. For example, Mr. Richard Ettinghausen of the Islamic Department of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, provides an admirable account, 'The man-made setting',

in which he discusses the attitude towards decoration and artifacts; and Dr. Fritz Meier, Professor of Islamic Studies at Basel University, contributes a valuable essay on the Sūfi tradition. There are also useful studies on the nature of Islamic civilisation in Moorish Spain, Safavid Iran, the Ottoman Empire and Muslim India and a penetrating link-piece by Mr. Elie Kedonrie on Islam today.

Mr. Ettinghausen also provides the introduction to Signor Scerrato's book, which is one of the Monuments of Civilisation series that Cassell have recently been producing, particularly with regard to architectural monuments. This is liberally provided with colour photographs, some of which are of quite outstanding quality. As Mr. Ettinghausen points out, in ancient times it took weeks and months to travel from one region of the Moslem world to another. Today the motor-car has reduced these distances to a matter of days, while the jet plane cuts down the intermediate journeys to the matter of hours. Whilst this may do something to reduce the strangeness, the bewilderment of strange cities and styles of buildings, it makes it the more important that a vastly increased number of travellers should have the benefit of accurate and scholarly guides to the places which are now becoming available to them. Signor Scerrato's book is such a guide and though the modern traveller in the Islamic world may not find the sheer sense of excitement and wonder that Kinglake or Doughty did, he is lucky to have available a far higher degree of understanding of what he is visiting. For the armchair traveller as well such a book is a delight.

By comparison with both these volumes, Mr. Rogers' *The Spread of Islam*, one of a new series called The Making of the Past to be produced by Phaidon, is a less ambitious affair. It is less beautiful to look at, perhaps, than some of the past productions of the Phaidon Press have led us to expect, but at the price is certainly good value and contains a series of interesting interludes, in particular dealing with such topics as Samarkand in the 15th Century, the Citadel of Aleppo, the Art of Islamic Calligraphy and the Mosque of Sultan Hasan in Cairo. Mr. Rogers, who is professor of the history of Islamic art at the American University of Cairo, provides a text which is well suited to the needs of the beginner in this subject and he makes available an excellent glossary of technical terms so that the reader can follow more easily what he is about. The decision to introduce pictures in the course of the text by earlier European artists like David Roberts and Dievlofoy as well as modern photographic material is an imaginative one, but unfortunately the quality of these is not always up to standard.

Mr. Michael Levey's *The World of Ottoman Art* breaks fresh ground but in quite a different way from the other books under review. Like everything that Mr. Levey writes it is elegant, invigorating and beautifully put together. It also has the benefit of providing a subject which is almost tailor-made for Mr. Levey's particular and very considerable talents, as an art historian. It is a remarkable achievement, in fact, that at a time when he is involved with the present-day problems of a major national collection, the Director

of the National Gallery can produce a book of such delightful and totally unselfconscious scholarship in a field which has not only been largely overlooked in this country but is outside what has been hitherto regarded as his major spheres of interest in Renaissance and Eighteenth Century art. It was Gibbon who said of himself that the historian of the Roman Empire owed not a little to the captain of the Hampshire Volunteers. Certainly the historian of the artistic history of the Ottoman Empire from its rise with Osman in the thirteenth century to the abdication of Abdul Hamid in 1909 owes a good deal to the sympathetic interpreter of Baroque patronage and eighteenth century Venice. Mr. Levey does not suggest that this is more than an introductory study to the subject but he manages, in what is quite a short book (one hundred and fifty-odd pages) not only to whet the reader's appetite to visit many of the places about which he writes (how marvellous now to be able to see for oneself, for instance, such places as Edirne and Konya, how fascinating to visit the exquisite green tiled 'fruit room' of Ahmed the Third at Tokpaki, the Sofa Kiosk at the same palace or the Haci Mahmed Emir Fountain at Dolmabalize) but to put into perspective the great figures like Sinan and Nevni against the background of Turkish art. Of living writers in English on the arts only Sir Sacheverell Sitwell has a greater gift to encapsulate in a few sentences what it might take other people months to find out and pages to write about and Mr. Levey uses this facility to wear a very considerable burden of scholarship with great lightness of handling and sensitivity of taste to a delightful effect. The illustrations, both in colour and black and white, are wholly worthy of the book.

The same cannot unfortunately be said for those to the elaborate and generally scholarly catalogue to the Arts Council's Arts of Islam exhibition at the Hayward Gallery. Though the text of this is on the whole extremely informative and the sixteen or so colour photographs are good, the majority of the black and white reproductions come over as a rather dull representation of the treasures which were actually on view. However, such was the quality of the exhibition itself that this very fully annotated catalogue is likely to remain a useful handbook in connection with a large number of the different fields such as textiles, jade, glass, ceramics, metalwork, and the arts of the book that it covered.

# HUMAN RIGHTS: A NEW DIMENSION?

## by James Avery Joyce

WHEN, before the Second World War, I read political science under Harold Laski at L.S.E. and started dinners in the Inner Temple, I had hardly grasped the meaning of 'human rights'. The Rights of Man and the French Revolution, yes! The not-so-self-evident truths of the American Declaration of Independence, yes! (Were not a dozen signatories at the foot of that document members of the Inns of Court?) The Minority Rights protected under the League of Nations Covenant, yes! (As it happened, my first paid job, outside the law, was that of Organising-Secretary of the International Conference on Minorities at the Caxton Hall, London, presided over by Lord Robert Cecil.)

But all this seemed a long, long way before the United Nations Charter of 1945, wherein the peoples 'reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person'. All these 'rights' were the inchoate local beginnings of a global movement which sprang so quickly from the Universal Declaration of 1948, itself born of the escalating inhumanity of a catastrophe that had started with the 'defence' of Poland and ended (did it?) with the rain of atomic death over the unwarned civilians of Hiroshima.

The Universal Declaration was humanity's unanimous response to the Nazi death camps, the fleeing refugees and tortured prisoners-of-war. But it was by no means a once-for-all reaction. In 1949 the century-old humanitarian law, enshrined in the first Red Cross Convention, was revised and widened to cover some of the shameful gaps the War had revealed, especially safeguards for civilians caught in armed conflicts. And the Universal Declaration began to proliferate further Declarations, Protocols, and Conventions, a process that has grown faster of late. The Universal Declaration itself was, in fact, conceived from the start as a global 'Bill of Rights', to be implemented by a legally enforceable Covenant—actually, this became two: the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—both of which came into force early this year, following 35 ratifications for each.

Almost unnoticed by press and mass-media—preoccupied with news and photographs of violence, torture, exile and with the deprivation or extinction of human rights—the United Kingdom's ratification of both Covenants last May, alongside Canada's ratification, is regarded in U.N. circles as a happy augury of further ratifications from hitherto reluctant parties and also, it is to be hoped, of Britain's speedy ratification of the Optional Protocol, attached to the latter Convention, which gives ampler scope for individual petitions and complaints to find their way through a new U.N. Human Rights Committee.

But why, after so promising a start, does it take so long to get basic rules of humanitarian law onto the universal statute book? And why such a gap

between precept and practice? These two questions are basic to our present enquiry and invite a serious answer.

In the first place, it is not generally realised, following the immediate post-war breakthrough, how big a jump forward humanitarian law has made within less than half a generation. Not one of the 150 sovereign States —whether they practise what they preach or not—would today openly reject or denounce the principles proclaimed in 1948, even though it took ten years of close argument (1956-1966) to put the Declaration into legal form and another ten years (1966-1976) to secure enough ratifications to give it legal force.

Speaking to an audience of representative non-governmental organisations in London in June, Dr. Marc Schreiber, who has been Director of the U.N. Human Rights Division for over a decade, stressed the fact of continual growth behind the present U.N. Human Rights machinery. Humanitarian 'diplomatic intervention' had been the maximum permissible application of Human Rights in the nineteenth century, while under the League of Nations the examination of or intervention in Human Rights issues was limited to Minorities and Mandated territories. It was not until the U.N. Charter's Chapter 9 on Economic and Social Co-operation became elaborated in the Declaration of Human Rights that the first specific provisions were made.

Dr. Schreiber instanced some of the tremendous changes that had taken place in the last ten years. The initial advance for this new phase came with the advent of new States to the U.N. membership, which provided an incentive to query and challenged hide-bound practice; and Human Rights instruments have since grown in number and enforceability. For instance, the reporting system to the Committee on the Abolition of Discrimination has provided an example of objectivity and scrutiny that would have been inconceivable fifteen years ago. The importance governments attached to not being exposed at the U.N. was considerable. This mobilisation of 'international shame' is a tremendous weapon.

Exiled Chileans, for example, have maintained that the Commission's Working Party and its Reports on Chile had saved many lives of opponents to the present régime, and saved many more from imprisonment and torture. The unanimity with which the Working Party had been established and presented its findings had itself been another breakthrough, and could well prove a useful precedent for investigating trouble spots. Moreover, the General Assembly, under resolution 1503, by which private individual complaints could be made to the U.N., was a hopeful innovation; while the Covenants and the Optional Protocol would be seen in historical perspective as significant milestones as the Declaration itself. Today, concluded the speaker, complaints received are sent back to Governments with individual names, and in some cases it could be proved that a Government had responded favourably and effectively.

Bearing in mind how long it took Britain to ratify the two Covenants, a mere listing of some of the instruments now in force between a widening

range of sovereign States is indeed impressive and some indication of what would have been 'inconceivable fifteen years ago'. Saving a global holocaust, this new framework of humanitarian law can be regarded as irreversible. Here one can cite only a few of the actual instruments in force or awaiting further action by governments:

Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,

Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance,

Convention on Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes,

Convention on Freedom of Information,

Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.

And so on. These and other forms of international action promoted directly by the Human Rights Commission are apart from the numerous declarations, covenants, protocols, and other instruments dealing with the rights of refugees or migrants or detainees, the slave trade or traffic in persons, the rights of youth and the child, apartheid, and, of course, the Red Cross Conventions and Protocols, as well as a continuous succession of ad hoc regional investigations and U.N. Headquarters commissions of enquiry. While outside this central action, the ILO, UNESCO, WHO and other U.N. agencies are constantly looking after workers' rights and educational or health standards (another term for 'rights'). So this relatively new phenomenon in Man's affairs: the building of a global structure of humanitarian law expands with each United Nations collective decision—always unanimous or nearly so—to spell out the simple affirmations of the 1948 Declaration.

But the second question abides an answer, and is, of course, crucial. It takes us back beyond law and history to St. Paul's despairing cry: 'For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do' (Rom, VII.19).

In this article, however, we are concerned with more mundane and immediate matters. At the heart of this age-long dilemma we find the orthodox sovereign state in head-on conflict with the new emerging world order. In this mounting contest between international ideals and national egotism, the whole United Nations system is caught in the eye of the storm. It is not surprising that in this overt struggle between the rights of the individual and the claims of state sovereignty the evolving doctrine and instrumental embodiment of Human Rights should be under constant attack from those sovereign states and their allies that, for one reason or another, find themselves assailed by that 'tremendous weapon', the mobilisation of 'international shame'.

The prevailing Western mood of disquiet, if not dismay, at several soul-shaking resolutions passed by the U.N. General Assembly last year—stretching all the way from a full-fledged Special Assembly's blueprint detailing a New Economic Order to what was textually a very brief minor amendment to a resolution (otherwise generally acceptable) condemning Racial Discrimination—has tended to consolidate behind United States

leadership-in-the-reverse, with the former U.S. spokesman, Daniel P. Moynihan, like the notorious little drummer-boy, sounding a general retreat from behind. Meantime, the Russians and the Third World, secure in their arithmetical majorities, look on undisturbed, leaving the founders of the Rights of Man and the creators of the modern Sovereign State to sort out their present confusions and come to terms with a World Organisation that has sadly slipped from their exclusive control.

The main counter-attack that this leadership-in-reverse has mounted against the United Nations and all its works has been capsulised by Western speeches and editorials in the term 'politicisation'. But the real vice of 'politicisation', at least in the field of Human Rights, is not that it is a false charge; but that it is true! It is certainly true of the three delinquent sovereign states, whose names and conduct are bracketed together in the repeated condemnations that have filled so large a place on the Agendas of the Assembly and the U.N. agencies (ILO and UNESCO and even WHO), namely, South Africa, Israel and Chile. Not that the U.N. condemnatory resolutions—now going back three decades in the case of South Africa, two decades for Israel, and half a decade for Chile—are framed in the same way. The facts are different, the procedures are different, and the remedies sought are different. But what is lamentably the same is that the Government's response in each case has been—or appears to be up to this date—a complete blank, at least as far as the general public is able to see.

There is no space or need here to add to or enlarge on these three current patterns of persistent violations, since the substance of each has been widely editorialised in press and mass-media. But what has not come out in the public debate is that Human Rights in such a context cannot be other than 'politicised'. For underneath the violations, so carefully listed in the U.N. resolutions and the massive evidence that has been painstakingly accumulated to support each of the specific charges made public, lies a primary political outrage that can only be put to rights by a political decision. In other words, Human Rights cannot be protected (I am keeping the argument to these three cases) merely and solely through the U.N.'s present machinery of Human Rights. The advantage that the Human Rights approach gives, however, is that it draws universal attention to the fact that human beings will continue to suffer as individuals when a sovereign state uses its sovereign power contrary to the claims of humanity and the principles laid down in the Charter.

The brutal oppression of the indigenous peoples in South Africa and Namibia over so long a period of time, and in spite of the unremitting efforts of the United Nations, is too obvious to require further comment here. Never has a sovereign state in our generation, claiming to be a democratic and Christian community, trodden down the rights and freedoms of over twenty millions of its people with such callous and ruthless methods of race discrimination. How can Human Rights in Southern Africa be other than 'politicised'?

Israel presents quite a different geographical and ethnological problem,

and one that only recently (i.e. since Egypt broke in 1973 what too many superficial observers had fondly imagined was a long-term status quo) has begun to offer acceptable alternatives; alternatives that could only be described with hushed breath before Yom Kippur and the discovery of the Arab oil 'weapon'. But, confining our analysis to Israel's official reaction to the last of the U.N. Special Committee's investigations of 'alleged violations of Human Rights in the occupied territories', conducted always impartially by non-Arabs (e.g. the Sri Lanka Ambassador, assisted by the Chief Justice of Senegal, and the Head of Ljubljana Law Faculty) we must ask: How did the distinguished delegate of Israel answer the detailed indictment (names, dates, witnesses, documents, incidents) posed against his Government in an itemised and verified legal document of some 50 pages?

The trampled rights of hundreds of dispossessed and suffering human beings, deprived of homes or possessions, jobs or freedom or life itself, cried for redress in those pathetic pages. The answer was no answer at all, but true to form. It was instead a vitriolic attack upon Syria and the Soviet Union and then something else that was probably unique in the annals of the General Assembly: an onslaught on the Human Rights Commission itself, which had been doing the humanitarian job for which it had been set up before Israel was even founded. And the justification for this attack? None other than the hearsay gossip included in a let's-scare-'em feature article in an English newspaper by three freelance journalists. I cite from the U.N. provisional record this astonishing piece of non-defence, addressed to 150 Member governments:

> Quoting an article from the *Sunday Times* of London, he said the Commission represented 'an almost total lie'. Although the Commission had received since 1970 over 100,000 complaints of alleged violations of human rights, throughout the world, 'not one has been followed through'. With a record like this, the Commission had 'deprived itself of any moral standing on issues with which it is supposed to deal'.

As regards Chile, its Government did not seek to bolster its case with quotations from the *Daily Worker*. It had, however, first invited the Human Rights Commission's Special Panel of Investigators (again under an impartial chairman and composed of well-known legal experts), but then refused them admission—a second South Africa! So the Chilean junta, too, plays for time and denies that the thousands of exiles and detainees and institutionalised torture is anything more than Communist conspiracy and propaganda. As with South Africa and with Israel, the case against Chile is unquestionably political. But a government that puts its temporary political power against universal human rights rests on sand, and it must assuredly crumble, however long the international mobilisation of shame may take. At base, human rights rest on moral values.

Yet the *Economist* (8.5.76), reflecting the malaise of a time when terrorism and other forms of violence seem to be in the ascendant, imagines that it has put its prescient finger on the touchstone of wisdom when it states: 'If you want to exert moral pressure on others, you need to have moral standing yourself. This simple rule has been forgotten by most members of

the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. . . . The most obvious failing is the way the Commission focuses only on a few favourite targets (especially Chile, Israel and South Africa) and blandly ignores charges brought against régimes which the majority of Members do not want to offend. . . . '

Selectivity? Why pick on me? Does the defendant, under indictment, with each charge exactly set against the legal provisions he has violated, turn to the Court and the Jury and cry: 'Not me—Bill Sykes is your man; his crimes are worse than mine; unless you put him in the dock, I refuse to be condemned!'?

There are two brief but direct rebuttals of these bland assumptions. The first was suggested at the beginning of this article. There is today more profound knowledge behind the Commission, after thirty years of relentless probing and sustained effort, of the hidden sins of sovereign governments which have not yet been exposed to the broad glare of day, than any of the hit-and-miss, fly-by-night revelations of current journalism. The second is really so obvious that it is a wonder that the Commission's armchair critics cannot grasp the point. If the Commission cannot win governments and a wider public loyalty to its support when it presents an ironclad case against the patent and uncontradicted delinquencies of those 'favourite targets' (where democracy or Christianity is supposed to govern community life), what hope has the Commission to succeed in the moral ghettoes of Brazil or Uganda?

Where should the moral pressure of an enlightened public lie: against the Commission or with it? With the delinquent, or with the judge?

# JAPAN AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: UNCERTAINTIES OF THE NEW ORDER

## by Gene Gregory

ON April 30th, 1976, the third United Nations Conference on The Law of the Sea came to an end: the decision having been made to re-convene it in New York this August. Meanwhile, it is interesting to look back to an earlier session, held in Geneva, and to consider the Japanese viewpoint in particular.

With the adjournment of the recent Geneva Session of the Law of the Sea Conference, another inconclusive round came to a close in what experienced diplomats agree are some of the most important and complex negotiations since the founding of the United Nations. As had been generally expected, the areas of agreement between the some 140 states on matters of vital national interest was limited and progress was confined to the drafting of a single 'informal' text of treaty articles.

The Conference, which began with high philosophic rhetoric about the 'common heritage of ocean resources', soon became bogged down in power plays between advanced and developing countries, with firm understandings increasingly elusive. General bewilderment grew as an accumulated morass of detail was swept ashore by the rising tide of national avarice which seemed almost certain to spell doom to freedom of the seas. But this was one of the few certainties which Geneva bequeathed to the forthcoming final session of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea held in New York this year. In the confusion, as Mexican delegate Jorge A. Vargas candidly noted, 'Unfortunately, the work in Committee II—the grabbing for territory—seemed to have highest priority in Geneva'.

An undertaking that was intended to make the sea man's common heritage was instead transformed mainly into an effort to give international legal recognition to the extension of national sovereignty over the seas and, many participants felt, to the detriment of both the freedom of the seas and optimal development of rich ocean resources for a world threatened by scarcity. Specifically, two developments have grown like a pall over the Law of the Sea negotiating process at the last two sessions, in Caracas and Geneva. A most unequivocal and apparently irreversible consensus has emerged extending the limits of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, while the notion of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone—propelled by a well-organised campaign of the '77' developing states with the Latin American bloc in the forefront—gained universal acceptance.

Most advanced countries, and especially the leading maritime nations, saw little good news in these developments; but Japan seemed likely to suffer the greatest disadvantage in an ocean regime which would deprive fishing fleets of access to 36 per cent of the ocean areas, pose potential dangers of control by coastal states of Japanese shipping through the

world's major straits, and check the development of ocean industries with cumbersome national and international bureaucratic regulation, or, as some would have it, direct involvement in operations.

Recognising the trend of world opinion and political pressures, Japan's position at the Geneva confab—essentially moulded by interests in freedom of ocean navigation, fishing and resource development—had evolved considerably since the Caracas Conference a year earlier. Japanese delegates at that earlier meeting had been severely jolted by the virtually total absence of sympathy they found for Japan's stand in favour of preserving as much as possible of the status quo. When the Caracas Conference convened, some 26 states still claimed only a three-mile territorial sea, with 52 states having extended their jurisdiction to 12 nautical miles, seven states insisting on sovereign rights to 200 miles offshore, and a few asserting rights to exclusive fishing zones even beyond these limits. But the unexpectedly strong conciliatory tide at Caracas swept all limits seaward; when the conference was over, it was clear that virtually all nations were prepared to agree to extending territorial waters to 12 miles, and that the time was ripe for establishing some kind of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the waters beyond, out to a maximum of 200 miles. Japan was alone in its commitment to open seas.

At Geneva, if Japan was prepared to incline before the massive weight of world opinion, a strong Japanese delegation was on hand to assure that vital national interests were protected in the process of drawing new jurisdictional limits and defining rights of transit and fishing.

Of particular concern was the implicit threat to the maritime lifeline which assures the flow of raw materials and energy to Japanese industry and provides the equally vital access to markets for its products. If the new Law of the Sea were to establish the 12-mile limit as the rule of international law, some 116 straits would fall within the territorial seas of coastal states—including critical passages such as the Malacca Straits, the Bering Straits, the Dover Strait, the Strait of Gibraltar, Bab-el-Mandeb at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. Under present international law, coastal states are not permitted to suspend the freedom of navigation throughout international straits. The rule that currently applies to international straits in territorial seas is that of innocent passage. The traditional regime of innocent passage evolved long before the advent of modern naval and aircraft, and was premised on a narrow territorial sea. Partly because of this historical beginning, the innocent passage regime does not permit transit by submarines or overflight by aircraft. Moreover, there is an insufficiently agreed understanding of what passage is 'innocent'. As a result, there is always the danger of subjective interpretation of 'innocence', which is generally defined as passage that is not prejudicial to the 'peace, good order, or security' of the coastal state.

For an advanced maritime state like Japan, which in recent years has been producing 40 per cent of the world's new ships and operates the world's largest merchant fleet, aggregating well over 30 million gross tons,

the present legal order does not provide adequate safeguards, if territorial jurisdiction of coastal states is extended to the 12-mile limit, for the unhampered freedom of access to and transit through international straits.

There is real danger, as recent events have shown, that the passage of nuclear powered ships or mammoth oil tankers might be declared inherently 'non-innocent' by coastal states.

Of particularly vital import to Japan in this regard are the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, through which 90 per cent of its crude petroleum, supplied by Persian Gulf States, is carried by an ever-increasing stream of tankers. In 1971 Malaysia and Indonesia declared their sovereignty over the Straits of Malacca, insisting that the regime of innocent passage should apply to shipping through the Straits. The expressed concern of Malaysia and Indonesia is twofold: In keeping with the notion that the extension of territorial seas from three to twelve miles is necessary to assure the security of coastal states, the subjection of warships passing through the Straits to the regime of innocent passage, which applies to all territorial seas, should, they contend, apply equally to international straits. At the same time, the increasing use of the Straits for petroleum transport in supertankers of 200,000 tons or more poses increasing dangers of pollution to low lying agricultural land along the coast. The Straits of Malacca are relatively shallow and the poorly charted reefs and rocks undoubtedly enhance the probability of accidents. Significantly, Singapore, while no less concerned for its own security and environmental welfare, has not joined with Malaysia and Indonesia in their position that the Straits are no longer an international waterway, and that the passage of warships and petroleum tankers should be subject to their control.

Japan, of course, is not a naval power, and there is no evidence that it has any intentions of becoming one. But there are elements on the far right of the political spectrum in Japan, advocates of the reconstruction of Japan's military and naval forces, who would profit from any move to restrict Japanese shipping through the Malacca Straits.

If Malaysia and Indonesia were to close this passage, Japanese tankers would be obliged to sail through the Lombok Strait, adding more than a thousand miles and three days to the trip, or might even be forced to sail south of Australia, more than doubling the sailing distance from the oil-producing region. Hence, an international Law of the Sea which did not assure Japan's right of transit through this critical waterway would place in jeopardy Japan's economic well-being, its present political constellation, and the balance of power in the Western Pacific, South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Fortuitously for Japan, this question will probably be settled by other countries on another score. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were ready to scuttle the Law of the Sea Conference if it did not assure the right of transit of international straits, including the Straits of Malacca, and both 'super powers' have made it quite clear that their main concern is to assure the global mobility of their naval forces. While acknowledging the

12-mile territorial limit, the United States has said that the Straits of Malacca have in effect been recognised as an international waterway since Marco Polo, and has declined to give any advance notice of naval movements. Similarly, the Russians regularly move ships through the Straits, which is a vital passageway for sustaining their permanent fleet in the Indian Ocean.

At the Geneva Conference, Japan and other advanced countries, and especially the major maritime powers, pressed for the right of transit passage through territorial-sea straits to be as free as possible and stressed that its recognition of the 12-mile limit will be conditional upon satisfaction over this issue *sine qua non*.

While China, the Philippines and a number of Third World countries support the Malaysian-Indonesian position, the informal negotiating text provides for free transit of international straits thus satisfying this principal demand of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union. That this principle will, in sum, serve to assure the free flow of maritime traffic and the general stability of the region—hence the long term vital interests of Malaysia and Indonesia—there can be little doubt. It is in the nature of nation states that they frequently favour policies which are contrary to their general welfare. Too proud to see the inevitable long-run consequences of their conduct, they find delight in its passing short-run effects. A legal regime that would countenance restriction on navigation would abet those practices which have perpetuated the general impoverishment of South-East Asia, and weaken rather than strengthen the basic infrastructure of international co-operation in the region. That Singapore, motivated by these pragmatic longer-range considerations and no less concerned with protection of the environment against ocean pollution, has refrained from joining with Malaysia and Indonesia, in itself suggests that the vital interests of the region are not well served by extension of national sovereignties to the regulation of international shipping in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.

The basic trade-off in compromises hammered out at the Geneva Conference accommodated the cardinal importance attached to this issue by Japan and other advanced countries, in return for assent to the demands of developing coastal states for a 12-mile territorial limit and a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

But if all advanced nations recognised, in principle, the need to accept more extensive rights for the coastal developing states, in negotiations their stands at Geneva varied substantially. Australia, Canada and New Zealand have been clearly sympathetic to demands for a 200-mile EEZ, while recognising that a coastal state's rights of management and utilisation must be exercised subject to internationally agreed principles. At the other extreme Japan, the EEC, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, though prepared to recognise sovereign rights for coastal states in the EEZ, have persistently sought to preserve as much of the interests of their distant-water fishing fleets as is now politically feasible and have accepted the establishment of extensive exclusive fishing zones only with qualifications:

traditional rights, derived from past achievements in fisheries, should be recognised in the EEZ.

Reasons for Japan's position are well-known. Between 85 and 94 per cent of the current world fish catch is taken from within 200 miles of land. The annual Japanese fish catch, now running at more than 10 million metric tons, is the world's largest, and almost half of this haul comes from fishing grounds which under the proposed regime would fall under the jurisdiction of foreign coastal states. Under the present ocean regime, Japan already limits its catch in the Northern Pacific and Atlantic fishing grounds and pays about 2 billion yen a year in fees to coastal states for skipjack and tuna fishing in southern waters.

Fully half of the protein intake of the average Japanese is provided by seafood. Since any limitation of supply or increase in cost of marine products immediately impairs the health and quality of life of the Japanese people on grounds of welfare alone, they and their government can be expected to exercise grave concern if the establishment of coastal economic zones were to restrict in any significant way this vital supply of food. But there is also a justifiable *a priori* defence for prescriptive rights of nations which have long had access to what have been international fishing grounds on the high seas. Thus, Japanese negotiators in Geneva persistently sought to have written into the new Law of the Sea recognition of traditional fishing rights of nations; and for similar reasons, the Soviet Union, East European countries and the EEC gave broad support to this position.

As a result, the 'informal negotiating text' issued at the end of the Geneva Conference would make it encumbent upon coastal states, in granting access to their EEZ, to promote suitable use of marine resources and take into consideration the need to minimise economic dislocation in states whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks. But it would still be the coastal states' prerogative to determine and announce the availability of such resources and to fix the volume of the actual catch.

Just what this means in practice is far from clear. It is reasonably certain, however, if the principle of 'patrimonial sea' or exclusive economic zone were recognised, that the grant of access to fishing grounds by outsiders would be determined by perceived balances of advantage between highly articulate national political interests and an incoherent comity of nations. Most of the world's states are coastal states, and they have varied interests manifest in diverse ways. For developing countries, the fish in their coastal waters are seen as means of achieving their rising expectations. It is tempting to claim all these fish resources for themselves, and to view distant 'interlopers', even those who have been fishing these waters from time immemorial, much as they regard foreigners who have in the past exploited their land-based mineral and agricultural resources. Even the most developed of coastal states see the extension of their sway 200 miles into the ocean as a new bonanza, giving them a decisive cutting edge even against powerful competitors with historic interests. The latter have resisted, but without

being able to render their resistance effective with force or other harsh action for fear of jeopardising relations with the countries in question and provoking adverse public opinion, which tends, even in socialist countries, to give greater weight to property rights than to others.

As a result, the incipient Law of the Sea would, if the informal negotiating text were accepted, likely succeed willy-nilly in institutionalising uncertainty where clarity of principle and an equitable definition of rights on a somewhat less tribalistic basis are clearly needed.

Law shapes action, and the most recent cod war between the onetime ruler of the waves, Britain, and the tiny state of Iceland—both NATO members—may be taken as a harbinger of things to come if the 200 mile EEZ is adopted as the Law of the Sea. Iceland, after unilaterally extending its EEZ to 200 nautical miles, attempted to restrict the British cod catch to 65,000 tons annually, considerably lower than London's demand of 110,000 tons. As a result, Iceland's gunboats took to cutting the nets of the British fishing fleet, provoking a riposte by Royal Navay frigates with a protective shield to enable British trawlers to go about their business. Only after much bitterness and many setbacks a settlement was reached on less favourable terms than the British might have obtained at an earlier stage. Since then, further negotiations regarding the acceptance of the 200 mile fishing limit have taken place between member nations of the EEC. For centuries, the British have been fishing these Icelandic waters. The British fishing industry is highly developed, and it supports major cities such as Hull, Grimsby and Aberdeen. And about one quarter of the fish landed in England and Scotland comes from 'Icelandic waters'.

If this is a foretaste of what can be expected, Japan is in for some serious problems which will strain both the acumen of its diplomats and the present defence policy of limited naval strength. Given the incongruities of power in the realms of ocean issues, diplomats skilled in the dynamics of conference diplomacy and Japan's economic prowess will undoubtedly be the predominant factors of Japan's participation in the rule-making process. The underlying structure of power in the ocean arena is no longer largely based on naval force as it was during the nineteenth century and until the end of World War II. The utility of gunboat diplomacy has been diminished for major powers; naval power has ceased to be the decisive element, the principal arbiter, in shaping the contours of order in the ocean regime. But if the role of force in the mix of influence on ocean issues has been diminished it has by no means been eliminated from the power equation. Hence, the inevitable question that the Japanese must face is: Can their fishing industry survive and continue to supply Japan with its present level of seafood without the support of a far-flung fleet of frigates? Most Japanese will answer that they can, and they must. While there is doubtless truth in the saying that 'Where there is a will, there is a way', the world would be much better served if international legislation were contrived to avoid such conflicts rather than institutionalise them, to establish a world order which would assure the rights and welfare of both maritime and coastal states and

avoid over-reliance on the self-imposed restraints of either. The present danger is that restriction of the rights of distant fishing states will not only lead to increasing conflict, but the welfare of mankind—which is ostensibly what the Law of the Sea Conference is all about—will suffer in the process. But there is also a danger that uncertainties in a new law of the seas which does not unequivocally guarantee traditional fishing rights will only exacerbate the lawless scuffle of conflicting interests which have dominated the seas in recent years. The sea, particularly the coastal sea, is especially susceptible to this kind of uncertainty, the more so since it admits even to some tyranny of smaller nations over stronger, often wealthier, more developed states.

Most certainly, when the Geneva Session adjourned, the question that especially concerns Japan and other major fishing nations—as well as the Food and Agricultural Organisation—had been left unanswered by the Conference: Will the universal introduction of 200-mile zones encourage the maximum yield of fisheries on a global scale? Clearly, it is not only in the interest of fishing nations or coastal states that total world fishery stocks be fully developed and exploited. The global shortage of protein makes this desirable, even imperative, and it is in the common interest of consumers the world over—read 'mankind'—that fisheries be developed as fully and as economically as possible. Who controls the seas, and who reaps a reasonable profit from fishing operations, are strictly secondary considerations.

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[Gene Gregory is a freelance political journalist living and working in Geneva, specialising in Far Eastern affairs.]

# JOHN STUART MILL AND THE FUTURE OF LIBERALISM

by J. N. Gray

IF there is a consensus on the value of Mill's political writings, it is that we may turn to them for the sort of moral uplift that sustains the liberal hope, but we shall be disappointed if we expect to find in them much enlightenment about the urgent issues we face today. There are some, claiming access to new and greater truths, who do not hesitate to announce the obsolescence of that impassioned and reasonable liberalism which is the inspiration of all Mill's political writings. There are many others who will express their confidence that most of the causes for which Mill fought have now been safely won, and who accordingly deny to Mill's writing that contemporary relevance they undoubtedly possessed for their original readers. Most significantly, perhaps, there is a widespread impression in progressive circles that Mill's tentative and humane liberalism has little to say to the perplexed citizens of societies whose manifold crises demand bold and drastic measures. Whether the news is greeted with regret, complacency or acclamation, there are not many who doubt the accuracy of the report that Mill's liberalism is as dead as any tradition of political thought can be.[1]

Obituaries of this kind may be premature, however, and their currency should be a matter of concern for all liberals. Mill's liberalism has a permanent relevance which transcends the conditions of the age in which he wrote, and it meets needs which are perennial and universal. Mill's writings contain an argument for an open society which has never been decisively refuted, and of which every generation needs reminding: they are especially relevant to those sceptical of the claims of collectivist and totalitarian systems, who remain dissatisfied with any kind of defensive conservatism and seek a form of radicalism which is not afraid to contemplate the necessity of massive changes in current policies and institutions but which keeps a clear head about the dangers of all such large-scale social engineering. Those who are looking for a humane and open-minded radicalism of this kind will find that Mill addresses himself to some of the most pressing problems that we face today. It is hard to believe that contemporary debate has not suffered through its neglect of Mill's distinctive contribution to the liberal tradition.

The vital centre of Mill's liberalism as he expounds it in *On Liberty* is not to be found in any of the consequential arguments he adduces there in support of liberal freedoms of thought, expression and association, but rather in a conception of human nature and self-development. The central argument of *On Liberty* is in the claim that a liberal society is the only kind of society in which men confident of their own manifold possibilities but critical of their own powers and of each other, men who aspire to the status of autonomous agents and who cherish their own individuality, will consent to live. His conception of man as a progressive being suggests to Mill the necessity of defining the sphere of legitimate social control in such a way as

to promote the development of men as autonomous agents, and he does this by proposing the famous *principle of liberty*. In fact, this principle assumes various forms at different stages in Mill's argument, but its main force is contained in the injunction that the liberty of the individual should be restricted by society or by the state only if his actions are (or may be) injurious to the interests of others.

It is important that present-day readers of *On Liberty* take note of two points about Mill's principle of liberty. In the first place, though Mill carefully stresses that it states a necessary and not a sufficient condition of justified limitation of liberty (since costs of enforcement may make it wrong to limit liberty even where the interests of others are clearly damaged by a given kind of action), Mill insists also that the principle of liberty is violated in modern societies whenever individuals enjoy a traditional freedom to act in ways injurious to others. The example of a traditional right unjustifiable by the principle of liberty which Mill cites most frequently is that of unrestricted procreation, which is injurious both to the interests of the offspring of irresponsible parents and to the interests of all who compete with them for scarce jobs and resources. Mill would have had no objection in liberal principle to proposals for the institution of 'child licenses' (though he might well have had doubts about their practicability), and he would certainly have been sympathetic to those who advocate population control—including even coercive measures—as part of a freedom-preserving policy for an already overcrowded world.[2]

Secondly, it is a clear implication of Mill's principle that, in laying down a necessary condition of legitimate limitation of liberty, it disallows an indefinitely large range of interferences with personal freedom, and Mill is at pains to draw his readers' attention to two classes of intervention which his principle prohibits. These are restrictions of liberty designed to prevent individuals from causing harm to themselves, and restrictions designed to bring an individual into conformity with the received moral ideas of his community. Importantly, Mill goes much further than most contemporary liberals in ruling out such paternalist restrictions on liberty as are involved in legal prohibitions of the sale of 'hard' drugs. Equally, there can be little doubt that Mill would adopt an uncompromising libertarian stand on questions of censorship and pornography, and would reject all legislation on sexual behaviour which has a moralistic rather than a straightforwardly harm-preventing rationale. Nor can it be doubted, finally, that Mill would have extended his support to the campaigns of those, like Dr. Thomas Szasz, who wish to see the practice of the confinement and involuntary treatment of those judged mentally disordered discontinued or at least subject to far more stringent legal controls.[3] Whether or not contemporary liberals follow Mill in his intransigent opposition to state paternalism and legal moralism, they would be well-advised if they were to consider carefully his objections to such policies.[4]

Though fashionable progressive opinion will find Mill's stand on the question of drug use and censorship congenial, it is worth noting that his no less sensible views on the proper organisation of national education find

little favour in such circles. Mill's view that 'An education established and controlled by the State should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence',[5] despite the fact that it flows directly from his concern with the promotion of diversity and variety in all spheres of life, finds few echoes in contemporary political life outside the rightwing of the Conservative Party and the far-left disciples of Ivan Illich, though liberals have continued unnoticed to advocate voucher schemes as an alternative or a supplement to state education for many years.[6] It is paradoxical that radicals who bemoan the fate of such schools as Risinghill have not grasped the simple truth that bold experiments are unlikely to flourish in a monopolistic state education system dominated by conservative bureaucracies and politically vulnerable local authorities. Mill's views on education reveal an important general difference between his anti-collectivist radicalism, which sought always to assist the disadvantaged by widening their opportunity for free choice and self-reliance, and the Fabian paternalism by which it was supplanted, and whose goal apparently is to make the poor dependent on an expansionist apparatus of social workers and benevolent planners.

This overall contrast between Mill's radicalism and that of twentieth century socialist parties (to which I shall return shortly in another context) is worth remarking on in that it discloses one of the most important tendencies of Mill's political thought, which is expressed in his constant search for methods which alleviate distress and strike at the roots of social injustice while restricting personal liberty to the minimum practicable extent. The relevance of Mill's anti-collectivist approach has increased rather than diminished in the century and more since his death, for we know now that vast nationalised social services not only involve considerable loss of liberty, but often facilitate a net redistribution of income and resources from the poorer to the better off sections of the community. Indeed, those who give up the most freedom under such schemes are the poor who get least in return.

Mill's whole approach to the social injustices of industrial society involves a critique of orthodox socialism which can be deeply instructive to radical reformers well over a century later. Presciently identifying the fate of revolutionary socialism, Mill warned that catastrophist strategies to socialism, since they presuppose the collapse into chaos of the existing social order, are bound to generate (not the benign classless anarchy of which their proponents dream) but rather a dictatorship, in all probability far more oppressive than the old regime, in which there will be little room left for individuality of any kind, and he was no less perceptive about the dangers of reformist socialism of the statist of Fabian variety. If it is plainly mistaken to count Mill among the precursors of Fabianism, it is, however, equally inaccurate to suggest that he would be at home in the Selsdon Group.[7] For Mill developed a series of proposals for the alleviation of the central injustices of the industrial society that was emerging around him which have the most radical implications today.

It should be a commonplace by now that Mill was no inflexible adherent of *laissez-faire*—none of the classical economists subscribed to *laissez-faire* principles without making important exceptions and qualifications to them, for that matter—and that he acknowledged the propriety of a wide range of governmental activities, many of the kind which have become taken for granted in the liberal democracies of the twentieth century Western European and English-speaking world. It is important to recognise, however, that Mill's proposals for tackling the social problems of an industrial civilisation go far beyond anything that merely suggests the kind of non-coercive activities undertaken by the post-war Welfare State.

The major targets of Mill's criticism of the arrangements of the emergent industrial society of his day were the maldistribution of property and the oppressive system of industrial organisation. In the posthumous *Chapters on Socialism*, published in the *Fortnightly Review* in 1879, Mill declared that, in existing society, 'reward, instead of being proportioned to the labour and abstinence of the individuals, is almost in an inverse ratio to it'. One of the primary causes of this inequitable distribution of rewards, according to Mill, was the concentration of fortunes facilitated through their uninterrupted accumulation across the generations, and his remedy for this, though much discussed in subsequent economic writings, seems as Utopian today as it did when he proposed it in the first edition (in 1848) of his *Principles of Political Economy*. Mill advocated the institution, not of an estates duty, but of what we would nowadays call an accessions duty or an inheritance tax, to be levied (unlike the present government's capital transfer tax) on the recipient and not on the donor of the capital.

The merit of such a tax is that, unlike other arrangements, it need not transfer wealth from private individuals to the state, since it is eminently avoidable through the desirable expedient of dispersing one's wealth widely. Mill's support for a reform of inheritance taxation which would promote the diffusion of wealth, when taken in conjunction with his opposition to the progressive taxation of income, distinguishes his radical sense of social injustice sharply from that which animates most socialists. Though it prompted him to favour a redistribution of property and so of incomes in the context of the industrial society of his day, Mill's radical conception of social justice has no specifically egalitarian orientation, condemning the inheritance of large fortunes rather on the grounds of its undeservedness and because huge concentrations of wealth may ultimately become inimical to liberty—whether they are held in governmental or in private hands. Equally, however, Mill's conception of social justice separates him from all those conservatives who are at bottom concerned with nothing more than the preservation of entrenched privilege. His advocacy in the first edition of *Principles of Political Economy* of what amounts to a guaranteed annual income or social dividend for all confirms this contrast with conservative thought, and shows how close is Mill's position to that of contemporary radicals in the same tradition.[8]

An inequitable distribution of property is, of course, closely related to that mode of capitalist industrial organisation in which enterprises are

owned and managed by owners of capital who stand in an authoritarian relationship with wage-earners. Throughout his life Mill was opposed to such a system of industrial organisation. He opposed it because, in the first place, it institutionalised a permanent conflict of interests between owners of capital and wage-earners, and no system of productive association which rested on such a contradictory basis could be expected to be either stable or efficient. In the second place, the separation between wage-earners on the one hand and owners and managers on the other deprived workers of any real opportunity for personal initiative. In so doing it stultified their growth and prevented them becoming anything like the responsible, autonomous individuals that Mill had celebrated in *On Liberty*. Mill's fundamental objection to the capitalist system of his day led him to take a lifelong interest in schemes for profit-sharing, industrial partnership and producers' co-operation, but his boldest vision goes far beyond such proposals, and can best be described as a form of non-revolutionary, competitive syndicalism. As Mill put it: 'The form of association . . . which, if mankind continues to improve, must be expected in the end to predominate, is not that which can exist between a capitalist as chief, and work-people without a voice in the management, but the association of the labourers themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, and working under managers elected and removable by themselves'.[9]

A number of points need making at once about the syndicalist or non-state socialist vision which is expressed in this passage. Crucially, Mill's vision of a post-capitalist society, unlike that of virtually all socialists, does not include the elimination of competition: indeed, as far as Mill was concerned, no changes in the existing system of industrial organisation would bring about a tolerable society which sought to suppress competition between enterprises and individuals, or which resulted in competition becoming less effective. If Mill is in any sense a socialist—and he certainly envisaged a social order which was no longer recognisably that of nineteenth century England, and which differs at least as much from our own capitalist society—then his was decidedly a 'market socialism'. Unlike market socialism of the Yugoslav variety, however, Mill's vision of a post-capitalist society is not one in which the institution of private property in the means of production has been abrogated: there is no suggestion that the workers' shares in their enterprises will not be marketable, and there is every reason to think that Mill wanted to see an improvement in the capital market, with an entrepreneurial class of industrial pioneers having an acknowledged place even in the fully realised syndicalist society. Again, it should be noted that, despite his unorthodox sympathies with trade unionism, Mill envisaged no real place for trade unions in the society of the future: he looked forward to a time when the harmony of interests between all partners in production, facilitated by workers' ownership and self-management, would allow 'the true euthanasia of trade unionism'. Mill's proposals for workers' participation in management were, in other words, at the furthest removed from those contemplated by the present government, which

apparently envisages no more than the inclusion in managements of faithful representatives of our reactionary trade union bureaucracies.

Perhaps the cardinal example of how Mill's thought catches up with our preoccupations in the last quarter of the twentieth century is to be found in his advocacy of the stationary-state economy. Like the other classical economists, Mill accepted that economic growth could only be temporary in a world of scarce natural resources in which population constantly pressed on land and food reserves. In contrast with all other economists in the classical tradition, however, Mill did not fear the arrival of a stationary economy, but rather welcomed it as an opportunity for a large-scale transformation in social values. It is true, of course, that a large part of Mill's concern that society be re-ordered so as to allow a peaceful transition to a no-growth economy derives from his neo-Malthusian insistence on the finitude of the world's resources and the constant danger of overpopulation, —an insistence which seems far less unreasonable now than it did twenty years ago. Yet the larger part of Mill's advocacy of a stationary-state economy is concerned, not with considerations of resource-depletion, but with the damaging effects on human character of the unremitting pursuit of possessions and with the destructive consequences for our natural environment of open-ended economic growth.

I suggest that it is a feature of Mill's radicalism—one which makes it especially relevant to contemporary radical reformers—that, unlike almost all forms of socialism, it is not based on the illusory prospect of a cornucopian abundance created by the magical fecundity of technology. At a time when such a viewpoint was almost unknown, Mill told his readers that 'It is only in the backward countries of the world that increased production is still an important object: in those most advanced, what is economically needed is a better distribution, of which one indispensable means is a stricter restraint on population'.[10] Again, he concludes the prophetic chapter of *Principles of Political Economy* on 'The Stationary State' with the remark that 'a stationary condition of capital and population implies no stationary state of human improvement'.[11] Mill's summons to us to welcome a stationary-state economy has increased in relevance during a century in which the self-defeating and destructive aspects of indefinite economic growth have become one of our most central concerns. It is more than ever urgent that we heed it at a time when an unplanned curtailment of economic growth precipitated by a rise in the cost of energy has panicked many public figures into supporting a desperate search for new methods of sustaining the growth economy.

My discussion of the relevance of Mill's thought to contemporary liberals should have illuminated some of the reasons why it is a mistake to regard him as a patron saint of a defunct creed. In at least three respects, I suggest that Mill's radical liberalism still has much to offer those in search of a reasonable radicalism. Mill's is a decentralist, anti-statist radicalism, which, unlike orthodox socialism, addresses itself to the problems involved in meeting the widely acknowledged need for political devolution and the diffusion of power and initiative within the great entrenched institutions of

our society. It is a radicalism which, while calling for a massive redistribution of property and so of incomes, offers an alternative conception of social justice to that of a levelling-down egalitarianism—which seems in practice inexorably to issue in either a stagnant and uniform society, or else a society in which differentials in power and authority replace far more innocuous differentials in monetary reward. And it is a radicalism which is well prepared to meet the challenges posed by an end to economic growth in the world's developed (or overdeveloped) societies. Mill's political thought should be the major inspiration of those who seek to modify the institutions and policies of liberal societies while remaining faithful to the central ideals of the liberal tradition.

It would do no good to pretend that we can find in Mill's writings answers to all the major problems that confront us now—and, in any case, Mill would have deprecated any such attempt. Mill cannot tell us how we are to combat explosive inflation and ever-increasing unemployment while preserving traditional liberal freedoms: we will look in vain in his works for illumination regarding the multiple crises of contemporary economic systems (both 'capitalist' and 'socialist'). In forging institutions to cope with unprecedented economic conditions, we need (as Keynes emphasised) new wisdom for a new age. It would be disloyalty to the spirit of enquiry which Mill stood for if we were to exempt from criticism any of the political or economic institutions which we have inherited from the great age of English liberalism. As Mill himself argued, radical reforms in our political institutions will be necessary if we are to realise the promise of democracy, while avoiding the danger of a democratic tyranny of the majority.[12] Though we must not expect from Mill's writings a blueprint for the achievement of a liberal society in a world in many ways very different from Mill's, it has been the argument of this article that radicals will be unreasonable if they neglect Mill's thought on some of the principal dilemmas that perplex us today. Mill always regarded his age as an age of transition: and our age is no less an age of transition. It would be a hopeful augury if the current decomposition of conventional political wisdom were to encourage liberals to re-examine Mill's views on how this great transition should best be conducted.

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NOTES

[1] Some dissenters from this consensus are: Alan Ryan, 'John Stuart Mill's Art of Living', *The Listener*, October 21, 1965, 'John Stuart Mill and the Open Society', *The Listener*, May 17, 1973; Antony Flew, 'J. S. Mill—Socialist or Libertarian?' in *Prophets of Freedom and Enterprise*, ed. by Michael Ivens; Ian Bradley, 'John Stuart Mill—a Victorian's Message for Modern Liberals', *The Times*, May 8, 1973.

[2] For example: Jack Parsons, *Population versus Liberty*, 1971, with forewords by Douglas Houghton, Sir David Renton and Lord Beaumont. The proposal to introduce 'child allowances' originates with Kenneth Boulding in his *Economics as a Science*, 1970, p.149.

[3] See Dr. Szasz' *Law, Liberty and Psychiatry* and other writings.

[4] See especially Chapter Three of *On Liberty*.
[5] *On Liberty*, p.161.
[6] For example, Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom*; A. T. Peacock and C. K. Rowley, *Welfare Economics—a liberal restatement*.
[7] The suggestion is made by Flew (see above, footnote 1) in Ivens, p.21.
[8] See for example Prof. J. E. Meade's *Intelligent Radical's Guide to Economic Policy* for a reform programme very much in the Millian tradition.
[9] *Principles of Political Economy*, Penguin, ed. 1970, p.133.
[10] *Principles of Political Economy*, pp.114-115.
[11] *Principles of Political Economy*, p.116.
[12] See Mill's proposals for proportional or personal representation in *Considerations on Representative Government*, Chapter X.

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I wish to express my thanks to the Chairman, Secretary and Trustees of the Hampden Trust, who assisted my study of liberal thought by granting me financial assistance without which I would have been unable to attend the Mill Panel of the American Political Science Association in San Francisco on September 1st-4th, 1975.

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The following information about the Hampden Trust may be of interest: Set up in 1969 with Lord Gladwyn as its Chairman, the trust promotes educational work in history, economics, international affairs and social sciences. In co-operation with like-minded trusts it aims to do this through study conferences, seminars, and discussion groups in the United Kingdom and abroad and by the encouragement of educational exchanges and visits. It also assists educational organisations overseas and has helped in the production of pamphlets and research documents on such subjects as *Environment and the Economy in a Free Society* and *The Policies and Programmes of European Liberal Parties*. It provides scholarships for international youth seminars, and arranges occasional lectures. Applications for assistance with worthwhile projects far exceeds the limited resources of the trust and support would be welcome. For further information write to The Secretary, The Hampden (Educational) Trust, 1 Whitehall Place, London, SW1A 2HE.—*Editor*.

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[John Gray began his study of John Stuart Mill and Liberalism at Oxford (after reading for a degree in P.P.E.) under the direction of the late Professor J. R. Plamenatz. Dr. Gray is now Fellow and Tutor in Politics at Jesus College, Oxford.]

# THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL THEORY

## by W. J. Stankiewicz

TO be successful, an empirical approach in the social sciences needs a (non-empirical) faith in the appropriateness of the methodology. One should remember that more than a century of sustained effort by thousands of investigators has failed to produce a single law of human behaviour comparable with the physical laws formulated during the infancy of scientific method. That human behaviour is more complex than that studied by the physical sciences, is a fact that can be empirically observed and can lead to still greater effort and more complex techniques of analysis. The real problem for the empiricist—the reason why he must develop a faith—is that an empirically-based theory in the social sciences can describe only the particular phenomena from which it was derived. Thus the voting behaviour of blue-collar workers in a New Jersey suburb in November 1972 describes this behaviour alone. If it appeared to do more, to be evidence of a law of blue-collar voting, the empiricist would be the first to recognise that his investigations had gone astray; for empiricism certainly suggests that human behaviour is not determined by wearing a blue collar or having a certain level of intelligence. There is no evidence that any given conditions in man invariably lead to given behaviour. Even experimentally-induced conditioned responses—which achieve spectacular results in animals—work consistently only among very young human beings.

The empiricist, then, must resort to an act of faith to continue his investigations. He must say that, despite evidence to the contrary, he will affirm that choice is an illusion, and that man is bound as tightly in a chain of cause and effect as the universe was believed to be, by some eighteenth-century theorists.

From this act of faith it follows that the real reason for the failure of empiricism in the social sciences is the complexity of subject-matter and the difficulty of distinguishing the multiple causes behind even the simplest human behaviour. It also follows that what the investigator needs is a larger number of investigations—a particularly popular plea among behaviouralists of various schools—and more refined tools of analysis: bigger computers to process data; more complex surveys; and more ingenious methods of overcoming the difficulties of investigating phenomena that are capable of recognising they are being investigated and of altering their behaviour accordingly.

Is the empiricist's 'faith' justifiable? It was understandable when the cause-effect premise of science was considered inviolable. The introduction of choice into such a system would, of course, place the social sciences in a special category having no clear relation to the rest of science but some affinities with the theological conception of the universe (which proved hostile to all science). Indeterminism makes it now less obvious why empiricists should attempt to establish an empirically-based theory in the

social sciences. Yet the alternative to empiricism in the social sciences does not even have an adequate name. To talk about it, we must invent one: for example, normativism.

The two approaches are by no means sharply separated. The normativist bases his approach on what empiricism cannot avoid revealing: that human behaviour is goal-directed rather than 'caused', and that the goals—or norms—are put into 'rational', orderly patterns that do not necessarily resemble the patterns from which they were derived. From the assumption—based on excellent empirical evidence—that the patterns formed by the individual are almost always orderly, it follows that an observer—given some of the norms—can predict some of the patterns, and—by himself manipulating the norms—can foresee the consequences to both the individual and society, if certain norms are accepted.

Empiricism does not discredit the normativist's assumption about normative patterns. Indeed, many attempts to refine empirical methodology are based on the same assumption. Both the empiricist and the normativist believe that if a man holds the 'freedom of speech' norm, he will, other factors being equal, uphold the 'right' of a dissenter to express himself. What they do, if this proves untrue, shows the essential difference in their approach. The empiricist returns to his field studies and by manipulating his techniques attempts to discover what the man's norm 'really' is, or perhaps tries to find the factors that made his respondent say he believed in the norm when in fact he did not. The empiricist's very methodology leads him to the belief that he must either refine his technique or give up the belief that normative statements have any impact on behaviour. Paradoxically it is the normativist who remains much closer to what empirical observation shows—that it is perfectly possible for a man to assert a norm and then fail to observe all its requirements. Instead of assuming that a mistake was made during observation, he attempts to conceive a normative pattern that will accommodate the apparent discrepancy.

Even a 'strict' empiricist—who is not likely to be as strict as he pretends—will probably not deny the influence of normative patterns. (His major problem is to prevent just such an influence while he is obtaining his data.)

Yet it is clear from the lack of empirical studies of normative patterns in both individuals and societies that the empiricist is hostile to normative approaches and avoids them.

In the physical sciences empiricism has played a major role in theoretical development, but it has never been the sole basis for theory, as the narrower thesis of empiricism maintains. Even such scientific laws as Boyle's or Gay-Lussac's—which seem no more than empirically observed regularities—are not mere generalised descriptions: they require the concept of an 'ideal'—imaginary—gas. The recognition that a regularity or law has in effect been imposed may help explain the tendency toward an empirically-based theory in the social sciences. The question that keeps arising is: Might there not be, beneath the great diversity of human behaviour, the same kind of regularities which will become observable when suitable methods of observation

have been developed?

The hypothesis that such regularities exist obviously influences empiricists in the social sciences, but the resulting activity is unlike efforts in the physical sciences—it requires presuppositions about the results that have never been present in empirical investigations of the physical world. In the first place, physical sciences began with observable regularities which they made universal through the concept of the ideal. They did not have to assume that the regularities were there. Consequently, even highly abstract mathematical formulations in the physical sciences are largely reducible to empirical observations (of which some—perhaps most— have not yet been made). Now if we change the method by searching for the regularities instead of starting with them, we are bound to make assumptions about the nature of what we are investigating that must affect our results.

Thus the assumption that there are uniformities beneath cultural and individual diversity—man being a member of the species homo sapiens—is necessarily an assumption about the influence of biology upon society. Conjectures about the role of sex, aggression, territorial imperatives and so forth are widely accepted, even though empirical observation of their role is not possible. Diverse phenomena are conjectured to be manifestations of sex, or some other drive, not on the basis of empirical observation of regularities but on the assumption that divergent behaviour must have a regularity which is an aspect of the only possible one—the biological nature of man. Needless to say, this kind of hypothesis is not testable, for the regularity which permits experiment, prediction and testing in the physical sciences is not present in the social science hypothesis. Where the behaviour of gas A, B and C under set conditions gives rise to a statement that will be changed if the regularity is not always observable, the regularity in the social sciences is the hypothesis—not the source of it.

Most social scientists avoid the difficulties present in theories of behaviour based on assumed regularities by eschewing theory and searching for regularities which—when discovered—will presumably permit genuine theory: facts first, then theory. Without realising it, however, they adopt the narrower thesis of empiricism, the supposition that the entire science can be reduced to empirical observation. This, of course, cannot be done. In order to have a theory one must have a selective principle concerning empirical observations, or an assumption about possible relations. The physical sciences have always acted this way. They could never have developed if they had first to search for the regularities: the possibilities are theoretically infinite.

The empiricists' sense of hopelessness is in part related to the close connection between most social science studies and the goals set by society. The bulk of social science is now directed by the requirements of social policy in the society in which it takes place—it is 'practical' rather than theoretical. There is no shame in this. Social scientists are not being venal when by their studies they supply information about voting behaviour and factors in race riots. The fact remains that they are not capable of develop-

ing any useful theory from such studies, for the 'problem' they investigate is set and defined by social norms, not by 'facts' in the usual sense.

A most serious limitation of pure empiricism is its inability to deal adequately with normative behaviour: empirically-based analyses of the latter do not allow us to draw any conclusions. Thus statistics can show that at certain times and places certain people may do both X and Y. But if such facts are to attain significance, we have to know what the relation between X and Y is. But there is nothing that compels us to believe that a relation must exist. Furthermore, in view of the nature of normative 'exceptions'—which are expressions of interactions between norms—or 'inconsistencies', the significance of the relation will vary according to the normative sets that are accepted. Conceivably, a highly elaborate system of empirical studies could give some idea about the relations between the Xs and Ys of normative behaviour, but it is hard to envisage how such studies could distinguish between what a normativist would regard as a logical inconsistency—which could be corrected by pointing it out (or so normativists believe)—and what would be an exception, namely the operation of another norm—which cannot be corrected by pointing to it.

This major difference in the response to what the observer regards as an inconsistency has given added weight to relativistic arguments. The relativists assume that—because people do not usually change their behaviour when 'inconsistencies' are pointed out—normative behaviour is not 'logical' and cannot be studied by logical analysis: all political theorising is a waste of time. The normativist's answer is that because only logical analysis is able to distinguish between 'inconsistency' and 'exception', it alone can deal with normative behaviour. Although empirical analyses of political behaviour may yield conclusions that permit action, those conclusions are themselves based on something other than empiricism. Furthermore, because they almost inevitably confuse elementary distinctions that are self-evident to the theorist, the recommendations of the empiricist can be misleading and even dangerous to society.

The relativist, committed to the view that norms are expressions of tastes, attitudes and desires, is necessarily committed to a single way of interpreting evidence of 'inconsistencies' in normative behaviour and to dwell on this as if it were the only evidence. The fact that a very large number of people—perhaps the majority—believe both that killing is wrong and capital punishment is right, is for him further evidence that normative statements are not 'rational' and that it is futile to debate them. Logically—he argues—anyone holding the view that the killing of a human being is wrong must claim that capital punishment is wrong. He is led to this interpretation because he is committed to the non-rationality of normative behaviour. The normativist can interpret things differently: he is not committed to excluding evidence. He recognises that in fact some people are open to the argument that 'logically' the man who disapproves of killing must disapprove of capital punishment. There is clear evidence in recent developments in the criminal law that some men at least have changed their normative position to accord

with their view. But to the relativists this is difficult to explain; any change in norms is mysterious to them and so is the communication of norms within society and the continuance of any normative patterns.

But if the normativist is able to explain why men change—or appear to change—their normative position when inconsistencies in their behaviour are pointed out, what can he do about the large number of people who do not change their position? What about those who resisted, and still object to, the abolition of capital punishment? Do they have norms which are different from those held by persons who welcomed the elimination of an 'inconsistency'? Is the relativist right in the sense that men in general disregard inconsistencies because most normative sets have no logical requirement? The normativist adopts the view that anything that maintains an historical continuity should find a logical place in a social scheme which pretends to explain or even describe. He does not believe that 'inconsistencies' are illogical. He can perceive them as quite logical exceptions, the result of an interaction between norms in which the 'exception' indicates the presence of a norm having a higher position on some normative scale. It is in fact quite easy to regard the concept of capital punishment as a logical exception to the norm about killing, if one recognises that the concept of sovereignty is implicitly present in the mind of the general public.

What if empiricism had its way? What future would it hold for political theory? Empiricists hope that 'their' theory will be a guide to action. I prefer to see their theory as a contribution to inaction. Thus we can envisage life itself as one huge experimental field for a games theory. Instead of applying the latter to some life-situations—which is its task at present—in order to clarify them and foresee the implications of various alternatives, life can be imagined as serving the purpose of testing the games theory and other theories that are likely to emerge.

Strategic staff games played by the Pentagon officers and RAND experts have been known to create their own rules and limitations and impose rigid demands on those engaged in them. Perhaps the day is not far off when these bloodless wars will become a substitute for real war. Conceivably, they may also become substitutes for other types of activity: business transactions, financial speculations, politicking, sports, social 'up-manship', etc. Ultimately, game-playing may become a substitute for living as we know it today: all human action will be make-believe. Game-playing will offer a whole range of emotions—satisfactions and frustrations—which otherwise may not be given to an individual in a lifetime. And since playing—unlike real life activity—will spare the player dangerous or unpleasant consequences, it will increase his propensity to play—it will create a life-long addiction.

The tyranny of that age will be absolute and moral disintegration complete. Principles and standards will be but 'rules of the game' that one adopts for the purpose of a particular game only. With a complete absence of a moral consensus on standards, values will be no more than semantic labels, changed at will, shuffled at will to produce the desirable mix and

attached at will to a particular set of circumstances required by the game. Political theory will become a super-set of rules which are applicable to a situation desirable for a particular life-game and can be duly programmed into a computer. Hence, anything that cannot be programmed will no longer qualify as theory.

Computerised game-playing—as a substitute for 'living'—will not be limited to games whose basic rules are already known and which simply call for decisions in answer to the alternatives with which the player has been confronted by the computer. The next, and inevitable, step will be to use the computer to create new rules of the game, by programming into it the ingredients of rules, or various sets of rules—values, as it were—with the help of which not only new rules but also new games can be 'invented'. In the socio-political realm this will offer the dazzling possibilities of creating experimental ideologies, hitherto practised in only a relatively limited fashion by totalitarian countries. But whereas in 'traditional' totalitarian systems any experimentation had the inevitable drawback of being slow in inception, cumbersome in application and uncertain of results, computerised experimentation will provide the possibility of rapid testing and general availability of experience through 'participation' in 'instant' systems.

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[Professor W. J. Stankiewicz teaches Political Science at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. He wrote and edited several books including *Institutional Changes in the Postwar Economy of Poland* (with J. M. Montias) (1955), *Politics and Religion in 17th Century France* (1960), *Poltical Thought Since World War II* (1964), *Crisis in British Government* (1967), *In Defence of Sovereignty* (1969), *Canada-U.S. Relations and Canadian Foreign Policy* (1973), and *British Government in an Era of Reform* (1976). The above article will be part of Professor Stankiewicz's forthcoming book entitled *Aspects of Political Theory: Classical Concepts in an Age of Relativism*, which is to be published later this year (1976) by Collier-Macmillan.]

# IMPROVING THE HOMES OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS

## Pilot Study in the United Kingdom

Referring to recent articles by David Whiteman on *Employment Services for the Mentally Handicapped* (p. 260, Vol. 227) and *Training for a Life Worth Living* by Peter Niecke (page 294, Vol. 228), we have received a number of enquiries regarding provision for handicapped people in other countries. It is hoped that the following information, supplied by the European Communities Commission, may be of interest.—*Editor.*

The E.C.C. has recently approved a non-repayable grant of £187,500 (450,000 units of account) to part-finance four pilot schemes and five pilot studies aimed at making the homes of handicapped persons more adapted to their special needs.

This aid, which is the first to be granted for housing outside of the coal and steel sectors, is being allocated in the framework of the Council Resolution of January 21, 1974, on the Social Action Programme which gave a high priority to the professional readaptation and social reintegration of handicapped persons.

When considering specific actions aimed at meeting the twin objectives of professional readaptation and social reintegration, it became obvious that there was a need for vigorous and coordinated action to eliminate architectural barriers to mobility in the homes of the handicapped persons just as much as in the world outside their homes. The Commission therefore gathered together a group of independent experts who worked out a framework of minimum standards for wheelchair users concerning access to their homes and space for movement inside their homes.

Last July the Commission informed the Council of the results of the work of these experts and of the Commission's intention to bring together, as a next step, a group of government experts in order to explore the best way of implementing through national legislation the minimum standards proposed by the independent experts.

A sum of 450,000 units of account has now been inscribed in the 1976 Community Budget to part-finance a series of pilot operations and studies in the Member States designed to improve the housing conditions of handicapped persons. The Commission can now go ahead with the schemes.

*Summary of Schemes*

— Evry, Paris region of France: Adaptation of 33 existing dwellings and 63 new dwellings. Community grant—180,134 units of account.

— Dahlheim, Luxembourg: The provision of barrier-free accommodation for 20 handicapped persons aimed at breaking down their psychological isolation. Community grant—120,000 units of account.

— Bonn, Haus der Behinderten: Scheme for young handicapped persons

which will provide 20 flats for students of Bonn University and 35 apartments for school-leavers linked with a nearby medical and welfare centre. Community grant—54,645 units of account.

— Landegem, Belgium: The provision of accommodation for 20 severely handicapped adults suffering from cerebral palsy in the form of a transit home between a medico-pedagogical institute and a normal living environment. Community grant—19,678 units of account.

The five pilot studies will be carried out in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark and Ireland. The total Community grant will be £17,265 (41,436 units of account).

*United Kingdom Grant: Central Council for the Disabled*

There has been discussion for some time on the question of providing kitchen and bathroom fittings which are adjusted to suit persons with varying disabilities.

The 'feed-back' of information on the advantages or disadvantages of specifying adjustable equipment is scarce and often the owners or the users are not in a position to relate the 'capital input cost' to the eventual success or failure of such equipment.

It is an important area of research because the conclusions will clarify whether it is necessary to provide a higher cost element in housing for such sophisticated equipment.

The total cost of this study is estimated to be £9,200. A 50 per cent contribution from the Community would cost £4,600 (11,040 units of account).

*Growth and English Values* by Martin J. Wiener, *A Uruguayan* The October issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Economic Appraisal* by Chris Lines, *Rome* by Christopher Hampton and *Parent Power* by Michael Locke.

# MUTILATION OF THE 1944 EDUCATION ACT

## by Joseph H. Allen

IT came as no surprise to read that Sections 25 to 30 of the 1944 Education Act have been selected by the New Humanists for exclusion from the Act in a Private Member's Bill to be presented to the House in the new session of Parliament; an Act, from the outset, subjected to constant, deliberate misrepresentation and educational and political abuse. In many ways not unlike Christianity which has not failed but has never been seriously tried.

Once more a subtle misinterpretation of the spirit of the Act. A similar case where the proposals, under a pious camouflage of a hypocritical concern for the individual liberties and religious rights of our children, and disguised to further their own ends, attack this liberal piece of educational legislation by a misrepresentation of the religious proposals written into the Act as no more than rigid dogmatism.

Cursorily considered, the implications of this particular section of the Act, if it were true, unjustly work against the free choice of religious worship of racial minorities, other cultures and creeds; and, as the Act is worded, it may be assumed there is no place for a free expression of such creeds as Buddhism, Islamism, Sikhism, Hinduism-Black Magic, Marxism and Maoism. A separation I make by use of the hyphen, unmeant as such, but used only to highlight the underlying purpose behind the proposed Bill, which, by implication, would make religious expression, free or otherwise, impossible within our voluntary, controlled and county schools. Consequently, our schools would become negatively atheistic by default; and the continuation of any education of our children in all religious faiths and creeds would fall to the enemy. An enemy not primarily Marxist or Maoist but subtle enough to remain anonymous, to work an anarchic will through the mouthpiece of puppets. A personage I greatly respect, even if to acknowledge such a presence brackets me with Bally Graham as a person '—— no longer with it.' Still, ignoring such criticism, I sense a similar concern clearly arising from much the same dilemma, which provoked the speech titled 'Mind Murder in Our Schools' by Nicholas Winterton, M.P. for Macclesfield, and later reported in the Guardian.

Neither did the immediate reactions to the proposed Bill come as a surprise; nor the panic shown by varied committed groups in defence of their own sectional interests written into the 1944 Education Act. Panic, too, was truly immediate. The variety of reactions must have pleased the chief instigator of the Bill and his puppets. The Devil, once more, was up to his old, successful trick. The age-old ploy to divide and conquer was well judged. True believers in a broad-based oecumenicism, which, in reality is no more than a pious word, were further frustrated; and the breach between denominations and creeds perpetuated and increased. The Devil, so to speak, has put the wolf among the sheep; and in their predictable, parochial

manner the shepherds have panicked to protect their own interests and flock. Expressed no better in a parochial Catholic Weekly Newsletter and in a report in the November 7th edition of the *Universe*.

'The Humanists', the Newsletter read, 'are lobbying to have the teaching of Christianity removed from its exclusive place in all State Schools. Instead, comparative religions will be taught. Under the heading 'religion' it will be possible to teach any way of life—e.g. Marxism—but not Fascism. It requires little imagination to forecast what way of life will emerge from the mixture of ingredients. It emphasises the continuing need of our Catholic schools at whatever cost'. An immediate fall into the trap of sectional interest. The simple epitome of the attitude expressed in the old saying, 'a dog in the manger'; a further planned fragmentation between denominations and creeds.

A similar fear, perhaps, that prompts the *Universe* in their detailed coverage of a report prepared for presentation to a Bishops' conference of England and Wales, to take up the cudgel in the personal defence of maintaining Catholic education within their own Voluntary schools. Can we suspect a fear among the clergy that they, too, in company with Zionism, may in a short time find their Church branded as a form of Racism through racial discrimination within their schools? Surely, these fears must run high! Evidence of which, I must assume from 15 years' experience as a teacher and deputy head of a combined Catholic nursery, infant and junior school. Even with no axe to grind against the continued maintenance of Voluntary Schools, I find great difficulty in restraining a cynical surprise at what I read in the report of *Where Creed and Colour Matter*.[1]

It is not for me to question the findings of the Catholic Commission for Racial Justice for England and Wales but to wonder at the sudden, inordinate urgency to meet a rather long, lingering problem; and the complete volte-face in the policy that the schools (Catholic) must not insist that parents should be 'practising Catholics'; and, 'Schools', says the report, 'should respect the religious practices of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs'. I assume this to mean that Catholic schools will incorporate the teaching of these varying beliefs in their Voluntary Schools? Admirable sentiments, I must agree; and to be greatly commended when put into practice.

Still, Catholics are not alone in facing a similar problem. Eric Shirvell Price, M.A., Editor of *Faith and Freedom*, in a recent correspondence commented on the Inter-Faith Committee of the Unitarian General Assembly (of which he is the Chairman) which convened a conference on R.E. early this year, in multi-faiths schools to discuss further the ratification of [an Agreed Syllabus] the 1976 Birmingham Agreed Syllabus.

The Act, as is proposed by the stated Bill, is neither arbitrary nor does it, as suggested by the advocates of the Bill, discriminate against any particular creed. Therefore it is possible, without any dramatic change in the wording of the Act (Sections 25 to 30) to accommodate the changed national, religious needs, which have occurred since the passing of the Act—even to include instruction in Marxism or Maoism.

We remind you of the provisions enacted:

**Religious Education in County and Voluntary Schools**—Volume 11. Ed (part 2) Sections 25 to 30 of the 1944 Education Act (n.b. The word 'Christian' does not appear within the proposals for R.E., made within the Act and with reference to either types of school).

**Section 25.** Innocuously, the Act proposes (sic).

1. The day to begin with collective worship (exclusion permitted).
3. Abstinence is permitted.
6. No direction shall be given by the Local Authority to interfere in provision of reasonable facilities, etc. No directions shall be given so as to prevent a pupil from receiving religious **instruction** (my emphasis) in accordance with the provision of this Section during normal set hours set apart for that purpose.

**Section 26.**

1. Collective worship required to be given within an 'agreed syllabus' not including catechism of a particular denomination.

b). Parents of pupils in attendance at the school may ask for instruction in accordance with the tenets of a Particular religious denomination and (continued)

c). that satisfactory arrangements be made for the Provision of such instruction to those pupils in the schools—without the cost falling upon the Authority.

**Section 27.**

R.I. to be given not more than two periods a week. Teachers in aided schools must be efficient and suitable to give such instruction.

**Section 29.**

Provision as to R.I. in accordance with an 'agreed syllabus'.
Authorities shall have the power to contribute a standing advisory council on R.E., to advise in accordance with the 'agreed syllabus'; in particular to method, book choice and provision of lectures for teachers.

**Section 30.**

No person shall be disqualified from teaching under the heading, 'religious conviction'.

If those sections of the Act are neither doctrinaire nor so intractable to liberal interpretation as to embrace all religious instruction in Christian and other cultures within our educational system, can we not assume the advocates of the Bill must be motivated by some aim or purpose other than the sole concern for the individual liberties and religious rights of our children? By deception, is it not, as I have earlier stated, their intention to promote a negative atheism by default of the exercise of those sections of the Act, which, contrary to their propaganda, are within the Act to protect the true liberties and rights of all denominations and religious cultures?

Consequently, must it not be the resolute intention of all leaders of religious bodies to unite to oppose this Bill; and in a really true oecumenical spirit interpret the Act to the benefit of all our children, with complete disregard of sectional advantage? With a true spirit of co-operation, the aim must not be defensive but positive in a united approach. To the benefit of all our children, these religious leaders must be of one mind in their absolute positive attitude to continue to defeat this Bill. Together they must be prepared to co-operate fully in a liberal interpretation of what is offered to

them all in the Act. Here, the Catholic Church, with many of her own children in County Schools, must take a much more active part in creating an 'agreed syllabus' in union with all other religious cultures; and no longer hope to exclude itself by the sole maintenance of her voluntary schools. To speak bluntly, no group can hope to adopt successfully an attitude of 'I'm all right, Jack'—or—'The Devil take the hindmost' unless they, too, in time, wish to become the 'hindmost'.

Let no power defeat us over our doctrinal disparity but let us find unity under a general agreement. How is this to be achieved? Not, I suggest, by bemoaning the continued decline in moral standards of our children; when, with a true, united and determined will we have to hand an Act, especially conceived to help relieve an increasing concern by a whole body of people.

It must be agreed that all religious cultures are one in their committal to the hope of establishing a firm, moral education within all our schools and their children; and an overall belief in eventual salvation. Here is a firm base upon which to establish an 'agreed syllabus'. With at least the two R.E. periods per week written into every school timetable, both religious teachers and leaders can hope to achieve this end and more, when, by general accord, their time can be given both for work on such an 'agreed syllabus' and in individual doctrinal instruction. This, simply by exercising our rights to be in the schools under the provisions made in the Act. There is an opportunity for either sectional or group work within the scope of the 'agreed syllabus', when the different groups can come together in common cause; or to utilise our individual, denominational rights—always in Charity —to withdraw children of different denominations and religious cultures for specific instruction. In true unity, why fear Marxist or Maoist indoctrination within our schools? They, too, can apply to the Education Authority to instruct the children of their particular persuasion to their own purposes.

Such religious unity would be a positive approach to a negative atheism. A real deterrent to the cunning machinations of the Devil; when, no more is needed than a true, practical spirit of the united efforts and goodwill of all denominations and cultures. With such accord, the enemy's weapons can be turned upon itself. In brief: the atheistic swords, so to speak, can be beaten into our religious ploughshares.[2]

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NOTES

[1] Published by the Catholic Information Office.

[2] See *The Place of the Play in Schools* written as an article for publication in the education journal *Speech and Drama* at the suggestion of Eric Jackson, Editor.

# QUARTERLY FILM REVIEW

## by James Morton

THE London Film Festival held in November of each year always takes time to disgorge its goodies. Many films remain submerged. *La Caza* took nearly ten years to appear at the Paris Pullman and one from the Festival in 1973 has now turned up as part of a sex double bill in Soho. This year does seem slightly better and we have already had a good half dozen shown commercially. Of these the most successful has undoubtedly been *The Enigma of Kasper Hauser*. The film, directed by Werner Herzog, is the story of a madman who suddenly appeared in Nuremberg in the 1830s. No one knew of his past. He was variously supposed to have been chained in a cellar as a young boy, and to be Napoleon's illegitimate son. He lived for a few years after being taught the rudiments of literacy and according to the film proved remarkable in his insight into current petty bourgeois morality. He was later murdered, possibly by the Masons, who always seemed to get the blame for such things about that time.

The film, which bears similarity to Truffaut's *L'Enfant Sauvage*, is a simple tale of a petty society unable to accept what it does not know or understand. The scenes of Hauser's humiliations at the hands of the townsfolk are truly frightening, particularly as Herzog has cast Bruno S, himself a man with a long history of mental instability, in the title role. It is not an attractive film but certainly a remarkable one.

Possibly because of the Gate Cinema's policy, German films at the festival have come out best for limited distribution. In addition to *Kaspar Hauser* we have had *Fear of Fear*, Rainer Werner Fassbinder's story of an emotionally disturbed housewife, and *Fox and His Friends*, about a young fairground hustler who wins a fortune, is taken up by the bourgoisie and is milked of his money. Fassbinder himself plays to homosexual Fox, a fairly disagreeable young man, in a film which is probably the best film to explore homosexual relationships that has been shown.

Sadly, the film *Winstanley*, a story of the seventeenth century Surrey commune set up by the eponymous Cromwellian soldier, has not yet found a home, whilst *Intimate Reflections*, the first film by Don Boyd, showed briefly in the West End and disappeared. It is unlikely that, because of contractual difficulties, we shall see the new Jacques Tati *Parade* and so those of us with long enough memories will have to rely on *Jour de Fête* and *Monsieur Hulot's Holiday*. One of the two Claude Chabrol features, *Innocents With Dirty Hands*, has been distributed by Fox-Rank. This is another of his closely observed views of a deteriorating relationship. Rod Steiger, a man with a heart condition and a dissatisfied wife, Romy Schneider, live in the South of France. She spends her days sunbathing in the raw; he, the evenings, putting away as much whisky as he can before he falls down. Into this unattractive menage comes a writer played by Paolo Giusti. It is not long before he and Schneider are plotting to murder Steiger.

This murder, borrowed from Clouzot's *Les Diaboliques*, takes place some twenty minutes into the film and so we know that since he has top billing our Rod will somehow escape. The plot turns and twists reasonably convincingly, given that Romy Schneider is the girl. To me she seems to be a most beautiful woman and a most unconvincing actress. Chabrol, as always, takes us through his little rituals such as the policemen ploughing their way through the case over large mouth-watering meals. In this film one feels that the plot is subservient to the characters, whereas in *Que La Bête Meurt* they were of equal importance. The film, which is appallingly dubbed, is somewhere in the middle to lower half of the Chabrolian canon. Not up to *La Femme Infidèle* but superior to *La Decade Prodigeuse*. The second Chabrol, *Une Partie de Plaisir*, has yet to find a home.

Walwrian Borocywck's *Story of Sin* has been shown at the ever-enterprising Electric Cinema Club and has just transferred to the West End. This is remarkably good news, coupled as it is with the fact that the other film of his, *The Beast*, has been bought for distribution, as has his film from the 1974 festival, *Contes Immoraux*. I have in the past extolled Borowczyk's praises for his film *Blanche* and *Story of Sin* magnificently repays praise. A stunningly beautiful girl played by Grazyna Dlugolecka is ashamed of the erotic thoughts her body brings in others, but nevertheless manages to fall in love with the young lodger in her father's house. He has come to Warsaw to try to obtain a divorce. He fails and the girl is ordered to leave home by her straitlaced mother. From then on her life is one long downward sweep. She becomes pregnant and disposes of the baby after she learns of her lover's arrest in Rome. She is then gathered up by a pair of thieves and reduced further into degradation. She inadvertently kills the one man who has befriended her and manages temporarily to escape from her captors. The escape is into prostitution. Eventually she is shot trying to protect her first love.

Summarised, the film sounds like pure melodrama and it is none the worse for that. It lives on the edge all the time and it is to the director's credit that it never topples over into disbelief. Assessing it afterwards, despite the diffuseness of the incidents, there is an inexorable progression in the girl's behaviour. Given that she has an *amour fou* for the first love, then everything else falls into place. Borowczyk has made the film as a homage to an inverted *Les Enfants du Paradis*. The villain closely resembles Marcel Herraud and his companion portrays an emaciated Erich von Stroheim. There are close parallels among the latter's work and that of Borowczyk. Both have great attraction to fetishistic objects—corsets, shoes and so forth —and both in a way have a very naïve attitude to their undoubted eroticism. Both have an interesting attitude to the corruption of innocence. *Queen Kelly* could almost be a mother to this film. Beautifully photographed, it should not be missed.

*All the President's Men*, a film from the book of the same name, was not shown at the Festival, but it is concerned with an aftermath of another kind; that of the Watergate bugging. It is a totally pedestrian account of the

unravelling by two young reporters of the cover-up operation following the discovery of the burglars. It stars Robert Redford and Dustin Hoffman, both 39-year-old star material, as the cub reporters who undertook the investigation. It has been billed as the greatest detective story on the screen. This may well be right. It is almost the most boring one as well. Redford and Hoffman have a seemingly endless series of minute and a half conversations on doorsteps. There are, to be fair, interesting little minute and a half vignettes by the various interviewees, but this in no way dissipates the boredom. After an hour I was obliged to have a short doze. Ernle Money, my companion, tells me nothing happened in the 15 minutes I was asleep and certainly nothing happened afterwards. The film, directed by Alan Pakula, who made *Klute*, was received less than enthusiastically by the audience at its European premiere. One can only hope it does not spawn a British spin-off of the Poulsen affair, starring the staff of the *Gateshead Reporter*, or whatever.

Finally, a few films to which to take the children and still have a good time. The first of these is undoubtedly *The Man Who Would Be King*. John Huston has directed Sean Connery and Michael Caine in this adaptation of Kipling's story. Connery and Caine, retired army sergeants in late Victorian India, cannot face a return to London where they will undoubtedly end up as commissionaires at some gentleman's club. They aim to conquer a far away land beyond the Khyber Pass. This they manage but, of course, one of them starts quite understandable delusions of grandeur and the whole pack of cards collapses. Huston has always had a strong line in morality and this comes through the *Boys' Own* adventure stories of battles, avalanches, masonic symbols, boundless treasure and all the other things which make life worthwhile. In the end you are sitting willing Connery and Caine to get out while there is still time. It appeals not only to adults and sons but, so my friends tell me, to daughters of about 9 upwards.

Anyone from about 5 will enjoy some or all of *The Return of the Pink Panther*, starring Peter Sellers. This time the bungling Inspector Clouseau has to investigate the loss of the 'world's most famous diamond.' Quite apart from his remarkable destruction of the English language, Clouseau manages to destroy cars, swimming pools, hotel rooms and more or less anything which comes into his range of vision, Christopher Plummer, who was so good as Kipling in the previous film, is rather boring in the old David Niven part of the English milord, but there are enough cinematographic references to identify to keep mum and dad awake whilst he is on the screen.

And last of all, a really good economy budget thriller, *Sky Raiders*, with James Coburn. His son has been captured by a group of terrorists and imprisoned in an inaccessible Greek monastery. To get them out he enlists the services of a hang gliding team of American beach bums. Fortunately they all—including some very pretty girls—are qualified in the use of machine pistols! But the gliding sequences are very prettily photographed by Osawa Rawa and the action is genuinely exciting. What more can you want from half of a double bill?

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## A NEW HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

*A History of Christianity.* Paul Johnson. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £7.00.

Could anyone, except Paul Johnson, have written a book such as this? So comprehensive, of such sustained literary quality. So provocative of thought on every page? Now that Arnold Toynbee is no longer with us I cannot think of such a one. It may be said that our most highly regarded historians would shrink from the attempt on the grounds that no single writer could adequately perform the task. And in a sense that is so. But what is magnificent is the scope of the work as a whole. What is thrilling is the control exercised throughout by a single penetrating mind, never flagging in its search for the truth. The concluding chapter, rightly described by Mr. Muggeridge as a noble piece of writing, rounds off the immense work superbly.

The conclusion indeed should be briefly quoted: 'Mankind without Christianity conjures up a dismal prospect. The record of mankind with Christianity is daunting enough as we have seen. Christianity has not made man secure or happy, or even dignified. But it supplies a hope . . . ; we are less base and ignoble by virtue of Divine example.' Just previously he has written: 'Christianity's outstanding moral merit is to invest the individual with a conscience and bid him follow it. This particular form of liberation is what St. Paul meant by the freedom men find in Christ and of course it is the father of all other freedoms.'

The enemies of Christianity can, if they like, debunk Mr. Johnson's book as Christian propaganda. On the other hand Mr. Johnson is at great pains to insist that he is always concerned before all else with the objective truth. Both statements can apply. Mr. Johnson conceals nothing, however discreditable to Christianity. He is often in my view much too severe to the Papacy especially in connection with the last war. He is always determined to tell the story as it really happened, whatever the debating advantage or disadvantage. But he is satisfied by the end that the whole truth told in this way works out in a manner that supports the basic Christian claims. He does not subordinate truth to Christianity or Christianity to truth. He emerges as the faithful servant of both supreme causes.

But having made such general comments, a reviewer sits back a little helplessly. There is so much to applaud and almost as much to dispute in the detailed narrative and the interpretations flowing from it. The absence of St. Francis from the index and (virtually) from the text has not unnaturally been picked on by more reviewers than one. Theologians like Augustine and Origen figure prominently, but spiritual writers very little. It is tempting to describe the book as an external history of Christianity. But when one puts it down one is conscious irresistibly of the spiritual inspiration that has guided Mr. Johnson and driven him on through the vast labyrinth.

In the circumstances it seems best to concentrate on one out of the eight parts—the first one, 'The Rise and Rescue of the Jesus Sect (50 BC—AD 250).'

One eminent Divine has already picked it out as the strongest and another as the weakest part of the book. Almost every sentence permits of controversy, for example, 'Paul did not invent Christianity or pervert it. He rescued it from extinction.' The historical submissions on which Mr. Johnson bases this conclusion cannot be summarised here. They include an assessment of the Council of Jerusalem (49 AD?) whose significance has been widely questioned. Stating my own difference with Paul Johnson, almost in shorthand, I would describe myself as primarily a Christian of the gospels and him as a Christian of the epistles. In my view he seriously under-estimates the uniqueness of Christian ethics as revealed in the gospels. In his eyes 'the teaching of Jesus is more a series of glimpses or matrixes, a collection of insights, rather than a code of doctrine . . . it is not a *summa theologica* or indeed *ethica*.' It is not, of course, I agree, an academic textbook, but the same could be said, and even more so, of St. Paul's writings. From the gospels one can at least extract marvellous new ideas about humility, forgiveness and, as Paul Johnson acknowledges, universal charity.

I can find nothing new under these headings in St. Paul's teaching, though, of course, he was able to exemplify them on many occasions in his missionary life.

Paul Johnson might reply that whatever might be the case with the ethics, the theology of Christ is carried to far greater heights in St. Paul than in the gospels. But it has long seemed to me impossible to separate the ethics of the gospels from the theology, or either from the personality of Christ. All that matters in Christian teaching can be extricated from the gospels. The works of St. Paul supply an exciting and often eloquent embellishment; his life, like those of the apostles, an heroic example. We are left with an inconclusive argument about the extent to which St. John's gospel itself owed much to St. Paul's teaching.

But this and many other issues in this mighty book must be left over. At the moment it is a duty and a privilege to praise so notable an achievement.

FRANK LONGFORD

## VENERABLE INSTITUTIONS

*See How They Run.* Edwin Samuel. The Woburn Press. £5.95.

This is both an unusual and an excellent book. It is unusual because the detailed description of the structure and working of institutions in Britain has been a relatively neglected field in both the economic and the political sphere; and although a majority of the studies in this volume are neither economic nor political in the strict sense, but are autonomous bodies such as The Catholic Church or Westminster Abbey, the same remark applies to them.

Lord Samuel has based his selection on the antiquity of the institution combined with its continuous life through the centuries. His background is that of a former colonial administrator followed by a substantial period as a university lecturer in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He had for long been deeply interested in the administration of venerable institutions, because the mere fact of survival was an indication of viability in a changing world and therefore of an ability to adjust to changing circumstances. The study began in 1963 when he succeeded to a peerage on the death of his father. This led him to undertake a detailed study of the House of Lords—the first that had been made in seven centuries—followed at intervals by studies of the Catholic Church, the Royal

Opera House, the British Museum Library, Balliol College, Oxford, Westminster Abbey and The Times Newspaper.

In every case the author is specifically concerned with the administrative aspects of the institution, rather than with its function or its efficiency. There are obviously enormous differences in the role and activities of the seven institutions surveyed in this book and some readers may question the validity of the criteria which has qualified them for inclusion. In my opinion the best justification for the book is to be found in the author's remarkable ability to present in astonishing detail every nook and cranny in the administration of highly complex institutions. Moreover, Lord Samuel is no mean historian. He traces throughout the ages the creation, changes and adaptations which have enabled his institutions to survive the vicissitudes of life. He avoids criticism, and some readers may feel that some criticism would be welcome. But that might have conflicted with his purpose; for every detail has been obtained from, and checked by, authoritative sources; and abstention from criticism may have been an essential feature in obtaining the fullest co-operation from persons prominently engaged in the undertaking.

Several chapters in the book are brilliant examples of detailed reportage. Among those I would specially commend for this quality are the study of *The Times* and the one on the Administration of the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden. I know of nothing which remotely approaches these pieces in helping the lay reader to understand how an institution such as a leading national newspaper or a great opera house is really run. Lord Samuel makes one comprehend the complexity, the immense amount of co-ordination which is involved, and much else which is normally taken for granted by those who are interested only in the final product, not how it is produced. Herein lies the excellence of the book. It is good news that Lord Samuel is engaged in further research on other highly interesting venerable institutions.

W. A. ROBSON

## THE NEW NATIONAL THEATRE

*The National Theatre* by Judith Cook. Harrap. £3.25.

It is not surprising that hardly more than three months after the opening of the £15 million National Theatre on The South Bank, a book about the Theatre should appear. Obviously, all those connected with this mammoth project would like to see a chronicle of their achievement. Judith Cook, a theatre journalist, had also been thinking along these lines.

Her book, after recording the preliminary history—the first suggestion for a national theatre was mooted in 1948 — gives a biography of Lilian Baylis, founder of the Old Vic, and then goes on to interviews with those who helped to build or run the National Theatre, including Denys Lasdun, the architect, Peter Hall, Lord Olivier, Sir Max Rayne, Chairman, and actors Albert Finney and Diana Rigg. They enlarge on their work and aspirations, and answer various criticisms that have been levelled at the complex

This format highlights the different characters and beliefs of the various men involved, and makes one wonder how they all get on. Mr. Peter Stevens, the General Administrator, defining his job, says he is responsible to Peter Hall 'for the general management of the whole operation and for the implementation of the director's policies through the disparate talents of a group of

specialist managers and administrators. . . . It is my responsibility to co-ordinate their work, relating them to one another and to the overall concept.'

After reading this convoluted statement, it is interesting to see the more forthright comments of their Head of Design, John Bury. 'Now it takes you three times as long to design a set as it used to because you're constantly having to justify your expenditure to half a dozen people who are constantly looking over your shoulder and chopping back . . . As theatres get bigger they just get more expensive, with shift systems and days off and holidays and so on, which take over so you're designing to meet all these requirements rather than the job you set out to do. Regulations don't help the artist at all.'

It seems, from reading the book, that one of the greatest dangers which could afflict the National Theatre would be civil service committee thinking, resulting in unenterprising choices for repertoire. One feels uneasy that the first new production to be seen on the South Bank is Noel Coward's *Blithe Spirit*. Why was it chosen—because it has a small cast and one set, because Coward is a name which attracts the middlebrow audience? It was certainly not from a spirit of adventure, and the production did not enhance this much revived play. There is no point in using all your enterprise on the building and none for the play itself.

Possibly the answer is that, as yet, the men behind the Theatre are still overawed. It will take a year or two before they manage the Theatre rather than let it manage them. One hopes that the National Theatre will pursue a more singleminded policy than the disparate views expressed here might lead one to expect.

CLARE COLVIN

## TRAVELLER IN THE BALKANS

*Curtain Calls: Travels in Albania, Romania and Bulgaria.* Leslie Gardiner. Duckworth, £3.95.

A long talk with Albania's Chairman Misto, Europe's least publicised ruler, is the high spot of these travels. Mr. Gardiner says he had taught himself French as a young communist, Italian while a prisoner of the fascists, and was now studying English. 'I'm reading the journals of Lord Byron, who travelled in this country,' he said. 'We shall show you the plaque we raised to him at Tepëlëne, where he visited Ali Pasha.' Asked, 'When are you going to let the foreigners in?' Misto replied that for some years Albania would not be able to accept large numbers, her own people's welfare must come first. 'Something has been achieved,' he added, 'that chair you sit on, the wine you drink, the glass and the bottle, those chocolates . . . the suit I'm wearing, my shoes, my glasses, everything but the buttons on my jacket is made in Albania.'

China, Mr. Gardiner noted, had had a hand in nearly all new export industries—minerals, oil, fruit and fish canning. China operated a political system like their own, Misto explained, so they were companions on the same road; 'we welcome the Chinese among us, but if China should try to interfere . . . ' His most startling statement, however, was that in February 1944 when the Allied armies were in difficulties in the west it was agreed that Russia should launch an attack in the east on the 17th. Churchill allowed details of the plan to reach the Germans—to 'put the Russian head into the German mouth' and destroy the Russian army. Stalin, however, discovered the plot and forestalled it by attacking nine days earlier, on the 8th. When Gardiner asked 'is there

historical evidence for this?' Misto said it was in Stalin's memoirs; he had also heard Enver Hoxha, the Party secretary, speak of it.

With no guide, only driver, Gardiner visited factories, State farms, martyr's monuments, war-of-liberation museums, a maternity hospital for working women where a cotton worker, for example, would receive nine-tenths of her pay plus allowances for baby clothes and special diet. For six children the Mother's Medal was awarded, for nine the Glory of the Mother, for twelve the Heroine Mother. Divorce was easy, by mutual agreement and a letter to the Tirana ministry. Former 'aristocrats' who had hastened to present their estates to the provisional Government remained as managers, occupying a tiny corner of the *palazzo* with perhaps thirty workers as lodgers.

In Romania the author is equally revealing—about Queen Marie's fantastic 'Quiet Nest' near Balchik, her reputed lovers, Carol and Mme. Lupescu, the wonders of the Danube Delta on the Russian frontier. He talked with Marie's daughter, Princess Ileana, about court life. In Bulgaria he met a sociologist of Sofia's Academy of Sciences who told him the Rodop peasants believed that Tsar Nicholas and his family were not murdered at Ekaterinburg but escaped via the Black Sea to Varna and Plovdiv, then settled in the Rodop, where the four daughters still survive as old peasant women, two married. George V knew of it and kept in touch with the Tsar; our Foreign Office had documents about it! Mr. Gardiner is a tireless, questing, vitally readable wanderer whose judgments of places and people one is disposed to take on trust; his impressions of a southern Bulgarian region I knew as a soldier accord with mine.

TREVOR ALLEN

## THE ENIGMA OF SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION

*Fire From Heaven.* Michael Harrison. Sidgwick and Jackson. £5.50.

Mr. Harrison's book dealing with the alleged phenomenon of spontaneous or preternatural human combustion presents a curious mixture of science, superstition and the data of psychical research, ingeniously textured into a plausible construct of fact and fantasy. Certainly, a great deal of original thinking has been brought to bear on the subject, but not, one suspects, in this enigmatic context, right thinking. There is an over-balance of basic acceptance without satisfactory verification. There is much recondite building upon sand. One of the main troubles is that the preponderance of the evidence adduced is hearsay: necessarily so, for the opportunity for first-hand observation is impossibly restricted.

For a number of cogent thermodynamic reasons, orthodox forensic medicine has always rejected the possibility of the human body having the capacity spontaneously to reduce itself within a matter of minutes to a handful of self-incinerated ashes. Such acknowledged forensic authorities as Professor Keith Simpson and Dr. Gavin Thurston are strongly opposed to the idea of death resulting from this paranormal cause. Investigating *a priori,* Mr. Harrison, however, has discovered a number of what he conceives to be possible explanations. An aberrant variation of the electro-magnetic bioluminescence of the Kirlian effect is invoked as a conjectural source of the fire from within. So are poltergeistic phenomena. He suggests that, under certain, unspecified conditions, telekinesis may extend itself into spontaneous human combustion. Indeed, he

casts his net so widely that one is in the end rather confused by its heterogenous enclosures.

The book, the first on this subject to be published in Britain, has the merit of assembling a considerable number of precisely dated case histories, recorded over a substantial period of time from an impressive variety of localities all over the world. This seems to me to be its most important function—consolidation. The theoretical part of the book, although stimulating, fails to supply any coherent resolution of the very considerable problems raised. There is a valiant attempt to codify the characteristic features presented by what Mr. Harrison regards as authentic examples of destruction by the 'fire from heaven' and coalesce them into a pattern which will allow of definite diagnosis, but it never quite succeeds.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

## POLAND'S DARKEST HOUR

*The 79th Survivor.* Bronislaw Mlynarski. Translated by Casimir Zdziechowski. Foreword by Arthur Rubinstein. Backman and Turner. £5.50.

We have had relatively few first-hand accounts of Poland's 1939 ordeal, first under German invasion, then Russian. This is a vivid one by a young Reserve officer of a musical family who left bombed Warsaw to join his unit; and what he witnessed en route epitomises the nation's tragedy. A young woman lay dozing in a stubble furrow with her five-year-old daughter when three low-flying German fighters flew over with guns blazing. She screamed. The child called out: 'Don't be afraid, Mummy. I'll cover you up,' spread her calico frock over her mother's head and breast, then slumped silently in the stubble. Her tiny body and dying mother were taken to a cemetery on a wheelbarrow for the last rites.

I find that even more affecting than Mlynarski's graphic account of the fighting. Two days after the Russians invaded on September 17 he and his comrades were taken prisoner in the Zurawno region, searched, looted of their rings, watches, belt, bags, map-holders, even overcoats in some cases. Marched east over the frontier under conditions that caused the author to faint, they were handed over to the NKVD military police, taken on a nightmare rail journey with as many as 88 men crammed in a box-car.

Their objective was Camp Starobyelsk, a former monastery in eastern Ukraine housing up to 10,000 people.

'Physical suffering was at its worst in the first few weeks of our captivity,' he writes. 'Hunger and disease were rampant. Nevertheless, the great majority . . . bore their burden of adversity with pride and dignity.' Food for a day's heavy work loading logs in a freezing forest was bread and a bowl of oatmeal in early morning, foul, sour soup in the evening. One indignity they had to suffer was having their hair shaved, despite protests that they were officers, not criminals. Holy Mass was banned because they sang an ancient patriotic hymn. Their priests were taken away—to what fate? They were forbidden to change living quarters, assemble or walk in groups of more than two men. The exchange rate of any Polish *zloty* they possessed rose from two to fifty to the rouble, making it costly to supplement meagre rations.

There were constant interrogations. Accused falsely of having been an intelligent agent on pre-war trips abroad, Mlynarski ingeniously switched the

talk to music, mentioning that his father had been a pupil of Tchaikovsky and Leopold Auer, close friend of Glazunov, Scriabin, Liadov, directed the Warsaw Opera, founded the Warsaw Philharmonic Orchestra. That acted like magic on the interrogator, who forgot he was there to probe his victim!

Mlynarski's narrative ends abruptly, to be supplemented briefly by Witold Kaczkowski. When the camp was liquidated in 1940, Mlynarski was one of the lucky 79 Polish officers to survive out of nearly 4,000. His able translator says the traumatic experience undoubtedly left an indelible scar that affected him mentally, physically, up to his untimely death in 1971. Arthur Rubinstein, his brother-in-law, states that the inmates of two other camps also vanished mysteriously; over 4,000 from Kozyelsk were later found buried in the Katyn Woods near Smolensk. The book is an impressive record of man's inhumanity to man in war, his courage and resource in adversity.

TREVOR ALLEN

## SHORTER REVIEWS

**Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India. The Transfer of Power 1942-47.** Volume VI. (H.M. Stationery Office. £30.) This new volume covers 'The post-war phase; new moves by the Labour Government 1 August 1945-22 March 1946.' Like its predecessors, this volume, under the editorship of Dr. Nicholas Mansergh, assisted by Sir Penderel Moon, is designed to make available to scholars the most important official documents in convenient form. Over this eight month period the Editors have included 545 documents in 1,237 pages. There is also additional supplementary material, including summaries and explanatory sections. The volume follows the failure of the Simla Conference in July 1945 and is concerned with the efforts of the new Labour Government to transfer power at the earliest possible time. Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, influenced the government against proceeding with the Cripps proposals of 1942. The attitude of the Muslim League was a particular difficulty. The British attitude became one of more cautious approach, but without delaying the process of transfer of power. There was the whole problem of law and order and a large part of the volume, between September and November, is devoted to this. In January a British Parliamentary Delegation visited India partly as a soothing operation. In this month the Cabinet determined to send out a Cabinet Mission, consisting of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps and A. V. Alexander. It finally left for India on the 19th March 'to discuss and explore all possible alternatives without proceeding upon any fixed or rigid preconceived plan,' with a view to independence and self-government to India. The Directive stated inter alia that the States' 'paramountcy must not be handed over to an Indian Government.' Yet it was becoming quite clear that in practice this would be inevitable. The next volume no doubt will include the work of the Cabinet Mission.

World Drama (Harrap. £16.00). This celebrated work by Professor Allardyce Nicoll was first published in 1949 and reprinted ten times, the last being in 1972. The purpose of the book has been to provide a 'general conspectus of the drama's development' from Aescylus to Anouilh. In

this new second edition, the text throughout has been revised in the light of fresh historical knowledge and of current theatrical trends. More particularly, over two hundred pages have been added, to the discussion of 'the confusions, the doubts, the deviations, and the complexities nearly everywhere apparent in the development of the drama during the middle years of the present century' to 1973. Professor Allardyce refers to the impacts made by radio, television and cinema and to the operation, now as always, to 'the force of the social-political environment within which the playhouse has its being.' He has reached the conclusion that contemporary drama can only be properly surveyed by those with a close knowledge of the theatre within a particular area and who also 'have an equally intimate acquaintanceship with the particular patterns of social life amid which these activities have their being.' Accordingly, in Part XIV, The Transformation Scene: 1945-73, there are ten chapters each dealing with a particular region. Arthur Wimurt writes on Post-Drama in the USA. England and Ireland are discussed by Gareth Lloyd Evans, and France and Belgium by Pierre Paul Auger. Hilde Haider-Pregler writes on German language post-war drama. Jens Kistrup has a chapter on post-war drama in Scandinavia and Malgorzata Semil-Jakubowicz writes on Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. Post-war Hispano and Brazilian drama is discussed by Rudolfo Cardona; and Italy is covered. Katherin Brisbane writes briefly on Australia and Lewis Nkosi has a short piece on African drama. The illustrations have been updated.

**William Shakespeare, the Sonnets** (Dent, London: Dutton, New York. 50p). This is one of two additions to the Everyman Paperback series, and reproduces the sonnets in the first edition of 1609. Mr. M. R. Ridley has written a very brief Introduction. He makes no attempt to identify the young man to whom the sonnets are addressed or the dark lady. Indeed, he regards the evidence as quite inadequate. Of the dark lady, he expresses the view that 'the field of conjecture is far too wide for any certainty to have been attained, or indeed to be attainable.' Dr. A. L. Rowse will certainly disagree with this conclusion. The second new Everyman Paperback is *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (65p). Mr. Peter Faulkner has contributed a biographical assessment of Oscar Wilde with emphasis on *Dorian Gray* and comments, 'Wilde the Aesthete is a better writer than Wilde the Decadent.' To the bibliography may now be usefully added H. Montgomery Hyde's recent life of Oscar Wilde.

**The Naked King, The Shadow and The Dragon.** By Yevgheny Shvarts (Marion Boyars. £5.95). Elisaveta Fen, noted for her translations of Chekhov, introduces and translates three satirical plays by the Russian dramatist Yevgheny Shvarts (1896-1959), written in the Stalin period when dissident home-truths had to be veiled as fairy-tales in Hans Andersen garb. Significant for Russians at the time, westerners may find their airy-fairy fantasy a little baffling; but they have a rare literary quality, lucidly conveyed.

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

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# Contemporary Review

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## ROME: 'THE PEOPLE'S FABLE AND THE SPOIL OF ALL'

### by Christopher Hampton

LIVING in Rome one lives within the public eye of history, so to speak. The record of the past that the city offers, from its putative beginnings on the Palatine to its establishment as the secular capital of a unified Italy, gives it a unique place among the great cities of Europe. This we can say within the convention. But Rome is more than the sum total of its pasts. It is a twentieth-century city that has once again, and for the second time, become a metropolis—in terms of which (miraculously, one might have said) the Church itself still manages to survive. And surprisingly enough it happens to be a place where, for many of the people, its history is but a background, an accepted setting. The Roman of today may be conscious of inheritance and all that this implies, but he is first of all concerned to live. Therefore Rome to him is not the Rome of the Church or the tourist, the haunter of churches, museums or ruins. It is a particular part of the city—a square perhaps and a network of streets, the area surrounding his home. And to him the histrionic surface of the Public City is less a declamation than an accompaniment, even though it may remind him that he is the privileged descendant of an abused people.

The architecture remains part of the facade of tainted power. But today, flowering out of old roots, it also gives a richly varied perspective to the complex human pattern. Though the great palaces were built at the expense of the poor and in contemptuous indifference to their needs, many of them have now become a legacy of the people, an adornment to the limitations of their sometimes meagre homes. The Romans can afford to accept, to make use of and to enjoy, what has come to them out of the past, because they have at last begun to free themselves from the yoke of papal domination. But their city is still the city of the popes, and the Church continues to exercise a peculiar hold upon the psychology of Rome, resisting change, retarding and inhibiting the swift and sometimes bewildering developments in 20th century psychology. Hence the startling contrasts that it offers the observer, where technology and materialism jostle uneasily beside ancient

dogmas, and the secular power attempts its rule in face of an obstinate indifference to authority on the part of the people.

Not that the Romans are frivolous or light-hearted. They have little respect for authority, but they tend at the same time to be stolid, slow to commit themselves, blunt in speech and reserved in manner. True, they use their hands demonstratively, as most Italians do, and are not to be confused with the Puritan races of the north. But the Roman character is certainly not mercurial or open. The passions are there, but they are mostly under the surface, inheld. For the Romans are a long-suffering people. They have had no choice for centuries but to adjust themselves to the harsh realities of life; and these do not encourage the subtler refinements and involutions that have so distinguished the manners of the princes and the papal court. The people have seen too much, and lived too close to the facts of their world, the perverted logic of this Christian capital, its 'inborn, inveterate and ineradicable avarice'. Hence they are laconic, intensely sceptical and materialistic, with a gift for mockery and a gusto which are not immediately apparent. To get to understand them, therefore, we have to get to know them well.

And we shall nowhere find their attitudes and values more accurately or more sympathetically mirrored, even today, than in the work of the 19th century Roman poet Gioacchino Belli, who was born in 1791 and lived just long enough to witness the birth of the Italian nation. For Belli is above all the poet of the Roman people. In his great series of sonnets, written entirely in Romanesco, the dialect of the streets, they became (almost for the first time) the central theme of a work of art. For it is *their* voices that are heard, irreverent, scoffing and bawdy, responding to the episodic drama of daily existence in Rome, its diversity and immediacy.

> 'My intention,' Belli was to write years later, 'was solely to have our people speak for themselves in their own frank, unsophisticated, ribald tongue, of their own habits and customs and distorted opinions, and beyond all this to voice their own original thoughts concerning the more elevated orders of this social phenomenon they are the basis of.'

What prevails through all of his 2,279 sonnets, as it does still in the speech of the people, is a tone of vehement mockery, often richly comic in effect but detailed and devastating in its ridicule, against those—from the pope downwards—who operate and maintain the system in Rome. For them, *per esse buffo abasta esse signore*—to be a fool it is enough to be a gentleman. But with this dismissiveness goes a compensatory relish for the things that signify community and continuity among the deprived—food, wine, talk, sexual pleasure, the home, the family. In terms of Belli's poetry, that is, the oppressed poor of the city live their lives with indelicacy, gusto and warmth in a climate of ruinous corruption, injustice and misery. His people share with us (as with each other) the intimacy and spontaneity of their way of life. And they bring us very close to all those qualities that have made the Roman what he is, and what he remains.

Essentially, as his views come through to us from Belli's teeming pages, there is nothing on earth that could convince the ordinary Roman that those in control, the men of the Church who have ruled Rome or have had Rome

ruled for them by foreigners, are men to be respected, or revered. *Il popolino* has known too much and has seen too much. Imposing and imperious though the institutions may be, those who represent them are after all no more than men beneath their ceremonial robes and all their finery of office, having the organs of other men and impelled like them by desires and ambitions. Or they may simply be grotesques of the comic spirit, grown impotent with age, as Belli sees Pius VIII in his sonnet 'Pio Ottavo':

> Look at that thing over there, stand-in
> For Christ on earth. A pair of balls
> stuffed with sausage-meat!
>
> The goldsmith's girl put it well
> seeing him in church: 'Mha! What an ugly
> big screw of a pontiff they've given us!'

In just such a tone—irreverent and deflationary—is pretentiousness stripped of its masks and injustice exposed. Rome is seen not in terms of elevated principle and the luxurious tastes of the rich but through the eyes and the tongues of the ignorant poor. For Belli does not simply observe and comment. With his profound sympathy for their predicament, he sinks himself in the situation of the poor, the rhythms of their speech, their ways of looking at their world. And the dramatic appeal of the sonnets—Belli's own great monument to the Roman populace—is their embodiment of the comic drama of a people employing all their considerable resources in the trap of an intolerable situation imposed upon them by centuries of deprivation and abuse. At this level they are an extraordinary achievement offered in passionate defence of an oppressed people against a world of monstrous privilege and corruption which, in pursuit of its pretentious aims, had ignored the most elementary rules of conscience, and thus forfeited its right to govern. But they are above all a celebration of the life of the common people of Rome in all its richness and complexity, and with the strangest contradictions intermixed; for it was Belli's purpose to have each one of them say what he knew, what he thought and how he worked, and thus to reveal sonnet by sonnet the deep knowledge, the sentiments and beliefs and the underlying rationality of the anonymous populace.

These people are a people born to resignation and despair. Their warmth is the warmth of those accustomed to sharing their meagre possessions and lives with others; their gaiety the gaiety of those without hope. And because they have so little to hope for, they cannot afford to be miserable. As Stendahl observes: *'Il faut un commencement d'espoir pour être triste.'* So in the end it is their reserves of humour and of comic banter that provide their strongest defence against surrender. And Belli is their advocate, the voice of their truth, even in leaving them to speak. He is a *cantor rectitudinis*, like Dante; a poet pleading for justice by example, in a world given over to vice and a conscienceless abuse of power, the world of *la Citta del Vicé-Dio*, the city of the Vice-God, of the Omnipotent Deputy.

In the light of such evidence, it should come as no surprise to us to find the Roman of today unable at heart to believe in his institutions—though today he is no longer so deprived or abused. It will take more perhaps than

the goodwill and sincerity of the better men in the Church to win him over, to eradicate his ingrained distrust and scepticism. Now that he is freer, now that he has the chance to cash in on things a little, he will take the opportunity, for himself and for his family, since in the end these are the only things that really matter, or can be trusted to work to his advantage. Rome has taught him what to expect from his institutions. 'As ye sow, so shall ye reap.'

Of course, the situation is today complicated by the fact that the city is full of people who cannot strictly be classified as Romans at all. Over the last thirty years, the influx of the 'foreigner'—natives of Gubbio or Perugia or Ancona or Ascoli or any of a hundred other towns—has been one great cause of the increased congestion of the capital and its extraordinary expansion outwards. Rome has drawn into its orbit thousands of non-Romans, even as it did once before when, under Julius Caesar, it is said that there were 300,000 working for the Treasury. But all the same the distinctiveness of the Roman character remains, and the Roman way of life imposes its own rules upon those who come to stay in the city. As Stendhal has pointed out: 'It is not true that the simplest action is performed in Rome as it is in Florence and Bologna.' On the contrary, there are fundamental differences. Though it may be that the bureaucratic situation of modern Rome is a process that tends to level out the subtler shades of customs and of passions, the Romans will not easily submit to being levelled. They have their own style of living, even as the Neapolitan does, or the Florentine, or the Venetian. This is the consequence of the sharp contrasts of custom and of culture that persist between one city and another; and in Italy such contrasts cannot be ignored, since the idea of the one nation has only just begun to penetrate the old boundaries. It is a matter of roots and of shaping conditions. '*La lingua fiorentina nella bocca romana*', it is said, gives us the best Italian; but this implies a distinct role for each city that is not reversible—Florence for elegance and intellectual refinement, Rome for resonance and rotundity.

One may not have much occasion to witness 'the moments of absolute madness', of 'moral inebriation' that Stendhal considered an aspect of the Roman temperament, though this may be one of the causes, as it is likely to have been a consequence, of the peculiarly perverted actions and occurrences that distinguish the history of the city's foremost exemplars. But there is a curious and diabolical Roman custom which occurs as soon as the New Year has been celebrated, which may be symptomatic. For ten or fifteen minutes after midnight chaos reigns in the streets when a stream of deadly objects, mingling with the exuberant explosions of the New Year fireworks, is thrown from the open windows of houses all over the city. Suddenly, indiscriminately, with mad abandon, the Romans take hold of any rubbish they can find—old bottles, boxes, tin cans, broken chairs, garbage from the waste-bins—and cast it down into the empty streets. This *is* a kind of madness, and it is madness for anyone to be out, for they venture at the risk of their lives. Not that people are likely to take such futile risks—the streets stay empty, and most of the cars are parked carefully out of range of the

windows. Though not everyone is in his house on New Year's Eve, and it can be something of a hazard to negotiate the litter-strewn city in the hours before the dustmen have arrived, the Roman's licence doesn't stretch to walking in a rain of bottles.

New Year's Eve cannot anyway be considered as much more than an excessive way of letting off steam. But what of the characteristic crimes of passion that take place periodically in the city? Murder—often condoned during the worst years, as we know, by papal pardon—used to be a common occurrence. During the eleven-year pontificate of Clement XIII (1758-69), 13,000 homicides were registered in the Papal States, and of these 4,000 were said to have taken place in Rome itself. And in the twenty-five years up to 1800, according to Stendhal's report, there were some 18,000. 'What strikes any foreigner', Goethe had observed in his *Italian Journey*, 'are the murders which happen almost every day. In our quarter alone, there have been four in the last three weeks.' Today, naturally, the situation is less extreme. But the murders still occur quite frequently, and they do not differ much in character from the examples recounted by Stendhal. There was one that took place recently in Rome which followed an almost classic pattern. A man living apart from his wife, who had observed her on a number of occasions in the company of a local *falegname* or carpenter and been told stories about the couple, walked early one morning into a bar where the *falegname* usually went for his cup of coffee. Without hesitation he drew out a pistol, fired two shots at the man and watched him fall to the ground. Then, where the body lay crumpled below the bar-counter, he fired three times more into it, murmuring fiercely: *'Tu mi hai rovinato, ed io ti ammazzo!'* Having said this, he threw the pistol down at the body with a gesture of disgust, turned stiffly away without a word to the astonished bartender, walked out of the bar, and gave himself up to the police.

The point about such a killing, and what gives it its special character, is that it is regarded sympathetically as an act of moral justice, a legitimate revenge for the heinous crime of adultery. It does not matter perhaps that the killer himself may have committed adultery with other men's wives. If he *has* done that and not been punished that is because he has acted discreetly. So perhaps the real crime is that the adultery should have become public knowledge, injuring the husband's reputation. Whatever the reason, since the moral code does not sufficiently discourage them, these crimes continue, and the conscience of the wronged husband is often not strong enough to prevent him from killing his rival—or let us say is not as strong as the vehement moral impulse that drives him to kill.

However, it could be said that such madness, such moments of inebriation, are abnormal everywhere, except when war gives us licence to kill, or when corruption and frustration (as in the claustrophobic situation of 18th century Rome) have become intolerable—and then it is the rules that are abnormal. And normally the Roman lives with prudence and reserve. He may not be a model of efficiency in the present bureaucratic circumstances. But then why should he be? Bureaucracy has flooded the city with intricate chaotic methods and procedures. And these mean very little to the individual except

when he finds himself caught up in their tortuous confusions. They may be a means to a livelihood, but they also represent impersonal state control, which is difficult at the best of times to believe in. The controls multiply, and with each multiplication the individual's control over the controls weakens. So it is that, dealing with Rome's Public Institutions, people find themselves exasperated by incredible obliqueness and indifference. The little man in from the country seeking to settle a claim or a dispute is likely to find himself involved in endless litigation, moving from office to office and official to official, not knowing any longer where he is, frequently to be seen clutching a form he hardly understands. Indeed, the machinery of Roman Law is often so tortuously complicated as to inhibit all incentive to efficiency, and even honesty; nor is the Italian suited by temperament to give himself to its abstractions with enthusiasm. But then is anyone anywhere?

Certainly not in Rome. Asking such a question one might get a shrug of the shoulders for reply, and any one of a number of eloquent monosyllabic exclamations implying impotence, ignorance, indifference or contempt. It does not matter. Life has more important things to offer. Besides, it is not to be expected that enthusiasm should thrive against the heavily scented aura of the Church or the insistent materialism of a world obsessed with affluence and status in the wake of unaccustomed prosperity and all that threatens it.

Naturally, the Roman takes his casual pride in being Roman. He will even boast sometimes of the continuous traditions of his world. He may not accept them, but that is another matter. And though non-Romans tend to get annoyed at what they take to be his unjustified conceit, perhaps they do not hear the other side of it. For he does not speak with any more enthusiasm of the papacy than in the past. It is accepted as a fixture, a sign of continuing Roman power; and whether you believe or not, you cannot ignore the existence of the Church or the place it has in Rome. After all, St. Peter's is a superb adornment to the architecture, and you can always go there on a Sunday, even if it *is* just to take the air or walk your children through the colonnades in sight of the glistening fountains. You can even *use* the fountains on a windy day to wash your car. And then there is the pope to gaze at when he comes out on his balcony and gives his blessing; or the crowds on the great days of the Christian Year that pack the square to suffocation.

Nevertheless, the 'unalterable core of Roman indifference', as Alberto Moravia points out, leaves the Roman unconvinced. He has known what all this luxury and magnificence has meant. Justice? In Rome, as Belli put it, *'nun trove un cazzo chi te fa giustizia.'* And in the voice of the common Roman he then exclaims:

> E questa e una città? che! sta sporchizzia?!
> No, chiamela per dio Terra de cani.

—which, translated, reads: 'And this is a city? What! This filth?! No, by God, call it rather a Dogyard.' This Moravia confirms, writing of Stendhal's commentary on Rome:

> As in 1827, so today, everything that is done and happens in Rome, happens and is done without any real participation on the part of the people, or rather without any of that immediate, contingent and momentary participation that lies behind the civic spirit of the great European capitals.

This *menefreghismo*—or refusal to care—deep-rooted as it is, makes one wonder sometimes how Rome ever had the energy and the conviction to achieve what it has been able to achieve so triumphantly. But then we know that it was not the *people* who made Rome splendid, but the leaders of the Church, their rivals and protectors and enemies, the minority seeking power and domination by any and every means they could devise. One has only to remember that up to a hundred years ago the social mechanism of the Roman States was 'so adjusted as to accumulate all enjoyments on the heads of some forty cardinals and some hundred generals, bishops and prelates', as Stendhal mockingly pointed out. 'Consider the prudence that had to prevail in a country where a court—the most despotic, but also the most prudent and the least violent in the world—was flanked by thirty courts at least as prudent.' For none knew which might stand to gain the highest prizes till, by sudden and unforeseen election, the ticket of the Curia had conferred the throne. It was all a hazard—fortunes were made and lost on the choice of each new pope. And those who were not attached to any of the courts—that is, the mass of the people of Rome—had no alternative most of the time but to accept the conditions and try to get on with their lives.

Today, the Roman is still affected by the psychology the Church has imposed on his society; by the sometimes claustrophobic influence of its morality; by its ubiquitous and active presence; by the very weight of its prestige in the world beyond Rome. But now he knows that, though the Vatican remains a more or less reactionary power, it is a reactionary power that has had the sting taken from it. For it is not the Church that dominates the city now, but the economic situation—Rome's post-war leap into prosperity and its aftermath, which has altered the face of the city and its rhythms, and put luxuries within reach of the ordinary man for the first time, if only perhaps eventually to deny them to him. Not that the prosperity meant the elimination of poverty. But it did mean that new jobs and new opportunities and new scales of pay created new horizons (however insecurely based) for untold thousands of the people.

And what of the effect upon the city of this aquisitive expansion, this new affluence? Faced with its challenge, the Church has found it increasingly difficult to present itself as an unchanging ideal in a culture on the move; as a bulwark standing firm against the irreligion of reality. And in the secular sense, there are many, reacting with the harshest pessimism, who believe that Rome is all but ruined as a place to live in. Though the city is beautiful and its beauty is inimitable, they'll tell you it is almost impossible to enjoy it. Where can you find a noisier or a more chaotic place? they'll say. As a friend put it to me once: 'There is such disorder here. The government is disordered, bureaucracy is disordered, the traffic has its will, speculation runs riot, everyone lives on credit, and everything seems just about to be getting out of control. Rome lives and dies each day a little bit more raucously.' One is reminded of Juvenal's declining second century city, where 'sick men die from insomnia', since 'in any rented room rest is impossible'.

But: *'Che ne so'*, the Roman would say, if you told him. 'Who cares?' For it is only a personal verdict anyway. 'One makes the best of it. This is Rome, after all'. The city has its own rhythms and its own order. Every day the routine starts afresh, as everywhere. And every day the Romans plunge in, as another bureaucratic money-making round begins. The fairground opens up, the crowds come streaming down from the suburbs, the merry-go-round starts turning, laden with its passengers, and once again the joy-ride goes its way. The Rome of yesterday, though managing somehow physically to hold its ground, is nothing but a broken dream, the memory of a party cleared up after and already fading. And the Rome of half a century ago seems light-years off, discarded like an outworn myth. Is it possible that anyone can now think back to that—the Rome of the 600,000, that post-first war, pre-Fascist Rome? For most perhaps too much has happened. We can only purse our lips and shrug. Yet for the few, surviving with their corrupted memories of youth through five decades, there is the melancholy recognition of a vanished world.

For now the motor age is with us, the age of Americanisation, so to speak, of revolutionary technology, with its own totalitarian methods, marked by the strident mechanistic war of a Corso day, going to extremes. But then hasn't Rome itself *always* been a city of extremes? Here you find extremes of heat and cold, sudden changes of temperature, and tempestuous rains. Noise, too, and chaos, and indifference, go to extremes. And isn't the city a vehicle for some of the extremest forms of order and authority ever to have issued from a creed of love?

But there are extremes of quiet too to be found at times—at the turn of a street, in the squares and gardens and churches, in the very stillness of great buildings. Not in the daytime perhaps, unless you catch the city in its early morning waking hours or in summer when the heat is most oppressive and has driven everyone into their houses or away to the sea. But at night such an aura of ruined beauty and the beauty of ruins pervades certain parts of the city that one feels oneself back in the Rome of Claude and the old landscapes his contemporaries and successors painted, a Rome of ethereal beauty in which ancient, mediaeval and baroque forms meet in a strange exotic flowering of styles. The Americanised city, the city of big hotels and suave boulevards and the shuddering gleam of machines, is a long way of. Though it is an illusion, suddenly in place of the harsh grind of reality you have the melancholy brooding poetry of pediment, column and arch, broken shapes against the sky, majestic stutterings to the gods.

Such stutterings recall the ancient virtues, the *gravitas* and *civitas* that went into the making of the greatness of Rome. Though the jungle riot of the modern city quickens and proliferates, it sometimes seems a mere elaboration of these older roots—that deeper sense of the permanence of Rome which satisfies 'the sombre pleasures of the melancholy heart'. The city is beleaguered almost, its facilities and amenities strained to the limit. But much, miraculously, of the eloquence and dignity, the old patrician splendour, remains, however crippled and contaminated. And this is not a question simply of the aura of the facade, or the hauteur of the past that

clings to stones, but of the sense of the continuity of human contacts and encounters, mingling in a complex multiple of happenings to give an intangible resonance to the actualities of architecture. The pleasure and the satisfaction of the beauty of Rome is, in other words, a question of associations stirred and quickened by experience.

In one mood, of course, one wonders how much longer Rome can go on multiplying its chaotic brawl of mechanisms without making the city an impossible place to live in; for day by day the situation worsens. But what other city, in the end, can offer quite such an aura of myth and of history? It has an animated laden present all its own, rich with innuendo—making its own image of a modern world out of the proximity of its many pasts. It is a presence rife with history, a playground for speculation, an insistent potentiality; and has now become, as Edmund Spenser wrote, 'the people's fable, and the spoil of all.'

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[Christopher Hampton's published work includes two collections of poems, two children's books, a study of the Etruscans, a book on Rome, and a critical study of contemporary society, *Awareness and Apathy*. He spent four years in Italy, living mostly in Rome, as teacher and writer. As poet, he took part in last year's Warsaw Poetry Autumn. He teaches English at the PCL in London.]

# ITALY AFTER THE ELECTIONS

## by Paolo Filo della Torre

AGAINST all the apocalyptic predictions of the Jeremiahs, the Italian General Election of June 20 did very little to change the dolce vita of the bourgeoisie. The old faces are still in command with the Christian Democrats still calling the tune. The push to the left has not been as strong as was anticipated simply because the Communist success was met by a surprising Christian Democratic recovery, which particularly impressed foreign observers.

Nevertheless the Communist's electoral performance was impressive. In 1946 they obtained just 19% of the poll. The figure rose to 22.6% in 1953 and 1958, to 25.3% in 1963 and then to 27% in 1968 and 27.2% in 1972. But in the latest elections it rose to 34.5%. The growth must be considered particularly remarkable when the lack of progress made by the other left wing parties is taken into consideration. It means that more and more voters are prepared to accept the Communists as a respectable political force.

The Italian Communist Party's success is basically due to the willingness of its leaders to move towards consensus. Indeed, many people now have considerable difficulty in understanding the differences between the Italian Communists and the Social Democrats.

In an interview in the monthly magazine *Euromoney*, Luciano Barca, the Party's economic expert, said the value of the lira must be kept up, debts must be repaid, commitments to the IMF must be met, the balance of payments must be brought back into the black, public expenditure should be cut and incentives be given to productive companies. The interview was illustrated in the daily newspaper *Repubblica* by a cartoon which depicted an umbrella (instead of a hammer) and a sickle, covered by a bowler hat.

The interview confirmed the moderate line taken by the party against nationalisation, in favour of the Common Market and NATO, ready to compromise with the Christian Democrats and prepared to accept profit-making policies and the capitalist world.

Italian Communists are quick to stress that their aim is not to gain complete power nor to govern alone. They say their aim is to share office with the Christian Democrats or to join a coalition with all the democratic parties, which would mean leaving the right wing party, Movimento Sociale Italiano, and possibly the left wing Unita Proletaria and the Radicals in opposition.

This policy of acceptance of the present bourgeois realities is in direct contradiction with the Leninist principles of proletariat-dictatorship and with the destruction of parties representing the capitalistic society. In other words the Italian Communists are now prepared to work within a political system where both the Church and big business play a major role.

Therefore the Italian Communists are not prepared to force change, let alone govern the country, by means of the strength of the left wing forces or through a French-style Popular Front. To many observers the Italian Communist Party appears to be becoming more moderate every day.

This lack of extremism is not new. Antonio Gramsci, the great founder philosopher of the *partito del proletariato* tried for a long time to work with the more moderate political forces. Gramsci himself is known to have been a great admirer of Niccolo' Macchiavelli while Palmiro Togliatti, the statesman who led the Party through the most dramatic years of its history and made it by far the second largest party in Italy, was an even more committed follower of the Renaissance philosopher.

In *The Prince,* Machiavelli argued that the end justified the means. Perhaps, remembering this, Palmiro Togliatti has always been prepared to adopt moderate policies in order to gain support and respectability.

Fanatical anti-communist propaganda by the Fascists and the Christian Democrats brought little reaction from Party leaders. They have consistently demonstrated their pragmatism. They were prepared to look for possible areas of agreement with Mussolini in 1938. They were ready to accept the authority of the King and cooperate with his government until the referendum of 1946. They felt able to work with all the forces, including those of the right, in the Resistance and in the immediately successive years. After the war they came to agreement with the Christian Democrats on the new constitution, which kept all the special privileges which Mussolini had given the Church, through the Concordat with Pope Pius XI. The real-politik of Togliatti was based on the priority of avoiding any confrontation with the Establishment of Italy. Even when an attempt was made on his own life, Togliatti insisted that his supporters should not react. When in 1947 the Christian Democrat Prime Minister, Alcide de Gasperi, decided, after his trip to America, to get rid of the Communists and the Socialists from the Government, the Party still showed no reaction. The Communists left like any other democratic force, showing that it was not part of their strategy to gain power at any cost.

Under the leadership of Enrico Berlinguer, the Italian Communists moved even further out of line with accepted Communist practice. In internal political affairs and in economic policies it would be easy to imagine that the Party leaders had not even heard the name Karl Marx. But in foreign policy matters, their acceptance of NATO and the Common Market and their pledge to make such institutions work, represents an even more important turning point. In doing so the Italian Communists are distancing themselves from Moscow and they seem more and more keen to establish the point. Berlinguer has now officially told the Kremlin that his interpretation of socialism may differ from the official line. This policy has acquired more credibility since other Communist parties and particularly those in Spain, France and Britain have proclaimed their independence from Moscow.

In the circumstances it is becoming extremely difficult to see clear differences between the Italian Socialists and the Italian Communists. At times

the Communists appear to be more to the right than the Socialists. This may not be surprising but it is certainly frustrating for the Socialists. If the electors cannot see the differences between the two sets of policies they are likely to choose in ever greater numbers the PCI, since the Italian Communists have the advantage of a really superior organisation, a formidable party machine and a good and prestigious leadership. In contrast, the Socialists have been through a difficult time. The appear divided, with a lack of organisation and since Pietro Nenni has become too old to lead the party they also appear to have no effective leader.

The Italian Socialists won well over 20% of the votes in 1946. Since then they have shown a constant decline so that they gained only 9.7% of the poll in the June elections.

They must have been particularly disappointed in their performance. Only a few months before they gained 12% of the poll in the regional elections and during the 70s they have been particularly influential in modernising and improving Italian society.

The Socialist decline is even more considerable when it is remembered that the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Republicans have nearly disappeared and the extreme right is now reduced to a 6% share of the electorate.

Italy is still a long way from having a two party system, but at the same time the Socialists need to make a great effort if they want to survive as a major political party and if they want to avoid the prospect of a Christian Democrat-Communist alliance dominating the country.

Known as 'compromesso storico' (historic compromise) the agreement between the two parties appears to work. In the elections they fought a bitter campaign against each other. The Communists attacked the corruption of Italy's largest party, while the Christian Democrats took the opportunity to mount one of their traditional anti-red crusades. But as in Dickens' *A Tale Of Two Cities* they understood that it is possible to say one thing and mean another.

Nearly immediately after the election compromises were started. Jobs were shared out on the parliamentary committees. As soon as Giuli Andreotti, a man who belongs to the right of the Christian Democrats, formed his one party government, the Communists did not show any embarrassment in giving it their unofficial support through abstention.

The 'historic compromise' seems really to operate in favour of the Christian Democrats and there are now prospects that they will remain in charge for a long time to come.

The Communists recognise their strength. Their performance in the elections was striking. Not only did the Christian Democrats recover all the ground they lost in previous regional elections but they have recovered their unity as well. Only weeks before the elections the party appeared discredited and abandoned. But faced with the possibility of the Communists emerging as a major political force, the Church, industry and big business rallied round the Christian Democrats, who emerged with nearly 39% of the votes. If an early General Election is called, this share of the votes

may even grow. This may be the reason why the Communists prefer to get on good terms with their 'adversaries', instead of forcing a confrontation from which they may come out the losers, particularly now that their moderate electors demand that they behave in a bourgeois manner.

George Orwell wrote 'one of the analogies between Communism and Roman Catholicism is that only the educated are completely orthodox.' But PCI's leader, Sig. Berlinguer, and Christian Democrat leader, Sig. Zaccagnini, are both good scholars and in politics far from orthodox.

The alliance between the Catholics and the Communists would be blessed neither by Marx nor for that matter by the Popes of his time.

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[Paolo Filo della Torre is London correspondent of *La Repubblica.*]

The November issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *America in a Hostile World* by Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Religion and Instinct* by Katharine M. Wilson, *Goa—a 450-Year Episode* by Lord Horder and *D. H. Lawrence in Italy* by F. L. Owen.

# ITALIAN COMPROMISES—HISTORICAL AND NECESSARY

## by David Hine

ITALIAN voters went to the polls this June to elect a new Parliament—their seventh since the Republic was founded in 1948. The vote was held amid unprecedented international attention, and Italians were not short of advice from a number of interested Western governments, anxious about the widely-expected advance of the Communist Party. The result, however, has proved inconclusive. Italy did not wake up on June 22nd with a Communist-led government, nor has the Communist Party (PCI) even become the largest party. That honour still goes to the Christian Democrat Party (DC) which topped the poll—as it has done in every postwar election—with just over 38% of the vote, again the PCI's 34%. One of the party's leaders, Giulio Andreotti, has just returned to the Premiership to head yet another Christian Democrat administration—the thirty-ninth in an unbroken string running right back to the end of the war. Nevertheless, beneath this apparent continuity, the whole shape of Italian politics has begun to change quite radically, and both the result of this June's election, and the circumstances surrounding the formation of Signor Andreotti's government, confirm developments which have taken place over the last two years.

By the standards of glacial immobility normally set by the Italian electorate, the increase in the PCI's vote (up from 27% to 34% since the 1972 election) itself represents something of a landslide. One elector in three now votes Communist. And although the curious feature of this election was that the advances of the Communist opposition were made not so much at the expense of the Christian Democrats as, ultimately, at the expense of the several minor parties—Social Democrats, Liberals and Neo-Fascists in particular—the plain fact is that no government can now be formed without the at least tacit support of the PCI.

From the party line-up in the new parliament, shown in the accompanying table, it can be seen that neither of the two main parties enjoys a majority; what is more significant, however, is that neither party has any real prospect of putting together a lasting government without the consent of the other. The Communists could not form a left-wing government with the Socialists (PSI) even if they wanted to: the two parties together are still some 30 seats short of a majority. The Christian Democrats, however, are little better off. They can no longer rely on the support of the smaller parties, and to rely on the benevolent neutrality, let alone open support, of the politically untouchable Neo-Fascists would be quite out of the question. Hence, if Italy is to get any workable government out of her new parliament, the two giants of the political system, the Christian Democrats and the Communists, appear to be condemned to some sort of collaboration, despite all their differences.

The Italian General Election of 1976. Results for the Lower House.

| | Percentage vote | Seats* |
|---|---|---|
| Christian Democrats | 38.7 | 263 (266) |
| Communists | 34.4 | 227 (179) |
| Socialists | 9.6 | 57 (61) |
| Neo-Fascists | 6.1 | 35 (56) |
| Social Democrats | 3.4 | 15 (29) |
| Republicans | 3.1 | 14 (15) |
| Liberals | 1.3 | 5 (20) |
| Extreme Left | 1.5 | 6 (—) |
| Radicals | 1.1 | 4 (—) |
| Others | 0.6 | 4 (4) |
| | | 630 |

* Figures in brackets represent seats held after the 1972 election.

Why has this apparent stalemate arisen, and what are the likely consequences of such a situation? To answer these questions we need to understand something of the background to the present situation. During the Sixties, Italy was ruled by what was known as the Centre-Left coalition: an alliance between the DC and the Socialists, with additional support from two very small parties, the Social Democrats and Republicans. Originally, the Centre-Left was hailed as a reforming government which would modernise those archaic social structures—education, the social services, housing, the public administration—which had not developed to keep pace with the so-called Italian 'miracle': the enormous, but unplanned, economic growth of the later Fifties and Sixties. Such hopes were soon dashed, however. Opposition from the conservative sectors of the DC prevented most of the reforms from even reaching the statute book, and by the end of the Sixties such failures were beginning to constitute a serious check to economic growth.

In addition, the unions, under pressure from shop-floor workers increasingly restive about government failures to improve housing, health services and transport, began to adopt a far more militant attitude towards wage negotiations. In this they were helped by a long-term tightening of the labour market—particularly in the advanced industrial sector; gone were the days, in the Fifties, when low unit labour costs, founded on a huge reserve of labour from the under-developed South, yielded enormous profits to industry and high rates of self-financed capital investment. Increasing union militancy came to a head in the so-called Hot Autumn of industrial conflict in 1969, when a wages explosion occurred, accompanied by acute social unrest.

The end of the Sixties therefore constitutes an important turning point for Italy. Economic management became more difficult; the economy was henceforth far more inflation-prone than it had been, and developed just

those problems which had bedevilled economic policy-makers in Britain for the previous decade—namely, a tendency, whenever output was allowed to expand, to generate production bottlenecks and wage-led inflation, sucking in imports and provoking balance-of-payments and currency crises. The Hot Autumn was followed by a three-year recession from which the economy only recovered in 1972/73, to face an immediate surge in domestic spending, and severe balance-of-payments difficulties, together with an inflation rate which, fanned by spiralling energy costs, rose to over 25% in 1974. A further extremely tight credit squeeze had to be imposed at that point, and although there was for a time a positive response, the signs are that as these restrictions are being removed the economy is again running into serious inflationary problems.

In political terms the end of the Sixties was just as significant a turning point. The Socialist Party became extremely disillusioned with its alliance with the Christian Democrats, and relations between the two parties, which had been fairly good in the mid-Sixties, when there was relative political stability, grew increasingly tense. The responses of the two parties towards the changed economic environment differed markedly. The Socialists accepted that the Communists were by now irredeemably established as the major left-wing party, and that it was no good to fight them. Instead, they sought to restore their own tarnished image by placing themselves at the head of union demands for reform, and by gradually re-integrating the Communist Party into the political system. The PSI proposed that the old Centre-Left formula, which was 'closed' to any sort of relationship with the PCI, should be abandoned, so that where necessary Communist votes could be used in parliament to overcome the opposition to social reform from the right wing of the DC.

But while the PSI sought to mend its bridges with the Communist Party, and was basically sympathetic to the demands thrown up by the Hot Autumn, the Christian Democrats shifted to the right. They were firmly opposed to any suggestion of an alliance with the Communist Party, and while they paid lip service to the need for economic and social reform, they did little about it, realising that it would jeopardise the support of their more conservative followers, who would be hardest hit by reform. The public utterances of their more conservatively-inclined leaders—Amintore Fanfani especially—have thus in recent years taken on increasingly virulent tones of anti-Communism. The result has been, predictably, that since the end of the Sixties the ruling coalition has become ever more unstable, and none of the 12 governments to have been formed since 1968 has lasted much over a year.

In some ways it could be argued that the Christian Democratic policy has been successful. Six years after Communist participation in government was first seriously mooted there are still no Communist ministers at national government level. Moreover, despite the serious rebuff which the DC suffered at the 1975 regional elections, when its vote dropped to 35%, the party managed in this June's election to recover all the ground lost, largely by persuading those who might otherwise vote for one of the smaller parties

—Liberals, Neo-Fascists or even Social Democrats—that the DC was the only credible bulwark against Communism. Given the setbacks of the last couple of years—the recession, unpopular economic measures, a seemingly endless series of political scandals, and a mounting barrage of criticism against government inefficiency and corruption—this was no mean achievement, especially for a party which had already been in power for over thirty years.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the influence of the PCI *has* steadily grown during the Seventies. The Socialist idea of associating the party with the ruling coalition by the use of its parliamentary votes in certain legislative areas helped the PCI considerably. It has always feared political isolation above all else, and the Socialists' cautious rapprochement with the party gave it a new respectability. It has also lent credibility to the PCI's loudly proclaimed 'Italian road to Socialism.' The PCI's leaders have always maintained that with Italy so firmly rooted—both militarily and economically—in the Western camp, no revolutionary strategy is possible. Instead, their policy has been to adopt a parliamentary road to power, which implies the establishment of social alliances with sectors of the middle-class, and political alliances with Italy's other 'popular' parties, the Socialists and Christian Democrats. It also necessitates creating the image of a democratic, reformist and eminently respectable party, neither conspiratorial nor blindly tied to Moscow. Thus in recent years the party has been increasingly critical of the Soviet Union, and has publicly affirmed its acceptance of Italy's continuing presence in both the EEC and NATO.

The Communists have already effectively won the battle for acceptance by the Socialists; the latter, while still expressing some reservations about the democratic credentials of the party, affirmed at their Congress in March that their long-term aim was an 'alternative' to the Christian Democrats: a left-wing government of Communists and Socialists. But the Communists themselves are not content with this, and are aiming to win acceptance from the Christian Democrats too, and to form a 'Grand Coalition' of Communists, Socialists and Catholics—the so-called 'historic compromise' of their secretary, Enrico Berlinguer. This approach is both easier and harder than a left-wing alternative: easier because it could yet take the two left-wing parties many years to obtain a workable parliamentary majority on their own, but harder because of the obvious fundamental differences between an essentially conservative party like the DC and a working-class party with a 'revolutionary' past, like the PCI. But the Communists argue that it is necessary in order to prevent a crisis of economic confidence, a right-wing backlash and possibly a coup d'état, when they join the government. In other words, the Communist-Christian Democrat coalition will reassure opinion, both internationally and domestically, in a way that a left-wing 'alternative' could not.

The PCI's critics argue that such a coalition would not solve Italy's problems nor achieve much-needed reforms. They believe that having accepted the Communists into government the Christian Democrats would be keener than ever to defend the vested interests which they represent. It

is also suggested that such a wide and all-embracing coalition would effectively stifle opposition, and that the Socialist Party, which might be expected to be the party most ardent in its defence of civil liberties and freedom of information, would be squashed between the two giants.

Whatever the truth in this matter, it is undeniable that as a result of last year's regional elections and this June's general election the Communist Party has come very close to achieving its aims, despite the declared opposition of the Christian Democrats to the historic compromise and PCI participation in government. The economic power which the PCI has always wielded through control of the largest sector of the trade union movement, is undiminished. Given the precarious state of the Italian economy in the Seventies, moderation on the part of the unions has been essential to the success of stabilisation policies of successive governments, and the Communist Party has, over the last two or three years, been working hard to deliver union restraint. Not only does it give the party an image of responsibility, but it has also given it considerable influence over government policies; however vigorously Christian Democrat governments may affirm their opposition to the PCI's solicitations, they have been unable to ignore the basic fact that union co-operation is essential to keep the Italian economy afloat.

This economic power has now been augmented by the Communists' enhanced power. Last year's regional elections gave them control of five regional governments—including Liguria and Piedmont—and they also control local government in the majority of the larger Italian cities. That unexpectedly large surge forward has now been consolidated at parliamentary level, so that, as we have seen, it is almost impossible to envisage a government surviving against the outright opposition of the Communist Party.

The formation of Signor Andreotti's new minority DC administration is an implicit recognition of this fact. It was preceded by six weeks of circumspect party manoeuvres during which it became clear that the Socialists would not provide any parliamentary support for a new Christian Democrat government unless the Communists did so as well. The DC, however, having fought the election on an essentially anti-Communist platform, could hardly turn round immediately afterwards, invite the PCI to form a coalition, and give it its due of ministerial posts; nor could it even be seen publicly to have made an agreement with the PCI which would ensure the latter's parliamentary support. Nevertheless, a number of steps have been taken which, while stopping short of a formal and public agreement between the two parties, do give the Communists the recognition they are seeking, and, to most politically astute Italians, amount to much the same *as* a formal agreement.

In the first place, a Communist—Pietro Ingrao—now holds the important post of speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of parliament, and the PCI also has seven chairmen of the important legislative committees in parliament—highly influential posts because of the amount of legislation in the Italian parliament dealt with entirely in committees. The attainment

of these positions was the result of direct agreement with the Christian Democrats, and represented the first fruits of the party's electoral success. Following this came the party negotiations to form a new government. Signor Andreotti, unable to obtain sufficient pledges of support from the other parties to ensure him of a majority *before* presenting his government for a vote of confidence, had to go before Parliament in the knowledge that unless the Communists abstained in the vote in both houses, he would be defeated at the outset. His public face was saved by not having to seek this abstention formally, and by avoiding the embarrassment of an unsolicited promise of it from the PCI prior to the vote; but it is clear that in the negotiations between Berlinguer and Andreotti such an agreement *was* reached, and it is equally clear that whatever Andreotti may claim, his government *does* depend on Communist benevolence.

Although this solution falls short of actual participation in government, the PCI leaders are no doubt temporarily quite satisfied. They are aware of the difficulty any Christian Democrat leader would face in bringing the PCI into government so soon after the election. They cannot form a government themselves, and they do not want to be seen to be preventing anyone else from forming one. To do so might rebound against them if a second general election were held as a result; the DC would fight an even more anti-Communist campaign, in which it could rightly claim with greater reason still, that the real choice was between itself and the PCI. Such a campaign would be fraught with dangers for the Communists, for the bitterness engendered would jeopardise their coalition hopes with the DC, and could force them to rethink their whole strategy. Besides, in the present economic environment they are probably better off in nominal opposition, where they can criticise the government, and yet exercise substantial influence over government policies because of the strategic power of their parliamentary position.

However, the solution which has been reached can only be a temporary one. The Communists will not want to prop up a Christian Democrat government indefinitely—especially if it proves incapable of improving on its past performances. A whole series of measures is essential if the Italian economy is to recover the vitality of earlier years: a rationalisation of the public administration; an end to the enormous misallocation of resources created through government patronage and politically-inspired subsidisation of parasitic industries and social groups; reorganisation of the public sector of the economy; reform of the banking system; a channelling of investment funds to the productive manufacturing sector; and so on. But many of these measures would damage both the Christian Democrat Party's power structure and the interests it represents; the DC has declared its good intentions before without acting on them.

It is clear, therefore, that whether the PCI provides indirect support for the Christian Democrat government, or actually joins it, a long hard battle is about to begin over government policies. And if agreement cannot be maintained, the only solution would be fresh elections. It is unlikely, but just conceivable, that from such elections a left-wing majority might emerge.

If it did, a whole series of fundamental problems which hang over the Communist Party might be answered. How genuine is the Party's self-professed commitment to parliamentary democracy and the mixed economy? What are the economic capacities of its ministers, particularly in controlling rank-and-file trade unionists over an extended period of time? What would international reaction be to a Communist government in NATO and the EEC; and could such a government sustain international economic confidence?

But it is far more probable that fresh elections would change nothing and leave the two major parties condemned to co-operate. It is this awareness that the present stalemate is probably unresolvable by elections that prevents Italian parliamentary life from collapsing entirely even though it is dominated by two such ostensibly contradictory parties. The 1976 elections mark a change which has been discernible for at least the last two years: the end of absolute dominance of political life by the Christian Democrats. But they do not constitute a transfer of power to the Italian left either. Instead, they appear to initiate a transitional phase in which neither major party dominates. The outcome of the ensuing battle for party advantage is unlikely to be clear for many months; the spectacle is certain to be unedifying; and whether Italian politicians possess the political maturity to operate such a system to the advantage of country as well as party is, on past performance, open to doubt.

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[David Hine is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne.]

# A URUGUAYAN APPRAISAL

## by Chris Lines

JUAN Marie Bordaberry lost his job as president of Uruguay last month (June). For most Europeans, the fact is of little consequence. South American presidents are renowned for their ability to come and go at random. But behind the Bordaberry removal lies the military force that may make or break the Uruguayan way of life.

The circumstances leading to his retirement are fairly straightforward. Elected by popular vote in 1971, Bordaberry was due to complete his term later this year and give way to his successor in 1977. This he was unwilling to do and wrote a memorandum to the military forces enlarging his belief that Uruguay without the benefit of a democratic system, was in a better position to overcome the economic ailments that have beset it since the war. He volunteered himself to be the figurehead of such a system, advising the military that he was available to remain president for an undefined period. (This memorandum was first published in Argentinian, then Uruguayan newspapers.) The military obviously found the proposal unacceptable and simply speeded the completion of his term.

Bordaberry was 'retired' on a pension of $1,200 per month, a massive sum by Uruguayan standards. The ageing 85-year-old career politician, Alberto Demichelli, who must now be far beyond the age of personal ambition, was the man who replaced him.

Uruguay has the reputation of being the most socially advanced of the South American states. People on the streets in a misguided, nationalistic fervour, still refer to it as the Switzerland of America and talk of the welfare state and the old age pension. In theory all these exist, but it is a poor facsimile of the welfare state that existed in the mind of Jose Battle y Ordonez when he created far-reaching reforms in the early 20th century. He was an uncompromising man who ran a newspaper and believed in the rights of individuals. On being elected president he nationalised utilities and public services, to the chagrin of some foreign enterprises. He firmly believed that if anything belonged to the people it was these. He instituted the concept of free education, free medical treatment and old age pensions.

All such benefits require finance and since the war there has been increasingly little available. It is difficult to say whether any of Uruguay's modern rulers have salted great sums of money away in Swiss banks; nothing on the scale of the Perons of Argentina has ever been uncovered. But steadily, in the post-war years, capital has been disappearing from the country. Exporters have arranged that buyers pay into foreign banks and the country lived above its exporting capability. Reserves built up during the war when South American food products were at a premium dwindled until currently there is practically nothing left. It is estimated that the Uruguayan government is presently spending about 70% of its income on military projects. Little is left for civil needs and the welfare state which was once Uruguay's pride is in a very sorry condition. Medical treatment is free, though drugs are expensive; schools are free, though uniforms and

books are not. School teachers' salaries in the public schools are abysmally low ($50 per month in Montevideo). The standard of teaching is in jeopardy and many fee-paying private schools exist. The old age pension for a single person is $20 per month. It would be difficult to rent a flat in the city for less than $30 per month.

About half the Uruguayan population lives in Montevideo and the surrounding district. The city represents a great lure for the country people living in small towns in the interior where work is in short supply and life is routine by nature. Television, the one luxury that exists everywhere, broadcasts North American programmes with Mexican dubbing through four channels to a population of less than 3 million. The indoctrination of an archetypal city life is fairly effective and for many the dream of living in Montevideo is the ultimate ambition. Deserted villages and lone empty houses are evidence of those who have made the move. Smallholdings inherited from the days of partitioning are sold to the major landowners and the country people move to the towns. The north of Montevideo is a great perimeter of slums and shanties. In spite of being cheap by European standards, the city is expensive for those who come from the interior and little work is available. For the boys and some of the girls, if they are lucky, there is work in the factories and shops. A cashier working 12 hours a day, seven days a week, picks up US$120 per month, many make much less. A maid living-in might make $60. For the girls who cannot or choose not to work in a factory, the alternative is whoring. Inevitably the rewards depend on the effort, but for many it appears infinitely preferable to the drudgery of factory life.

By comparison a working Gaucho in the country, with food, board and fodder for his horse will earn between US$30-50 per month.

Contraceptives are freely available but children, especially boys, are an asset and large families abound. For the gaucho who sells all and travels to the city, the ultimate reality can be very hard. Without work or money, the city has nothing for him, yet unless he has a family in the country, it is difficult to return there. If he does, he returns to a life worse than the one he left. Many girls find city life preferable to the dawn to dusk work of the country and refuse to return there. The interior is slowly losing its population and the girls are going first.

On the political front, the ordinary man has little in his favour. Traditionally, Uruguayan politics have been divided into two parties. The Red, representing the commerce and industry of Montevideo, and the White, representing the landowners and the interior, traditional products such as wool and beef. Both sides represent capital and there has never been a party which truly looked after the bulk of the population. The Uruguayan is conservative by nature and tends to vote on a geographical basis.

It was against a background of the general degeneration of the country and the increasing poverty of the people, that the Tupermaros appeared. Their ranks consisted of various factions of the centre, left and far left; during the period 1969-73 they carried out acts of terrorism aimed at altering the established norms of government. The acts were selective. They blew

up a casino as a protest at the misuse of money. They took over the whole town of Pando in a show of force. They robbed banks to finance their operations. And once captured, they arranged a mass escape of 100 members from a prison via a tunnel. But their actions were carried out against a democratically elected government and most have seemed highly unconstitutional to the greater part of the population.

The 1971 election fielded three parties. The traditional Reds and Whites and for the first time the *Frente Amplio,* who canvassed a wide range of policies including the promotion of Uruguayan ownership of the means of production and an increase in multi-lateral trade, including communist countries. It also decried the foreign influences at work in the country (especially the USA). Within the *Frente Amplio* ranks were many of the Tupermaros and the party took 21% of the vote. Depending on the standpoint, this was taken to be a victory or an abject defeat. Either way it was not enough to influence the outcome of the election and Bordaberry, under the Red party ticket, became president. (He later exiled Ferreira Aldunate, the White Party candidate, who had closely followed him in the voting.)

The military in Uruguay, until recently, had never been a respected profession. University entrance failures trained as officers and those with no ability to learn a trade became enlisted men. The wave of Tupermaro activity unsettled the establishment and Bordaberry persuaded the parliament to allow the military more power to restore order. In 1973 he closed the parliament, invoking the State of Emergency statute, an action which was barely constitutional in view of the actual situation. The army moved behind Bordaberry and issued a communiqué denouncing the rotten elements in Uruguayan society and undertaking to help Bordaberry remove them. The communiqué was either exceptionally well worded or totally misunderstood as even the official Communist party lent support to it. They were banned some time later.

Uruguay is still poor. But the term is relative. There is an abundance of food in the country and even by local standards it is cheap. Prime steak currently sells for 40p per kilo. The poverty will never reach the monstrous proportions of famine that could once be neen in India and are still evident in the Sahel. It is a poverty of degeneration, where the machinations of life become an all-embracing routine. Uruguay looks old and tired. More than half the cars in Montevideo must date from before the war. The buses (all of which are British Leyland) span forty years, although the older ones are being slowly replaced. The gas company operates with British machinery dating from before the First War and the gas goes 'off' between 11 p.m. and 5 a.m. Apart from the main street in the city centre, street lighting is almost non-existent and many of the roads are slowly disintegrating.

The people look weary. Emigration, which in 1973 reached an all-time high of 500 per day, has reduced, but more because fewer countries offer a welcome than because less people wish to leave. Australia and Canada have shut their doors, as have Brazil and Argentina. Bolivia, Paraguay and Chile can only offer worse conditions than already exist in Uruguay. There is an all-embracing despair in the city, a feeling that everything is running down-

hill and will eventually lose impetus and stop. I could find few people with anything good to say about the country and there is a widespread fear of becoming subordinate to the United States economic machine. Inflation last year reached epidemic proportions, due mainly to the rise in oil prices. In the year ending January 1976 it was averaging over 120%, but by May dropped to 46%. Needless to say, wages dropped far behind in the race.

Against such a background, the military government face a hard job restoring prosperity to the country, if indeed that is their aim. Too many dictatorships exist and have existed on the continent with the sole aim of lining the pockets of the rulers, for anyone to regard the Uruguayan leaders without a degree of cynicism. They are paranoid about their position. They fear communism, but so do the ordinary people. It is an undefined term for subversion. They purge the population in ill-planned swoops, concentrating on Central Europeans who settled in Uruguay before the war. The motivation behind selecting these people is difficult to grasp except that they represent something tangible that originated where communism now exists. The last swoop, in January, resulted in three hundred arrests, of which fifty are still behind bars. Bodies turn up in the River Plate, maimed and tortured, but so disfigured that no one knows if they originated in Uruguay or Argentina, let alone their identification. Torture is spoken of quietly. Everyone knows someone who knows someone . . . who was tortured, but the victims stay out of sight. There is little doubt that there is substance to the rumours.

If one can believe that the military have Uruguay's, rather than their own best interests at heart, then perhaps there is hope. For the first time Uruguay possesses an economic policy. Whether workable or not remains to be seen, it is the product of Senor Garzon Vegh, currently Uruguay's Finance Minister. He is basing Uruguay's revival on an export boom coupled with an increase in the production of 'non-traditional' goods. Since the days of the nomadic gaucho, before partitioning in 1830, Uruguay has had only two major products: beef and wool. The world recession has squeezed both, and recent Common Market policy eliminated Europe from her list of beef customers—a heavy blow considering that previously she had been a major buyer. In spite of Brazil taking some of the excess production, most of the beef remained on the home market at a low price: a rare sight, when only three years ago beef was available only two weeks in every four in an attempt to supply the export demand. In 1975 wool for the first time overtook beef as the major export commodity but again, Europe is the prime market and fears of a similar Common Market edict are being sounded.

Vegh is concentrating initially on animal skins and arable produce. The former have been in the past a sideline to the major product, beef and the latter almost non-existent. Only 20% of Uruguay's land is arable, the rest pasture. Last year she became a rice exporter and this year wheat is expected to follow suit. Methods of cattle production have never been intensive. A typical small *estancia* (farm) may be 2,000 hectares in size and carry 1,500 cows and 1,000 sheep. Only two gauchos would be needed to cover the stock. In almost every case the cows breed indiscriminately and the steers

are only rounded up when it is time to sell.

Intensifying beef production is a long-term aim, but it is against a falling world market and rapidly increasing costs. Five years ago a steer was sold for U$880, today the price is still the same. In the intervening period, fuel costs have risen 12 times, fertiliser 17 times, fencing wire 7½ times, overall food prices by 80% and wages by 80%. If profits were good before, they must be very minimal now.

Import terms remain high on luxury goods and all imported goods carry a high premium, However, one can obtain almost anything in Montevideo, provided one can pay for it. Inevitably, something goes sour in the midst of such a bureaucracy. Tractors, fundamental to the agricultural programme, carry a huge import premium and very few enter the country. The military have complete control of the import premiums and refuse to relax them on this item.

Probably Uruguay does have the capability to restore some of its prosperity. Imports last year totalled US$400 million and exports $340 million. This year the gap is expected to close. But whether the people of the country will see a great difference in their lives is debatable. Currently, in their terms, they having nothing, neither political freedom nor economic prosperity—the last step to abject poverty would be for the food supply to dry up, but that is unlikely.

They are an educated people (92% literacy). In South America, Uruguay is regarded as the most highly civilised state with the most cultured people. The wealth of the country could be increased and passed on to the people or, as with most dictatorships, it could remain in the hands of a few. The next few years will show.

The *Palacio Legitaslivo* (Parliament Building) now houses an exhibition dedicated to the history of Uruguay and its heroes. Significantly the period covered is from Artigas and the River Plate Federation to the expulsion of the Portuguese and the founding of the constitution in 1830. That constitution, now indefinitely suspended, lies between blue leather covers, on a floodlit throne in a glass case on an altar in the parliament. The exhibition is highly patriotic, emotionally charged music and readings from San Martin issue from hidden speakers. The listener is exhorted to fight for his country and remember the deeds of his forefathers. By military decree each class in each school and the University must visit the exhibition.

Whether that constitution is ever returned to the people to whom it belongs depends on the ethics and morality of the military who now rule by decree. But just as that is a certainty, so it is also a fact that there is no single power in Uruguay, other than the military, capable of making the required changes.

# ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENGLISH VALUES

## by Martin J. Weiner

IN the economic and social crisis of the past few years in Britain, arguments over wage-settlements, trade balances and nationalisation seem to regenerate themselves endlessly to little purpose. Perhaps some guidance through this verbal and statistical maze may be found in less precise but more fundamental questions of national values. If we look, with this purpose in mind, at the history of English opinion in the twentieth century, we may notice a shift from the ideal of growth and change to that of stability. As J. B. Priestley observed in his best-selling book of two years back, *The English*, 'the real English cannot feel at home in the contemporary world' which 'demands bigness [and] . . . severe efficiency . . . alien to Englishness.' 'The future of the English,' he urged, hangs upon resisting 'change for change's sake.'

A surprising message, perhaps, from a professed socialist; not so surprising, however, in the light of history. For Priestley's is by no means the first warning against change, or attempt to fashion a national self-image based upon opposition to technical progress and economic growth. Throughout this century an anti-growth cultural tradition has flourished in Britain. Repeatedly, especially at moments of economic crisis, voices have emerged singing reassuring praises of England the traditional, the tranquil, the rural, the insular. The 'workshop' identity of the Victorian age was again and again repudiated, and an older England and its imagined qualities were harked back to. Economic growth and all that it involved (these numerous voices insisted), went against the true English grain. This is a pattern of thought familiar in undeveloped countries first confronted by the impact of the West, but the more striking for occurring in a developed country, indeed the very initiator of worldwide economic growth.

It might be illuminating to begin with two early voices from this chorus —those of Austin and Morris. Not the duo first called to mind—the leading motor-car manufacturers, Herbert Austin and William Richard Morris—but as different a pair as could be imagined: late-Victorians Alfred Austin, the Poet Laureate, and William Morris, poet, artist and socialist. Like the two industrialists, the literary Austin and Morris were competitors—arch-Tory and fervent revolutionary—yet converged more than one might at first think. They occupy a place in the history of British anti-industrialism not altogether dissimilar from the place in the history of British industrialism held by their namesakes. They articulated, for their different cultural constituencies, right and left, an anti-growth vision of England, to be echoed through the twentieth century by 'practical' as well as literary men.

Austin's writings overflow with polemical enthusiasm for the Empire and the traditional institutions of monarchy, aristocracy and Church—but you will search in vain for praise of British industry, technology or cities, the real bases of late Victorian national power. Instead, for Austin, it all rested on a determinedly idyllic picture of a still-rural England, an England

> Of happy homes and Empire vast,
> Hamlets meek and many a proud desmesne,
> Blue spires of cottage smoke 'mong woodlands green,
> And comely altars where no stone is cast.

Through Austin's poetry 'England' is continually invoked, always as a changeless pastoral haven from the turmoil, ugliness and dangers outside; always, that is, defensively and with disdain for, if not fear of, everything most representative of the modern world. These sentiments pulsate through his three best-selling 'garden' books of the eighteen-nineties, which combined rambling reflections on gardens with musings on art and life, and on every page of his 'travel through England' book, entitled *Haunts of Ancient Peace* (1902). His aim in travelling through the country was to find, as he put it,

> *Old* England, or so much of it as is left. . . . I confess I crave for the urbanity of the Past . . . for washing-days, home-made jams, lavender bags, recitation of Gray's *Elegy*, and morning and evening prayers. One is offered, in place of them, ungraceful hurry and worry, perpetual postmen's knocks, an intermittent shower of telegrams. . . .

In his travels the Poet Laureate happily found 'Ancientness . . . in abundance', and concluded with the reassurance to his readers that old England still lived. The nation as a whole was yet a 'haunt of ancient peace.' 'May it ever remain so!' were his final words.

A surprisingly similar note was sounded by William Morris, who fused zeal for social revolution with an ideal of 'rest.' Morris' utopia, *News from Nowhere*, was subtitled 'an epoch of rest', and juxtaposed the 'hurried and discontented humanity' of his day with the relaxed and tranquil inhabitants of his future pastoral world, a world without change. *News from Nowhere* was written as an answer to the American socialist utopia of Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward*. Bellamy's future society was based on an extrapolation of modern trends, technological and urban. Against Bellamy's American vision of socialism as ultramodernity, Morris placed his self-consciously English ideal of socialism as anti-modernity.

Morris was as consciously 'patriotic' as Austin, and saw his work as aimed at bringing his beloved country back to its true nature. 'England' for both immediately called up pictures of rural tranquillity and continuity with the past. Thames Valley scenes—ancient churches and cottages in a setting of placid natural beauty—sent both into poetic and patriotic raptures. Much of Morris's fierce criticism of Victorian England centred on its break with the past, its abandonment of old and cherished national traditions. The Victorians had traded a precious national way of life for the shallow goods of money and power. The neat and pretty little England of small local communities, close to the land, living a tranquil and 'human-scaled' life, had been a precious England indeed, with much promise for the future. Its abandonment had begun with the beginnings of capitalism in the sixteenth century, carried near conclusion by Morris's own century.

Morris and Austin came together in hatred of 'commercialism', under which rubric was included industry, cities, most new building, and the

general 'materialism' of modern economic life. The future without a national revolt against commercialism that Morris conjured up would have brought a shudder indeed to Austin: a 'cockneyised countryside' with 'no rest, no beauty, no leisure anywhere: all England become like the heart of Lancashire is now.'

The work of the revolutionary and the arch-Tory flowed together to support an emerging consensus of distaste for modern economic life and a myth of England as essentially un-modern, with an alien growth of factories and cities foisted upon it.

For one example out of many of this convergence, listen to the socialist artist and illustrator Walter Crane, who considered himself Morris's political disciple. 'We might still be happy', he was lamenting in 1911,

> were it not for the whirlwind of trade and the whirligig of fashion. . . . Happily they leave some quiet corners unswept, as they have always done, or we could never have known what the homes of our ancestors were like. But how many still does England hold of these delightful places full of the pathos of old time, where each dumb thing of wood or iron, or cooper, each fragment of faded tapestry, seems to have the speech of romance.

In short, Austin's 'haunts of ancient peace' all over again!

These mental pictures of England so clearly drawn by literary men were not their sole property, but increasingly pervaded middle class culture, shaping the attitudes of politicians, businessmen and others influencing the economy. They lay behind the almost universally negative reaction in Britain to the 'scientific management' ideas of the American, Frederick W. Taylor, just before World War One. 'Taylorism' seemed to many peculiarly American in its worship of efficiency, and thus un-English. To be 'English' meant to follow 'common sense' rather than making everything into a pseudo-science, to be humane ('men are not machines'), and to keep the ideal of efficiency in its decidedly subordinate place. On this definition of 'English' there was striking agreement, from businessmen to industrial journalists to social critics.

The most important businessman-turned-politician of the century, Stanley Baldwin, set forth an idealised picture of the slow-moving, patriarchal factory he inherited as a standard by which to measure industrial and social questions, at least rhetorically. Baldwin's speeches quite deliberately echoed both Austin and Morris in nostalgia for an imagined 'Old England', idealisation of the countryside, and distaste for modern industry and city life. Baldwin's success was in part due to his giving political expression to an increasingly widespread mood of retreatism: if the 'workshop of the world' had fallen into such difficulties, then perhaps the 'workshop' had been given too much importance. England was not primarily its cities or industry, but something older and more enduring. Ready at hand in this time of troubles was the vision of a non-industrial national essence, which offered comfort and reassurance in the face of apparent national failure, and an alternative to unsettling calls for modernisation. The self-image that emerged from the many writings and broadcast talks in the interwar years devoted to the 'search for England' was of a fortunately insular, tradition-oriented, and

unambitious people. As F. J. H. Darton, author of several popular books on the countryside, argued, the English at heart 'do not want power or gain.'

The economic crisis after 1929 might have had the effect of a cold shower, but it did not. Rather it encouraged this tendency to repudiate the Industrial Revolution. More and more people came to argue that England had taken a wrong turn in the nineteenth century. A number of politicians and advisers saw the depression marking an end to the era of easy economic growth, and viewed the task of the future as that of developing new social forms appropriate to the new relatively static economic era. This was not necessarily regarded as a tragedy; on the contrary, many rather welcomed it. They sought to tranquillise and elevate, not to invigorate, national economic life, and in this context expansionism was at best fanciful, at worst evil. As Roy Glenday, Economic Adviser to the Federation of British Industries, put it:

> We are in a world whose rate of movement is destined to slow down rapidly . . . this, to a people accustomed to flashing along the road of so-called progress at vertiginous speed, will for a time seem like calamity. But it will not be viewed in that light for long. When he has properly realised that speeding is not synonymous with living, man will adapt himself to the new life; the spirit of the countryside cannot be absorbed from the window of an express train, nor the faculty of wonder bring food to the imagination save in quietude.

Lord Eustace Percy, Minister of Education from 1924 to 1929, looked towards, as he put it, 'a return to the standards which have always governed societies before they acquired great wealth through trade.' He, Glenday and others—like many today—expressed nostalgia for the simpler life of 'Old England', a distaste for large-scale industry and great cities, and a desire to put a new moral order in place of the rampant 'materialism' of modern life.

Again, the Second World War offered an opportunity for economic renewal, but it was not taken. The war did give new prestige to industry: the factory assembly lines were clearly the front lines in a war as much of production as of military tactics and strategy. For the first time in a century, a national mystique of industrialism became possible.

Some of this did appear, certainly in comparison with pre-war years. Yet an even stronger response was a strengthened insularity and passive mode of thinking. Here the 1940 experience, which bulks so large in later memories of the war, was crucial: England as a sturdy island, standing alone, ready to repel incursions from without—this was the dominant national image emerging from writing, speeches and broadcast talks. 'Britain can take it'—self-sufficient endurance was enshrined as the chief national quality. Endurance, but not assertion or innovation or imagination; not imposing the national will upon the outside world—nature or other nations—but resisting the imposition of others' wills.

To this hallowing of passivity was frequently added the identification of modernity with the at best unpleasant, at worst horrible, wartime world. Not only was the war often seen as a kind of culmination of modern tendencies, but the enemy—Nazism itself—was sometimes portrayed as a logical end-product of modernity: technology and mass-society run amok. England was frequently seen as just the opposite: 'humanely' old-fashioned

and essentially rural, the world of *Mrs. Miniver* and P. G. Wodehouse. The war thus was conceived of as a struggle between evil efficiency and humane inefficiency, between the stainless steel 'machine civilisation' of Germany and the more ramshackle, but human-shaped traditional society of England.

In this spirit, the popular historian Arthur Bryant, from his weekly column in the *Illustrated London News*, offered the hope in the grim days of spring 1941 that the enemy 'will presently collapse. For a nation that has lived for so long at so violent a pace, lacks the reserve of accumulated energy that can only come from calm and peaceful living.' Thus would frightful dynamism prove its own undoing, and English resistance to change be vindicated. Germany failed to take Bryant's suggestion, yet the outcome of the war could still be—and was—interpreted in this light. In other countries—France as well as the Axis powers—existing values and habits were shattered by defeat. In Britain, victory, be it ever so narrow, preserved obsolescent attitudes along with obsolescent industrial plant. It seemed to confirm the validity of what had come to be seen as the English way of life.

Even some sweeping reforms of the Labour Government of 1945-51 reflected values resistant to economic reinvigoration. One example is the highly restrictive system of land use controls set up in 1947. The ambitious physical objectives of the British planning system, and the new means developed to carry them out—green belts, new towns, development permits —have appeared radical indeed. Yet as the geographer, Peter Hall, has discovered, beneath these lay 'a deeper and more general social objective . . . the control and guidance of change in the interests of social stability and continuity with the past' [*The Containment of Urban England* (1973)].

Continuity above all with the pre-industrial past. It is paradoxical that Britain's greatest contribution to the course of human history—the Industrial Revolution—has received such short shrift from the modern British. That age of economic 'take-off' is still largely seen as the 'Bleak Age' characterised by J. L. and Barbara Hammond many years ago, a time when 'dark Satanic mills', belching fumes and cruelly exploiting the labour of little children, spread like a blight over a bucolic land.

Every medium of communication has abounded over the past several decades in such characterisations, from a BBC television series in 1974 on Japan that focused exclusively on the evils of a society dedicating itself to the 'bitch-goddess' of rapid economic growth, to the surprising jacket summary of a recent book on industrial archeology (Anthony Burton, *Remains of a Revolution* [1975]): industrial machines, now antiquated enough to be interesting, were 'the heartless iron monsters whose speed and efficiency eroded the gentler, more picturesque life of pre-industrial Britain and put in its place a society riven with inequalities and divisions which lie at the back of our political life to this day.'

Certainly this dimming of the appeal of economic growth is not at all limited to Britain. Yet it is appropriate that Britain has produced the leading anti-growth economist, E. J. Mishan, as it produced Roy Glenday in the 1930s. For only in Britain have the new criticisms of growth found such

general acquiescence. An observer from abroad after the dramatic election of February, 1974, could not fail to notice an unmistakable air of relief at the abandonment, at least for the moment, of serious efforts towards growth.

J. B. Priestley in *The English* has thus given lively and elegant voice to a pervasive outlook, which might be summed up as follows: The modern world, resting on the twin pillars of mechanical efficiency and ceaseless change, is inhumane and distasteful to a true Englishman or Englishwoman, and rightly so. Economic growth means yet more of this, a Trojan horse bearing deceptive gifts. To actively pursue economic growth as a goal would be vulgar folly and a betrayal of the national spirit.

From this perspective the fall of Edward Heath, very soon after Priestley's book reached the shops, was quite understandable, for no modern British politician so identified himself with the goal of economic growth and the means of 'severe efficiency'. Heath set himself in opposition to this whole complex of attitudes and in the end, assisted by the politics of the Middle East, it brought him down. As the political scientist Shelley Pinto-Duschinsky suggested by studying the language used by the candidates, Heath presented himself as a demanding father, Wilson as a comforting mother-figure [*New Society*, March 7, 1974]. The British people found the price of growth—in discomfort and social conflict—too high and voted for, in the Labour leader's own words, 'a quiet life.'

Is British economic performance likely to change fundamentally without a change in national values? Such a mental change may occur when enough people can be convinced that the anti-modern world-view that has taken hold during this century has been self-deluding and dangerous. Self-deluding, because, masquerading under the guise of 'experience' and 'common sense', it has been as much an ideology as the most simple-minded enthusiasm for all things new. Resistance to change has become the 'English ideology.' And dangerous, because in a world of continual change, stability cannot be achieved by directly aiming at it, but only as a product of successful adaptation to circumstances. National stability in the modern world can only be the *dynamic* stability of the sailor, who harnesses the wind and currents and knows better than to resist them blindly.

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[Dr. Martin J. Weiner is Lecturer in History at Rice University, Houston, Texas.]

# PARENT POWER

## by Michael Locke

'PARENT power' has become a popular catch-phrase of the newspaper headlines. The growth of protest movements and political lobbies for minority causes has hit the education service, as other public services in Britain. Parents have joined protests about aspects of their children's schooling and have demanded more say in the running of schools. As a phenomenon it is more interesting than any specifically educational development during the past few years: no proposals for teaching or curriculum have created as much fuss or seemed as truly significant as the arguments for changes in the government and administration of schools and for greater public participation.

The protests take many forms. Some of them are frankly sensational—a father goes to gaol for refusing to pay a fine imposed because he would not send his daughter to a particular school, some mothers chain themselves to the railings of the education offices. Such events make good and immediate copy for local and national newspapers, whilst other protagonists argue their causes in pamphlets or closely argued letters to the education authority. Some protests are those of an isolated individual, and some of them campaigns organised by pressure groups. Pressure groups, such as the Confederation for the Advancement of State Education, have grown mostly through campaigns at local level and become a force to be reckoned with in some local authority decision-making.

The debate about the reorganisation of secondary schools into comprehensive schools—with the attendant abolition of the grammar schools—stimulated much of the public discussion and encouraged many of the pressure groups. The original Labour Government circular to local education authorities in 1965 asked that local authorities involve parents in the discussions about reorganising their local schools, and in a few areas it was a pressure group of parents and teachers which really got the debate moving. In some instances they presented schemes for reorganisation as a basis for discussion, whilst others undertook marches and demonstrations or organised petitions. In Surrey the STEP (Stop The Eleven Plus) group, for example, handed out examination questions in advance in order to discredit the 11 plus examination upon which selection for the grammar school was based. It was, however, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, when Conservative Secretary of State for Education from 1970 to 1974, who brought many local groups to life when she made it clear that she was sympathetic to organised support for the retention of grammar schools, and in areas such as Birmingham there were flurries of pro- and anti-comprehensive actions.

Some of the groups which were formed to work for or against comprehensive schools stayed in existence to raise more general points about the operation of the schools in their areas. Other protest actions got underway because of anger about inadequate facilities in a school or a need for new

buildings. The campaign for greater educational provision for the under-fives was a classic of pressure group action during this time, involving parents and teachers, photogenic toddlers, lobbies of the House of Commons and mass petitions, and seemed until the Government expenditure cuts to have been successful.

The protests are no longer seen as isolated or incoherent outbursts. *Where*, the magazine of the Advisory Centre for Education, has collected a register of parent campaigns. Politicians of all parties are expected to nod in the direction of greater public or parental participation in the running of schools. The Conservative spokesman on education, Mr. Norman St. John Stevas, proposed a 'parents' charter' during the course of the campaign for the October 1974 general election and his party's manifesto then pledged recognition of parents' rights.

The complaints of individuals about some action of the education system and the organised protests or proposals of pressure groups are all seen to add up to what is vaguely referred to as 'parent power'. The idea of 'parent power' has a substantial set of central arguments which concern the recognition of the propriety of parents having more say in what happens to their own child and to schools in general, the provision of mechanisms for public participation, the publication of more public information on schools and their special features, the attitude towards the home as a constructive influence upon a child rather than as an interference with his education, and so forth. It looks on the surface, and is usually treated as, a strong and coherent body of opinion. I think, however, there are two important features of this body of opinion, and they do not fit as neatly as is often assumed. One feature is just this weight of argument moving in roughly the same direction, but the other is the division of purposes and theories within this movement. 'Parent power' may represent all things to all men and if one makes institutional arrangements to accommodate it without recognising this then the results may be surprising.

There are good reasons for greater parent involvement which belong to the category of purely educational arguments—if there are such—rather than of political or social arguments, and it is these which are usually brought to the fore. The Plowden Report on *Children and their Primary Schools* (HMSO) published in 1967, pulled together evidence about cultural deprivation, social class and parental interest and correlated them with the child's performance at school. It found that fathers and mothers in higher socio-economic groups were more likely to take part in school activities, to talk to teachers and to have books in the home and that these factors gave their children an educational advantage over lower class and poorer children. This now is the conventional wisdom of the education service and among teachers (and possibly to an extent that is counter-productive as teachers expect poorer children to be educationally disadvantaged before they have actually assessed the particular child and his particular home). Eric Midwinter in his account of the educational priority area project in Liverpool, an outcome of Plowden's recommendations, summarised the argument in his book *Priority Education* (Penguin 1972):

> Many teachers seem to me now to be convinced of the vital necessity for strong and supportive home relationships. . . . The justification is initially educational. The aim is to augment the educational understanding of the parents and the social understanding of the teacher, so that a closer partnership for the education of the children might be realised.

There are other issues, and high among these is the parents' feeling of being shut out of schools and the education service, of being regarded as an irrelevance to their children's education. This may be expressed as a demand for more information about schools and, superficially, this could be met by local authorities quite easily by the usual techniques of public relations—information booklets, helpful answering of telephone inquiries, spreading news of plans through the local press and so on. Some local education authorities now publish information about curricula and other activities in their schools. The problem, however, remains that, whilst sometimes information of itself may be all that is required to set someone's mind at rest, it may often be useless unless it is possible to act upon that information. It is no use having notes about different schools if you are not allowed to choose between them. It is no use reading figures of inadequate expenditure if there are no channels through which you can communicate with or influence those who have made the decisions to this effect. Likewise if a local authority gives notice of its intention to gather opinions from parents and public it does have to be seen to be taking those opinions into account when it makes its final decision.

It is, however, the issue of choice of school which arouses most venom. There is a limited and much qualified provision for parental choice in the Education Act 1944 but local authorities are sometimes unable or unwilling to allocate a child to the school of its parents' choice. The wrong allocation can arouse strong feelings against local authority bureaucracy, and local authority officers may respond by regarding the parent as a trouble-maker. The DES has circulated proposals to revise the appeals procedures.

These different arguments within the umbrella of 'parent power' have prompted some general changes. Headteachers and education officers have been encouraged to be generally more considerate to parents and to keep them informed. Headteachers and their staff may make themselves more open to visits from parents. Parent-teacher associations have been established in many schools. Constitutional changes have been made to the managing and governing bodies of schools in some authorities to include representatives of parents in order to ensure a formal means whereby parents may have influence and be informed, whereby their rights might be protected or the school opened up to the community, according to local and personal persuasion.

Even in such a superficial discussion of the arguments as this it must appear that, whilst they may often amount to much the same thing practically, the force and motivation of the arguments varies. There is an important difference to approaching the issues from, say, the standpoint of 'grassroots democracy' or from the standpoint of 'consumerism'. On the one hand one would wish to stress power and participation, community responsibility and political involvement. On the other hand one would wish to stress freedom

of choice, information on schools (as products) and the rights of the individual. The latter may be satisfied with good service, information and a defined procedure for appeals and complaints. The former may regard representation in real decision-making as a necessity. One set of arguments does not need to exclude the other. The Conservative Party would be probably more associated with the 'consumerism' set but it has proposed substantial representation of parents on managing and governing bodies. The Conservative's emphasis on freedom of choice is, however, often interpreted as an argument for retaining the grammar schools, whilst a socialist would hope and expect that greater public participation would be the undoing of the grammar schools.

The extent and manner to which parents are involved has important effects. Out of some of the work in the educational priority areas has come the concept of a community school in which not only would parents be involved in the school but children would be through their studies involved in the community, taking their learning from their environment with the object of improving that environment. How much control of this school would the community have *vis-à-vis* the local education authority? What would be the teacher's professional position? On the other hand, a school might invite parents as a means not of listening to them but of undermining their criticism or might involve them in a parent-teacher association and divert their energies into organising fetes for fund-raising.

One has to recognise also that when people are given the opportunity of making decisions they do not always make the decisions one would have wished. Likewise, pressure groups have acted both to save grammar schools and to spur on comprehensive schemes. The recognition of these facts is liable to make professionals in the education service suspicious of the concept of greater parental participation in schools. It may raise the question of how much benefit the education service will derive from the movement. Is 'parent power' a progressive force educationally?

As a trend, however, it looks unstoppable, no matter how oblivious some of its proponents are to its subtleties. And perhaps what one should really take account of is that the movement as a thing in itself is potentially more radical or more progressive than any of the decisions taken as a result of pressure groups or through bodies incorporating greater public participation. It may be most important that there is 'parent power', that parents—whether as parents or as representatives of the local community—have a determining influence on what happens in schools. Traditionally the education service has thought itself better able to judge what is best for children than either parents or their children could. Perhaps, however, it is more important that people judge for themselves than that the outcome is—as progressives fear—that parents prove greedy and demand only examination successes for their children or that—as conservatives fear—community schools produce social critics and revolutionaries. It is this power of judgment and decision which could have the most radical, and surely educational, effect on society and its administration.

Even if that is radical, however, one has at once to introduce a limitation

upon it. In making arrangements for greater parental participation, it would not be expedient or fair to deny the teachers (whether as 'professionals' or as 'workers') their influence upon the school's administration, nor to deny society its larger concerns, nor pupils theirs. At the most, therefore, one should talk about the establishment of greater influence rather than thorough-going 'parent power'.

This political fact added to the variance of opinions within the protest movement seems to me therefore to argue for a recognition that opinions are different rather than the conventional assumption by which the education service operates that there is agreement about what is best for a child. In constructing its governmental and administrative institutions the education service should be seeking to accommodate not a—bogus—likemindedness but conflict. It should not look for the voice of education but for different opinions about it, not, for example, in forming a board of governors for the voice of the parents but for their several voices. Perhaps one can establish institutions such as managing and governing bodies, school councils, consultative assemblies, education committees and public meetings with the aim of resolving conflicts rather than leaving them to be displayed on placards or ignored in official memoranda—though, of course, protest actions in some form will always be necessary.

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[Michael Locke is a journalist who writes mostly about education. He is author of *Power and Politics in the School System* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974) and this article is in part adapted from sections of that book.]

# POEM

## A LESSON

When the boy entered the room again,
The size of the piano overwhelmed him
And the chair seemed an impossible throne
From which he must rule dissenting time.

And when he sat down to play intensely,
The simplest piece fractured beneath his hands
While the clacking metronome persistently
Rang out the intervals of urgent demands.

He thought time conspired with his tutor,
But he could not comprehend the part she played
Or see how time had so much altered her
From the portrait of her earlier head—

And when she turned away to mark his music,
He sighed and looked to the window to see
His bicycle gleaming in the early dusk
Against the rain-wet trunk of the apple tree.

FREDA DOWNIE

# AN ADDRESS TO THE SCOTTISH LIBERAL PARTY CONFERENCE AT PERTH

(*Saturday, June* 19, 1976)

**by Russell Johnston, M.P.**

WE are moving towards the end of the most lively, vigorous and dedicated Conference of the Scottish Liberal Party that I can remember. What we have done during this week laughs to scorn the narrowly based opinion polls, deprecatory political commentators, the sceptics, the critics, the pessimists. Liberalism in Scotland is clearly on the advance. The constructive atmosphere which has characterised our debates is matched by a mood of commitment, an ingredient essential if we are to move forward. For while it is true that Liberalism is a philosophy of reason, Liberals throughout history have not, nor can we now, rely on reason alone. If we are to make our contribution to the finding of solutions to the divisions of interest and blood and prejudice which sunder humanity, there must be more. There must be an emotional devotion. There must be passion. There must be idealism. There must be the will to climb the Matterhorn of human cupidity, up its impossible face and the belief that this can be done.

Let me take a moment to look again at the fundamentals of Liberalism.

No definition of Liberalism can ever be wholly acceptable to another Liberal.

Liberals are individuals and individuals disagree as inevitably as the sun rises each day—only much more frequently!

It is the way of solving problems and the attitudes we believe make their resolution possible, rather than the specific means which bind us together. The Liberal Party Conference will, at one and the same time, commend the intention of a Resolution and demand endless votes about its particular application.

It is the way of solving problems and the attitudes one brings to the conference table which binds us together rather than the specific solutions worked out, as for instance in Northern Ireland.

Because Liberalism is an attitude, while recognising interests it refuses to base its approach upon them (as do the Labour and Conservative Parties). It is a never-to-be-completed effort to build a community, not of communally imposed standards (Socialism) or endlessly in-built conflicts between the haves and the have-nots (Conservatism)—I accept that this is a very broad generalisation, but one has to make such generalisations—but a lively, individualistic community of free persons, pushing for achievement, but conscious of the responsibility their talents lay upon them and ever anxious to reconcile.

Reconciliation on the basis of radical reform. This, for me, is what Liberalism is about.

I became a Liberal at university because I agreed with the writings of a

Yorkshire Liberal, Elliot Dodds who, in trying the impossible, to sum up Liberalism, settled upon three words: Liberty, Welfare and Responsibility. I have never been able to do better.

The wish for the maximum freedom of persons to have their say which leads one to talk of proportional representation, of federalism (giving positive release to communal energies), of industrial democracy (closing the medieval gap between management and worker by creating a common commitment through co-ownership and profit-sharing to progress), to the right of each of us to live the kind of lives we want to live so long as they do not impose things on others, whatever our race or colour or sex.

This is the heart of Liberalism. Because it is about the individual, it makes the assumption that if we concentrate on him/her, justice for the group of which he/she is a part will follow logically, while the converse is untrue. In this it is fundamentally set apart from political philosophies like Communism, Socialism and Nationalism, which start from this converse, seek to better the group and believe that this will lead, in time, to the improvement of the individual's lot. Conservatism is not a philosophy but a resistance to change, valuable in clarifying arguments about the way we are to go, but valueless in providing signposts. As I have said before, Conservatism is a consensus of prejudices moderated by remorse.

Liberalism then is an attitude, which may, pragmatically, support different administrative or social legislative solutions but always in relation to the doctrinal concept (and we should not be afraid of recognising that it is a doctrine) that the roles society fashions for itself should be based on precepts which are (in the translation of the Latin for 'liberal'), 'free and generous'.

We are therefore not talking simply about power: we are talking about changing a whole set of human relationships, perhaps indeed the whole basis upon which human relationships are presently founded.

It is not enough to be the government: one must change the governed.

The rise of the Scottish Nationalist Party over the past five years has, without doubt, been the most significant change in Scottish politics. The apparently unbreakable grip of the Labour and Conservative Parties has been broken. But is it a real change? There has been a realignment of loyalties; a redirection of ambitions. There is a new focus for the needs and greeds and hungers and demands of men and women in Scotland. But is the climate of debate more enlightened? Is the nature and style of the political dialogue enhanced?

The SNP agent in my constituency—and one must have a certain sympathy with him: he does, after all, have a most unenviable job! —made a contribution to the great political debate the other day, which I think sums up what I am talking about. 'We are suffering', he said, 'under a Labour government who are using the infants, the infirm and the deprived as political footballs in a Treasury exercise to pep up the flagging English economy'.

It has been insufficiently remarked upon that the rise of the SNP has not exactly coincided with an exaltation of the quality of political debate.

In fact it is profoundly depressing that a new movement which has achieved so much, so quickly, in terms of political impact should not only use the old divisive grossly exaggerated rhetoric of political confrontation but do so with such evident relish.

Those who see the SNP as a vehicle for genuine change in our society should think very hard about this.

Firstly, real, lasting change does not happen quickly. It is a foolish self-delusion to believe that it does: it is a cruel deception to seek support by suggesting it.

Secondly, a change which simply replaces one power grouping by another is no change at all. It is simply history repeating itself.

It is not enough to champion the under-privileged against the privileged—and remember that most of those able enough and articulate enough to do so are themselves already privileged. It is not enough to champion the downtrodden blacks against the oppressive whites. Or even the under-developed half-starving masses of the world against the technologically advanced, plump, comfortable 20%.

Far less the Scots with their undeniably worse housing (worst housing, if you like), higher unemployment, lower incomes and narrower opportunities against the UK as a whole.

Liberalism, whatever its definition—and I have given you mine—cannot be about the replacement of one injustice by another. It only has meaning, emotional and philosophical validity if, having given every man and woman and child the equal value as human personalities to which they are entitled, it directs their energies to finding ways whereby their unequal situations are resolved fairly and compassionately and they are led to will it.

You may say this is evangelical. You may say this has no contact or relation to the realities of now and the specific things we face—the shame and the misery of deprivation and poverty; the agony of unemployment, itself in our pretty civilised land, incomparably to be preferred to the utter despair of millions rotting in disease and despair in Asia and Africa . . . like little birds in a nest whose mother is killed, waiting hour after hour opening their mouths trustingly for the food that never comes. Biafra and Vietnam and Ethiopia were pictures on a screen for us, but this was real.

What has this to do with, you may say, how we are to vote on the Devolution Bill or whether we should have backed Maggie Thatcher in her Vote of Censure or what we think of rural transport or urban transport or rates or nursery education?

I remember a couple of years back after speaking to you, I was told that the press reaction was that it was marvellous stuff but unreportable. Nothing hard, they said.

Must a politician be defined as the man most able to cram the maximum of platitudes into the minimum of words?

Not a Liberal politician!

Because what I have been doing is talking about the roots of change, the basic drives which flow beneath the superficial policies. They may be unreportable, but, by heaven, they are decisive—and unless one bends one's

will and intellect to their resolution, no number of smooth, pat, logical, administrative answers will have a blind bit of effect.

Changing the shape of the bottle doesn't change the taste of the whisky.

Producing fair laws in Northern Ireland doesn't change the fear and aggressions of Protestant or Catholic or hold back their murderous minority. Any more than impeccable constitutions in Russia or Czechoslovakia protect human rights or making General Amin the Chairman of the O.A.U. makes him a nice man.

Of course, Liberals must be indefatigable in the pursuit of systems which reduce conflict, of laws which protect the weak, of methods which marry initiative and caring, of schemes which promote co-operation as they satisfy nationalism.

But the moment that we forget our way along the great compassionate road to reconciliation and slip down the side tracks of pragmatism, of short term solutions, of bartering support for bolstered privilege, we sell our soul and become just like the rest.

If we do that, though we win, we lose.

People keep asking me pleasant, practical, direct questions, like how many seats are you going to win at the next General Election? What impact will you make in the Assembly Elections? How strong is your local government effort?

I think that at all these levels progress will be made but to a convinced, doctrinal, ideological Liberal, such progress is only meaningful in relation to the fundamental precepts I have laid out and if the media cannot project these precepts or provide discussion about them, perhaps they should re-examine the extent to which the agendas they set out for the radio or TV programme or piece in the papers do not exclude thought about the things which are at the heart of it all.

Perhaps that sounds arrogant. And I am very conscious that very often Liberals in promoting a doctrine of kindness really do sound insufferable.

All too many Liberal speeches, while apparently based on a condemnation of confrontation politics, end up by being even more abrasively abusive of the fact that the Conservatives abused the Labour Party, who abused the Nationalists than any of them contrived to be about each other.

If we, who rest our case on the expansion of the freedom of the human personality, cannot raise the standard of politics above the empty Party-bashing so readily accepted as the only means of attracting public support we commit the faults we condemn and separate ourselves from the goals we avowedly pursue.

It must be made possible for politics to be made a matter of debate about issues, not about the sanctity or idiocy of manifestos or the *amour propre* of Parties or the impossible infallibility of politicians.

Let me take four issues which I think are central and within which the Liberal solution is critical to progress.

Firstly, there is the way we elect the people entrusted to run the country and how they do their business.

Proportional representation basically has nothing to do with getting

Liberals more seats. That it would is obvious and, if all that I have said before has any validity, must be based not on our own advancement but upon the advancement of the whole body politic.

We have a government elected by 28% of the electorate, 39% of those who voted. In Scotland, the governing Party, the Labour Party, for 36% of the votes got 57% of the seats.

(1) according to any definition of democracy, this is wrong.

(2) democracy is an argument that the fair representation of the divisions of opinion in society in an Assembly or Parliament will enable these divisions to have a far better chance to be resolved in a reasonable and stable way than by the imposed solution which is the Fascist and Communist answer.

The short, clear and direct point to make to those Parties who reject this view—which means the Labour Party—for all their endless talk of social justice—which means the Conservative Party—for all their repeated affirmations that they are the Party of freedom—which means the SNP—who support the alternative vote, demonstrably disproportional in operation in Australia—is that they are actively prepared to perpetrate unfairness and the divisions this produces. The lesson to be repeated endlessly to the public, who do not realise what is happening, is that the Liberal answer is the safeguard for their interests, the best protection of the fair projection of their views. Whatever these views may be.

A Parliament elected in such a way one would hope—perhaps even expect—because the system would enforce co-operation, perhaps even coalition—would not operate on the basis of a clear minority seeking to impose its view upon the whole nation. And would not transfix M.P.s to an endlessly repetitive Pavlovian series of votes. It really is quite extraordinary that in what claims to be a sophisticated democracy, the old, the lame, the halt and the dying should be dragged out to make a mark on a predictable result. Perhaps it is necessary to have certain grand votes about major matters of principle, but it is certainly not necessary to vote endlessly for the sake of it. Even if you are a fit chap, there are much more significant things to do, whether in one's constituency or tapping the exciting minds of our society or cajoling the established interests whose trust must be won if change is to come without convulsion or revolt . . . or even attending a Liberal Conference!

Secondly, there is federalism, which you have just been debating against the background of the splendid work done by Jenny Chapman and the Federal Unit. What is totally clear is that the choice for Scotland is between separating herself from the United Kingdom and working out a federal relationship. Nothing in between makes sense.

In the last century, Lord Acton said 'A great democracy must either sacrifice self-government to unity or preserve it by federalism' and, again, 'a state which is incompetent to satisfy the different races within it, condemns itself.' That basic argument for Home Rule remains the position of the Liberal Party.

For us this whole argument is not new but the inevitable working out of

primal needs we ever recognised.

Another layer of administration, as proposed in the White Paper, without the saving grace of a reformed electoral system, solves nothing and will only add friction to frustration.

The Conservative idea, weak as it is, is still fiercely condemned by active and forceful elements within their Party. For people like Teddy Taylor and Iain Sproat, the transference of the Scottish Grand Committee to Edinburgh, which some would not regard as exactly a galvanic event, would so excite our fellow countrymen that they would rush like lemmings along the road to separation, desperate to reach the fabled slippery slope so that they would have the pleasure of sliding down it. If, by this argument, they suggest that a wholly inadequate response to a wide general feeling might lead people to extremes, they might be right!

Scottish self-government on this basis will neither be right nor have any chance of changing the nature of the Scottish scene unless founded upon the principles of a Parliament with clearly defined sovereign powers of its own, elected by proportional representation.

Thirdly, I turn to the economic area so central to the well-being of us all and at this time so severely and unpredictably under threat. Again looking at things in terms of the principles I have set out, our objectives at least are straightforward.

To encourage the initiative which is born of responsibility; To protect the weak and actively to work for the redistribution of wealth; Neither of which objectives can be easily realised if conditions are unstable.

Our record on economic policy stands comparison with any. And from the days of Keynes to the inflation tax we have never feared to risk the rewards of a radical approach.

We were the first to realise the potential of Europe.

We were the first to commit ourselves to a prices and incomes policy and the only Party to consistently maintain that position, despite the short term pressures of public opinion.

We were the first to realise the potential of the Scottish oil and gas fields. And if our policies had been carried out, then we would not today be seeing the drying up of investment in the North Sea with its effects on the fabrication yards, such as that at Methil.

Our policy of equity involvement in foreign companies rightly attracted to secure employment would have saved enormous sums of taxpayers' money and made wider social provisions possible.

The proposals made at our last year's Conference whereby the debts of the Electricity and Gas Boards would be written off as a first direct charge on the income from the North Sea remains the only and certainly most dramatically simple method of bringing direct benefit from this exciting discovery to every family in Scotland through lower gas and electricity bills.

During the last Conservative Government I remember going in company with Bob Robertson, our Industrial Adviser, to whose far-sightedness and originality I pay warm tribute, to see William Whitelaw, the then Secretary of State for Employment, and put it to him that if he could not offer the

miners a further rise of the proportion they sought, a wage increase relieved of tax could have met their demands without the inflationary impact he feared. Of course, this would have represented an exception to orthodoxy, but it would have averted the miners' strike and the three-day week and now, today, we see the Labour Government keying its whole economic policy to the fact that if wage restraint is accepted, tax concessions will be given—another of our original ideas used out of context.

Let me suggest another. If company profits were split three ways, one third to the Government, which means reducing Corporation Tax, one third to the employees, which is the dynamic form of profit-sharing, and one third to the investors, and the employees' and the investors' share freed from tax, this could have a dramatic effect on both the generation and redistribution of wealth. And if it is argued that this is weighted too much in favour of the investor, let it be remembered that the significant investors now are not rich individuals, but the pension funds, the unit trusts and the insurance companies.

Our present plight demands boldness not timidity. A radical re-appraisal of the traditional methods which we can see to have failed, linked to an imaginative and caring social policy could transform our situation.

Fourthly, whatever our own problems, no Liberal should ever or can ever afford to relax his efforts to make the developed world with, whatever its problems, a standard of living unbelievably superior to more than half the world, to face its responsibility to the less developed.

Future and more enlightened generations will be appalled at the enormity of our disregard for the poverty and misery of millions of our fellow citizens. If their fury and frustration bursts into war, doubtless armed with weapons with which we have provided them at a profit, it will only be our just desert.

For Liberalism is a concept which knows no boundaries and whose responsibilities have no limitation.

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[Russell Johnston, leader of the Scottish Liberal Party, is Liberal Member of Parliament for Inverness and a member of the European Parliament.]

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

### by Rosalind Wade

*The Takeover*. Muriel Spark. Macmillan. £3.95. *Shine On, Bright and Dangerous Object*. Laurie Colwin. Chatto & Windus. £3.50. *Waiting for Sheila*. John Braine. Eyre Methuen. £3.25. *An Indiscretion in the Life of an Heiress*. Thomas Hardy. Hutchinson. £2.95. *Women of the Shadows*. Ann Cornelisen. Macmillan. £4.95. *My Fantoms*. Théophile Gautier (translated by Richard Holmes). Quartet Books Ltd. £4.50. *The Hospital Ship*. Martin Bax. Jonathan Cape. £3.95.

It is unfortunate that a successful, even a brilliant novel can be marred by an inconclusive ending. This is not to suggest that there is anything radically wrong with the finale, but simply that it fails to satisfy the reader as being an acceptable outcome to all that has gone before. Two examples in the present season's publications are *The Takeover* by Muriel Spark and *Shine On, Bright and Dangerous Object* by Laurie Colwin. Both are extremely capable, so that to qualify approval may well seem captious. But the fact remains that in each case there is a sense of disappointment over the final pages.

Muriel Spark has chosen for her theme the kaleidoscope of life in present-day Italy. Anyone even glancingly familiar with the paradox of lawlessness and idealism which dominates the contemporary Italian scene will applaud the fidelity with which this curious situation is conveyed. The beautiful lake of Nemi is a fitting setting for handsome, middle-aged Maggie with her three houses and as many love affairs. She has a flair for acquiring and restoring property, if not for handling the business side of her ventures, in a community where vendor and purchaser walk on legal quicksands. Regrettably, one of the occupiers, Hubert Mallindaine, contrives not only to assume rights of possession but to swindle Maggie of some of her art treasures.

The decision to oust Mallindaine and punish him for his perfidy forms the dominant theme of the novel; yet he proves to be as difficult to manipulate as a poisonous snake. Eccentric, unscrupulous, although curiously vulnerable, he is never incredible and even in his much publicised cult of the goddess Diana stays well away from the borderline of fantasy. With his fragmented loyalties and homosexual and heterosexual relationships, he probably could not have survived so successfully anywhere except in twentieth century Italy.

Maggie, by contrast, is an outsize portrait of a wealthy tyrant cut down to size by financial disaster. Only in her final encounter with Hubert in the twilight near Nemi, dressed in rags as a protection against the risk of being kidnapped for her supposed wealth, is she reduced to the stereotype of a disillusioned harridan, for whom a slick solution must be presented, quite out of key with the complex character so skilfully developed in the opening pages.

Laurie Colwin is one of those naturally gifted novelists who seem not to require apprenticeship in the art of fiction. From the first paragraph of her first novel, *Shine On, Bright and Dangerous Object*, she proves herself as a stylist and narrator. Her background theme is very different from Muriel Spark's

colourful tapestry; the dependence of a young widow, Olly Bax, on the memory of her husband, Sam, recently drowned in a sailing accident. Sam made a religion of taking and surviving risks but in his contest with an Atlantic gale he was outclassed. Widowhood and all that it involves in grief, remorse and final readjustment is the unpromising situation in this curiously titled novel. But gradually a more complicated pattern emerges. Did Olly really love her husband, Sam; or was her passion for him purely transitory? Was he, the child of almost pathologically inhibited parents, capable of genuine involvement with another human being?

Ready to console her is Sam's brother, Patrick, resembling Sam in appearance although with a disposition subtler and more sensitive. They slip easily into an intimate relationship once Olly has established herself in a labour-saving flat and taken up the threads of a musical career. Yet the relationship lacks urgency because there are so few surprises. It is just not good enough for passionate, unfulfilled Olly; and finally, as part of her programme of rehabilitation, she attempts to distance herself from Patrick by attending a music summer school where she meets a fellow musician who, despite his brusque overtures, awakens her senses, perhaps for the first time in her life. She does not yield to him too quickly but when she does admits that she has at last found the ideal partner. Yet neither contemplates the possibility of breaking up his marriage and so, after an inconclusive dialogue at the airport, he flies off to his wife and family and Olly returns—to what? No clear indication emerges as to whether she will make a life with Patrick or carry on alone rather than settle for second-best, and so the reader is left with insufficient guidelines to speculate on what the future holds for Olly. Yet the uncertainty may well have been deliberate. Perhaps, in her haphazard though consistently engaging experiment in emotional reportage, Laurie Colwin never intended a conventional tying up of ends.

There is nothing uncertain about John Braine's new novel, *Waiting for Sheila*. John Braine's talents are rooted in the most explicit approach to the sexual experiences of his characters, about which he contrives to generate a kind of steamy excitement. When we first meet Jim Seathwaite, the affluent manager of a Surrey department store, he is snugly ensconced in his luxury villa awaiting the return of his attractive wife, Sheila. It soon becomes clear that despite his apparent self-sufficiency, Jim's reliance on Sheila borders on the pathological. The scope of the novel is to explain, by means of numerous flashbacks, the origin of his dependence.

Beginning with Jim Seathwaite's boyhood in dreary Droylesdon, he is presented as a bright lad, though blighted early by the half-understood affair between his mother and uncle. With the untimely death of Jim's father, Mrs. Seathwaite is free to indulge her nymphomaniac tendencies, the realisation of which scars Jim to an extent she is incapable of understanding. Mrs. Seathwaite emerges as a woman frightening in her hedonistic sensuality, and it is not surprising that Jim makes a bold attempt to seek release from the buried nightmare through a series of casual entanglements. Unfortunately, periods of sexual incompetence convince him that he is impotent. And so he might have remained, but for the emergence into his life of Sheila, his boss's mistress and secretary. Sheila is a woman capable of powerful tenderness. She also nourishes an iron determination to achieve married status. Rather surprisingly, she cares enough about Jim to coax back confidence in his manhood, so that he becomes the father of two children. Inevitably, he finds himself completely dependent on her willingness to maintain him as a normally functioning male, despite her

determination to bestow her favours as and when she pleases. And so the novel ends as it begins, with Jim waiting uncomplainingly for Sheila to return from one of her nocturnal 'outings.'

This absorbing if frequently squalid sequence of events is brusquely unfolded, sometimes with crudity but always with humour and commonsense. And if in the final pages no solution is offered to Jim's dilemma this is no reproach to the author; rather the reverse, for Jim Seathwaite is seen as a man permanently maimed by his wounding childhood experiences.

That to arouse interest, a novel need not be a work of outstanding merit, is demonstrated by the reissue of *The Indiscretions of an Heiress*, all that remains of Thomas Hardy's first novel, *The Poor Man and the Lady*, written in 1868 and published on both sides of the Atlantic some ten years later. In a stimulating and informative introduction, Terry Coleman gives the background to this literary curiosity. The script was first sent to Alexander Macmillan, whose letter of rejection indicates that he discerned quality in the unknown writer, despite inept construction and unconvincing portraits of upper-class Londoners. Later, George Meredith, on behalf of Chapman and Hall, advised putting the novel aside and attempting another with a more dramatic plot. Eventually, sections of the original *Poor Man and the Lady* found their way into subsequent novels. One of the most valuable aspects of this reissue is the opportunity to note some of Hardy's early observations and convictions: such as the rural class barriers and the inadequacies of a village school financed by the 'big house.' Apparent, also, is his lifelong disregard for medical and scientific accuracy. The young heiress dies mysteriously of 'a ruptured blood-vessel internally,' brought about by the shock of acknowledging her clandestine marriage to an irascible parent. Inevitably, in its truncated form, much of the *Indiscretions in the Life of an Heiress* reads like a scenario yet despite stilted dialogue and a creaking plot the true Hardy is constantly breaking through with memorable descriptions of the Wessex countryside which, at the age of twenty-eight, he had already absorbed in detail.

Hardy was known to regard Dorset in the mid-eighteen hundreds as one of the harshest of peasant environments and it is interesting to speculate on what he might have thought by comparison of conditions in southern Italy today. In *Women of the Shadows* Ann Cornelisen supplies at least part of the answer with her stories of Italian women at work on the land and in their homes, imprisoned within a timeless structure of prejudice and deprivation. The vignettes are based on Ann Cornelison's experience over many years, working for the *Save the Children Fund* in Sicily, during which the reserved yet not always inhibited wives and mothers came to accept and trust her with their confidences. To some extent it is a matriarchal society, due to the high ratio of able-bodied men who migrate to Germany or Northern Italy in search of work. Thus the Sicilian woman's lot resembles that of the wife of a serving sailor—though without the security—separated from her husband for unpredictably long periods, punctuated by brief, tempestuous homecomings during which another child will probably be conceived. Sometimes she may be driven to adopt unsqueamish attitudes and activities to make ends meet. Yet despite gruelling conditions the women—Peppina, Ninetta, Maria, and the rest—emerge as worthwhile people, capable of envisaging a different kind of life for their children, even if there is little chance that this will materialise.

Another collection of short pieces which makes a profound impression is *My Fantoms* by Théophile Gautier, selected and translated by Richard Holmes.

Richard Holmes is a young writer, living in Paris, close to Gautier's former home, who has made a sympathetic study of this strangely unorthodox 19th century French writer, one of the first to become a professional full-time author. Gautier's output in journalism was impressive; but alongside the heavy demands of *La Presse* he wrote novels, plays and a string of short stories or sketches, eight of which appear in chronological form in the present volume. A single theme obsessed Gautier;—emotional and sexual passion for the dead, best illustrated in *The Tourist,* in which three young men visit Pompeii for the first time. One of their number, Octavian, is so impressed by the freakishly preserved outline of a once beautiful Roman woman, Arria Marcella, that he returns to the scene of this discovery by moonlight—there to experience a situation popular with writers down the years—a reliving of actual events enacted by the long-since dead—an experience sufficiently traumatic to leave Octavian permanently 'melancholy', and impervious to the rallying comments of his friends, even to the charms of his young wife. So delicate and allusive is Gautier's style, enlivened with humour and shrewd comment on many facets of life in Paris of the period that the necropolis theme is never oppressive.

And finally, another unusual slant on death and dissolution, in this case contemporary. *The Hospital Ship* is a first novel by Dr. Martin Bax, arising out of his experiences of the Vietnam War. In the spate of war stories and journalistic reports the fact that many civilian casualties are rescued by boat and receive medical attention at sea is often overlooked. The hideous situation of hundreds of refrigerated bodies in the hold, and near-corpses in the wards who cannot possibly survive, is lightened by amusing anecdotes of patients who run true to form, whatever circumstances have landed them in a hospital bed. Told in a somewhat haphazard succession of diary entries, *The Hospital Ship* builds up into one of the most evocative novels of war in the far east.

**Also Received:**

*The Deep.* Peter Benchley. Andre Deutsch. £3.25. It is not an easy matter to follow up a phenomenal success such as Peter Benchley enjoyed with his best-selling novel, *Jaws,* and it cannot honestly be said that *The Deep* is in the same class. This story of a couple of young skin divers on holiday in Bermuda, drawn into an intrigue of drug-peddling and official 'cover-up' certainly sheds new light on recent events in the 'holiday island'; yet lacks essential credibility. Nonetheless, on a long flight or during a bout of insomnia, it will provide compulsive reading.

*Morwenna.* Anne Goring. Macdonald and Janes. £2.95. This unashamedly romantic story gains strength by stopping short of a conventional finale of wedding bells for Morwenna, the waif-heroine who falls in love with the scapegrace son of the lord of the manor, already married to an incurable invalid. Morwenna finds solace in working for the poor in mid-Victorian Manchester and her attempts to alleviate the conditions of life endured by her beneficiaries are particularly well drawn.

*The R Document.* Irving Wallace. Cassell. £3.95. Once the existence of a secret document setting out plans to assassinate the President of the United States might have seemed far-fetched. But now the assumption of an 'R' document does not strike the reader as utterly impossible. Either way, this strongly plotted and compulsively written novel will win adherents, despite a general weakness in characterisation.

# NON-FICTION

## A NEW BIOGRAPHY OF ASQUITH

*Asquith*. Stephen Koss. Allen Lane. £6.95 hardback: also in paperback.

This short biography of Asquith is the latest in a series of books about late nineteenth and twentieth century Britain to be written by Mr. Koss. With each book he writes, his understanding of British history and society grows and this biography of Asquith will prove a valuable part of the British Political Biography series which already includes studies of Gladstone, Salisbury, Keir Hardie, Lord North and Castlereagh. It is doubtful whether Mr. Koss' study will add a great deal to our knowledge of Asquith but it will serve as a good introduction .

Asquith has been well treated by his biographers, all of whom, including Mr. Koss, have treated him kindly. All of his biographers accept, with varying degrees of devotion, the myths which surround Asquith's career. These are three: that Asquith was especially intelligent; that the Balliol of his day was especially brilliant; and that the Liberal governments between 1905 and 1916 were especially gifted. The first myth is symbolised in the Spy cartoon of 14 July 1904 which pictured Asquith in a bright, keen and confident manner. (This is what in Mr. Koss's country would be called a picture of a 'smart lawyer'.) 'Spy' has made Asquith's head disproportionately large and the caption under the cartoon reads simply 'brains'. When one examines Asquith's writings and political career he comes across as an intelligent man but really quite typical of his class, era and profession. (Mr. Koss does attempt to show that Asquith was part of his era by emphasising his 'anti-semitism', a point, it seems, of some importance to the writer.) However one wishes to judge 'intelligence', one must accept that Asquith was excelled, by normal standards, by men like Haldane, Salisbury, Gladstone or Balfour.

Mr. Koss is inclined to swallow whole the myth of the 'brilliant Balliol' of Asquith's day and, like others, cites various men of Asquith's year who later achieved fame. Unfortunately the very *raison d'être* of Oxford is to grant its favoured sons entrance into the larger Establishment; success is no sure guarantee of brilliance. Any college must be judged by its entire performance, not by the minority who achieve brilliant success. Anyone with a more familiar knowledge of Oxford would recognise this. (In passing, Mr. Koss refers to the 'cloisters' of Balliol which, alas, do not exist; such remnants of mediaevalism would not have been welcomed in the reconstructed Balliol of Jowett and Green.)

The final myth is that the Liberal governments between 1905 and 1916 were, if not the most brilliant, then some of the most brilliant of all time. Mr. Koss accepts that Campbell-Bannerman's 1905 cabinet contained 'a team of uncommon—perhaps unsurpassed—distinction'. Maybe it did, but in cabinet government the whole is often not the sum of the parts. The Liberal cabinets between 1905 and 1916 accomplished a great deal, for example Old Age Pensions, National Insurance and Home Rule legislation for Ireland. But they also failed in many things, especially education, where they proved incapable and eventually unwilling to pay off the forces of Nonconformity, and land reform. In their willingness to use money bills as a means of general social reform they brought about a 'confrontation' with the peers which resulted in the 1911 Parliament Act. This, in its turn, only emphasised the growing dictatorship of the Commons within what had been a more or less balanced Constitution. Mr. Koss assumes, with other pro-Liberal historians, that when the Peers

exercised their rights and duties, they were 'interfering' and that when they fought for their very political life they were being foolish, to say the least. Finally it was the combined intelligence of the Liberal cabinets which forced Britain into a diplomatic corner from which the only egress was war, a war which helped to destroy Liberalism and Liberal Europe.

The parallel between Asquith and some later politicians who likewise made capital of their being extremely intelligent is obvious. As in 1905, so in 1964, a new team of brilliant technocrats for the 'new England' was created and in both cases they failed miserably; war in the one case, recession in the other were the main legacy. Perhaps it is in Asquith's normality rather than in his brilliance that his real importance lies. Was he not the beginner of a new breed of politician who by his 'brilliance' would pull the machinery of government apart, only to put it back together again, the better to master it?

One wishes that there were a conclusion but perhaps space did not allow. Whilst for the time being Roy Jenkins' 1964 biography, of the same title, will remain the better study, nevertheless Mr. Koss' work will prove a useful introduction to the subject.

J. E. B. MUNSON

## THE OPERA-LOVER'S ESSENTIAL COMPANION

*Kobbé's Complete Opera Book*. Edited and Revised by The Earl of Harewood. Putnam. £15.00.

Gustave Kobbé was born in New York in 1857 and received a musical education both there and in Germany. For eighteen years he was the music critic of the *New York Herald*, and when he died in 1918—the victim of a tragic accident when a sea-plane landing off Long Island struck his sailing boat—he had almost finished his *Complete Opera Book*. The material was assembled and completed by Katherine Wright and 'Kobbé' was first published in 1922. Having passed through several editions, in 1954 Lord Harewood was first responsible for a major revision which sought to make the work more accurate and to reflect some of the changes which the operatic repertory had undergone since 1918. This edition, further revised and corrected, last appeared in 1969. By then it covered 237 operas and, thanks to Lord Harewood's additions, it already took the opera-lover into the world of Janacek, Bartok, Stravinsky, Benjamin Britten, George Gershwin and Menotti. Nevertheless, since 1954 there has been a very considerable expansion in the operatic repertoire, and in the availability of opera, both in live performance and, particularly, on gramophone records and on the radio. Not only that, but during the past 20 years living composers have continued to write operas of considerable merit—Britten, Tippett, Henze, Penderecki and Ginastera are examples.

Thus the time seemed ripe for a new edition of 'Kobbé', and fortunately, despite his very full life as Managing Director of the English National Opera, Lord Harewood has again been able to supply one. There are now over 400 extra pages with accounts of 91 additional operas given for the first time in the work. So there are well over 300 operas with nearly 100 new musical examples to add to the invaluable ones already to be found in the previous edition. There are also 40 new pages of photographs selected most intelligently by the Editor—the companion pictures of Wagner productions of the 19th century alongside recent ones are particularly useful—and an enlarged index. Unquestionably then this new edition is as comprehensive a one-volume work as the opera lover could hope to find. It will be immensely useful both to an enthusiast coming upon a relatively rare opera for the first time, and, as has always been the case,

to the middle-of-the-road opera lover wishing to 'get up' a familiar work, to be seen that evening, without having to digest an often ill-written programme synopsis in a crowded and noisy foyer.

Lord Harewood's additions are, naturally, selective, and even if to some extent they appear to have been influenced by the English National Opera's current repertoire—the inclusion of Szymanowski's *King Roger* might, for example, produce a raised eyebrow on grounds of infrequency of performance, if not on quality—one would quarrel with the inclusion of few, if any, of the 'new' operas he has chosen to analyse. It might, however, be thought that both Benedict's *Lily of Killarney* and Wallace's *Maritana,* neither professionally performed since the 1930s, could safely have been omitted, even if they were once known, with Balfe's *Bohemian Girl,* as 'The English Ring'. Similarly one slightly wonders whether either Millöcker's *Der Bettelstudent* or Catalani's *La Wally* are of great relevance to the contemporary opera-goer.

Naturally no true 'aficionado' will want to see anything already in 'Kobbé' excluded: one never knows when a University Opera Club performance, or one by the John Lewis Partnership, may not make the presence of an obscure work invaluable. It is simply a question of priorities. For although the Editor has made some essential additions to the pre-20th century repertory—we now have Monteverdi's *Coronation of Poppea* eloquently analysed, four Handel operas (though sadly still no *Ariodante*), a lot more Rossini, Donizetti and Bellini, half-a-dozen early Verdis (though no *Giovanna D'Arca* nor *I Masnadieri*), Offenbach's *La Belle Hélène,* Bizet's *Fair Maid of Perth,* Rimsky-Korsakov's *Show Maiden,* Tchaikovsky's *Iolanta* and Dvorak's *Rusalka* to name but a few —many will be disappointed still to find no operas by Cavalli, or Haydn and none of Mozart's prior to *Idomeneo.* The Mozart seems an especially unfortunate omission when we are finally getting the opportunity, through performances both on stage and records, to discover *Lucio Silla, Il Re Pastore* and *La Finta Giardiniera.* Some too might have found it helpful to have had an analysis of Leoncavallo's *La Bohème,* so successfully performed at the Camden Festival a few years ago, and that another 'Camden', and since recorded, work, Delius' *Koanga,* might have been of more use to the book than the retention of Dame Ethel Smyth's *Boatswain's Mate* as well as *The Wreckers.*

But enough quibbling. One must be grateful for what there is, and particularly grateful for Lord Harewood's masterly treatment of the 20th century operas he has now added. His analyses of Janacek's *Makropulos Case,* Prokofiev's *War and Peace* and Shostakovitch's *Katerina Ismailova* are magnificent. His chapter on the operas of Schoenberg is essential reading, as is that on Hans Werner Henze, and both composers were omitted entirely from the previous edition. So too was Sir Michael Tippett, and one would go far to find more succinct and illuminating analyses of *The Midsummer Marriage, King Priam,* and, above all, of *The Knot Garden* than are here. The same is true of Britten's *Death in Venice*: the introduction to the work is brilliant, the treatment of the second act a masterpiece of informed compression.

Although perforce a large volume, this new edition of 'Kobbé' is a pleasure to read, and above all to dip into. Its index is a great improvement on its predecessor's, and so is the table of contents, which now helpfully enumerates which operas by each composer are analysed. Despite its price—in any case no more than just one best stall for the current Ring Cycle at Covent Garden—it is a book which no lover of opera who pretends to understand, as well as just superficially to 'enjoy', the art should be without. Indeed, without it any real

enjoyment will inevitably be diminished.

DAVID FINGLETON

## LANDSEER, BEARDSLEY AND SICKERT

*Landseer. The Victorian Paragon.* Campbell Lennie. Hamish Hamilton. £6.95.
*Beardsley and His World.* Brigid Brophy. Thames and Hudson. £3.50.
*Walter Sickert.* Denys Sutton. Michael Joseph. £10.50.

When it comes to assessing the individual standing of English painters it is a relatively easy task to pick out the really great ones. Turner, Gainsborough and Constable obviously lead the field, perhaps in that order, then Stubbs and Hogarth and more controversially Richard Wilson. Sir Joshua Reynolds must clearly be found a place, possibly at a slightly lower level than the names already mentioned and as much for what he was as for what he actually accomplished in terms of art. After that there comes a complex choice from a selection of lesser but still impressive masters, specialists like Hilliard, visionaries like Blake and Samuel Palmer, the landscape artists such as Girtin, Bonington, Crome and Cotman, and the portrait painters like Romney and Lawrence. There is the vexed problem of the status of the Pre-Raphaelites. There is the question of Whistler and Sargent. Finally there are the major figures of our own time to be considered, though it would be a bold judge who could lay down an authoritative decision in this regard except perhaps for the overtowering figure of Henry Moore. There are a fair number of artists in the field who stand somewhere on the periphery of genius and by a coincidence biographies of three of them have been published at almost the same time.

Landseer is certainly the least important of these and, unfortunately, Mr. Lennie's is also the least good of the three books. This is a pity as it has its points. Landseer was an immensely fashionable and successful painter in his own time and has suffered since then a good deal of quite unfair denigration. Mr. Lennie has to some extent allowed himself to become mesmerised by the job of writing the life of a great Victorian in need of rehabilitation without really getting down to analysing either his subject's actual works or their claim to a permanent place in the history of English painting. Some pundits indeed would deny that they have any claim at all and even so generally sympathetic an authority as Sir John Rothenstein affirmed, as recently as 1965, 'Landseer's appeal perhaps escapes us now. With the exception of a number of fine sketches, his subjects, sense of design and handling of paint all seem rather facile.'

Mr. Lennie takes us on a glittering tour of Sir Edwin's social life and provides an illuminating study of his relationship with his patrons, in particular the royal family and a touching account of his final collapse into illness and near madness. At the end of it all, however, we are not much the wiser about Landseer the artist. In this respect the illustrations do not help much since these seem frequently inapposite and their quality is frankly awful. We are left, in effect, with a series of truisms like the division of Landseer's achievements into the dog period, the stag period and the lion period. And yet, as one of the characters in Lady Snow's entertaining novel *Cork Street, Next to the Hatter's* puts it: 'If you knew anything about painting, you'd realise that even Landseer had his points. It wasn't all dogs and lions, whatever you may think.'

He was a formidable craftsman, certainly, with a dextrous use of paint and a brilliance of execution that could scarcely be rivalled even in the age of Leighton, Frith and G. F. Watts. He was fundamentally a lazy man who produced an immense amount of work with some reluctance and could both

draw and paint with great dash and expertise. As an animal painter he set out to emulate Stubbs but he frequently fell into the trap of providing his animal subject with human type characteristics or personalities. As Mr. Lennie suggests, some of his pictures of animals like *A Swannery Invaded by Sea Eagle* show a violence and cruelty about them which is almost akin to sadism, whilst at other times these walk a tightrope between sensitivity and bathos. There was much, however, to recommend him. As Sir John Rothenstein suggests, he was an excellent draughtsman, his genre paintings were in a genuine succession to Wilkie and his vision of the Highlands, although landscape as such never seemed to interest him much, has a dignity which is far preferable to the now sought after but sentimental effusions of Leader and the rest of the brown windsor brigade.

Mr. Lennie seeks to account for such contradictions in terms of Landseer's lack of general artistic education, of John Landseer, his father's, over-immediate ambitions for the most obviously gifted of his family because of his own bitterness at his standing as an engraver in the view of the artistic hierarchy and of the penalties of over-immediate social and professional success. Much of what he has to say about this is interesting but he never really seems to look at Landseer's work for long enough to get to the heart of the matter and for someone who has been in his time a journalist, television writer and editor for a publishing house, the book is marred by a surprising archness and some curious infelicities of style. The chapter which deals with the beginning of Landseer's liaison with Georgiana, Duchess of Bedfordshire, wife of the sixth Duke and the painter's long-term inamorata, is, for instance, entitled 'And so to Bedfordshire.' Lady Blessington is described as 'the soiled plaything of the brutal and licentious soldiery' and Landseer himself as 'a kind of unofficial Minister without Portfolio of dogs.' A good deal of fairly ruthless sub-editing might have eradicated this kind of thing and have resulted in a much more enjoyable book which is a pity, too, since Mr. Lennie has it in him to produce a careful and interesting study of life in the Victorian period.

Miss Brigid Brophy's study of Aubrey Beardsley, on the other hand, is a delight all the way through. This is a subject which is tailor-made for Miss Brophy's talents and she sets about it with a distinct and a distinctive relish. The trouble in dealing with Beardsley is that he died at a mere 25 before he had the chance of producing more than a handful of near masterpieces. Tubercular and intuitively sensitive, he seems to have sensed that time was not on his side and he brought his style to fruition extremely early. It is difficult to say what would have happened to this if he had been allowed a longer life. It is easy perhaps to overrate his influence as well as his potential but no less an authority than Sir Herbert Read saw in him one of the originators of the Jugendstil and wrote that one can follow a gradual development from the naturalistic fancies of Beardsley and Walter Crane to the linear abstractions of Van Doesburg and Mondrian. Interestingly Miss Brophy discovers one of the strongest influences on Beardsley himself to have been Brighton, where he spent his childhood and it is ironic here to think of another short-lived but different master of fantasy, Rex Whistler, whose last work *George IV Waking the Nymph Brightehelmstone* is now to be found in the Pavilion. On the plaque at his birthplace at 31 Buckingham Road, he is described as 'Master of Line' and it is undoubtedly the elegance and sureness of his line drawing that account for his confirmed popularity and make him something more than just another *petit maître*. It was this intuitive gift which raised his work in *The Rape of the Lock* and the last *Lysistrata* drawings to a world of

fantasy *sui generis* rather than mere pastiche. The elegance of his line drawing is comparable with a few later artists such as Egon Schiele and George Grosz. Of all the black and white illustrators he knew best how to use black as a colour rather than a background (e.g. the wonderful *Messalina Returning Home* and *The Wagnerites*) though Sickert was later to claim that he persuaded Beardsley to drop the white line on black and added 'his subsequent drawings were, I think, a justification of that advice.' One of the most moving illustrations to Miss Brophy's book, which are numerous and excellent incidentally, is a reproduction of Sickert's portrait of Beardsley emerging as an almost wraith-like figure from Hampstead Parish Church after the unveiling there of a commemorative bust to another great tubercular, Keats.

Sickert himself is the subject of a superb new biography by Mr. Denys Sutton, which is even better to my mind than his earlier books on Rodin and Whistler. Let me start by confessing that I personally regard Sickert as a very considerable painter indeed, much greater for example than the more generally admired and written about Augustus John. Mr. Sutton's summary of him is that though he can hardly be considered a major painter in the world sense, as far as the national school goes he was the ablest and most original artist of his generation. Since this was a list which included, besides John, Steer and Gillman and Gore, this is by no means an unimpressive tribute. Degas was one of his formative influences, but so was Millet and the other great French early nineteenth century masters such as Delacroix, Gericault and Ingres. He was very much what Wolfflin refers to as a *Malerisch* painter and part of the tradition which stretched unbroken from Poussin to the Impressionists. 'To understand modern art at all,' he wrote, 'you must have understood Poussin since it is by way of Poussin, among other channels, that modern art has become what it is. What would you think of an English historian who, writing of the last century, should remark incidentally that he didn't care much about Queen Victoria and had never heard of Bismarck?'

The words are bravura but the theatrical was very much an aspect of Sickert, who had started life as an actor and was the best depicter of the English stage since Zoffany. 'Sickert's paintings and drawings of the music-halls,' writes Mr. Sutton, 'reflect his pleasure in a new world of creation; he was liberated as an artist. In some ways the shot in the arm they provided offers an analogy with that received by Nicolas de Staël when for the first time he saw a Swedish team playing hockey at the Parc aux Princes in Paris: he was inspired by the pattern made by their coloured jerseys to adopt a more figurative manner of painting. In Sickert's case, the music-halls brought him into touch with life in the raw. "Gusto goes a long way", as Max Beerbohm said, and the introduction of gusto into his art was what Sickert needed at this juncture.'

Despite the vicissitudes from which he suffered in the course of a not always very smooth life, Sickert retained this marvellous energy and enthusiasm throughout. Mr. Sutton quotes from an account by a student at one of his lectures, when a very old man, given to the Bath School of Art in 1939: 'He'd been talking about something quite different but out of the tail of his eye he had become increasingly irritated by a colour lithograph hanging on the wall and finally he stopped and glared at it and said: "We don't let off fireworks every day; life is more but more beautiful!" And, again, of the same period in his life: "On one of his last visits to the school, which had changed premises owing to the war, his eye had been caught by the washing hanging outside some flats: "These people are making poetry for us," he said.' As Mr. Sutton rightly points out this sentence sums up much of Sickert's philosophy of art.

Although Renoir was one of the Impressionist masters with whom Sickert appeared to have least contact, there is a touching similarity between the old age of these two remarkable old painters.

Sickert himself, as Mr. Sutton shows, was a lively and provocative writer about painters and painting, if sometimes a fairly contradictory one. Now that Sir Osbert Sitwell's *A Free House* (the writings on the Artist as a Craftsman by Walter Sickert) is difficult to get hold of, one of the pleasures of the present book is that it gives us access to a number of examples of Sickert's comments on art. Even when he was at his most pig-headed he could be wonderfully refreshing, as for example:

> I have always disliked Van Gogh's execution most cordially. But that implies a mere personal preference for which I claim no learning. I execrate his treatment of the instrument I love, those strips of metallic paint that catch the light like so many dyed straws; and when these strips make convolutions that follow the form of ploughed furrows in a field, my teeth are set on edge. But he said what he had to say with fury and sincerity and he was a colourist. Les Alycamps is undeniably a great picture, and the landscape of rain does really rain with furia. Blond dashes of water at an angle of 45 degrees from right to left, and suddenly across those a black squirt. Such intensity is perhaps madness, but the result is interesting and stimulating.

This is splendid stuff, individual and evocative but it is matched by the comments of Mr. Sutton on Sickert's own painting. Take, for example, his account of the pictures of the Camden Town period. These, he writes,

> . . . are unique in English art; they have a character exceedingly different from those of his friends and associates such as Gore, Gilman and Augustus John, whose work had something of the rosy charm of Georgian poetry. Sickert was never a lyrical poet in that sense; he was an epigrammatist. He emerged as the recorder of the local scene in the tradition of Hogarth, not that he drew a moral from his observations. He was a documentary artist selecting an angle of vision that permitted him to depict dull, lower middle-class life, as in Ennui (Tate Gallery) or his paintings of Hubby and Marie. . . . Sickert's paintings of popular life—of the music halls, the back streets of Camden Town, the deserted calli of Venice and dubious Paris interiors—enabled him to express his melancholic yet humorous spirit. He understood how love and illusion can turn to dust and that bitterness may lie beneath a mask of wit. To give of his best, in fact, he needed a challenge, one that he found in presenting as objectively as he could, and with due solicitude for painterly effects, human quirks and weaknesses.

Sickert's painting, as Sir John Rothenstein has claimed, was the opposite of the *plein-air* tradition. It was impossible, Sir John writes, for him to make a complete painting on the spot, out-of-doors since the light changes too quickly. If a painting was to look 'realist' it must be achieved by a process of cumulative observation. Like Degas, he placed a premium on composition. As he himself once more with a typical degree of irony wrote to Middleton Murry, the latter's criticism was good 'because it is literary and doesn't pretend to be anything else. What's the use of you—or any critic—pretending to know about painting? You don't, you can't or you would be painters yourselves and not even a painter can write intelligently about the painting of a picture.' But they can write about what the painting of a picture is itself about, and here is every reason to suppose that Mr. Sutton's book, which is both biography and art criticism of a high order, would have given Sickert, as it will give the reader, great deal of pleasure.

ERNLE MONEY

## TWO PRIME MINISTERS

*Baldwin*. Kenneth Young. *Anthony Eden*. Sidney Aster. *Series on British Prime Ministers*. General Editor A. J. P. Taylor. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £4.25 each.

It is convenient to review these two books together. Eden never forgot (until Suez) Baldwin's dictum that a Conservative prime minister should be left of centre, thus enabling him to influence the floating vote to his left. Eden served under four prime ministers, most notably Stanley Baldwin. They were both Tory democrats and yet how utterly different their careers.

Baldwin was for eight years a back bencher and after only two years as a Cabinet Minister became Prime Minister in May 1923. Three times he was Prime Minister. After a disastrous election in December 1923, Baldwin returned to power in November 1924 and stayed for nearly five years. He later served under Ramsay Macdonald's National Government in 1931 and once again became Prime Minister from 1935-37.

On the other hand Eden, who was my contemporary at Oxford, entered Parliament at the age of 26 in December 1923. After a series of posts always at the Foreign Office, he had to wait twelve years before becoming Foreign Secretary in 1937 and another eighteen years before succeeding Churchill as Prime Minister from April 1955 to December 1956 after Suez. Altogether Eden was over ten years Foreign Secretary.

These two short books, written by competent younger historians, do not set out to provide new research or fresh insights into the characters of their subjects or the events surrounding them. Each book is introduced by A. J. P. Taylor who writes a brilliant page and a half introduction.

Kenneth Young's picture of Baldwin is eminently fair; he is quick to detect the romantic side of his character, publicly displayed in three of the most moving speeches ever made in Parliament. Sidney Aster explains one aspect of Eden's life which has escaped most historians. On the surface Eden had a golden entry into public life, a good war history, a safe seat for life, good looks and open door to affairs of state. In fact he was always industrious and wore himself out with air travels, negotiations, speeches and the rest; moreover, he had his meed of private sorrows. When the 'crown prince' finally became Prime Minister at the age of 57, the gilt had worn away. Unlike Baldwin, who superficially was a lazy man, he did not understand domestic problems and seemed to lack the inner resilient power which was Baldwin's long suit. Both men served their country well; both men in their respective spheres, domestic and foreign policy, were if anything ahead of their times. Each had a special and friendly relationship with Churchill, but that is another story.

KENNETH LINDSAY

## SHORTER REVIEW

**The World of the Forsytes.** Martin Secker and Warburg. £6.50. Mr. John Fisher has written an enjoyable and instructive book about the world and outlook of the English upper-middle class during the period covered by John Galsworthy's Forsyte Saga, from the eve of Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee of 1887 until the death of Soames in 1926. The account of social manners and general outlook and conventional behaviour of this class against the background of these forty years of vast social and political change could quite easily have been told without the backcloth of the fictional Forsyte family. Nonetheless, this method of treatment adds interest and to some people extra impact to the story of class behaviour during these years. A particular feature of the book is the numerous illustrations, including sixteen colour plates, which 'attempt to give a representative view of upper-middle class life in England' during this period.

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# Contemporary Review

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## AMERICA IN A HOSTILE WORLD

### by Zbigniew Brzezinski

TWO hundred years after the birth of the first nation committed explicitly to the principle of independence, the appearance of a world based on self-determination has become somehow troubling and threatening to the very nation that has contributed so directly to the shaping of this new world. Indeed, it poses the spectre of an isolated America in a hostile world.

That world appears hostile not because it so proclaims itself—though parts of it do—but because what is happening in that world seems so at variance with American values and expectations. Global politics are becoming egalitarian rather than libertarian, with demands from more politically activated masses focusing predominantly on material equality rather than on spiritual or legal liberty. Moreover, the global distribution of power is beginning to favour political systems remote philosophically, culturally, ethnically, and racially from American antecedents, while the process of redistribution of that power is threatening new forms of violence. All of that makes for an uncertainty in America about the thrust of global change—and in many parts of the world for the feeling that America is against global change.

The result is a fundamental shift in the way that Americans perceive themselves in relation to the rest of the world, and in the way much of that world perceives America. Traditionally, Americans have seen their society as the wave of the future, and as an embodiment of libertarian values of universal pertinence; much of the world—be it poor immigrants or activist nationalist leaders—saw America much the same way. This libertarian link defined America's place in the world and gavé America a very special standing.

Today, many Americans recoil in horror from a world that appears to them headed in the wrong direction, while many abroad—especially in the new nations—perceive America as indifferent or even hostile to their condition. America's bounty—which in the past was seen almost as history's reward for America's liberty—has become the focal point of envy, thus

breeding in turn anxieties regarding the egalitarian values proclaimed by the newly emancipated nations.

America was born in liberty. That central fact shaped much of America's character and world role during the subsequent 200 years of its history. It also defined the nature of the world reaction to America during much of that time, thus making the spiritual dimension an important aspect of America's world role.

To be sure, the social and even political reality of America was far removed from the libertarian ideal. The America born in liberty was largely a mixture of a slave-owning rural aristocracy and a newly emerged urban commercial class, with voting rights restricted to a minority. The subsequent 200 years of the country's history can be seen in large measure as a struggle to fulfil that libertarian ideal and to give it substance in the context of a changing socio-economic setting. The struggle against slavery, the extension of suffrage, the open doors to immigrating millions, the implementation of social rights, the violence surrounding the emergence of the trade unions, the battles for civil rights for blacks, and lately women's self-assertion went hand in hand also with the appearance of larger and more powerful personal fortunes, the widening public scope of corporate influence, the emergence of large bureaucratic clusters of institutionalised power, and the pervasive cultural influence of a commercialised mass media based on only several, mostly New York City located, national publications and three television networks.

This pattern gave an ambivalent meaning to America's history—and it justifies both the most varnished as well as the most critical interpretations of America's past. Yet that ambivalence—inherent in complex historical processes—does not negate the special historical symbolism and the historical essence of the American message. There are moments in history that capture and symbolise a mood, that express—however imperfectly—a certain pervasive aspiration, that give substance—however inadequately—to a felt hope. The idea of liberty, wedded to the notion of progress, was 'in the air' in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century—and the appearance of America expressed it. Though the parallel may strike some as offensive, the above also explains why Cuba or China are today so attractive to so many. The idea of equality is increasingly the underlying mood and the felt aspiration in an increasingly congested world, and it is more often than not first expressed by intellectuals. Thus—in spite of the regimentation and the pervasive control that dominate both the Cuban and the Chinese societies—to many people both countries have become significant symbols, not unlike the way that America impacted on many sympathetic and fascinated late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europeans.

Indeed, on rereading some of the contemporary accounts of early post-revolutionary America, one is even struck by the extent to which their style and content parallel the accounts rendered not quite 200 years later after visits to China or Cuba. This parallelism highlights the importance of the relationship of political events to a pervasive mood or emerging values:

the event both crystallises the mood and acts as a catalyst for it, making it into a compelling outlook. An existing intellectual receptivity is thus translated into a state of mind by an account of a reality that is said to correspond already to the aspiration, an account made all the stronger by its exotic quality—as was true of a visit to America then, or of a recent visit to China—granting the raconteur the aura of having partaken of something unique and perhaps historically sacred.

There are thus the repeated references to honest and hard-working peoples, guided by a high sense of personal morality and civic dedication. As Brisset de Warville put it in his *New Travels in the United States of America*, 1788, Americans have 'the simple and kindly but dignified look of men who are conscious of their liberty and to whom all other men are merely brothers and equals.' Bostonians particularly are reported to be 'courteous to foreigners and obliging to their friends; they are tender husbands, loving—almost adoring—fathers, and kind masters. . . . A girl believes an oath pronounced by love, and her young man keeps his word or else is forever disgraced. You see girls go off for a drive in the country with their sweethearts in a chaise, and their innocent pleasures are never beclouded with insulting suspicions.'

There are the breathless accounts of personal interviews with the top leader, a man endowed with special graces and unique vision. In an extremely informative diary of his travels over the eastern seaboard of America, Julian Niemcewicz, a Polish nobleman who had accompanied Thaddeus Kosciusko on his second trip to the United States, gives in his *Travels in America 1797-1807*, a detailed rendition of his sojourn with George Washington, and it reads—with no *lèse majesté* intended—not unlike interviews of more recent vintage. Niemcewicz, having first been introduced to the General in early May of 1798 at a social gathering in Georgetown, spent in June of that year 12 days as a guest of the former first president in Mount Vernon and provides a graphic account of the man, of his wife, of his lifestyle, and of his views. He is especially impressed by the political vision of the American leader as well as by his civic spirit. Niemcewicz clearly conveys the feeling that he found himself in the presence of historical greatness, of 'a great man, whose virtues are equal to the merits of his service to his country.'

Most important of all, the early chroniclers convey the sense that the new American reality is the beginning of something very special, of a new age which it both symbolises and is creating. Edmund Burke, despite his scepticism toward democracy, perhaps expressed this sentiment best of all: 'A great Revolution has happened—a Revolution made not by chapping and changing of power in any of the existing States, but by the appearance of a new State of a new Species in a new part of the Globe. It has made as great a change in all the relations and balances of power, as the appearance of a new Planet would in the system of the solar World.'

The point in noting all of the above is not to draw parallels between America or China, nor to doubt the validity of the observations. Rather, it

is to stress the proposition that at given stages of history there are moments that acquire special significance—and that Americans should be both proud of theirs and be wary lest it become a transient phenomenon. As R. R. Palmer observed in his *The Age of Democratic Revolution*, 'the American revolution coincided with the climax of the Age of Enlightenment. It was itself, in some degree, the product of its age.' The American spirit of liberty and the unique and novel American experiment with a constitution infected Europe, and as a result—again in Palmer's words—'the effects of the American revolution, as revolution, were imponderable and very great. It inspired a sense of a new era. It added a new content to the conception of progress. It gave a whole new dimension to ideas of liberty and equality made familiar by the Enlightenment. . . . '

America's appearance was thus an historical watershed. The rhetoric of American independence and the principles of the Bill of Rights expressed most explicitly ideas and notions that were beginning to surface in Europe but were constrained from practical application by the strength of traditional European institutions. It was in the much more fluid and flexible American social context that these notions could become politically dominant, and their surfacing as the official belief of the new state had an immensely captivating effect on progressive Europeans, impatient with their own socio-political structures and desirous of profound change. In the absence of this ideological impact, the very fact of separation from the home kingdom of several remote, partially traditional-rural and partially commercial colonies would not have had much global resonance.

The libertarian aspect of America's birth branded the American experience in a particularly compelling fashion—and it had a lasting effect both on how Americans came to define themselves and on how others perceived America. It was the basis for a lasting and powerful myth, enduring even when America came to act like other states, even when American business came to be a powerfully expanding and exploitative force within weaker adjoining areas (especially in Central America), even when America became the principal bulwark of states only remotely to be characterised as motivated by a libertarian passion. It was the libertarian myth which gave a special quality to the way American troops were welcomed by ecstatic crowds in Europe and even in some places in Asia, and it was also the libertarian myth, and not just economic opportunity, that drew to America —rather than to Latin America or elsewhere—large numbers of European immigrants.

It was a vital and a self-perpetuating tradition, nurtured by American public education, reinforced by the rhetoric of American presidents, and eagerly absorbed and disseminated by individual Americans—especially in regard to their countries of origin. To the extent to which the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth were dominated politically by ideas stressing liberty and national self-determination, this American embodiment of libertarian values provided a philosophical reinforcement for American foreign policy probably without precedent.

Moreover, American social structure and social history were generally consonant with this primacy of the concept of liberty. America was the freest society—even though many of its social arrangements made for inequality and differentiated liberty—for the very dynamism of American social development and the open frontier—to the immigrants in the East and to the pioneers in the West—made for flexibility without precedent. Internal personal freedom, the free market, social and geographic mobility all combined to intertwine myth and reality in the notion of liberal democracy.

This condition could not last—but it did last long enough to stamp in a special way America's relationship to the world. It was a liberating relationship. Indeed, even the profound crisis of American capitalism of the 1930s did not vitiate but reinforced that relationship. Franklin Roosevelt, by creatively applying through the New Deal a mixture of liberalism with a dose of socialism to the American conditions (with both theories representing the major reactions to and normative syntheses of the earlier European industrial experience), shaped a model which to many Europeans became again a compelling vision of the future. It seemed to preserve and even to enhance personal liberty by infusing that liberty also with an egalitarian social component. World War II and its immediate aftermath were thus the high watermarks of the American appeal.

As a consequence, American foreign policy operated from a philosophical base and with a mass appeal that provided unique assets and were probably as important to the post-World War II American paramountcy as were its military might and its relative gross national product to that of the rest of the world. Though egalitarianism was already beginning to gain momentum in the more advanced societies, its appeal was hampered on the one hand by the discredited Stalinist Soviet Union and on the other by the fact that much of the rest of the world was still preoccupied with its own national emancipation. That emancipation, as Nehru or Nkrumah or Sukarno would often emphasise, partook for its emotive power more from the American than from the Bolshevik or from the Chinese revolutions.

Yet in that process a subtle but accelerating change was taking place. The Western, largely urban society was quietly becoming welfare-oriented, while the new states were rapidly confronted, almost at their birth, with the consciously perceived reality of global inequality. The attainment of their external liberty, rarely if ever matched by domestic liberty, thus became the point of departure of a quest for greater global equality—an equality more often defined externally (for example, in 'the Charter of the Rights and Duties of States' proposed by Mexico's President Echeverria in 1973) than practised internally—with the result that in the space of two and a half decades the broad preoccupations of the more activist and articulate international political actors have been rapidly transformed.

This new situation stands in sharp contrast to the situation which prevailed during and right after World War II. The Atlantic Charter did express the dominant yearnings of a period—and America symbolised them.

American values and interests were consonant then with the values and interests of the more active and central parts of the world. Americans saw themselves as enhancing their own liberty by protecting the freedom of the Europeans; as promoting their own economic well-being by financing the recovery of Europe and of Japan. Today, the traditional American values of individualism, free enterprise, the work ethic, and efficiency are contested both at home and even more abroad by statism, emphasis on the collective (national or societal), on social equity, and on welfare. The desire for a 'new economic order' is symptomatic of the new global mood—and America's relationship to that desire is much more ambivalent. The quest for greater global welfare appears to many Americans as a claim on their resources and as portending the confiscation of the fruits of their labour, with the result that sympathy for the new nations has gradually given way to rising suspicions and antipathy. A gap in values and perceptions has opened between America and major parts of the world.

The attendant danger of a philosophical isolation without precedent in American history has been accentuated by the new style and substance of U.S. foreign policy, especially as pursued by the Nixon administration that came into power in 1969. Covert and manipulative in style, it seemed committed to a largely static view of the world, based on a traditional balance of power, seeking accommodation among the major powers on the basis of spheres of influence, and more generally oriented toward preserving the status quo than reforming it. This further widened the gap that was opened already during the Vietnam war—a war initiated by an administration that paradoxically was more sympathetic to global change—and provided the emotional underpinnings for an increasingly hostile attitude abroad toward U.S. foreign policy.

The emerging philosophical and political isolation could, in time, also become economic and social. While the world is certainly not moving toward a single socio-economic model—and the Communist expectation of global socialism is a doctrinal remnant from the nineteenth century inclination toward simplistic utopias—the broad pattern of change is toward societies that will be more urban, more industrial, more welfarist, more congested, and probably more statist in the sense that governments in most places will be the major initiators of economic change and controllers of national resources. But for some time to come, the political as well as the socio-economic complexion of the world's states will continue to differ greatly, without a single model emerging as ideologically dominant.

This diversity notwithstanding, the general trend is toward systems that do diverge from the American blend of private enterprise, corporate ownership, and indirect governmental control. While the United States has not been immune to these trends, with the post-Depression New Deal expressing in America a new societal perception of the government's role, it has been more reluctant than most other advanced industrial societies to accept governmental intervention in social and economic affairs. Even its immediate neighbours, Canada and Mexico, have gone considerably farther in

social legislation and in extending the scope of the central government's economic powers. Moreover, on the level of doctrinal rhetoric, the American commitment to free enterprise, to the business ethic, to the creative role of the profit motive—with its connected commercial culture—stands out as quite distinctive, unmatched even in such otherwise similarly business-oriented societies as the West German or the Japanese. This rhetoric in some respects is even in conflict with actual realities, for such phenomena as Amtrak, soon to be followed by Conrail, the National Housing Partnership, Comsat, financial aid to Lockheed, not to speak of the much earlier Tennessee Valley Authority or of the complex but certainly close relationship between the Defence Department and defence-oriented industries are all indicative of major shifts in America as well.

The fact remains, however, that in other industrialised democracies the economic role of the state has grown more rapidly than in the United States. While French indicative planning cannot be compared with central planning in state-owned Communist-type economies and while the directing role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Japan (even considering its symbiotic relationship to the Keidanren and the latter's links to the Liberal Democratic Party's leadership) cannot be compared with that of Gosplan, in both states the economic role of the government is much more decisive and direct. As data in Raymond Vernon's *Big Business and the State* indicates, public ownership in other advanced democracies has expanded considerably and embraces the key sectors of the industrial economy. The extent of relative governmental involvement is even higher in many of the developing states, especially since their nonagricultural private sector remains generally weak.

Capitalism in one country is the potential inherent in the American pattern. As was the case with Stalin's 'socialism in one country,' it could prompt in America a siege mentality and, again, as in the Soviet case, with much of it self-induced. For economic diversity or even distinctiveness need not prompt political-ideological hostility, especially if the distinctive model, though ceasing to exercise attraction qua model, remains for many the most appealing condition (as still remains very much the case with the United States). In that context, for Americans to inject into American external relations the ideological claim that the contemporary world struggle is between liberal democracy and various forms of despotic statism is to provide a counterproductive economic reinforcement to the already noted political-philosophical tendencies toward America's global isolation. Making liberal democracy the key issue—as was done in 1975 by a number of key administration spokesmen—also deprives the United States of the opportunity to exploit its commitment to pluralism with a positive stress on U.S. support of global diversity; instead, by dichotomising reality it tends to create a doctrinal coalition against the United States.

Such a coalition also can draw sustenance from the widespread view abroad that the external expansion of American business, particularly in the guise of multinational companies, entails a new form of American

political and economic imperialism. The appearance and major expansion of these internationally active American firms, often organised on a regional or national basis (hence inaccurately labelled as multinationals), was in itself a response to the narrowing of domestic opportunities for U.S. capital, in large part because of expanded social regulations and obligations. However, it occurred also at a time of sudden proliferation worldwide in the number of governments and of an intensified preoccupation with national control over key or essential economic sectors, all of which served to relate resentments against foreign American economic presence to the nature of the American economic system. As a result, national economic policy in a number of countries, especially though not exclusively in Latin America and Africa, has acquired a distinctively anti-American and anti-capitalist bias.

This bias further widened the gap between American and non-American perceptions of world economic development. To many Americans, especially those in the business world, the 'multinational' was a creative response to the emerging new world of interdependence. A flexible and transnational instrument for the dissemination of technology, know-how, capital, and production, it was said in the words of John Diebold, 'Multinational Corporations: Why be Scared of Them?' (*Foreign Policy* 12), to be paving the way to a more truly cooperative world: 'The logical and eventual development . . . would be the end of nationality and national governments as we know them.' In contrast, the argument heard more often abroad, though voiced also by more radical American economists, was that the multinational corporation was primarily an instrument for the indirect extension of the power of American capitalism, creating wilfully or objectively a new form of dependency and exploitation, since thereby 'the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected.'[1] This viewpoint, by and large, tended to dominate the outlook of the new nations. The argument over the multinationals was thus an extension to the world economy of the more philosophical and political clash over the question of the proper relative weight of, and relationship between, liberty and equality—and it further highlighted the danger of the systemic as well as conceptual isolation of the United States.

Emerging U.S. vulnerability to resource shortages in several areas of key importance to U.S. economic vitality makes this linkage between philosophical and systemic differences even more threatening. U.S. dependence on imported minerals is gradually increasing and thus also the U.S. stake in orderly political relations with a number of countries that are not likely to be in ideological sympathy with the United States. Though any serious appraisal must take into account the potential for substitution, or for the development of alternative processes, data developed systematically under the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 by the Office of the Secretary of the Interior points to the prospect of increasing commodity deficiencies, independently of political factors, among such items as aluminium, asbestos, barium, bismuth, cadmium, copper, diamond, fluorine, germanium, gold,

indium, lead, mercury, sand and gravel, sulphur, tin, tungsten, uranium, and zinc. A gradual shift in the U.S. economy from mineral self-sufficiency to partial external dependency has already been taking place, with the United States dependent in 1950 for only 15 per cent of its needs in dollar terms on imports from abroad; by 1970, the foregoing had increased to approximately 25 per cent; and by the year 2000, the percentage may be anywhere from 60 per cent to 70 per cent.

This development has so far not generated the more dire consequences predicted by some observers immediately after the successful 1973 price self-assertion by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—notably the predictions both of resource scarcities and of resource cartelisation—but the trend is clearly toward much higher U.S. import costs. This as of itself will generate the appearance of new constraints on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, while some foreign powers may begin to strive to exploit more deliberately the fact that only 6 per cent of the world's population consumes approximately 30 per cent to 35 per cent of the total world production of petroleum, 55 per cent to 60 per cent of natural gas, 15 per cent of coal, 20 per cent of steel, 35 per cent of aluminium, and 30 per cent of copper.

The combination of systemic uniqueness with unique wealth makes the United States an obvious target for emotional hostility and economic pressure. That pressure is likely to come not from cartels based on a single commodity (since the special circumstances of OPEC are hard to replicate) but from mixed political-economic alliances in which clusters of diverse states might attempt to combine their varying assets in order to press the United States in a particular direction. The inclination to try to do this is likely to be enhanced by the general politicisation of world economics. The proliferation of new states with weak private sectors has thrust away many governments into external economic roles assumed elsewhere by private business. The growing emphasis on national control of resources has caused widespread nationalisations of foreign assets, especially in the extractive areas.[2] The need to provide some structure and stability to the management of global resources (be it commodity prices or the exploitation of deep-ocean resources) has prompted also the need for new international negotiations. The widespread feeling among the new nations that existing international arrangements perpetuate their economic disadvantage has caused the United Nations to undertake explicitly an examination of the need for a new 'international economic order.' All of that has had the effect of widening the role of governments in world economics. That in turn means that issues heretofore handled either by the private sector or through private-governmental negotiations, largely on the basis of business criteria, are tending to become injected with political content. The effect is to reinforce and in some cases to make dominant the role of political motives and of political criteria in international economics.

In that setting, structural change in the American way of doing things becomes inevitable. Resist as it might, the American system is compelled

gradually to accommodate itself to this emerging international context, with the U.S. government called upon to negotiate, to guarantee, and, to some extent, to protect the various arrangements that have been contrived even by private business. The oil crisis also has had the effect of stimulating congressional pressures for the assertion of greater governmental control over the operations and practices of U.S. oil companies, including negotiations with oil-producing states. This, too, has served to enhance the role of the state. The economic role of the U.S. government thus continues to expand both for domestic and international reasons, and in the process the distinctiveness of capitalism in one country may become somewhat blurred. Nonetheless, it is quite clear that for a long time to come both fundamental philosophical as well as structural differences will continue to complicate the relationship between the changing world and America.

In that context, America could easily slide into a siege mentality. Warning signals abound. The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, much to national applause, began in 1975 to counter-attack criticisms from the new nations in terms almost as sharp as those used in the early 1950s by another American ambassador to the United Nations, appointed then to forcefully rebut Soviet attacks. In a much cited speech of October 3, 1975, he invoked, in words pregnant with emotionalising imagery, the concept of a beleaguered democratic minority assailed from all sides by enemies:

> In the United Nations today there are in the range of two dozen democracies left. Totalitarian Communist regimes and assorted ancient and modern despotisms make up all the rest. And nothing so unites these nations as the conviction that their success ultimately depends on our failure. . . . It is sensed in the world that democracy is in trouble. There is blood in the water and the sharks grow frenzied. . . .

These words struck responsive chords among various groups of American society. To organised labour, they stood in welcome contrast to what was perceived as a dangerous tendency over the recent years for U.S. officialdom to cater both to Communists and to the new states; to the influential Jewish community, long the source of support for enlightened internationalism, the words were a deserved rebuff to the Soviet-Arab-Afro-Asian coalition against Israel; to the more conservative sectors of American society, they represented a belated recognition that American values were being threatened by a counter-productive courtship of fundamentally hostile systems of values and governance. To be told that in the complex and changing world—as they were in the same speech—'most of the new states and most of the old ones have ended up enemies of freedom as we would know it', was to provide a welcome escape from complexity, even if in the guise of isolated self-righteousness.

Yet such isolated self-righteousness could prove particularly destructive to the twin components of the underlying basis of legitimacy of the American system as a whole. That legitimacy, on the deeper psychological level, has been derived from a combination of optimism and universalism. Most Americans have instinctively believed in the idea of progress and in their system as a unique political expression of such human progress. And most

believed that the American-type liberal democracy was a potential model for the rest of the world. Yet implicit in the emergent new mood was the sudden recognition that perhaps 'progress' was destructive and even dangerous, and that the American system was no longer the carrier of a universally applicable message. This could make for a much more relativistic American self-perception, in some respects thus more mature and realistic. But the sudden fading of the underlying sources of the system's legitimacy could prove destabilising, and it could prompt many Americans to take refuge in the reassuring simplicity of the notion of the Hostile World as the successor to the Cold War—with both notions substituting political dichotomy for global complexity.

The temptation to escape from a world which all of a sudden looked quite antipathetic was also derived from internal changes in American society that had the effect of shattering the earlier consensus on foreign policy and of undermining American will to play a positive world role. That consensus has been reinforced by the presence of a relatively homogeneous foreign affairs elite which over the years provided to American society a broad sense of confidence and direction, by the internalisation by the American public of a broad concept of world affairs into which even new phenomena could over some years be assimilated, and by the underlying values and priorities widely shared by most Americans. In brief, the earlier consensus was based on the WASP elite, on the cold war as the basic organising principle, and on the willingness of the public to assign higher priority to external obligations than to internal needs.

All of that had become the past by the mid-1970s, with profound change within America interacting confusingly with profound changes outside America. The appearance of new and more radical states, the spread of statism, the demands for a new international order did not fit the earlier cold war formulas, nor the traditional view of a world balance of power assuring a generation of peace (as propagated by Messrs. Nixon and Kissinger), nor the benign expectations of the more internationalist critics of power politics and of the advocates of peace through aid and development.

It is difficult to estimate how long it will take for America to absorb and internalise a reasonably coherent yet necessarily flexible conceptual understanding of the emerging new world. Leaving aside the intellectual complexity of the process of formulating propositions that can be simultaneously responsive to global complexity and yet susceptible to wider acceptance, the matter is complicated by the changes in the character of the contemporary American elite and in American values. The waning of the WASP-eastern seaboard-Ivy League-Wall Street foreign affairs elite is a critically important aspect of that change. That elite, dominant in foreign affairs for more than half a century, provided the country with much of its leadership during America's thrust to world greatness, and that leadership was in turn based on shared values and solid institutional pillars of support.

These values—though they are elusive of precise definition—were a com-

bination of the traditional Protestant ethic, of strong American patriotism, of a blend of 'manifest destiny' with Wilsonian 'universalism,' of Keynesian economic neo-liberalism, all strongly conditioned by the failure of the 1930s to shape a system of collective security, in part because of American abnegation. The strong sense of a special U.S. global responsibility, inherent in this blend, was in turn reinforced by the post-World War II Stalinist challenge. All this made on the public level for at least an indirect will to greatness, combining the elite's ambition to be the world's number one power with the popular desire to be loved and with the general American belief in America's idealism. At the same time, the predominant WASP elite enjoyed the institutional backing of the internationally-oriented eastern business-banking community, with which it was in a rather symbiotic relationship, and it was also tied—often by close personal links—to the Protestant tradition and church. (Here, both Dulles and Acheson provide striking but by no means the only examples.)

The Vietnam war was the Waterloo of the WASP elite. But like Waterloo, a period of decay preceded the final battle, and hence it would be wrong to assume that the war by itself cracked WASP morale, motivation, and monopoly of foreign affairs. Social change by the 1960s was bringing to the forefront of American society new groups, clamouring for recognition and proper place. Among them stood out the Irish and the Jewish. Their rise on the social and philosophical plane coincided with the wider crisis of American culture, brought on—as I argued much more fully in *Between Two Ages*—by the unprecedented plunge of American society beyond the industrial age into a new post-industrial technetronic era, for which there was no prior philosophical or cultural preparation. The result was an upheaval in American values and culture, a crisis of confidence as well as sharpened ethnic cleavages. Of the latter, the racial aspect seized public attention, but the struggle to displace and to replace the WASPS was no less significant, even if less visible. It was waged with great intensity especially on the cultural-mass media front, where it soon became fashionable to denounce the WASPs in terms which, if applied to any other group, would have been considered ethnically or racially prejudiced. The underlying theme of David Halberstam's widely read *The Best and the Brightest* was the alleged arrogance and the historical irrelevance of the WASPs (with the two Bundy brothers depicted as antiheroes), and in some ways the book was a key weapon—as were many press articles—of this cultural-ethnic conflict.

The entrance into the presidency of Richard Nixon coincided with the breakdown of WASP domination of foreign affairs—as well as with the collapse of the earlier conceptual framework. It did not entail, however, the appearance of a new and equally homogeneous foreign policy elite. Perhaps the most successful ethnic group—replacing the displaced WASPs—was now the Jewish (ably represented in key administration posts), but the dominant pattern was one of greater fluidity and heterogeneity. In that more flexible context both academia and the mass media—emerging to some extent as the functional successors to business and church—became

the critical sources of authority, granting or withdrawing legitimacy as well as influencing policy. Neither of these two groups was dominated by the WASPs, neither partook to the same extent of traditional WASP values, both were less committed to an enduring world view, and the latter was especially inclined—in part because of professional impulses—toward a more volatile and impressionistic attitude on world politics. Moreover, neither of these possessed the coherence of values nor the social confidence to generate sustained leadership. Academia was disillusioned and increasingly captivated by determinist pessimism; the national mass media were professionally sceptical while the struggle against presidential abuse of power encouraged more generally an adversary style in relationship to the government.

During the early 1970s the resulting policy void was filled largely by Kissinger. His 'spectaculars' deflected debate from the more basic issues and gave the administration—at least for a while—a certain room for manoeuvre in the field of foreign affairs. However, it did so only for a while. The disintegration of the earlier consensus which accompanied the decline of the WASPs, and the secretive style and the manipulative character of Kissinger's stewardship had the effect of accelerating congressional entry into direct foreign policy making. For much of the postwar era, Congress—led by a leadership that tended toward bipartisanship on foreign affairs—felt it understood and partook of the basic strategic objectives of U.S. foreign policy. On the basis of that shared strategic comprehension, it was prepared to grant U.S. policy-makers considerable tactical flexibility. But in a setting in which Congress became increasingly suspicious that proclaimed doctrines were essentially deceptive, and with the earlier consensus shattered by the Vietnam war, Congress became more inclined to intrude into tactical issues while debating the larger strategic matters.

The result was not only an executive-legislative conflict over a number of foreign policy issues (be it Cyprus or Panama), but also—given the wider changes in American society—the increased intrusion of more fragmented concerns into policy debates. With the earlier consensus absent, with the WASP elite no longer personalising and legitimating an asserted overall national interest, the Greeks could lobby more effectively—and with less danger of being accused of insensitivity to the national interest—on the Cyprus issue; the Jews could do so on the Israeli-Arab conflict and more generally on American policy toward the Middle East or the United Nations; Southerners could block change in U.S. policies toward Panama and derivatively toward Latin America.

This fragmentation of national motivation was accompanied by a broader shift in public attitudes toward foreign policy. Though public opinion polls are not a reliable indicator of enduring trends, though much depends both on the manner in which specific issues are posed and on the mood of the moment, and though the massive documentation that is available on U.S. public opinion attitudes on foreign affairs does not offer in all cases a consistent picture, enough of a pattern has emerged from a number of

separate public opinion studies to warrant some important conclusions. Eschewing detail, the polling data suggests that in the course of the last decade the U.S. public: (1) has downgraded U.S. foreign and defence priorities and upgraded domestic priorities to a point in which the latter predominate to a considerable degree; (2) has become disinclined to support in a consistent fashion higher budgetary allocations for defence; (3) has become less inclined to view the Soviet Union and/or China as an imminent threat to U.S. interests; (4) has become generally more inclined to favour cuts or withdrawals of U.S. forces stationed abroad; (5) has become increasingly sceptical about the efficacy or desirability of foreign aid; (6) has become much more critical of the United Nations and of the coalition of the Third and Fourth Worlds increasingly dominant in it; and (7) has even begun to favour less U.S. foreign trade. More generally and even more surprisingly, the American public has become increasingly willing to describe itself as isolationist (in response in 1974 to a Roper poll bearing on self-identification 42 per cent of the respondents described themselves as internationalists and 37 per cent as isolationists) despite the negative connotations that over the years the term 'isolationist' had acquired.[3]

However, it would be wrong to conclude from the foregoing that a new isolationist consensus has finally taken shape. The data did not support the proposition that America was unambiguously turning inward. On some issues, such as foreign intervention, the public tended to be constant: in most cases against, but in the few favourable ones also constantly so over the years (with a larger, also relatively constant number willing to provide supplies to friendly nations that have been attacked). More importantly, the public remained willing to back international efforts on behalf of human rights, and to support (by a margin of 66 per cent as compared with 68 per cent in 1947) an 'active part' by the United States in world affairs. Finally, polls showed a heightened recognition of the need for international co-operation in dealing with various new global problems (notably, food, energy, and inflation) and for closer cooperation among the advanced countries, as well as recognition of the close linkage between developments abroad and future internal prospects for America. In brief, despite the sharpening cleavage within public opinion, isolationism was not the dominant mood.

Indeed, the data even suggested a potential for a constructive global attitude and it indicated relatively little predisposition in favour of a crusade either on behalf of capitalism or of liberal democracy (in a 1975 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations study both the public and leadership ranked the export of either at the bottom of a list of 18 suggested goals). Also manifest, however, was a great deal of confusion about the future and uncertainty about specific policies to be followed. A public opinion that is ambivalent but constructively malleable emerged from the surveys and it heightened the need for national leadership that was capable of defining politically and morally compelling directions to which the public might then positively respond.

But in the absence of such leadership there remains the real risk that drift

**Internationalist/isolationist trends 1964-1975***
In percentages




*The figures for 1964 and 1968 are derived from responses to five statements concerning the general posture the United States should assume in world affairs. The figures for 1972, 1974, and 1975 reflect responses to the same set of five statements, as well as two new statements regarding possible U.S. military intervention in defence of allies.

Source: Potomac Associates, Washington, D.C.

could become a decisive trend. Such a trend would be in keeping with some pertinent and striking predictions made years ago, which noted the cyclical nature of the American public's attitudes on foreign affairs. The first of these studies, by the Russian economic historian Nikolai D. Kondratieff, pointed to the recurring pattern of recessions in America and—an important corollary often ignored by those who refer to the Kondratieff cycles—to the related phenomenon of political-cultural change in American society. Using data on wages, prices, interest rates, and capital flows, Kondratieff noted a regularity in upward and downward trends in the capitalist economy, on the basis of which he predicted in the mid-1920s that the 1970s will witness an

inflationary peak, to be followed by a long downward 'wave,' accompanied by sharply heightened American social conservatism and indifference to world affairs.

An American social scientist, focusing more directly on U.S. attitudes toward international affairs, reached in the 1950s a remarkably similar conclusion. Frank L. Klingberg, having systematically collated data concerning foreign affairs—presidential messages, party platforms, election results, frequency of foreign treaties, naval expenditures, armed expeditions, wars, annexations, diplomatic warnings—argued that since 1776 America's relationship to the world has been characterised by alternating cycles of 'extroversion' and 'introversion'.[4] With each phase of extroversion having lasted about 27 to 28 years, Klingberg concluded, with remarkable prescience, that 'in view of America's past record, and of the presumed role of 'internal' factors in promoting the introvert-extrovert rhythm it seems logical to expect America to retreat to some extent at least from so much world involvement and perhaps to do so sometime in the 1960s.'

The possibility that a secular and long-range trend is at work heightens—rather than lessens—the centrality of the leadership response in America and makes all the more dangerous appeals calculated to exploit American disenchantment with world affairs. In contemporary American attitudes there are the makings of xenophobia—but there is also the potential for constructive response. Powerful but paralysed by the absence of will could be the American destiny if the leadership needed to translate that potential into reality fails to materialise.

Such a failure would be disastrous not only for America but even more so for the world at large. It is doubtful that a self-isolated America in a rapidly changing world could maintain (especially given the twin impacts of communications and economics) its own internal equilibrium, its own values, and eventually perhaps its own political system. Internal polarisation and fears would be likely to generate grave tensions, ultimately undermining from within the spiritual substance and the political resilience of any would-be fortress America.

However, the capacity of America to act consistently and constructively is limited by the paradoxical nature of America's relationship to the changing world. It is an interactive relationship, in which the world is subjected socially to a process of Americanisation even while America politically seems to be undergoing a process of Europeanisation. While America impacts in a novel fashion on the rest of the world through its technology and mass culture, American politics appears to be becoming more fragmented doctrinally, with less consensus and more ideology, thus reviving on American soil some of the older Right-Left European battles. Global Americanisation and American Europeanisation make for a particularly uncertain blend, inhibiting the United States from applying constructively its unique global influence.

This is cause for concern because the American impact on the world remains, on the whole, positive; because American power, both political

and economic, remains central; because the basic American message, some specific policies notwithstanding, continues to be relevant. An America that turns inward—repelled by the ugliness of the world around it and beset by internal ideological conflict—would create a vacuum that would be filled less by any single power, though that might be the result in some regions, and more simply by escalating chaos.

The American impact on the world should not be underestimated. For all its shortcomings, America remains the globally creative and innovative society. It impacts on the lifestyles, mores, and aspirations of other societies to a degree not matched today by any other system. This is true of the world of academia, with the United States having emerged not only as the major source of learning, but also as the most attractive magnet for foreign students, again to a degree that outdistances other nations by far;[5] it has more recently become true of the artistic world, with New York City emerging as the global centre for many of the arts; it is very true in the case of modern management techniques, with American business schools and management consulting firms pioneering new skills; it certainly has been the case with the women's liberation movement and with the ecological movement and even with the New Left; it is very much the case with mass leisure and culture, with American music, jeans, and social habits rapidly becoming the world norm.

As America plunges into the uncharted new technetronic age, increasingly dominated by electronics and technology (hence the neologism 'technetronic'), even its shortcomings become more broadly significant. Be it the drug culture or the setbacks in shaping more harmonious race relations, or the psychological problems of excessive permissiveness, the negative lessons of America acquire a wider significance and are closely scanned by others. In brief, contemporary America is the world's social laboratory. Its ferment, its new ideas, its experiments provide both stimulus and warnings.

Moreover, the overall impact of America is to stimulate change. Indeed, there is a paradox here in that American policies have seemed to be oriented against change whereas the broad social/political impact of America has been inherently anti-traditional and anti-authoritarian. Generally speaking, the American social impact and hence at least derivatively also political, has been to encourage more social experimentation, more institutional flexibility, more willingness to welcome rather than to oppose breaks with tradition. An inward-oriented America would gradually cease to perform that role.

American power remains similarly central to global stability and progress. The failure of Europe and of Japan to surface and to assume major political responsibilities represents the central and continuing disappointment of American postwar policy. Had these nations become more actively and constructively engaged in coping with global problems the pressures on America and the American role would have been much reduced, and the prospects for an East-West accommodation with a more effectively contained Soviet Union greatly enhanced. Yet 30 years after the end of the war,

neither Europe nor Japan is prepared to play a major role—neither in regard to the traditional nor in regard to the new global problems. (Toshio Kimura, former Foreign Minister of Japan and the head of the Japanese delegation to the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly of 1975—where the United States was the only advanced nation to submit detailed proposals for changes designed to move toward a new economic order—quite bluntly stated that he was ashamed of the 'general and metaphysical' character of the statement that he had to submit on behalf of his government.) Admittedly, France did take timely procedural initiatives in 1974-75, especially in launching the so-called Tripartite Conference on Commodities which brought together both the advanced and the developing nations, but the success of these conferences was again dependent largely on the American reaction.

Moreover, the economic dislocations suffered by the advanced industrial societies, especially because of the higher oil prices exacted by OPEC, have underlined the crucial economic and political role of the United States—indeed, making the United States more pivotal than it has been for almost 20 years. Furthermore, despite the understandable resentment within the poorer parts of the world over a situation in which one-sixteenth of the world's population was consuming one-third of the world's non-reusable resources, the global stake in American prosperity and higher production (hence also consumption) was inducing by 1975 more and more governments to put pressure on the United States to accelerate its own economic recovery from the ongoing recession. Nothing could be more illustrative of the American centrality to global economic well-being than these calls for a higher American rate of growth.

More generally, the systemic role of America, both economically and politically, has become that of the key stabiliser. This has been especially the case with food, with the United States having emerged as the key source of global nutritional stability, but it has clearly also been so with trade, monetary affairs, and region security. When America falters, the world economy and the political equilibrium become unstable—a lesson well drawn explicitly in these terms by Charles Kindleberger's *The World in Depression*, 1929-1939 and even more applicable to the present conditions. What is more, to cite the words of Robert Gilpin, writing in Bergsten's and Krause's *World Politics and International Economics*:

> The scale, diversity, and dynamics of the American economy will continue to place the United States at the centre of the international economic system. The universal desire for access to the huge American market, the inherent technological dynamism of the American economy, and America's additional strength in both agriculture and resources—which Europe and Japan do not have—provide a cement sufficient to hold the world economy together and to keep the United States at its centre.

The same happens to be true politically and strategically, especially in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East.

An America that ceased to project a constructive sense of direction would hence contribute directly to major global economic and political disruptions.

Finally, the broad historical message of America still retains much of its validity, provided it is not dogmatised into terms that could only produce American isolation. The basic message of the American experience was the primacy of liberty. But inherent in that was also the centrality of pluralism. Personal liberty was best assured by a society that was pluralistic. On the global scale, pluralism means diversity and not a march toward a homogeneous world based on a single ideological model. That message remains valid and has become especially valid because of the appearance of some 150-odd sovereign nation-states. Moreover, tied to more specific proposals for global cooperation, it could serve as the point of departure for a relevant concept of a new and more diversified international system.

All of that requires an America that is cooperatively engaged in shaping new global relations, both despite and because of the rising global egalitarian passions. Americans should not forget that external hostility is not generalised to the extent that it applies to the American society as a whole. It is primarily a doctrinal rather than a national hostility, and even as such it may still not be deeply rooted. America still provides to most people in the world the most attractive social *condition* (even if not the *model*) and that remains America's special strength. The Soviet Union is not even a rival in this respect. But that strength can only be applied if American foreign policy is sympathetically sensitive to the significant shift in global emphasis toward a value which has not been central to the American experience. This need not entail an American embrace of egalitarianism as the supreme virtue nor its artificial application to a differentiated and still much more open, less congested, and certainly more affluent American society. But it does imply a policy that does not ignore (nor reciprocate with doctrinal hostility) the global pressures for reform of existing international arrangements. To reduce global complexity and the emerging global preoccupations to the simple dichotomy of democracy (or freedom) versus despotism (or statism) is in fact to sever the libertarian linkage between America and the world, it is to reinforce radical passions abroad, it is to promote America's philosophical and hence also political isolation.

Finally, these broad-ranging considerations have also more immediate application. In the ongoing Conference on International Economic Cooperation, the United States has the opportunity to shape a policy toward the developing world that takes the philosophical dimensions as well as the political realities discussed earlier more fully into account, a position which the Europeans and even the Japanese have so far appeared more willing to adopt. Moreover, in the foreseeable future the United States may be facing difficult crises in parts of Africa or Latin America. There may also be political instability in Eastern Europe. The underlying premises that will guide the American attitude toward these issues may very directly affect the ultimate capacity of the United States to respond in a manner which is in America's longer-range interest and which enables the United States to coalesce around itself the sympathies and support of the majority of mankind.

Nothing could be more destructive than for the United States to position

itself as the ultimate shield of the remnants of white supremacy in Africa at a time when racial equality is coming to be accepted as an imperative norm. This would rally all of Afro-Asia against us. Similarly, American longer-range interests would be harmed by continuing indifference to the mounting desire in Central America for greater social justice and national dignity, as our indifference will only make it easier for Castro's Cuba to exploit that desire. Much of Latin America could be antagonised by any resulting conflicts. Finally, America would be untrue to its own initial values if it adopted a cynical view regarding the Soviet relationship to those East European countries that either seek to enlarge or to protect their own national independence. The consequences of such a stance would be harmful to the United States in all of Europe and even in China.

Above all, it is vital to remember that ultimately it is only America that has the power to shape a hostile world for itself.

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NOTES

[1] Benjamin J. Cohen, *'The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence'* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 190, as quoted in C. Fred Bergsten and Lawrence B. Krause (eds.), 'World Politics and International Economics' (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 44.

[2] According to one count, in the years 1973-1974 there were some 37 major acts of nationalisation in 18 African countries alone, involving some 40 per cent to 100 per cent of the affected foreign assets. See C. L. Aleksandrooskiva and I. Matsenko, 'Opyt i problemy natsionalizatsu a stranako Afriki', Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezbdunarodnye Ornosbenia no. 7, 1975, pp. 51-52.

[3] On the whole, such public sentiments tended to be consonant with elite attitudes, where in some respects they were even more dominant. As B. M. Russett noted, 'Anti-military-spending attitudes are concentrated precisely among those most likely to take an interest in international affairs, to vote, to make campaign contributions, and otherwise to be politically active.' A Chicago Council study of public and elite attitudes noted a similarly greater leaning to one side among the leadership groups. That tendency was especially marked among the new congressmen that came to Washington after the 1974 elections (and especially among the 'new liberal' Democrats, only 20 per cent of whom in response to a request to identify the nation most threatening to world power named the Soviet Union, with another 20 per cent similarly identifying Israel!). Overall, the House of Representatives, for instance, was reported in mid-1975 to be opposed to foreign aid by a margin of 53 per cent to 41 per cent.

[4] Frank L. Klintberg, 'The Historical Alteration of Moods in American Foreign Policy, *'World Politics,'* January 1952.

[5] It is noteworthy that despite much global criticism of U.S. policies, the attraction of the United States for foreign students has continued to grow. According to data from UNESCO and from the Institute for International Education, in 1960 there were 48,000 foreign students in the United States and 2,000 additional foreign students came as immigrants; in 1965 the respective figures were 82,000 and 6,000; in 1970, 114,000 and 20,000; in 1975, 155,000 and 65,000. In contrast, the Soviet figure for 1970 was only 17,500. In effect, about one out of every four foreign students was choosing the United States.

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[Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski is Director of the Research Institute of International Change at the Columbia University in the City of New York. The above article forms the basis of his forthcoming book of the same title.]

# RELIGION AND INSTINCT

## by Katharine M. Wilson

INSTINCT and consciousness alike make one of the mysteries of biology. Although we now know that man's conscious activities like his verbal, ideational and analytic potentialities, function through the left hemisphere of his forebrain, it has also been proved that conscious volition *precedes* any neuronal activity involved. The physiologist Eccles says he is 'constrained as a neuroscientist, to postulate that in some way, completely beyond my understanding, my thinking changes the operative pattern of neuronal activities in my brain.' We should therefore not think of consciousness as a brain activity, although it functions through the brain. Consciousness is inexplicable on any scientific theory; some scientists are even reduced to assuming it must be inherent in some way in matter itself.

Biologists differ in how early in evolution they attribute consciousness to animals, where also it would seem not explicable by their physiology. But the lowest organisms show some awareness of their environment, and even earthworms learn by experience. If the dances of bees have an instinctual element, then bees seem to use their instinct intelligently. Reason adequate to the animal's life starts far down the evolutionary scale. That instinct can be used by animals in this sort of way, rather than as merely a motivator that dominates their life, must make an important consideration for any philosophy of biology.

At its most primitive instinct can seem merely mechanical, but it throws up the same problem we meet in considering consciousness, of how what is not explicable in terms of physiology can be interfused with it as an active influence. We see it at its most mechanical in the dog's scratching behind his ear with his hind foot instead of his fore as would seem more natural. This very ancient instinct comes from the reptilian age, and the dog under its influence certainly looks shaken by some uncontrollable mechanism. Luckily it has been lost in man's inheritance (not conducing in any way to the survival of some ancestor one presumes). But yawning is as ancient and pre-voluntary an instinct. One can control its activity if it does not catch one unawares, and through the experience perhaps we see what it is like to have an ancient instinct within one's voluntary field. But powerful emotions like love and fear, which one could not call mechanical, are instinctual and can sometimes dominate one's conscious attitudes not much less than in animal psychology.

Instinct, as by implication I have shown, can persist from phylum to phylum in evolution as an inheritance transmitted like physical characteristics through DNA chains. In species-specific instincts each member of the species can be distinguished from those of other species in the family as clearly by the details of their instinctive actions as by physical differences. Instincts are, therefore, innate impulsions bound up with one's inherent nature, given *a priori*, partly determining it and our fate. An instinct is not

something we can choose voluntarily but is in a measure irresistible, as we may see if we try to love one whom we hate, or to hate one whom we love. We may control or inhibit its expression, and hence are responsible for our actions, but the hate or the love may possess us against our will.

The best known example of an instinct at work is probably that of Lorenz's greylag gosling, 'imprinted' with a following instinct on the first moving creature it sees. Even when he arranged that this should be a human being the instinct worked. Although we cannot know how the gosling experiences, much more than merely following seems implied, for it seems attached to the 'mother'-goose in other ways, and in some species the partner preferred in mating has been shown to be determined by its likeness to the 'mother.' If we turn to human psychology, it is interesting that Jung found evidence for such determinants in the psyches of human beings, who also could perhaps be said to find imprinted on their environment their innate expectations, or to use his word, their 'projections.' In so far as these determinants belong to the whole human species Jung calls them archetypes, and expressly states that they are the equivalents of instinct in animals. The mother archetype has a profound influence in human psychology. Although it obviously differs from what the greylag gosling finds imprinted on its 'mother,' indeed as much as a human being differs from a goose, yet there are correspondences. Now, the most primitive religions tend to have a mother-goddess. The Christian religion among others has a father-god, also archetypal. Not only so, the gods of the Greek pantheon represent areas of human emotion and activity, Aphrodite inspiring love, Mars the warlike instincts and so on. Even so late in development as Homer, Odysseus's 'bright ideas' are attributed to Athene, the goddess of practical wisdom. Here we have an example of man's early sense of his motivation and inspiration lying in powers beyond himself. Jung has shown that the same archetypal images occur in all cultures everywhere and in all epochs, primitive archetypal images appearing in the dreams of sophisticated people. It is from here that myths and symbols of religion come. So it looks very much as though religion arose as awareness of transcending powers within oneself. It would seem unlikely that animals 'experience' their instincts except in the actions in which they result, but the religion of earliest man shows this recognition. And it is recognition of them not only as transcendent, but as all-powerful like instinct. This is evident in Homer. Helen did not choose to seduce Paris and leave her husband; Aphrodite made her do it. This seems strange to us, but if our emotions are strong and we are self-aware, we may know that it may be true of us also. Or we may look in another direction for confirmation. Although the new theologians have buried God, they seem to take behaviour and moral principles as particularly relevant, these being the remnants of religion when reason is put in the place of instinct.

Lorenz's observations on instincts in his excursion into human psychology in *Aggression* and Jung's on the archetypes correspond. Both think of them as innate energies. Both consider emotion a sign of them and put their motivation as stronger than reason. Lorenz says, 'By itself, reason can only devise means to achieve otherwise determined ends; it cannot set up goals.'

The motive power that makes us choose ends 'stems from instinctive behaviour mechanisms much older than reason and not directly accessible to rational self-observation.' He also says, 'Instincts are the source of love and friendship, of all warmth of feeling, of appreciation of beauty, of the urge to artistic creativeness, of insatiable curiosity striving for scientific enlightenment. These deepest strata of the human personality are, in their dynamics, not essentially different from the instincts of animals.' All this can be corroborated in Jung's archetypes. It is as much as to say that the basis of man's motivation, as of the animal's, is instinctual. I have shown that the first awareness we can find of it in man is as a transcendent, compelling power. The question is whether among his archetypes there are any not apparent in animals.

The Self, or ordering, whole-making archetype, makes one possible claimant. It is projected into consciousness as the ego, the I, where we each know ourselves as a separate individual. Much evidence suggests that animals may not have this sense of themselves. But we know very little about their awareness. Perhaps the individual animal has more say in what appears group activity than we allow. Thus filming a flock of birds changing direction in flight, which looks like a group-motivated movement, has shown the bird in front taking the new direction, followed in quick succession by one after another. Then, animals that go in herds or packs act as separate individuals where common action is not called for. And birds returning after migration to their nesting place, remember their own nesting spot. Moreover, the higher animals make individual choices of relationships. Finally, the instinct of self-preservation seems to entail self-valuing of a sort.

Archetypal images for the Self vary and change. The commonest in our culture is (or was) God. I have shown early man feeling that all his instincts were the influence of gods. As civilisation evolved man learnt mastery over them, and they ceased to be felt as transcendent since his I controlled them. This might possibly be related with an emergence of a numinous sense of the Self, although it may always have been there, unknown. In his *Answer to Job* Jung traces a development in the God-image in historic times, he says it is 'the archetypes that accomplish the primary transformation.' This seems to imply the archetypes unchanged, the images changing. Although his history of this is very difficult to understand, anyhow too difficult to attempt as a summary, we can easily see development in images if we compare early with later religions. In Greek mythology one of the many gods is a Father-God, a ruler if often an ineffective one. Some African tribes have a much more developed sense of the Self than this. It is far-distant, numinous, an unknown God, too hidden in the unconscious to be reached except rarely, with the known gods acting as mediators, not unlike Christ in orthodox Christianity. Jung notes that today for the first time the circle which stands as a symbol for the Self appears in the psychology of modern people without any image in the centre. The circle, however, remains. He ends *Answer to Job* with a description of where we stand today:

> even the enlightened person . . . is never more than his own limited ego before

> the One who dwells in him, whose form has no knowable boundaries, who encompasses him on all sides, fathomless as the abysms of the earth and vast as the sky.

People in so far as they merely think have given up religion as irrational. Those, whether thinkers or not, who have not lost their religious orientation, are aware that it cannot have reason for its basis; they either live an agnostic faith, or experience religion as an interior life, some continuously, most sporadically. Jung points out that no one can come to wholeness (a conceptual 'image' for the Self) without first accepting the irrational in himself. And Rudolf Otto in *The Idea of the Holy*, although he attributes a rational element to religion, stresses its non-rational basis. This in itself might clinch the argument for its being instinct, an *a priori*, within oneself. He refers to 'a hidden depth, inaccessible to our conceptual thought' which as he points out is the mystical element in religion. It certainly looks as if this mystical basis has the characteristics of instinct. One of its most surprising features is its identity wherever found. Otto, in *Mysticism East and West*, describing the similarities between eastern and western forms with Eckhart as the Christian and Sankara, the Hindu, shows an identity of terms down to the most surprising details, that indicates

> strong primal impulses working in the human soul which as such are completely unaffected by differences of climate, or geographical position or of race. These show in their similarity an inner relationship of types of human experience and spiritual life which is truly astonishing.

The essential core of mystical experience thoroughly illustrated by W. T. Stace in his *Mysticism and Philosophy* is an apprehension of 'the One.' We might say an apprehension of the Universe as One, except that we should have to add that consciousness of the created universe in all its diversity may disappear into a sense of the undifferentiated. I am of course not referring to ideas, but to the 'tacit' experience which is strange and incalculable. Thus it cannot be assured by direct seeking, although certain conditions may conduce to it, and yet it can explode with a numinous strangeness in someone who has not consciously prepared for it, or even known of its possibility. No effort of will brings it; it seems to come of itself. But it is not a miracle. That is to say, although it involves an enlargement of consciousness far beyond the limits of one's little ego, it does not imply something outside the nature of things breaking into it from beyond time and space. If it appears to annihilate time and space it does so by intensifying the Oneness so that differences are not perceived. What it gives is a sense of the Whole, the undivided All. So this could be an experience of the Self. At its fullest or furthest, the person experiencing it feels he is this One, or that he and God are one, although to remain sane, when the experience fades, he must recognise at least in some sort that he is neither God nor All. He may then be left with a strong and numinous sense of his identity consisting in being filled by this Whole or in being a part of this One—a feeling that may remain for the rest of his life, for to have experienced it gives him a fundamentally new attitude; he becomes a different sort of person with new orientations. But the experience is not ecstatic, not a taking leave of oneself. What is lost is the limited ego. The genuine instinctive occurrence is easily distinguished

from the many pseudo-mysticisms which are ecstatic, or come as drug-enduced experiences, for its effect is not to separate one from the ordinary experience of life, making it drab by comparison and leaving one for ever seeking escape by whatever means. It is rather that one has discovered a significance from which the details of everyday life derive a new depth of meaning. By contrast, to be without any sense of belonging in what is greater than oneself, or transcends one in some sort, is to feel alienated.

Although religion in primitive societies expresses itself in ways strange to us, it too gives a strong and numinous sense of belonging in nature, and of the everyday world being embedded in an intangible universe that permeates and includes it. In both primitive tribal experience and the solitary mystic's unity there is a sense of relationship with a transcendent, and of one's consciousness deriving from it and depending on it,—a transcendent not outside but evident in its influence within oneself.

Animals, if they have this sense of belonging in a transcendent must do so in a pre-human way. Now the wild animal *in fact* is a part of its environment, of the herd, the flock, its habitat. It has the most intimate interrelationship between its instinctual expectations and their realisation in the environment. And, incidentally, I do not see how man could become aware of himself as an integral part of the Whole if there were not an actual basis in fact for it.

There is interesting evidence of mystical experience changing in detail while retaining its essential character. Thus both Eckhart and John of the Cross show what Stace called extrovertive mysticism maturing as introvertive. Although both climax in identification with the One, the extrovertive retains an awareness of the Universe that is experienced, while the introvertive, as I have already described, loses all distinctions in the One. We do not need to go to mystical experience, however, to see momentous psychological transformations. This characterises adolescence, where the physical changes may make them possible. But the development is also religious. Many adolescents have a numinous experience in the light of which they realise a new significance in the religion in which they have been educated, or more often reject it as quite inadequate. Both may happen in the same individual, one early the other late in adolescence. The latter is the more interesting. Suddenly, spontaneously, untaught, out of his own nature the adolescent has a new awareness. His preceding uncertainty of himself is resolved in a resurgence when he feels a joyous part of life. And it is by no chance that just at this time he may have the mystical experience of the One. Here we see an absolutely new sort of experience suddenly appearing on a previous foundation that, as far as we could have seen, showed little signs of it.

The new orientation that comes with an experience of the One, itself shows as sudden and surprising a change. Whether this occurs at adolescence or later, it brings a new sense of responsibility, a sense of kinship with all people, and thus a new breadth of view. It enduces a warmth of feeling that if personalised is love of God, and if not flows out towards life. Other-regarding attitudes result rather than selfish, social rather than anti-social, constructive and creative rather than destructive. These come spon-

taneously and therefore by definition are natural and instinctual. Thus man in maturity does not feel he must act out all that he could, following every impulse and instinct. If he is whole he orientates round the One with a sense of significance deriving from it, and out of which develop principles of selection.

Animals live innate purposes, their instincts being shaped to the part they play in the whole, just as are man's. As far as we can see, the animal's instincts orientate to deal with its present necessity, what it must do to pursue its habitual life, but those of the human being with a full religious illumination, to an ideal that is often far beyond this. This surely is very surprising, that neither past habits nor present circumstances but a future not yet, should motivate them. Every purpose involves a vision or intention for the future. But the future here is not intended by the individual, for he may not have thought of it. His actions are spontaneous, not deliberate but coming straight out of his natural feelings. If one's spontaneity is orientated to a future not yet dreamt of, this must imply that the innate purpose is superordinate. It may be, however, that animals which are going to evolve develop impulses no more conditioned by their past or their environment than this. Thus before the seal and the dolphin, like all mammals originally land animals, evolved their present characteristics, they must have developed purposes necessitating living much of their time in water, and those individuals whose bodies adapted best to the new conditions survived. In this way new purposes may appear in creatures due for development—visionary ones in man who is aware of himself, but no less future-orientated in the animal that is not.

If so, man differs from animals not in being led by what is beyond him, but in conceptualising and rationalising experience—the functioning of the left hemisphere of his forebrain which he does not share with animals. In this way he is led to live not spontaneously but by rational moral precepts which he can use without the expense of feeling. By directed thought he clarifies conflicting situations arising out of his inner complexities, relating one thing with another to understand himself, and perhaps even others. He systematises what he experiences and knows objectively, classifying and generalising. Indeed he can cut out the entire instinctual side of himself, letting it atrophy, when he may cease to be even human. And he can build a framework of thought comprised merely of concepts with no basis in outer reality at all, and differentiate these concepts with an infinite subtlety and complexity, spinning a cobweb of distinctions out of his own mind. Although this in intellectually respectable, it has a certain pathos, for it may involve losing all sense of instinctual values, the purpose-giving, transcending influences that make life meaningful.

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[Dr. Katharine M. Wilson, formerly a lecturer in English, is author of *The Real Rhythm in English Poetry, Sound and Meaning in English Poetry, The Nightingale and the Hawk* and *Shakespeare's Sugared Sonnets.*]

# GOA—A 450-YEAR EPISODE

## by Mervyn Horder

*SAINT Catherine's Day, February 17th,* 1510. When Don Afonso d'Albuquerque, 'the Mars of Portugal', sailed into the Mandovi river with his 20 ships and 1,200 men, Goa was for him what today we should call a secondary target. He had been preparing to return to his base on Socotra, there to refit for a new operation in the Red Sea, when a trusted Hindu agent came aboard to tell him that owing to the recent death of the local Mohammedan ruler and the youth of the son who was to succeed him, all was currently at sixes and sevens in Goa, and it would be an excellent moment to possess himself of this rich new area without too much trouble. Proceeding with the caution that marked all his enterprises, d'Albuquerque picked up a local *yogi* found wandering on the beach, who confirmed the story; so, after obtaining the support of his officers' council, taking elaborate soundings of the river bar, and despatching a junior officer to neutralise the fort at the river mouth by hand-to-hand assault, he pressed home his attack. No doubt he first put the *yogi* ashore again to spread rumours that a foreign invasion was foretold by the stars, so that resistance was useless.

Though he landed successfully, by August of the same year d'Albuquerque had been expelled again by the local Mohammedans, and had to bring up a second, larger force—28 ships and 1,700 men—before he was able to push his conquest 40 miles inland and something like the modern territory of Goa became formally defined. Portuguese possession of the area was repeatedly disputed by their neighbours for the next 250 years. The kings of Bijapur maintained a running war from 1570 to 1583, and there were Mahratta incursions in 1683, 1732 and 1750. The control of outlying villages was constantly changing hands, but command of the sea and superior artillery (plus on one occasion what was ascribed to the miraculous intervention of St Francis Xavier) enabled the Portuguese to contain all these attacks in the end.

D'Albuquerque made his first landing 12 miles up the river on the left bank and made his capital here, vastly developing and extending the old settlement already in existence. A stone arch, with St. Catherine sitting on top, was built on the spot where he first landed; all subsequent Portuguese came ashore ritually at the same point, and the arch still stands for tourists to photograph today. The city he cleared the jungle to build rapidly became a nine-days wonder—St. Catherine's cathedral, the viceroy's palace, squares, streets, shops, prisons, convents, customs houses, all on the most lavish scale. The city reached the summit of its prosperity at the start of the 17th century, when the saying current all over the East was 'See Goa, and you have no need to see Lisbon.'

A Frenchman, M. Pyrard, who spent three years there at this time has left us a most detailed description of the city and its society; of special interest is his account of the great Jesuit hospital where he spent many

months on arrival in 1608. The medical care in this highly organised institution, however, left something to be desired, owing to the Portuguese system of replacing their viceroys from home every three years, Each new viceroy brought with him his own medical attendant, who without any experience of tropical medicine took charge of the hospital as part of his duties, so that there was never any continuity of clinical knowledge or practice.

In the middle of the 17th century, from 1635 onwards, a series of epidemic fevers took their toll in the city and began its progressive decline and a general flight from the area by all except those engaged on religious duties. In 1759 the viceroy's residence was moved down the Mandovi to Panjim, a new riverside city only three miles inland. No one, however, could move the churches, so these still stand there under the blazing sun, a striking demonstration of the mutability of human affairs. The big three—St. Catherine's Sè Cathedral with its huge golden bell that kept Pyrard awake all night, the church of St. Francis of Assisi (a converted Mohammedan mosque) and the church of Bom Jesus consecrated in 1603 and repository of the remains of St. Francis Xavier—these are today the three jewels of a somewhat self-conscious Office-of-Works-style enclosure, complete with mown lawns, bougainvillea, a statue of Camoens (1960), souvenir shops and cafés to minister to the daily coachloads of tourists come to goggle at their vast echoing empty aisles and glittering golden reredoses.

In the Bom Jesus church vernacular masses are still read daily and attended by hundreds of worshippers, but no longer in the other two except on special occasions. And the rest of the famous city of Old Goa sleeps buried under the jungle for miles around, at least 50 years work ahead for the Archaeological Commission of India into whose keeping it has now passed.

St. Francis Xavier, patron saint of Goa and Portuguese places further east, was a friend of St. Ignatius Loyola, a rich, handsome, humorous young man who reached Goa in 1542, aged 36, at the start of his first missionary journey. Ten years later he died on an island off the China coast, on the beach of which, it is said, his body was found perfectly preserved two years later by some passing Portuguese who shipped it back to Goa. The Pope, hearing of this miraculous preservation, asked them to cut off one arm and send it to Rome so that the matter could be investigated; and while waiting on a side table for this purpose, the arm was observed to seize a nearby pencil and write 'F. Xavier' on the table. St. Francis was canonized in 1622, and his body placed in 1637 in a magnificent Italian silver casket which now towers over a side-aisle of the Bom Jesus church, twelve feet off the ground on a marble pedestal. Mummified now, the body is said to have remained uncorrupted at least till the middle of the last century, a priest being given the special task of shaving it every few days. The romance of the story is further attested by a curious flat silver casket negligently placed at the foot of the pedestal: this contains two of the saint's toes, bitten off by an enthusiastic female admirer and traced to her house by tell-tale drops of blood, so that she was made to return them.

Goa is indeed a forcing-ground for fantastic stories, where one can

believe almost anything. Another is recounted by a hard-bitten Scottish sea captain who was there in 1709. A Portuguese ship, rounding the Cape of Good Hope on its way to Goa, ran into a violent storm, and the captain and crew were preparing to abandon ship when the Virgin Mary appeared suddenly on the bridge with the words 'Allow me.' Willing to try anything, the captain handed the wheel to the new arrival, who drove the ship the remaining 3,000 miles to Goa overnight; but her navigation was not equal to her goodwill, and in the early morning mist the ship came to rest on land at the end of its journey, in the middle of a field—where a new church the exact shape of a ship was built forthwith to commemorate the miracle. Goans were delighted by this story which they had never heard; but no one could show me the church, or its site.

The splendour of the colony began to dwindle in the 17th century under the joint pressures of repeated plagues and fevers and the arrival of Dutch and British commercial rivals in the Indian Ocean, using smaller handier ships than the huge carracks on which the Portuguese continued to rely. Various other factors contributed to the decline: extreme religious fanaticism (supported by an energetic branch of the Inquisition 1560-1812), the inexperience and caprices of viceroys arriving fresh from Portugal every three years, the suppression of all native trade, and the disinterest of the Spanish government, to which Portugal was subject from 1580 to 1640; but the central problem was one of manpower. The vast area over which Portugal claimed sea sovereignty, with Goa as its capital, stretched from Bombay to Malacca and Macao. It needed a supply of at least 3,000 trained men annually to garrison and police it; and a nation the size of Portugal, even with the help of African auxiliaries, could not stretch itself to provide them, much less enough experienced administrators of the necessary calibre. One of the 18th century viceroys who found himself gravelled for enough men to send on a policing expedition solved the problem by signing on a number of local priests to do the job; within a few months he was ordered back to Portugal and excommunicated.

The end of the 18th century saw the invasion of mainland Portugal by the French; but by this time the British were well enough established in India to be able to lend a hand garrisoning Goa, and during the ensuing 150 years of the *pax Britannica* in India, Goa nestled more and more comfortably under the British umbrella. In the 1860s a metre-gauge railway was pushed from Belgaum in British India through the Western Ghats across the Suari river down to the deep-water port of Marmagao, adding greatly to the commercial riches of the colony.

In 1843 Panjim became the official capital of Portuguese India. Today, as Panaji, it remains the Indian administrative capital, with government offices in the old viceroy's house on the waterfront. Cool, green in its riverine setting, busy with its fish quays and a large daily packet boat from Bombay, its statued streets and squares still elegant with the old Portuguese architecture, the little city is much more inviting that most Indian towns, and seems in some way to typify the outgoing charm and accessibility of its inhabitants, so far removed from the introverted desperation which seems

to be the prevailing mood of so many Indians. For some reason a comparison with Lerwick suggests itself, both for the agreeably mongrel stock of the inhabitants, and for the parallel that so many of the males, both Goans and Shetlanders, habitually spend most of their working lives abroad, returning to the mother territory when they retire.

The length of time the Portuguese had been settled in Goa, the extent of Portuguese-Indian interbreeding and the cardinal importance of Goa to the Portuguese as a staging-point for places further east, together with that *vis inertiae* which so often takes a hand on such occasions, made Portugal decide to stay on as the sole remaining old-style colonial power in India when the British withdrew in 1947. It was asking for trouble; and after they had begun to develop the colony's iron and manganese ore deposits with the help of American money in the 1950s, trouble came. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter, the Indian takeover of Portuguese India—Goa, Daman and Diù—in December 1961 was all but bloodless; and those deposits, shipped mainly to Japan, rank today among the top five of India's most lucrative exports. Those who visit Goa now and remember the old colony will find that it is being dragged steadily forward into the 20th century, with electrification schemes, concrete office blocks, new schools, roads, hospitals, tourist hotels, bridges and all the admired hardware of conventional modern civilisation. A symbol of the process is the splendid new Nehru Bridge at Panjim. Like so many things Indian its fifteen fine arches degenerate most ungracefully where the approach roads take over at either end; but it is a key structure on the new trunk road being built down the west coast of India, and it effectively replaces the most frustrating of the many car ferries on which the traffic of Goa depends—and of twelve such ferries still remaining, eleven operate permanently at a loss.

Goa still retains its separate political identity and has not been merged into the state of Maharastra which surrounds it on all sides—a plebiscite in 1967 confirmed that this was the wish of the inhabitants; nor has prohibition been enforced there. There are said to be 3000 bars in the towns and villages of Goa, an area about twice the size of the Isle of Wight, and the *feni* arrack distilled locally from the fruit of the cashew tree is, when matured, a drink of some stature; so that any attempt to introduce prohibition would probably induce a riot, besides being impossible to enforce.

Notably unpopular is the fact that, in common with the rest of India, Goans are now subject to food rationing. Being a green well-watered land, it is one of the few parts of India where two crops of rice are possible in the year, of which the available surplus used to be sold by the growers at a profit; now the whole of every crop is bought at a set price for the government pool, and the local rice ration is nominally no better than anyone else's.

There are 850,000 Goans—60% Hindu, 38% Christian, 2% Moslem and the rest—statistics made much of by the Government of India to show that the place is really Hindu and should be under Indian control. In fact Hindus are largely in the country villages, the Christians among the middle

classes, the towndwellers and the fishermen—few of the seagoing fisher boats do not have a large cross painted on the prow. And the scorching sun is apt to blur all precise religious distinctions, so that the various carnivals and festivals of each religion are whole-heartedly enjoyed by all, and several of the most interesting Christian artefacts are the work of Hindu craftsmen.

Among the 2% are no doubt officially numbered the floating hundreds of white hippies of all nations—gentlemen beggars, you might call them—who have settled there for various periods since the hippy movement got into its stride in the 1950s. With an excellent supply of European vegetables and almost daily surpluses of fish, *far niente* is as *dolce* here as anywhere on earth, outside the ten weeks or so of the monsoon, and £10 will go further in Goa than in most places. It is probably the continued presence of hippies that first drew the Government of India's attention to the potential of the place as a tourist paradise, which may be said to have reached a peak this year with the opening of a magnificent new tourist resort, of most original design in red laterite, at Fort Aguada, at one end of the five-mile long Calangute beach. At the other end of this beach, at Anjuna, is the principal hippie settlement; and the weekly hippie flea market, held here on Wednesday afternoons under the coconut palms, is an event which has something for all who attend it—for the hippies themselves, who turn into cash their worn jeans shorts, paperbacks, cameras and other unwanted possessions; for the tourists, uneasily poised between curiosity and disapproval; and for the Indians themselves, who, being the bazaar experts of the world, have long ago collared for themselves all the lucrative traffic in foodstuffs and cheap clothes, to say nothing of such ancillary services as fortune-telling and tattooing. If you are a hippy tired of the Goa scene, it is at this market that you book to travel in whatever minibus to whatever destination next attracts you: Goa-Delhi was on offer this spring for 20 rupees, Goa-Colombo for 30, Goa-Nepal for 40, and your interest is further solicited by a list of exactly what cassettes are carried on board for your entertainment en route. But those who are thinking of taking up the life of a hippy must understand—as clearly appears from your first five minutes' stroll round the Anjuna flea market—that the life is prematurely ageing and exceedingly bad for the complexion.

Births, deaths, drugs, thefts, fights, indecent exposure, dysentery—these are some of the social problems that the hippies bring in their train, squatting outside their *cajjan* huts strumming their guitars through the long still evenings. Of these, deaths are one of the most difficult; the practice is, if a hippy corpse is unclaimed, for the Indian police to sew it up in a gunny sack, drive it to Bombay and tip it by night over the wall of the relevant consulate for further action to be taken there.

One of the standard tourist attractions at the new resort is a sunset launch trip up the Mandovi. Each village landing stage is crowded with small Indian boys who, as the launch approaches the shore, dance about with broad grins and ecstatic cries of 'Hippies! Hippies!' pointing derisive fingers at the utterly respectable Australian businessmen, serious Dutch

archaeologists and wives of British colonels lining the ship's rail. For the local Indian young 'hippy' is all that white man now means. And the solemn and not too cheerful dinner parties held in the new Fort Aguada hotel between parents and their irreclaimable hippy sons and daughters are another strange feature of Goan tourist life today. One cannot help wondering what Don Afonso d'Albuquerque and his captains would have made of it all.

'Democracy' the puzzled Japanese women used to ask in Tokyo in 1945, 'doesn't that mean washing machines? Well, where are they?' And anyone who has ever taken a photo in the more backward areas of the East will be aware of the subject's profound disappointment that the result cannot be produced at once out of the back of the camera. One of the most painful lessons the East has to learn is that Western civilisation is not instant; to embrace it is to subject yourself to as much unsettlement, frustration and unrelenting hard work as anything in the way of life you want it to replace.

This is the process, as agonizing as it is alluring, in which Goans in common with the rest of India are caught up today, with all it means in terms of lack of capital, country-town migration, erosion of family stability, education lag, and so on. Their mongrel blood, their religious instincts, their experience of other lands and a certain invincible cheerfulness of disposition give them extra strength with which to meet their troubles; and it is impossible for anyone who has known them on their home ground not to wish them well.

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[Mervyn Horder was chairman of the publishers Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd 1948-1969; he has composed song cycles to words by John Betjeman, Dorothy Parker and Charles Causley and has retained from his war service in the Far East a special interest in the history and affairs of the Indian Ocean. Publications include *The Little Genius*, a biography of his father, the royal physician.]

# A NOTE ON CARL SEELIG AND D. H. LAWRENCE

## by Frederick Owen

WHEN D. H. Lawrence returned to London at the beginning of October 1925 after being away for over eighteen months on his second period of residence in America, he replied to a letter from a Swiss called Carl Seelig, giving information about his literary career and promising to send him German translations of *The Rainbow* and *The Boy in the Bush*. After only a very short time in England, Lawrence had decided he couldn't settle there. The physical strain of unremitting travel was bad for his tubercular condition, but he was spiritually restless to move somewhere else, probably to the Mediterranean again. So that Seelig's invitation to come to Kastanienbaum, on Lake Lucerne, was opportune and welcome, and Lawrence said he should like to very much if it could be managed. He spent a fortnight with his sisters in the Midlands, and then he and his wife left for Baden-Baden, where they were reunited with Frieda's mother, the Baroness von Richthofen, before the month was up.

From the Black Forest he wrote definitely accepting Seelig's offer. He said what fun it would be to stop off at Switzerland and how he loved the Vierwaldstättersee. Lawrence, of course, knew the region from before the war, though his observations on 'Lucerne and its lake' in his first travel-book, *Twilight in Italy*, are scarcely of a complimentary nature. Distance, it seems, and nostalgia for autumnal Europe had lent enchantment to the view; in addition, there was his excitement at the prospect of seeing his beloved Italy once more and of going over much of the ground—if only as a train-passenger—which he had covered on foot on the journey to the Gulf of Spezia, in September 1913.

On Thursday, November 12, 1925, the Lawrences left Baden-Baden for Lucerne, where they were met by Seelig and his first wife. It was the one and only personal encounter between the ascetic-featured Swiss journalist with a taste for bow-ties and (to quote Seelig himself) the English novelist, 'lean, with a rusty-red beard.' Precious little is known of the visit which, in any case, only lasted a couple of days. They did some motoring in the neighbourhood of Lucerne and Zug, for which Lawrence paid with a cold. There appears to have been quite a lot of discussion about travel. According to Seelig, Lawrence proposed that they begin a new life 'over the Ocean', and the idea of going east to Russia was also mooted. A friend called Haas pops into the picture, too, but apart from the fact of sharing Seelig's matrimonial difficulties, he remains a mystery. It was, most likely, on the following Saturday that they continued their pleasantly interrupted journey to Spotorno, over the Gotthard.

However, the correspondence didn't stop with the termination of the visit. In May 1958, Seelig put up for auction, in Germany, seven letters and two postcards from Lawrence, which were knocked down to a purchaser in New York. Since the *Collected Letters* prints only four pieces of correspond-

ence from Lawrence, there is as much again unpublished material available somewhere. A pity it hasn't yet seen the light! Though it is fairly certain that there was at least one other letter in the interim, the *Collected Letters* gives May 21, 1926 as Lawrence's next communication with Seelig after the Lucerne meeting, by which time he had moved on to Florence. Lawrence writes that he has abandoned ambitions to go to Russia, and Frieda appends a note in German urging Seelig and Frau Seelig to come to the Villa Mirenda. But the invitation was never taken up. The last letter, dated three years after their first meeting, is from Bandol, on the French Riviera, and replies by return to the news that Seelig has divorced his wife and consequently feels free to launch out into the world. The Swiss toys with such places as Russia, Liberia and the South Sea Islands and possibly suggests that Lawrence accompany him. But the Englishman reiterates his disillusionment with Russia and says that his poor health forbids voyages to the Tropics. Here the correspondence, as we have it, comes to a full-stop. Seelig, unfortunately, didn't write an autobiography—perhaps an innate reserve restrained him—or leave behind memoirs of a richly personal kind —so there is nothing more to supplement the relationship with Lawrence.

But, mainly for the benefit of non-Helvetian readers, it *is* possible to say something more of Seelig himself, to fill out, so to speak, the shadowy form behind the all-too-brief correspondence, We discover, though we ought already to have suspected it in one of *Lawrence's* acquaintances, a figure of considerably more interest and complexity than the description 'Swiss journalist' leads us to anticipate. Carl Seelig was born in Zürich on May 11, 1894 and, whatever plans and aspirations he may have disclosed to Lawrence concerning global explorations, that city proved the life-long sphere of his professional activity. From the start, he had no money worries because his father owned a silk dye-works, which was an obvious asset in moulding his philanthropism and, later, in practically applying it. After studying literature and law at Zürich University and undertaking a number of instructional travels, he began to work for publishers and newspapers. He once confessed that literature, the theatre and films provided his favourite 'hunting-ground', but, as an obituary columnist points out, his versatility didn't end there: he was journalist, biographer, translator, editor and, in a modest fashion (one volume of lyrical verse published) poet.

He wrote a substantial life of Albert Einstein, which is now out of print, and in the highly praised book, *Wanderungen mit Robert Walser* (1957), recollections of the Swiss poet and precursor of Kafka, Robert Walser. He had also begun assembling material for a biography, but death intervened. Robert Mächler, however, who *did* write Walser's biography, acknowledges his heavy debt to Seelig's preliminary work. The same writer draws our attention to the oddity, or apparent oddity, of Seelig's being able to deal convincingly with two such utterly different personalities: Einstein, the physicist, interpreting existence in terms of factual exactitude; Walser, the poet, relying on erratic insights. But a liberal-humane belief reconciles their many differences, and this is shared by the biographer. Einstein described the biography as being true in every detail.

Seelig translated the whole of *Gulliver's Travels* into German; it appeared as an illustrated edition with a foreword by the 1946 Nobel Prize Winner, Hermann Hesse, who had long been living in Switzerland and was a close friend.

He edited the collected works of Novalis (Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg), Georg Büchner, Georg Heym and Robert Walser—an intriguing mixture of Romanticism, Socialistic-drama and Expressionism and another index to his versatility. His work on the five volumes of Robert Walser is particularly appreciated. Perhaps he took to heart what Hermann Hesse once said of Walser—that if he had 100,000 readers the world would be a better place. Furthermore, in 1953, he edited a new issue of Einstein's, *Mein Weltbild*, which had first appeared in 1934. And he completed his work on the famous scientist, in 1956, shortly after the latter's death, by editing and contributing to *Helle Zeit—dunkle Zeit*, a collection of reminiscences by friends of Einstein about their great contemporary. It is only fair to say that Seelig's work was uneven in quality, probably because he was very busy in other directions, and that some of Zürich's leading aesthetes treated it with condescension.

One thing which stands out in Seelig's life is the way he courted the favour of men of genius and managed to become their friend. His striking up an acquaintance with D. H. Lawrence is only one in a list of such occurrences. A youthful attempt, in 1919, to get on a friendly footing with Thomas Mann was less successful. He wrote proposing some kind of literary scheme, for which the master, in a perfectly courteous reply, couldn't see 'a practical opportunity at the moment'. However, when the Nazi regime drove Mann into exile in Switzerland, they got to know each other well and the German commended the Einstein biography. Seelig met Einstein for the first time when the physicist was teaching in Zürich during the 1914-18 War. Seelig notes how the friendship particularly ripened during the last years. He was a friend of Robert Walser from 1936 until the poet's unfortunate death, at Christmas 1956. Seelig once said that he had an instinctive aversion to the megalomaniac artist who considered himself the centre of the universe; like Gulliver, the smell of horse-manure was preferable to that of the sweating ambition of a writer. This conditioned his choice of friends, inclining him towards people who not only had genius but also humility: Albert Einstein, Albert Schweitzer, Robert Walser. . . . And, unlike, say, Max Frisch he had no time for coffee-house confabulations, but liked to exercise body and mind simultaneously in the open air—thus the title of his book about Walser; while Stefan Zweig, before he emigrated to South America, accompanied him on several 'Bergtouren.' Other friends included Max Picard, Max Brod, Henri Barbusse and Franz Werfel.

There was, nevertheless, a paradoxical side to Seelig's sociability. For even though he was successful in his approaches to these prominent men, it would be hard to describe him as a 'clubbable' person, and not merely because he favoured literary conversations in the open air. And, it is said, that even though he was always prepared to help relieve the distress of people from all walks of life—not just confining himself to rendering Robert

Walser comfort in the mental home—he didn't find deep bonds of friendship easy to forge and that very few enjoyed his closest confidence. His friendship with Walser, for instance, despite its long duration, was conducted with scrupulous formality. This may also explain why Lawrence's letters to him are rather scrappy and repetitive, as if the novelist has difficulty in finding mutual interests to write about. They contrast with the letters to another German friend, Max Mohr, whose disposition, one assumes, was warmer and more impulsive than Seelig's.

A natural reserve must largely account for this, but it was also aggravated by the painful death of his second wife. This experience intensified (to use his own words) a kind of 'inner emigration.' All the more reason, therefore, for admiring his humane sense of duty, which sent him out amongst anonymous sufferers in prisons, hospitals, slums and factories. He refused to indulge a growing aloofness, and people valued him for it. Though well-wishers held the ascendancy, he had enemies, too; his tendency to judge a person by the way he suited the action to the word could not expect to be universally popular.

Seelig's father, who had also been a well-known Alpinist, had met his death in the mountains, Seelig died from a more banal accident than his father's, in Zürich, on February 15, 1962. It was a stormy day and he slipped off the boarding-step of a moving tram and expired on the way to hospital. There were no children to succeed him.

Over the place in Bellevueplatz where he fatally stumbled from the tram, a black flag fluttered for several days. On it was the inscription: 'Here a human being was killed.'

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[Frederick Owen will contribute an article on *D. H. Lawrence in Italy* in a later issue.]

# QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW

## by David Fingleton

**OPERA**

WAGNER. *Lohengrin.* Bayreuth Orchestra & Chorus/Sawallisch. (4 records.) PHILIPS 6747 241. £10.50.

WAGNER. *The Valkyrie.* English National Opera Orchestra/Goodall. (5 records.) HMV SLS 5063. £10.95.

WAGNER. *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg.* Vienna State Opera Orchestra & Chorus/Solti. (5 records.) DECCA D13D 5. £17.50.

BARTOK. *Bluebeard's Castle.* BBCSO/Boulez. CBS 76518. £3.49.

**ORCHESTRAL**

IVES. Symphony No. 2/Decoration Day/Variations on "America". Los Angeles PO/Mehta. DECCA SXL 6753. £3.25.

GERSHWIN. *An American in Paris*/COPLAND. *Appalachian Spring.*/BERNSTEIN. Overture *Candide.* Los Angeles PO/Mehta. DECCA SXL 6811. £3.25.

BARBER. Adagio for Strings/IVES. Symphony No. 3/Other American Works. Academy of St. Martin-in-the-Fields/Marriner. ARGO ZRG 845. £3.25.

HAYDN. Cello Concertos in C & D. Rostropovitch/Academy of St. Martin-in-the-Fields. HMV ASD 3255. £3.50.

HODDINOTT. *Dives & Lazarus Cantata* & Other Works. Soloists/WNO Chorale/New Philharmonia/Atherton. ARGO ZRG 824. £3.25.

HODDINOTT. Welsh Dances & Other Works/MATHIAS. Celtic Dances & Other Works. National Youth Orchetra of Wales/Davison. BBC RECORDS REC 222. £1.79.

**INSTRUMENTAL**

LISZT. Sonata in B Minor/Mephisto Waltz No. 1/Venezia e Napoli. Berman (Piano). HMV ASD 3228. £3.50.

GERSHWIN. Solo Piano Music. André Watts. CBS 76508. £3.49.

**CHORAL**

BEETHOVEN. *Missa Solemnis* Soloists/New Philharmonia Chorus/LPO/Giulini. (2 records.) HMV SLS 989. £6.60.

**RECITALS**

FAURE, Songs. Palmer/Constable. ARGO ZRG 815. £3.25.

FRENCH OPERATIC ARIAS. Von Stade/LPO/Pritchard. CBS 76522. £3.49.

VERDI ARIAS. Scotto/LPO/Gavazzeni. CBS 76426. £3.49.

THE ART OF SHERRILL MILNES. (2 records.) RCA LRL2 5731. £5.98.

IN the summer which marked the centenary of Wagner opera at Bayreuth, it was fitting that the record companies should issue some important new recordings. The three operas I deal with here make an interesting cross-section of Wagner recording. Philips' *Lohengrin* could probably be called the most 'authentic' as it was a 'live' recording from the 1962 Bayreuth Festival itself, If only one had had the good fortune to be there fourteen years ago to see as well as hear this magnificent performance. Nevertheless, *pace* those who maintain that there is no discernible atmospheric quality from a 'live', as opposed to 'studio' recording, I would suggest that this *Lohengrin* preserves, like HMV's issue of English National Opera's *Valkyrie*, a presence which is virtually unobtainable in the recording studio, and I would willingly put up with occasional audience noises, and marginally less vivid recorded sound as the price to be paid.

Of all Wagner's operas, *Lohengrin* offers the greatest scope for a fine chorus, and here that of the Bayreuth Festival, lovingly trained by the late Wilhelm Pitz and superbly conducted by Wolfgang Sawallisch, gives a stunning performance. As indeed do the orchestra who play this vivid, ardent music with polish and conviction. The cast is a vintage one, with two veterans, Ramon Vinay and Astrid Varnay, more than compensating for any loss of vocal bloom by the sheer dramatic strength of their Freidrich von Telramund and Ortrud. Jess Thomas's Lohengrin is entirely dependable, and at times something more, and the young Anja Silja as Elsa gives what must be her most totally satisfying recorded performance. Add to these Franz Crass and Tom Krause's admirable King Henry and Herald and a formidable quartet of Brabantine Nobles and one has an indispensable set. At £10.50 for the four boxed records, with a booklet containing an excellent essay on the opera by William Mann, it is also astounding value.

Even more remarkably, HMV's recording of the ENO *Valkyrie* costs a mere £10.95 for five records. This enshrines the performances given last December at the London Coliseum and means that of the 'Goodall Ring' in Andrew Porter's magnificent English translation only *Twilight of the Gods* remains to be recorded, and this will be done at the very end of this year for release sometime in 1977. *The Valkyrie* has all the qualities of the two previous 'live' recordings at the Coliseum. Goodall's wonderfully judged, perceptive reading of the score as usual draws a devoted response from both orchestra and singers, and once again it is so illuminating to hear virtually every word of the drama so that Wagner's work comes alive in an unprecedented way. In many German language performances, at the highest international level, Wotan's Act 2 'Narration' can seem tedious. Here, as tellingly enunciated by Norman Bailey, a matchless Wotan, it becomes compelling listening and explains the entire Cycle, Alberto Remedios and Margaret Curphey display considerable ardour as well as tonal beauty as Siegmund and Sieglinde, and Rita Hunter, though possibly not quite on her best form, is a sweet-voiced youthful sounding Brunnhilde. Clifford Grant is an exemplary Hunding, Ann Howard a well dramatised, if vocally somewhat strained, Fricka, and the Valkyries are a strong team. Again this is a compulsory acquisition for the Wagnerian.

Decca's *Meistersinger von Nürnberg* is thus the only studio recording, made in Vienna's Sofiensaal, with the Vienna Staatsoper Orchestra at its most mellifluous under Sir Georg Solti. The recording is remarkably vivid and well balanced, and Solti offers a penetrating, admirably judged and remarkably warm view of this great work. But sadly, as is invariably the case with new studio recordings, the price of £17.50 for the five-record set is very much higher than for the other two. If undeterred by such expenditure—after all no more than the price of one best stalls seat plus programme and interval drinks at a Covent Garden Ring performance—then this is a *Meistersinger* to be reckoned with. There may be those who will still prefer HMV's Karajan's Dresden recording, but for me Solti's warmth and Norman Bailey's quite unsurpassed Hans Sachs make this one the more desirable. René Kollo singe Walther, as for Karajan, and though his is an entirely adequate performance, one regrets that Remedios was not per-

suaded to learn the role in German for this recording—his lyricism is much missed. Hannelore Bode is a fine Eva and Bernd Weikl sings Beckmesser with great beauty, an unusual, but pleasing, departure from tradition.

Another operatic recording of considerable merit is of Bartok's powerful, compelling *Bluebeard's Castle*, a one act work which fits neatly onto a single record. This recording comes via BBC performances, with their Symphony Orchestra eloquently conducted by Pierre Boulez. Siegmund Nimsgern sings Bluebeard with immense penetration, and Tatiana Troyanos is admirable as his wife, Judith, whose curiosity dictates her fate. Sung in Hungarian, and excellently recorded by CBS, this is a valuable addition to the repertoire.

Decca continue to mark the American Bicentenary with first rate new issues. Their Charles Ives record of the Second Symphony, 'Decoration Day' and this ever unpredictable composer's variations on 'America', orchestrated by William Schuman is winningly played by the Los Angeles Philharmonic under their immensely gifted conductor, Zubin Mehta, and the sound quality is impressive. It is equally so on Mehta's other recent recording with this orchestra, and this one is even more instantly enjoyable, offering Gershwin's exhilarating *An American in Paris*, Copland's beautiful, moving *Appalachian Spring*—surely one of the most successful American genre pieces every written—and, as a bonne bouche, Bernstein's effervescent *Candide* overture. This record is likely to become a popular favourite as well as a valuable showcase of American music. Argo have also added to the American collection, this time with our own Academy of St. Martin-in-the-Fields under their conductor Neville Marriner. This issue offers Ives' 3rd Symphony, a hauntingly beautiful account of Samuel Barber's well-known Adagio for Strings, and also works by Copland, Cowell and Paul Creston, whose 'A Rumor' is an intricate and amusing piece of musical craftsmanship. The Academy also accompany the great Russian cellist, Mstislav Rostropovitch, whose decision to live in the West is our great good fortune, in two Haydn Cello Concertos for HMV. They are both formidably played, and Rostropovitch makes the technical demands of the Concerto in C seem minimal with his singing, burnished tone. That in D is less extrovert in cast but equally rewarding, and the Academy, under Iona Brown their first violin, accompany with great zest.

Wales is of course renowned for its music making, and among its living composers none is more productive than Alun Hoddinott, whose own brand of melodiousness in an advanced idiom makes stimulating, enjoyable listening in whatever kind of work he writes. Argo have recently issued a most engaging selection of his music: The Dives and Lazarus Cantata, beautifully sung here by Felicity Palmer and Thomas Allen with the superb Welsh National Opera Chorale, was originally written for the Farnham Schools Festival, and is a simple, yet intensely moving work. So too in his exquisite Concertino for Viola and small orchestra, an earlier work written in 1958 when the composer was 30. Both, along with the Sinfonietta No. 1 and the engaging Night Music are splendidly played by the New Philharmonia under David Atherton. Another very attractive record of

Welsh music, again by Hoddinott, as well as his contemporary William Mathias, has been issued by the BBC, and is quite staggeringly well played by the National Youth Orchestra of Wales under Arthur Davison. Comprising Hoddinott's Welsh Dances, Opus 64, and Investiture Dances, Op.66, and Concerto Grosso, Op.46, and Mathias' equally attractive Celtic Dances, and his Sinfonietta written in 1967 for the Leicestershire Schools Symphony Orchestra, this is precisely the sort of enterprising addition to the record catalogue we need. It also demonstrates how high is the standard of our youth orchestras.

Two stimulating solo piano records have recently appeared. Having been spoken of in terms of legendary speculation for years now, the work of the Russian Jewish pianist, Lazar Berman, has finally arrived in the West. His recording of Liszt's B Minor Sonata displays a formidable technique and great intellectual comprehension, but one does occasionally miss a sense of total involvement and love. The second side of Venezia e Napoli and the first Mephisto Waltz is played with the utmost virtuosity, but this remains a record to admire rather than to cherish. On the other hand André Watts' recording for CBS of George Gershwin's piano music, including Rhapsody in Blue in its highly-attractive version for piano solo, which the composer himself once committed to a piano roll, and, as well as the three Preludes for Piano, thirteen of Gershwin's most beautiful songs, is an out-and-out winner. After the emotional punch of Rhapsody in Blue, what a joy to listen to Watts' way with *Swanee, 'S Wonderful, That Certain Feeling, Liza,* and *I Got Rhythm.* Get it!

Beethoven's *Missa Solemnis* is not a work to be undertaken lightly, and it is a measure of Carlo Maria Giulini's artistic integrity that only now has he recorded it. The result was worth waiting for: his interpretation may lack the sheer granite of Klemperer's matchless recording, but Giulini's has an emotional commitment and spiritual devotion that make it a most memorable experience, The London Philharmonic Orchestra and New Philharmonia Chorus respond vividly to his direction, the quartet of soloists is splendid, with Dame Janet Baker and Hans Sotin's seamless bass quite outstanding. Happily HMV's recording also displays the necessary spatial depth. Among our young singers Felicity Palmer is one of the most intelligent, and possesses a true and attractive voice. Her record of Fauré's *Chansons,* winningly accompanied by John Constable, has considerable merit. One feels nevertheless that in time she will find more positive expression in the Verlaine songs, but, quibbles aside, this recital gives considerable pleasure.

So, too, do two operatic recital discs. Frederica von Stade is one of the most exciting young mezzo soprannos of the day, and her recording of French arias is a winner from start to finish. Accompanied with great sensitivity by John Pritchard and the LPO, every aria is carefully, positively thought out. Contrast Berlioz' 'D'Amour, l'ardente flamme', and Meyerbeer's 'Nobles Seigneurs' with Offenbach's 'Ah, Quel diner' to grasp the full extent of this remarkable young singer's range. Renata Scotto has for some time been a leading Italian lyric soprano, much in demand in opera

houses, yet surprisingly under-recorded. CBS make amends with this rewarding recital of Verdi arias, accompanied by the LPO under Gavazzeni. Again every item is a pleasure to hear, and the more lyrical the piece, the greater Miss Scotto's success. 'Addio del Passato' from *La Traviata* and the *Willow Song* and *Ave Maria* from *Otello* are both intensely moving.

Finally, I can recommend a thoroughly enjoyable two-record set displaying the art of that fine American baritone, Sherrill Milnes. Magnificent in Verdi and Puccini, and a treat to hear in Stephen Foster and the American folksongs, there is plenty else in this collection that will please, even if one cannot recommend his rather negative treatment of Brahms' Four Serious Songs.

The December issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Vive le Canada Libre—et Vive nos Differences* by Brian Meredith, *The Latin Mass* by Suzette Coote, *No Progress Report on the Law of the Sea* by F. J. Birnie, and *Man and the Environment: Collusion or Collision?* by David W. Williams.

# WOMEN OF ASIA

## by Elizabeth Gordon

MANY Westerners, when they hear the words 'Asian Women', think of docile Geisha girls bowing before their guests, graceful Balinese dancing girls or perhaps Indian women squatting over their stoves. Whatever the vision, the words 'unemancipated woman' usually describe it. This generalisation, encouraged by inadequate coverage of women's status by the generally male oriented press, is erroneous and misleading. It is comparable with the equally erroneous concept of western womanhood held by many Asian women: namely, that all western women are pushful, graceless and domineering.

In fact, Asian women of various societies differ as diametrically as do their western counterparts; women from the Philippines and Pakistan, for example, having as different a status as do those from Sweden and Sicily.

Western women, who generally think of their Asian sisters as unemancipated in comparison with themselves, fail to realise that women in some Asian communities have held rights by tradition that have been won by western women only in the last century, often after bitter struggles.

Thai women, for example, have traditionally been able to trade in their own right, travelling alone for this purpose when necessary. Money earned from trading or homecrafts has been considered theirs by right. English women, in contrast, won the right to keep the proceeds of their labours only in 1882.

However, despite the fact that many Asian women have traditionally held rights long denied to western women, there are also many Asian communities in which women are held completely subservient or in which their rights are severely curtailed. Pakistani women, for example, especially orthodox muslims from traditional families, have few rights.

There are a number of reasons for the differences between the various Asian societies and the status they accord their women but one of the most important is the difference in kinship systems within the region.

There are two main types of kinship system within Asia and the effects they have had on society are far-reaching, particularly in terms of women's status.

The simple family system which emphasises the nuclear family consisting of mother, father and children is dominant in Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.

In these societies women have held a relatively strong position in the past, generally having equal divorce, inheritance and child guardianship rights with men.

The other type of kinship system, which has the extended family of three or more generations as its basic unit and has emphasised the male line, has been dominant in India, Ceylon, Pakistan and China.

In these societies women's rights have been limited mainly because a greater importance was given to propagating the male line. Inheritance rights, divorce and child guardianship rights were usually denied women in order to prevent division of the family or family property. Men were encouraged to have more than one wife in order to increase the family line and sons were valued above daughters because of their ability to carry on the line.

European tradition has generally been more like the patrilineal system in Asia than the simple system, women being treated, until recently, as legal minors, much as they were in India and China. In Europe, however, emphasis on the male line has had less religious significance than in Asian societies, particularly China, and so has been more susceptible to change.

The four main religions in Asia, Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam have modified traditional beliefs to varying degrees. In general, Islam has restrcted women to the greatest degree and in many Islamic countries women are still struggling to have their basic rights guaranteed by law.

In recent years, with the advent of modern technology, the lives of Asian women have been extensively affected. Man-made fabrics, water pumps, modern transport and communication systems and exposure to alien cultures have all had their effect on the way of life of the people. Even in countries where women have been most inhibited this has resulted in changes, mostly to their benefit.

Education for women has become acceptable and though it is curtailed early in some societies in order for a girl to marry, being able to read and write gives her a great advantage over the women of the previous generation who were often denied the opportunity of learning. Even the experience of leaving the family home to attend school for a few years often encourages greater independence.

In some societies, such as Singapore and Japan, factory work for men and women is changing the outlook of both sexes. In these and similar industrial societies, small city dwellings discourage extended family units living together, medicinal benefits are preventing high infant mortality rates and birth control has become accepted practice. Women of these societies are at last able to escape the bondage of continual childbearing in their fertile years.

Another recent influence on the status of women in Asia which can hardly be overrated is the effect of their participation in recent revolutionary wars in the area, most of which have been anti-colonial in nature. The lives of women in The People's Republic of China, North Korea and North Vietnam have been altered radically by participation in revolutionary struggles and by post-revolutionary policies promoting feminine equality which have been introduced by governments committed to this principle.

Considering that women in these societies, particularly China, were formerly some of the most oppressed in the world, the change is little short

of miraculous. The innovative, critical woman worker of today is a far cry from the footbound vassal of yesterday. In India and Indonesia also, women have also bettered their position by participation in revolutionary struggles during which they have been able to move out of the restricted circle formerly imposed on them.

Although village women have been affected to a lesser extent, city women are now playing a more active political and social role in their countries. Voting rights have been granted to women at the same time as to men in many eastern democracies mainly because the western democracies on which many of them were modelled had, by the time the Asian democracies came into existence, accepted universal suffrage. Asian women often show little appreciation of early western feminists, without realising that they too have had their lot improved by the efforts of these women.

However, despite their criticism of the 'bra-burning' female of the west, whose attitudes they find so difficult to understand, Asian women of most countries have formed societies whose aim is the same as many women's liberation groups of the west: namely, to protect rights already held by women and to agitate for rights they have yet to win.

Even in the most repressive societies women are becoming more vocal. Women in Malaysia and Indonesia are agitating for a ban on polygamy and equal divorce rights for men and women. Japanese women are encouraging their sisters to greater independence. Singapore women are forming their own professional women's associations and workers' unions.

The clock has been started and it can not easily be stopped.

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[Elizabeth Gordon, formerly a bio-chemistry research fellow in the United States, has lived for long periods in Europe and Asia, studying the situation of Asian women in their society.]

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A recent publication, *The Missing Half: Woman 1975* (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the U.N.) may be of interest: also the interim report of a seminar on *Vocational Guidance: Training for Women Workers* organised by the E.E.C. Commission. Publication of the full text is expected later in the year. —*Editor.*

# BERLIN—THE SAD FRONTIER

## by David Childs

SINCE the signing of the Transit Traffic Agreement by East Germany (DDR) and West Germany (BRD) in December 1971, travel between West Germany and West Berlin has been easier. Yet the Western visitor still has to pass through three checkpoints to reach the hundred or so miles of DDR motorway which separates, and links, the Federal Republic and West Berlin. And non-German travellers must pay DM 5 (about £1.12) for a one-way transit visa. The East German frontier police vary from stone-faced imitations of Hollywood Nazis, who will not even respond to an '*Aufwiedersehen*', to friendly, easy-going, young men who attempt conversation. Most of the guards on the 'Peace Frontier' are somewhere between these extremes.

On the Autobahn one will probably encounter a fast-moving US Army convoy with supplies for the Berlin garrison, a few Soviet military vehicles, fewer still East German police cars, a great many trucks from all parts of Europe, and Western and Eastern private cars in the ratio of at least three or four to one. The road itself is appalling, and one can be forgiven for concluding that little major repair has been done since 1945. In fact, with West German money, it is now undergoing extensive resurfacing.

At the end of the Autobahn three more East German checks follow and there is the most perfunctory passport examination on the West Berlin side.

West Berlin is a sad place. At least this was the impression it created on the dozen or so non-German—British, Australian, Canadian, Dutch, Norwegian, Swiss and Iranian—tourists the writer talked to. Of course, Kurfürstendamm continues to keep up its sophisticated, glossy facade. And West Berlin offers a fascinating blend of past and present, darkness and light. The old world broods on in the Nazi execution centre at Plötzensee where many anti-Nazi Germans of all political persuasions met their ends, in Spandau jail with its lonely old prisoner, Rudolf Hess, and in the restored Reichstag building, home of Weimar's ill-fated democracy. The postwar era beckons in the Hansaviertel, an exciting housing development designed in the 1950s by Gropius and 47 other internationally-known architects. Other postwar projects of note include the Europa Centre with its maze of shops and restaurants and including a political cabaret, the Kongresshalle, an international conference centre, and the Free University —just three among many. Berlin also offers wonderful opportunities for those who like sandy beaches, lakes and forests with ample facilities for boating, bathing and walking. Yet despite all of this, again and again one is struck by the isolation of this great city. One cannot go far without coming up against the frontiers of the cold war.

Among those interested in politics there is considerable unease about the future of West Berlin. Many see it as a community living on borrowed time. Writing in the much-respected Hamburg weekly, *Die Zeit* (23 July 1976),

Joachim Nawrocki reminded his readers of West Berlin's falling population, falling investment and contracting labour market. He also felt it was suffering from a decline of interest by Bonn officialdom, and the West German public in general. On the other hand, he felt that the pressure from the Soviet-DDR side was just as great as ever. Nawrocki explained how at the time of the conclusion of the various agreements between East and West, starting with the Four Power Berlin Agreement of 3 September 1971, hopes in West Berlin had been high. The city's ruling Social Democrats had seen their island as a bridge between East and West. They had expected that 'normalisation' would lead to increased investment and trade. They had expected Soviet and East German acceptance of West German government agencies in their city state. On all counts their hopes have not been fulfilled.

West Berlin still has a special, many would say, ambiguous, position in East-West politics. Since the currency reform of 1948, a key factor in the blockade, it has been part of the West German economy. Since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949 it has sent representatives to the Bonn parliament, though they have not had the right to vote. West Berlin is still divided into British, French and US Sectors, and the Allies still retain reserve powers. West Germany's national service laws do not apply in West Berlin, but in most respects it is run as any other *Land* of the Federal Republic. It receives massive aid from Bonn and the city's prosperity is in part a reflection of this. Ideally the West Germans, especially the Social Democrats, would like to incorporate it fully into the West German state. The Western Allies have opposed this out of deference to the USSR and because of fear of DDR-BRD confrontation. The Four Power Agreement, referred to above, attempted to formalise the situation. Under it, West Berlin continues 'not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it.' In emphasising this the Treaty represented a victory for the Soviets. However, the Soviets agreed that West Germany 'may perform consular services' for West Berliners, treaties signed by the BRD can be extended to West Berlin, the BRD may represent West Berlin in international bodies, etc. The Soviets also agreed that transit traffic to and from West Berlin through the DDR 'will be unimpeded.' On the positive side, since the 1971 Transit Agreement to the end of 1975 nearly 50 million West Berliners and West Germans had passed in both directions. In the same period about 13 million visits were made by West Berliners to East Berlin. Such visits had been severely restricted between 1961-71. Moreover, since 1971 West Berliners have once again been able to telephone relatives and friends in East Berlin and East Germany directly. Between 1952 and 1971 there had not been this possibility. All this is to the credit of all the signatories of the several agreements, and especially the Governments of the two German states.

Many people in West Germany feel that the DDR authorities have not fulfilled their obligations under the UN Charter—since 1973 both Germanies are UN members—and the Helsinki Accord of 1975. They point out that the tourist traffic is largely one-way, from West to East. Few East Germans in the active age groups are allowed by their government to visit the BRD,

though some come on 'urgent family business', mainly in cases of births, marriages and deaths of close relatives in the West. East German pensioners are permitted to go to the Federal Republic more or less on request. West German opinion is also incensed over a number of incidents on the DDR-BRD frontier. The most tragic recent case was the shooting dead of the Italian Communist truck driver by East German frontier guards. It is not yet clear how this came about. There have been other shooting incidents and a series of less dramatic cases. The Christian Democrats were outraged by the refusal of the DDR to allow transit to several busloads of their young supporters. They were on their way to West Berlin to take part in a rally organised to protest about the continued existence of the Berlin Wall.

The DDR Government naturally sees the situation differently from its critics in the West. Like the West German Government it emphasises the practical, positive, advances which have been made in inter-German relations. At the same time it condemns what it considers abuses of the agreements and provocations on the frontier. Such 'abuses' would include official West German parliamentary meetings in West Berlin, the setting up of West German Government agencies there, and the occasional presence of the Federal President who has an official residence at the Schloss Bellevue in the Tiergarten. The DDR regards the failure of West Germany to hand over Werner Weinhold as another abuse. Weinhold was serving in the East Germany Army when he shot his way through the frontier to West Germany. He killed two DDR frontier guards as he did so.

The East German mass media make the most of cases like that of Weinhold, and although they no longer attack members of the West German Government, they make much of the activities of the puny nationalistic NPD in the Federal Republic. This is in part to justify the continued existence of the Wall and the tough frontier. The ruling Politburo know that these remain the Achilles heel of their public relations efforts. How to explain this ugly frontier with so many devices which are clearly not designed to keep out NATO tanks, artillery or infantry. The members of the Politburo of the ruling Socialist United Party (SED) realise they still have a problem of morale in the DDR. Under both Walter Ulbricht, and his successor as first secretary, Erich Honecker, they have sought to solve the problem by political and economic means, by propaganda, persuasion and material incentives. They had considerable success in the second half of the 1960s, and more in the 1970s. The international recognition of the DDR was a great boost for them. No longer did their citizens have to feel they were subjects of a fifth-rate state. The tremendous Olympic victories in 1972 and 1976 must have helped the nation's self-confidence. They proved that given half the chance they could oustrip their brothers in the Federal Republic. After years of feeling they were the poor relations, the Games gave them a chance to regain their self-esteem. The economic and political difficulties of the West seen by the many East Germans who can and do watch Western TV must have also played their part. One wonders what they have felt about such oft discussed events as the Watergate scandal, the exposure of Prince Bernhardt, the revolution in Portugal, violence in the

streets of West Berlin, and the unemployed demonstrating in West Germany? The rebuilding of the centres of the DDR's towns over the last ten years has also been a plus. Not every architectural expert in the West will agree with every aspect of the rebuilding East Berlin, but what has been done since the Stalin period has much to commend it. When the writer visited the new *Palast der Republik*, opened in April, it was swarming with ordinary East Germans. This building in which was held the IX congress of the SED, houses, in addition to the DDR parliament, the *Volkskammer*, restaurants, bars, a post office, a theatre, a bowling alley, and other facilities. But more than any of these factors the personal consumption of the average citizen remains the key to morale. How successful has the SED been in this direction?

As in other East Bloc states, whatever else may be in short supply at any given time, there is certainly no shortage of statistics. The statistics indicate, and there is no reason to doubt them, that, in most respects, life has improved for the East Germans over the last decade. In 1965, for instance, only about 8.2 per cent of households owned a motor car. In 1975, according to the official figures, 26.2 per cent did so. Experience on the East German roads confirm the statistics. Other figures show that in the same period ownership of fridges and washing machines has increased from about 25 per cent of households to roughly 75 per cent. Nevertheless, despite these and other improvements, there is still much to grumble about. The writer was frankly surprised by the austere picture presented by the main department stores in East Berlin's Alexanderplatz and by the shops on Karl-Marx-Allee. Whether the department was toys, kitchen utensils, or women's clothing, the standards in Alexanderplatz were well below any provincial store in England, let alone the better stores in West Berlin. And talks with East Germans, in both casual encounters and with long-term contacts, confirmed that, though there have been improvements, food shopping still gives the housewife a few headaches. Housing too remains very much a major social problem. Official figures reveal that in 1975, out of 6.3 million households, about 3m had only one or two rooms. It was only in 1974 that the DDR building industry surpassed the level of its previous best year for home building—1961, the year of the Wall! Throughout the period, construction of homes has been well below West European levels. This situation helps to explain why considerable numbers of East Germans would still like to go West.

A few East Germans are still prepared to take high risks to leave. In 1975 673 DDR citizens managed to cross the East-West frontier at great risk to themselves. Another 5,338 East Germans decided not to return from trips abroad, while 10,274, mainly pensioners, were able to leave legally. The technical perfection of the frontier over the years has steadily reduced the flow of would-be crossers. More 'improvements' are scheduled. The DDR leadership must be worried in the knowledge that every ton of concrete poured into frontier fortifications represents one ton less for house building, thus making this sad frontier even more necessary.

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## THE PROPHET OF TRUTH

*Winston S. Churchill.* Volume V. 1922-1939. Martin Gilbert. Heinemann. £8.50.

Last year in reviewing the previous volume of this exceptional biography I said that 'the merit of Volume IV is that the reader can see, as in a Greek tragedy, the making of a world-famous Prime Minister.' In fact 'the making' took another eighteen years and yet all through those years I had the belief—and the book amply confirms the belief—that if war came there was only one conceivable leader. Nobody could say that Winston had an auspicious start.

After his defeat at Dundee in the general election of 1922, Winston was without a seat (the first time for 22 years). In the disastrous tariff election of 1923, he was defeated as a Liberal at Leicester by Pethick-Lawrence (Labour), to whom he said after the count: 'Well, anyhow, it is a victory for free trade.' In March 1924 he stood as an Independent anti-socialist candidate on a by-election at Westminster against the official Conservatives and lost by 43 votes, after which he said: 'The present so-called three-party system is unhealthy, unnatural and absurd.' Thereafter Winston, by a series of brilliant speeches and articles, had won widespread public support and a most friendly personal relationship with Baldwin, so that he was selected as Conservative for Epping and gained a substantial majority in October 1924.

We all know that he was Chancellor of the Exchequer 1924-29, but not a distinguished Chancellor; in the 1926 General Strike, Baldwin rather than Winston earned a national reputation. On the technical questions of de-rating he worked with Neville Chamberlain, then Minister of Health, but Neville found him a very difficult colleague. Here is a revealing paragraph in a letter written to Lord Irwin (later Halifax) in August 1928; after declaring that Winston was a genius, he said: 'There is too deep a difference between our natures for me to feel at home with him or to regard him with affection. You never get a moment's rest and you never know at what point he will break out.' This revealing quotation explains what is otherwise inexplicable, namely Chamberlain's reluctance to give Winston a job until 1939, after which he returned to the Admiralty and then became Prime Minister and also Minister of Defence.

Then came India and Winston's powerful battle within the Conservative party, drawing to himself most of the diehards and some whom we at the time regarded as near-Fascists. Finally the Abdication and, in Leopold Amery's words, 'he was completely staggered by the unanimous hostility of the House.' Well might he write to a deposed French Minister: 'Political life is full of ups and downs on both sides of the Channel. I have had my share and as you know have never accepted a hostile decision without carrying matters forward to fresh battlefields.' Even as late as 1938, Winston was, in Martin Gilbert's words, 'more isolated *in Parliament* than at any time in the nine years during which he was in Office . . . yet his wider, public popularity had never been so high, his speeches so in demand, nor his audiences so perceptive.'

This preliminary recital of Winston's misfortunes, mostly self-created, must be seen in perspective with his own life and with his subsequent triumphs; they are all part of the grand drama. What was he doing during this period?

Firstly, he was from 1932 calling attention in Parliament and out of Parliament to the main identifiable enemy, Hitler and his German Reich. His

articles appeared in syndicate all over the world. With the priceless aid of two men, Sir Desmond Morton and Ralph Wigram of the Foreign Office and countless others named in the book, he made an unanswerable case against successive Ministers on the question of Germany's accelerated re-armament and evil intentions. To me, Morton and Wigram are the unsung heroes of the book. Winston was not worked up about Spain; he was able to *regret* the Hoare-Laval affair. He slowly gathered round him the bulk of British opinion, a wide swathe of European public support and an ever-growing American sympathy, so much so that by 1940 he was not only Prime Minister but a world leader, a warlord in A. J. P. Taylor's language, but greater than the others. Secondly, he was finishing *The World Crisis*, he completed four volumes of *The Life of Marlborough* and he wrote much of the *History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, amidst all his parliamentary duties. Writing to his wife in 1938, as usual about his ups and downs, he adds: 'I am now doing the Wars of the Roses. . . . I have just finished writing about Joan of Arc, I think she is the winner in the whole of French history.' But he also finished *My Early Life* and *Great Contemporaries* and countless magazine articles. He painted wherever the climate allowed him. Incidentally, he built and rebuilt Chartwell and entertained there.

In one sense the writing was necessary, because as the author shows in some detail, Winston needed the money, earned the money to live in the way he chose. Needless to add, he was a welcome guest in numerous visits to the South of France and to the United States.

Thirdly, Winston seemed always to be bound upon a course of his own making; he sent about 70 copies of his books to his friends in and out of politics. The letters of appreciation from the Baldwins and Chamberlains as well as from his own circle such as Duff Cooper and Maxine Elliot punctuate the pages of this fascinating book. Moreover, in the pursuance of this course he was friendly with the League of Nations Union adherents (unlike the brothers Chamberlain). As early as 1924 they printed 250,000 copies of one of his articles; he wrote to Lord Robert Cecil: 'You see, I am not so unregenerative as you suppose.' In 1931 he wrote for a Hearst newspaper about the *United States of Europe* and later said: 'England's hour of weakness is Europe's danger.' Of course as Chancellor he kept a firm hand on armaments increase, including Singapore, but from 1933 he wanted to abandon the 'ten years rule' and deplored attempts at disarmament, especially as they included France. The cause of disarmament will not be attained by 'mush, slush and gush,' he wrote as early as 1932. By then he talked of re-creating the concert of Europe through the League of Nations and of a 'League of Western States.' In 1936 he accepted the presidency of the New Commonwealth Society founded by Lord David Davies; this brought him in touch with influential Labour supporters like Norman Angell and Walter Citrine. Over the years his supporters accumulated from all ranks of society. One must never confuse his cronies, Bracken, Beaverbrook and Baruch, with the heartbeat of the British people. By 1939, as even Harold Laski could write, 'the whole democratic world has recognised the part he has played . . . this view was shared by most Liberals and by the great bulk of the Labour Party.'

There is a younger school of historians who are re-assessing the 'Thirties'; they accept neither the Churchill version, much less the 'guilty men' yellow books. They point to the relative, perhaps unique stability of Britain, compared with the marching Fascists and Communists all over Europe. There was a

financial and industrial revival in two-thirds of the country. Unemployment in my hard-pressed Scottish constituency was halved and though a Minister in the Baldwin government, my majority in 1935 increased by 75 per cent. Social reform and particularly housing made great strides. Could the country have *also* re-armed from 1931? Would Admiral Fisher, as C.-in-C. Mediterranean, have been strong enough to apply sanctions and knock out the Italians? Would we have joined with the French and resisted the German re-entry into the Rhineland? Was Locarno a viable treaty? Above all, would Winston have galvanised the country to accept these policies and would the Second World War have been avoided or fought from an impregnable base? Historians will continue this debate for many years.

A last word about Martin Gilbert, the author of this book. It is a gigantic work of art and industry, all 1115 pages. There are nuggets of pure gold taken from Churchill's speeches and letters to *Clemmie*, skilfully inserted into the narrative. This is a fair and rare work of scholarship, but also a delight to read.

KENNETH LINDSAY

## THE NATURE OF THE WELFARE STATE

*Welfare State and Welfare Society: Illusion and Reality*. William A. Robson. George Allen and Unwin. £5.50 (also in paperback).

This is a slim book packed with wisdom. Professor Robson is deeply concerned with freedom, and with standards, both public and private. In this volume he deals with many of the problems of contemporary life, and comments on the writings of those who have expressed different points of view. For good measure, he compares from time to time the situation in Britain with that in several other countries, both democratic and totalitarian. This book, I feel, will be warmly welcomed as a guide by countless students of the social sciences, apart from the general reading public. It is clear, succinct and written in an impeccable style.

Professor Robson writes: 'I cannot claim to have formulated a welfare state philosophy, but I have presented a number of propositions on which such a philosophy could be based.' Some objectives of the welfare state, he says, are to remove injustice; others are to improve the quality of life. He sets out the four main aims of the social services in such a State: 'the better protection of personal rights, both social and economic'; 'the rehabilitation of injured, derelict, disabled or handicapped persons'; 'national investment in the young' through a system of publicly administered or publicly financed education, and, lastly, 'the prevention and cure of sickness.'

The author considers 'whether the prevailing attitudes and outlook in Britain today are compatible with the principles and policies of the welfare state.' He concludes that a welfare society is also concerned with our feelings as human beings and with our enjoyment of life. He finds it disturbing that there is such an emphasis in the press and in broadcasting on disaster, fear and violence, giving a distorted picture of what is *really* happening. 'A welfare state, and still more a welfare society, cannot exist in an atmosphere of pessimism, gloom and despondency.'

On Human Values in the Welfare State, the author discusses the alienation of the manual worker. How far, he asks, can the inhuman assembly line be replaced by smaller groups of men and women, each with a share of responsibility which will encourage greater pride in craftsmanship. Identification of the worker with the enterprise (as in Japan) might prevent such frequent resort in Britain to the use of the strike weapon.

Discussing economic policy in the Welfare State, he concludes that good economic planning is, of course, essential. But the doctrine of full employment and the Labour Party's continual pressure for an extension of the public sector may not necessarily be the proper solution. Sweden—one of the most successful of the welfare states—has little public enterprise, while Italy—which does not claim at all to be a welfare state—has a great deal.

Professor Robson enquires as to 'how far the hopes and expectations which were centred in the welfare state during the post-war years have been realised.' He has concentrated on giving a brief appraisal of some major features—a broad look over a wide horizon. This, in my view, has been accomplished soberly, critically but without polemics, and with the authority of an elder statesman.

He distinguishes the welfare state from the welfare society. The welfare state is what Parliament has decreed and the Government does. The welfare society is what people do, feel and think about matters which bear on the general welfare. Professor Robson claims, rightly, that it is impossible to achieve a *real* welfare state without first producing a welfare society. He stresses four points on which change is needed:

> 'First, everyone must understand and accept the duties that should complement the rights they enjoy in the welfare state. . . . Second, every man (or woman) should try to ensure that those who speak for an organisation to which he belongs do represent his views; and if they do not, he should stand up and say so. . . . Third, effective restraint on the power of non-governmental bodies which may become centres of power (such as trade unions, professional organisations and even some charitable organisations). Uncurbed, they threaten the authority of Parliament. Lastly, the stronger trade unions must understand the immorality of the unrestrained use of their powers to compel employers or the government to agree to inflationary wage settlements rather than face the disaster of a prolonged strike.'

A most illuminating and enjoyable book. EDWIN SAMUEL

## RECENT RELIGIOUS HISTORY

*Church and Society in England* 1770-1970. *A Historical Study*. E. R. Norman. Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press. £15.

*Religion and Voluntary Organisations in Crisis*. Stephen Yeo. Croom Helm. £9.95.

E. R. Norman, the Dean of Peterhouse, Cambridge, has written an interesting study of the Church of which he is himself a priest. His study, with its emphasis on the intellectual life of the Church in its relation to society, is part of what may be termed the 'Cambridge School' of historical writing. This school's major exponents are the late G. Kitson Clark and the present Master of Selwyn College, Dr. Owen Chadwick. Their emphasis is on intellectual studies which seek to examine history. Dr. Norman's emphasis is on how the Church of England's leaders reacted (and react) to the demands which they have felt, and still feel, that society is making on the Church.

The writer has chosen an extremely wide field in the two hundred years following 1770, as his aim is to draw broad strokes to give his reader certain interpretations. The theme which Dr. Norman has found running through the Church's history since 1770, is that 'the permanent tendency of the Church (is) to assimilate the prevailing social and political beliefs of the intelligentsia.' Therefore the aloofness which Church leaders feel from the mass of mankind is nothing new. They are (and were) no further separated than is any intellectual who concentrates on issues which concern not his fellow man. To be middle-

class in England is essentially, and purposefully, to be isolated from the mass of the 'people'; to be a middle-class intellectual is further to be isolated from the middle-classes.

Dr. Norman's subject is a fascinating one. Cut off by the 'Reformation' from the rest of Catholic Christianity, the Church in England found itself freed from one Pope only to be subjected to a host of others. The lack of authority has plagued the Church—an essentially Catholic Church outside the realm of Catholic authority. The Church became subject more than ever to the powers that be, and by the end of the eighteenth century, to the classes in society which produced its leaders. It is this dependence, placed alongside a growing 'social consciousness' in the new industrial society, which Dr. Norman has attempted, with considerable success, to delineate.

There are criticisms which are inevitable in a book with such a wide scope. Is it, for example, really correct to hold that Bishops attempted, 'early' in the nineteenth century, to disassociate the Church from political identification with the Whigs? Into the 1860s Palmerston continued to test would-be Bishops as to their allegiance to the Whig cause. In talking of Christian Socialism, perhaps a deeper, or at least wider, view would have been gained by mentioning Nonconformist activity. Whilst denominational commitment lagged, many independent ministers like John Clifford, J. C. Carlile, C. Silvester Horne or J. B. Paton were prominent in the cause. Yet these are relatively minor points. Dr. Norman's book will prove a valuable source for anyone interested in the English Church and how its leaders have seen, and continued to see, the Church and society.

Stephen Yeo's work is of a different nature altogether. Dr. Yeo is not part of the 'Cambridge School' but adheres, like Paul Thompson or A. D. Gilbert, to the sociological approach to social history, which might be termed the 'Essex School' out of deference to Dr. Thompson. Some would dismiss as irrelevant claptrap the wholesale, and sometimes indiscriminate, application of sociological terms and theories to history, but such application may well be the wave of the future in historical writing. It represents the latest attempt to 'make sense' of history, to apply an 'interpretation' which not only provides a philosophy of history, but also a basis for deciding what is history in the first place.

Dr. Yeo sets out to examine various social organisations in Reading which flourished in the period, 1890 to 1914. He seeks to discover how they individually and collectively came to terms with the demands which they felt society was making upon them. The writer pays a good deal of attention to Church and Chapel, to the famous biscuit factory, which dominated the economic life of the town, and to non-religious organisations like the Co-op, the W.E.A., and even the football club. He has amassed a good deal of information from local sources including newspapers and those manuscript sources which have survived. Altogether it is an interesting study. The attempt to generalise from Reading's experience, however necessary to a writer with a sociological approach or any approach, may be questioned. For any interpretation of history, be it Whig, Tory, Christian or sociological, must be universal in its applicability. What applies to Reading must also apply to Tonga. This, too, may be debated. But the actual study of a provincial town in he heyday of 'voluntary society, when society demanded a great deal of its churches and private service organisations, and when these organisations and churches demanded a great deal of themselves, is of value. It provides a balance to the more generalised, 'intellectual' approach of Dr. Norman. J. E. B. MUNSON

## EIGHTEENTH CENTURY WARFARE

*The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough.* David Chandler. Batsford. £6.95

This is a study of the organisation, training, and tactical concepts of the armies of Europe during the 60 years between 1688 and 1748 when significant changes were in process of taking place in methods of warfare and in the development of military equipment. The author considers that this period has been neglected at the expense of the Thirty Years' War on the one hand, and of the events of the American War of Independence and the ensuing Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars on the other. His intention therefore is to remedy this neglect, being of the opinion that 'it is difficult to judge the great commanders of any age . . . unless they can be set clearly against their military backgrounds.' The military commanders of this period are not, however, the subject of this book; primarily the emphasis is on how the regimental officer and soldier fought and on the equipment and training that enabled them to perform their duty.

The four major components of field armies were the Horse, the Foot, the Artillery Trains, and the Engineering Services: the organisation, equipment, training, and tactical employment of each component is examined and described in the most thoroughgoing manner. Nor is the treatment limited to any single army; attention is devoted mainly to English and French armies but comparisons are also drawn with Dutch, Swedish, Prussian, Russian, Austrian, and Turkish practices. By so doing one can acquire an *Ueberblick* of European military practice at the tactical level. 'The cavalry,' according to St. Cyr, one of Napoleon's marshals, 'represent the legs and the eyes of an army; the infantry and artillery are its body and arms.' Infantry formed the backbone of almost all armies. Increasing importance of infantry in the wars of this time was due to the comparative cheapness of recruiting, paying, and equipping a foot soldier; a mounted man was far more expensive. Changes in the type of infantry was largely the result of the development in infantry weapons; two most outstanding improvements were the supersession of the matchlock by the flintlock and the introduction of the socket bayonet.

The Board of Ordnance in England had control of all matters pertaining to artillery and its associated services. The provision of guns was its main responsibility but it exercised tremendous influence over almost every field of military activity. Artillery trains got much adverse criticism because of their bulk and slow rate of progress on the roads. Logistics played an important role in strategy. Field armies of the early 17th century rarely exceeded 40,000 but by the end of the century armies in excess of 100,000 were not unknown, and the problem of feeding such armies became critical. Armies at that time functioned along simple lines of operation which meant vast quantities of food had to be collected before the opening of a campaign. The idea of moving a large army in widely separated columns in order to spread the burden over the roads and countryside more evenly had to wait till the Napoleonic *corps d'armée* system.

The last section of the book is on siege warfare and exhibits the vital part played by the engineers in military affairs with special emphasis on the work of the two greatest engineers of that age, the French Marshal de Vauban and the Dutch expert van Coehoorn. There is an account, vividly and meticulously described, of the attack and defence of fortresses, preparation for a siege and

its highly ritualised prosecution, investment, siege guns and mortar, the final breaching of the fortress walls and other operations.

Carefully annotated throughout, the book also contains contemporary engravings, plans, diagrams, and appendices with statistical information on the wars, battles, and sieges of the period. Mr. Chandler modestly describes this volume as a work of reference to assist the reader to appreciate more fully the realities of 18th century warfare. So it is, but it is rather more than that; in point of fact it is an entertaining narrative that brings to life with many illustrative anecdotes the problems, complexities, dangers, and hardships of the soldier of that era.

S. F. WOOLLEY

## SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES

**Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. The Italo-Ethiopian Dispute. March 1934-October 1935.** Volume XIV Second Series (H.M. Stationery Office. £16.50). The Editors of these volumes of official documents extracted from the Foreign Office records, Professor W. N. Medlicott, Professor Douglas Dakin and M. E. Lambert, are publishing three volumes of documents related to the Italo-Ethiopian dispute and British policy. The first now published takes the story from March 21, 1934 until the outbreak of hostilities by Italy on October 3, 1935. The volume contains 667 documents and appendices, including the publication for the first time of the Maffey Report, which was circulated to the Cabinet in August 1935, and which included the political history of Ethiopia and more importantly British interests likely to be affected by an Italian conquest of Abyssinia. British policy was largely directed to finding a compromise solution to the crisis and through the League of Nations. Until June 7, 1935, Sir John Simon was Foreign Secretary. Throughout his term of office, 'the documents show a consistent, if somewhat ineffectual, British attitude towards the crisis, based on a willingness to recognise and support any Italian claims that could be secured by negotiation, a determination not to push any British interest that would conflict with prior Italian rights, and a refusal to condone forcible action challenging to the spirit of the League Covenant'. There followed, though conceived before Sir Samuel Hoare's appointment as Foreign Secretary, 'a series of attempts to satisfy the Italian appetite with Ethiopian concessions' subject to various proposals including assistance in Ethiopian reforms. Despite Sir Samuel Hoare's impressive speech to the League Assembly on September 11, Professor Medlicott concludes that 'when the first shots were fired to open the war on October 3, every aspect of British policy in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute lacked final definition'. There would seem to be little doubt that Britain's naval weakness had a cautionary effect upon British policy.

**Encyclopedia of the Third Reich** (Hale. £8.95). This comprehensive encyclopedia has been compiled by Professor Louis L. Snyder of the City University of New York. Professor Snyder, since his student days in Germany from 1928-31, has taken a close interest in the rise of National Socialism and the whole Hitler regime. He has made himself solely responsible for the entries covering nearly four hundred pages. He has done an immense amount of research and used a great deal of source material which 'comes from my own collection, from pamphlets of the 1920s to archival documents of the 1970s'. The scale of the entries is shown by the ten pages

given to Hitler, three pages to Goering and one to von Ribbentrop. Professor Snyder has clearly aimed to give as objectively as possible much basic information covering a very wide field. The entries cover not only biographies of 'those who would be recognised by most historians of the Third Reich as of some significance', but also social and cultural movements, as well as political, and places and events. The scope of the volume is shown by the inclusion of Pope Pius XII, with particular relation to the silence of the Pope over the Nazi mass murders. He reaches no conclusion but writes simply that the controversy 'has not been resolved and continues to the present day'. There is an extensive bibliography which students will find useful.

**The Grey Coast** (Souvenir Press. £3.50 hardback, £1.50 paperback) and **Young Art and Old Hector** (£3.00 hardback, £1.50 paperback) are the latest republication by the Souvenir Press of the novels of the distinguished modern Scottish novelist, Neil Gunn, who died in 1973. Both these stories, almost profound in their elemental simplicity, are set in the author's own homeland, the coast of the Moray Firth in the Eastern Highlands. These two particular novels were preceded in 1975 by the republication of *Morning Tide* and *The Green Isle of the Great Deep*. The series is to continue in 1977 with two more novels.

**Scenes of Clerical Life** (Dent. Everyman's Library. Hardback, £2.95; Paperback, £1.00). This is a reissue of the Everyman Library edition of George Eliot's book, published in 1910, with a brief Introduction by Grace Rhys. It contains, of course, George Eliot's earliest fiction, namely the three stories, *The Sad Fortunes of the Reverend Amos Barton, Mr. Gilfil's Love Story* and *Janet's Repentance*, which were first published together in one volume in 1858.

**One Woman's Story** (Peter Owen, £3.95). Anne Tibble is probably best known for her pioneering work, with her husband, on John Clare; and this second volume of her autobiography goes to show the background of ideas and of family life which lay behind their shared interest in that poet, who had been so greatly neglected. Their own marriage, unworldly, idealistic, described with much poetic feeling and candour, was, although mutually supportive, far from conventional. From the time of her education at university in the Twenties, and reaching far beyond the village in which she began life, Mrs. Tibble has always thought about woman's role in the world in combination with her role in the family. Her own life has been a brave attempt to make the two spheres compatible.

**Quotations in History** (Harvester Press, £4.50). Some 'quotes' books run alphabetically under subject heads. This, by Alan and Veronica Palmer—like the admirable *Penguin Dictionary of Quotations*—runs alphabetically under the names of persons quoted; for subjects one must turn to the copious word-index. Its 1,600 entries range from c.800 A.D. to 1975, so the centuries jostle each other on the same page, Stanley Baldwin and Arthur Balfour rubbing shoulders with priest and rebel leader John Ball (?—1381). It should be useful for browsing and handy reference, especially on the moderns, though (surprisingly) Kipling gets only one stanza from 'The White Man's Burden', H. G. Wells one short quote from *The New Machiavelli* and a 1914 title line, *The War That Will End War*.

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incorporating The Fortnightly

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# Contemporary Review

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## THE NORTHERN IRISH IDENTITY

### by Hugh Munro

WHEN James VI of Scotland came down from Edinburgh to become James I of England, one of his first concerns was to try to create a collective persona for the new personal union of two kingdoms by inventing a new name for England and Wales plus Scotland—Great Britain. The English did not take kindly to the new title, and still less to the idea of England being called South Britain; and it was not until the Scottish Act of Union in 1707 that James's title was accepted.

It is worth recalling the character of that Act of Union now, at a time when the future of that union is in doubt. The Scottish Union was a success, for the paradoxical reason that every important Scottish institution (leaving aside the unreconstructible Church and legal system) was abolished by it. For lack of special Scottish institutions a Scot could feel that he was clearly accepted as the equal of an Englishman in the new united kingdom, and the formal adoption of the title Great Britain for that kingdom helped to give reality to the new feeling of identity; and the Union ushered in the Scottish Golden Age.

Matters were seen differently when the Irish Act of Union came to be formulated, in 1800. There was no feeling then that the addition of Ireland to Great Britain would create a new, larger country for which a new title should be sought, any more than Henry VIII, when he added the title of King of Ireland to that of King of England in 1534, had contemplated a new collective name for the two kingdoms.

Britain has always, from the first invasion in 1169, taken care to rule her Irish territories at one remove; through a special Irish subordinate government rather than directly from London. The Irish Union was a union of parliaments only; the separate Irish government at Dublin Castle, with its 'Lord Lieutenant and General Governor of Ireland', Lord Chancellor and the rest, all remained in being, to the extent that the coming into force of the Union is not recorded in the minutes of the Irish government's bank, the Bank of Ireland. All that had happened was that the Irish government now had to have its legislation passed in the new union parliament at Westminster rather than at College Green; the effective Prime Minister of

Ireland, the Chief Secretary, was Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, not to the London government.

The partial nature of the union, and the lack of an attempt to create a name for it, had ultimately destructive effects; for it made it in practice impossible to preach the advantages of the union to the ordinary Irishman, who could see for himself that London wanted to rule the Irish at arm's length. One could not ask the Irish to identify with a union in which it was obvious they were not fully accepted; and in fact a positive, proselytising Unionism was not possible for 100 years, until the Boer War created the vision of the Empire, a new collective reality in which an Irishman could feel at last an equal, along with the Canadian and Australian. By then, of course, it was too late.

Nor in 1921, when Southern Ireland was seceding from the UK, and Britain's Irish territories for the first time contained a majority of 'loyal' citizens, was the opportunity taken to give a new name to the kingdom. Instead its title became even longer, a name uniquely cumbersome in the roll-call of the nations—The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In this fact, if in no other, lies the seed of our present troubles.

For a genuine Northern Irish Unionist, in the proper sense of one who wishes to put the union above local loyalties, is in the same unhappy position as the Irish Unionist of old. It is clear that the UK is not a nation in any real sense; that the addition of Northern Ireland to Great Britain does not make the British feel any different about their national identity; that, in short, it means nothing to the British to be Great-Britain-and-Northern-Ireland-ish, over and above being British, and so it never occurs to anyone that a name should be found for the country. The short title for the UK is Britain, and the short title, indeed the only title, for its people is British.

Yet British is what the Northern Irish are by definition not. The full legal title of the country they belong to makes it clear that Northern Ireland and Great Britain are two separate places, and London is content to go on saddling herself with this nine-word jaw-breaker to make the point clear. Northern Ireland is an appendage, in but not of the UK.

Britain's best friends in Northern Ireland—the Lord O'Neills, Robin Chichester-Clarks and the rest—are by Britain's own policy excluded from an effective role in the province's politics. The scores of decent moderate politicians, whose careers have been destroyed in the past few years, can testify to that. The benefits of the union cannot go to make up a viable political platform. The people of the most politically-conscious area of Western Europe will not be satisfied with a second-class nationality, or persuaded to find their primary identity in unity with a neighbouring people who are quite clearly determined not to identify too closely with them. Of necessity, the Northern Irish are forced to turn to other sources of political identity, in which they can be full and equal participants—to Irish nationalism, and to Ulster loyalism. And both of these are movements which operate not in UK politics, but in the politics of the island of Ireland.

From 1921 to 1971 Britain's policy on Northern Ireland was to have it ruled by a devolved government drawing its support from the loyalist

majority, a movement which derived its form and motivation from Irish, not UK, politics. In effect, Britain ruled her Irish territories by taking sides in an Irish conflict. This could not be done for ever, and in the end the explosion came.

The power-sharing policy was an honest attempt to put Britain in a genuinely neutral stance between the Irish factions. The trouble was that this could only be achieved at the price of disintegrating the majority faction, the faction which gave meaning to Northern Ireland; it therefore involved creating a situation where the province had no cohesion or meaning at all.

A devolved government must be based on the patriotism local to the area. Now, while Northern Ireland abounds with patriotisms, fervently held, there is only one of them which identifies with Northern Ireland considered as a political unit—namely, Protestant loyalism. The trouble with the power-sharing policy was that loyalism was quite incapable of the necessary compromises involved. Loyalism is a negative force. Its slogans (No Pope Here) are negative; its basic function is to say 'No'; 'No' to Irish unity, 'No' to the Catholic South. It cannot identify positively with the population of Northern Ireland, for the good reason that one-third of them are Catholic and by definition members of the 'enemy' community.

A negative political force cannot compromise. A positive force can, on the well-tried principle that half-a-loaf is better than no bread. Not so with negative movements; when you have sworn to have no bread, half or quarter of a loaf is quite as bad as the whole loaf. Power-sharing was never on, however much the individual loyalist might have wanted to participate in it; collectively their movement is one which cannot live with the necessary compromises.

Yet loyalism was necessary to the power-sharing policy, since loyalism is the only specifically Northern Irish political movement, the essential core of any Northern Irish devolved government. To try to run a Northern Irish devolved government without loyalism makes as much sense as trying to run a Scottish devolved government on a basis which excluded SNP involvement. Power-sharing needed loyalism; power-sharing involved compromise; loyalism cannot compromise; and so power-sharing cannot work.

All this it seems Mr. Merlyn Rees realised, and he did nothing to encourage the current efforts to revive the power-sharing idea. His eyes, it seems, were fixed on more distant targets. But what?

Northern Ireland is now in effect a Crown Colony. It is ruled, as all Ireland was from 1801 to 1921, by a locally-based Northern Irish government staffed by Westminster politicians whom the Northern Irish have no power to choose (indeed her own politicians are *ipso facto* excluded from being chosen), a government which operates legislation enacted in the Westminster parliament in which the Northern Irish MPs are a 2% minority.

Being ruled by a government from which your own political representatives are permanently shut out is bound to have the same effect on loyalists as it did on Irish nationalists during the Union period. The historical role of the Irish Protestant—of manning the garrison, of being the local agents of the British in ruling their Irish territories—is at last ended. There is

indeed no practical point in Protestant politics. When political activity in the province is suddenly reduced to a matter of seeking favours from the British ministers in the government at Stormont, Protestant politics will not serve. These ministers are likely to make it clear that approaches from delegations who keep their religion separate from their politics are more acceptable; and a politician whose Protestantism is essential to his politics is demonstrably less useful than a non-sectarian politician.

The disintegration of the Protestant political monolith in Northern Ireland is well under way. Only one thing can slow it down—talk of a devolved government. Let there be talk of a devolved government, and loyalism is immediately alerted. This is not a manifestation of bigotry, merely an automatic calling-forth of the only force which is essential to an effective devolved government—loyalism. The people who voted UUUC in recent elections were not bigots; they were merely sensible people who realised that if there had to be a devolved government, loyalism, as the essential principle of order in Northern Irish institutions, was needed for it.

If religion is to be got out and kept out of politics in Northern Ireland, then there are strong arguments for doing nothing to encourage talk of a devolved government; for a policy of creating a political vacuum and waiting for a new structure, a new ordering of Northern Irish political life, to arise and replace the old.

If the British are simply going to sit things out like this, what might be expected to happen? It must be realised that what will be going on will be the search by the Northern Irish for a new identity, an identity other than their second-class British identity. Whatever happens, we will not end up with the Northern Irish happily waving Union Jacks, for the Union Jack is the symbol of their second class British status.

For the nationalist Northern Irish, matters are reasonably simple. Thanks to the Republic's constitution, they can, as Irish-born, go to Dublin any day and get an Irish passport to prove their full identity as Irishmen. But to the loyalist, matters are different. Loyalists are facing a real crisis of identity. They are beginning to see that they are really colonials, not truly accepted as British. In their search for a new identity, an identity in which they can participate as equals, they have only two choices—an all-Ireland identity, or a Protestant identity.

If there is one flaw in Britain's colonial record, it is that she too often ruled by exploiting local differences, so that when the time for withdrawal came, she left behind a civil war situation. India, Cyprus and Palestine are classic examples of this. When after 800 years Britain finally leaves Ireland, her earliest conquest, will she leave behind yet another of those situations? It is to be hoped not; and British and Southern Irish politicians have a vital interest in guiding the Northern Irish towards the only choice which offers a prospect of lasting peace—a united Ireland. For it is perfectly clear that if Ireland were once united, there would be no pressure to divide it, to set up once again the sectarian cockpit that Northern Ireland was, is and always must be, for as long as it is asked to generate its own government.

At the moment, there is a period of transition; and paradoxically the

need is for more sectarianism in Northern Ireland, not less, For the immediate future, their Protestantism is going to be especially important to the loyalists. It is the only badge of identity they have left, now that their British identity is shown to be spurious. Talk of ecumenism is counter-productive; to imply that the good Protestant is the one who dilutes his Protestantism is to compound the blow the British have inflicted, by showing the Northern Irish they were in the UK but not of it.

To a man in an identity crisis, all shreds of identity are important; and we should be saying now, not that the barriers should be disappearing between religions, but rather that it is perfectly acceptable that a man should be a non-ecumenical Protestant. The urgent need is to make fundamentalist Protestantism a *respectable* creed, to diminish the risk that its practitioners, because they feel themselves to be in a world that does not properly accept them, will turn to the only form of political action open to a loyalist—street politics and violence.

But providing a role outside politics for Protestantism is only our immediate need. Beyond that lies the need to persuade the Northern Protestant that his only hope of a peaceful future lies in a united Ireland. How can this be done? One thing is sure; a united Ireland will not be brought about by Protestants, organised politically as Protestants, saying 'We want to join a united Ireland.' That was the delusive hope which led the Dublin government to sponsor the Sunningdale disaster. It will come—could only come—when Protestant politics has disintegrated and the political life of the province is no longer organised on a sectarian basis; and that process is well under way.

What Southern policies will hasten the needed change? When this question is asked, Southern politicians like to throw up a protective smokescreen. They emphasise the sectarian nature of the situation and picture it as one to be dealt with by sectarian reconciliation, by changes in Roman Catholic rulings, by British measures, in short by actions by someone else—but never by political changes which it is in the power of Southern politicians alone to make. For it is the existence of strong and guaranteed links between Great Britain and Ireland which will above all help Ulster Protestants to accept a united Ireland. Britain, after all, gave to loyalism the only positive element it had. It was the British connection which gave loyalism respectability, which lifted it above the level of sectarian politics. If they want the Northern Protestants to choose a united Ireland rather than a Protestant Ulster, it is up to Southern politicians to create a situation which would enable the British government to say to the Northern Irish that insofar as their choice is between Protestant Ulster and a united Ireland they must, if they wish to keep their links with Britain, opt for a united Ireland.

Membership of the Commonwealth, a guarantee of dual British-Irish citizenship, an Anglo-Irish Council on the lines of the Council of Europe but with some real powers—these are the kinds of measures which will enable Britain to back Irish unity. It is to be hoped that Southern politicians will at last turn their minds in these directions.

# VIVE LE CANADA LIBRE ET VIVE NOS DIFFERENCES . . .

## by Brian Meredith

SOME interesting lessons are to be learned from a quick look at Canadian realities at this post-Olympic game point. One is that the old clichés hold good: that it has vast natural resources and unbounded possibilities, and that it is inhabited by a lot of very agreeable people, many of whom speak French. The other is that, inevitably, the nation is wrestling with change and development and a considerable affluence. In short, it is a delightful place, but it has its problems: and, it may be, is gaining in experiences of use to others.

The realities for Canada are familiar enough. Currently, they consist of trying to beat inflation and high unemployment, to resolve a variety of other social needs and to keep the country together and Canadian.

The various levels of government wrestle as they have from the outset of Canada's constitutional development, with the demons of division. There is, of course, not just the federal government in Ottawa but there are the powerful provincial governments, and below them layers of local government. The federal/provincial lines of jurisdiction are vaguely drawn, and this leads to an eternal struggle of the whole against the parts, and the parts against each other as well as against the whole.

It is the Canadian counterpart to the US federal/state struggles, and there are times when the powers of Ottawa, the central authority, seem to be failing, and when the delicate political, domestic, east-west structure is threatened by the notorious north/south communities of regional interest. The eastern Atlantic seaboard, the industrial heartlands, the middle western prairies, and the Pacific mountain and coastal areas all tend culturally and economically to a common regionalism on either side of the 49th parallel.

Canadian provinces are becoming individually nationalistic. Indeed, they are as powerful, some of them, in terms of population and industrial potential as some of the small and medium nations who are members of the UN.

They deal directly with neighbouring states of the American Union. They establish their agencies in Britain and at the headquarters of the Common Market and elsewhere around the world. They are so individualistic, and so prone to variation in policies as one provincial government is replaced by another of a different hue, that a US Treasury Official is quoted as saying that there were times when it would seem more sensible for the US to maintain not one embassy in Ottawa, but several scattered across the country.

But there is a logic to the formulae of Canadian federalism and provincialism and there is an instinctive tolerance of the political philosophies innate in them. It is better to concede quickly to communities with ideas of their own the responsibility of coping with their own affairs, and hopefully

they will return to, or tacitly remain in, the general fold. History in Canada has many illustrations of this balancing act and, so far, of the degree to which common sense and common interest have managed to keep the country united. Canada has not even tried very hard to impose anything on anybody.

Currently the provincial balances are shifting. The prairies' provinces are individually and collectively growing industrially as they find more oil and natural gas, coal and potash and other mineral resources in addition to wheat and farm produce within their borders, or within their ready reach. Alberta is a power to be reckoned with these days. Saskatchewan likewise, particularly after taking over—having paid a handsome price for them—some US potash mining operations. Manitoba, on its own account, and as representing through the Canadian Wheat Board its neighbours as well, is a major negotiator in global protein politics.

Two of these prairie provinces, moreover, have come under the control of the NDP—the New Democratic Party—a mildly socialist movement that managed, briefly, to hold power also in British Columbia, but which so far, has not been able to hold the reins of power in Ottawa federally or, even on any sustained or realistic scale, to command the balance of power between the major parties.

The two provincial NDP governments are co-operating better with Ottawa and the Liberal Trudeau government there than some of the others; and the NDP opposition to the present Ontario government is having a considerable, some would say salutary, effect on the highly conservative industrial establishment of Toronto which, as in British Columbia, is being made more conscious of social problems and responsibilities and less introverted and monolithic in itself.

The British Columbia honeymoon with the NDF did not last long, and the province has reverted to the old social credit concept, which is a kind of Canadian *Poujadism*, the philosophy of the small businessman and shopkeeper. But the NDP remain a considerable opposition, chastened by their own mistakes while in office, and again exercising a considerable influence.

The maritime provinces on the Atlantic have a collective interest with the New England states in fisheries, tourism, tidal power and much else, and there are periodic joint conferences. They have made several brave efforts, not all successful, to attract and to retain foreign investment to spur their industrial development: but the impression is that they have been exploited by some of the firms who have benefited. When the preliminary phase was over and the advantages began to run out, these firms withdrew, cut their losses, and left them for others to bear, particularly in the work force that had for a time been trained and drawn into their employ.

Canada generally, and certain provinces and areas in particular, is exposed to the temptations and tribulations of a swiftly developing society and in this is akin to the Third World. Foreign investment and foreign enterprise is eagerly sought after, and the provinces vie with each other in soliciting it and also in attracting skilled immigrants: but the dilemma of

the degree to which this should be allowed to go remains unresolved.

Quebec province, to complete the provincial spectrum, because it is the chief custodian of Canada's second main culture, remains, of course, a special case. As TV viewers of the Olympic games in Montreal learned for themselves, Quebec is primarily French-speaking and thus has a cultural dimension to its nationalism that is less marked elsewhere in Canada. The separatist Parti Quebecois, who remain a powerful group in opposition to the Quebec government, are more liberal than the Liberals and have completely eclipsed the NDP movement.

And Quebec is prospering despite the business they lost when revolution seemed just around the corner ten years ago. Quebec's consumption of energy is so great, and her needs are increasing so rapidly, that she has given notice that she will terminate her export of power to Ontario Hydro at the end of the year and probably cultivate nuclear power into the bargain.

The easements and conciliations and meetings of trouble halfway that I deem to be characteristic of Canada politically and constitutionally, if only because we are anti-authoritarian by nature, I see also as operating culturally. In short, to use the usual cliché, Canada cultivates the mosaic as distinct from the US melting pot way of coping with the different ethnic elements in her midst, and generally strives to help them in preserving and cultivating their identities. Various groups are less troublesome if they are not only allowed but helped to do their own thing, and this partly explains Canada's projects of biculturalism, multiculturalism, and federal and provincial policies towards Canada's native peoples, the Indians and Eskimos.

Currently, bi-culturalism,—the struggle to make Canada bilingual and to give the French language and culture of Canada its historic place throughout the land,—is in some trouble, and Pierre Trudeau's government is running into difficulty over it, particularly in his efforts to make civil service employment and promotion contingent on it. French-speaking Quebeckers do not want to have to speak English to keep federal government jobs, nor do those elsewhere of other origins who speak English and who, in some areas find little or no need to speak French, wish to have to qualify. There were strikes affecting air travel during the summer over the use of English by some categories of air traffic controllers in Quebec; and it led to considerable political use of the fact that, internationally, English is the official language of aviation.

It is a situation familiar enough in any area where two or more official languages are officially accepted and sponsored, and where the impracticability or ridiculousness of the situation in some particular or exceptional case can always be a source of political capital and complaint. In Belgium or South Africa or Wales or India, or in countless other places these are problems that have to be lived with.

Suffice it to say that for a variety of reasons bi-lingualism is bogging down, and it is not proving of much help now to Mr. Trudeau or his Liberal party. In fact, if one believes some of his critics, it could help cook his political

goose at the next election.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, bi-culturalism led to multiculturalism as a policy, complete with a considerable governmental mechanism and programme behind it. It was logical to minority, ethnic immigrant groups, that if French-speaking Canadians were to get so much place and attention that others deserved it also, even if they were johnnies come lately to Canada. So the Poles and the Spanish-speaking immigrants and the Portuguese and the Germans and Dutch and variations of the Scandinavian and the Ukrainians and the Russians and the Arabs and Japanese and Chinese and Asiatics generally became vocal and demanding, and in the end they won support, if only from parliamentary candidates out to get their votes.

But a lot of it was financial, from federal and provincial sources, and it gave them an opportunity to preserve their languages and ideas.

One of the less publicised footnotes to the Olympics was the demonstration by Canadian Ukrainians protesting that, although the Ukraine was granted individual representation at the UN, at the Olympics it was absorbed into the team of the USSR. Canada, like the US, has always been a sounding board for expatriate politics. In the last war the pro-Hitler Germans were vocal for a time. And in Ontario Catholic/Protestant Irish rivalries and pressure groups have for generations been an embarrassment.

The mechanism created was the 102-member Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism under a Minister of State. Most of its membership is drawn from ethnic groups, with 20% from the English and French communities. It has several funding and grants programmes to employ and, to cite an official text, these are for 'projects that promote an awareness of Canada's multicultural diversity and encourage Canadians to share their cultural heritage with their fellow citizens.' The sponsored activities include cultural community centres, ethnic newspapers and academic work.

There may be an argument as to whether this multiculturalism is cosmetic, or created as a countervailing concept to bi-culturalism and as a means to defuse its explosive qualities; but on the face of it the idea is positive and reasonable and characteristic of the instinctive Canadian way of making the best of what one's got. Certainly a widening spectrum of Canadians of varied origin are appearing in public life, and as representatives of Canada abroad, commercially and otherwise, and certainly they are proving a healthy leavening to the Canadian basic character which, without it, could become pretty stodgy.

The native peoples of Canada, the Indians and Eskimos, also contribute culturally to the Canadian ethos; but from the outset, they have been treated separately and differently from other groups. The result has been that they have suffered from a kind of bureaucratic paternalism, and they risk becoming anachronisms, cut off and unable to compete with the rest. Their salvation may be the new, young leadership in the bands that are developing political awareness and drive and expertise, and fortunately some of the encouragement for this has come from official sources.

The latest development seems to be that the non-status Indians and Metis of Canada will be getting federal help, financial and otherwise, to explore and press their land and other claims on the country. It amounts to getting legal aid to close on three-quarters of a million people who are not in the larger category of Indians covered by various treaty rights, and it includes a large and deprived class of half-breeds. It might give them fresh courage and the means to work as a group conscious of their origins and possibilities.

They are to have a consultative forum under the charge of a government minister, the one in charge of health and welfare in this case. The exercise might seem legalistic and ineffective, but it has been welcomed as a recognition of aboriginal rights by the existing Native Council of Canada, the umbrella for all native groups, and the expenditure of eleven millions of dollars is contemplated.

It could also be argued that Canadians' conciliatory attitudes towards minority groups, culturally and politically, stem from the vulnerable nature of Canada's own culture and economy vis-à-vis the Big Brothers to the south. Trudeau invented the concept of the mouse and the elephant; of Canada being like a mouse sleeping beside an elephant. Every cough and sneeze from the elephant terrifies the mouse, who is fearful of being crushed anyway.

The Americans remain good neighbours and major trading partners, and the main source of tourist revenue; but relations with them are full of alarms and excursions over minor matters, and Canada remains obsessed by their overwhelming presence in every dimension along their frontier. They are acutely conscious of US penetration of their culture, and of the angry US reaction when Canada tries to protect herself culturally or economically. And they are justly fearful of the extent to which US and foreign capital generally owns Canada's natural resources and industries.

It is a year since the Foreign Investment Review regulations were set up federally, under which takeovers of Canadian firms are refused unless it can be proved that it is advantageous to the Canadian economy, and there is opportunity now to re-appraise it. There have not been many refusals and there have not been many changes, save perhaps, by an ironic increasing Canadian commercial activity elsewhere and investment in US firms, and by the purchase outright by the Saskatchewan government of those potash mines. The Canadian economy inevitably reacts to that of the US; suffers from the sale maladies, after a delayed take. And it often tries out the same nostrums, even after, in the view of critics, they have proved futile in the US. That is the case, they claim, with Canadia's wage and price controls.

The critics of the Liberal Government are found on both sides of the border, and it is quite possible that where US comments are audible in Canada they will be counter productive and convince many Canadians that Trudeau is right in doing what he's doing. Earlier this year the magazine Canadian Business sounded commercial opinion across the US, in the great cities where their reporters found 'Americans already worrying about Canada's higher wage levels, its unstable labour situation, double digit

inflation, and the combined influence of the foreign investment review act and of wage and price controls.' They were further upset, it found, by the then threatened nationalisation of potash interests in Saskatchewan (which has since overtaken some mines, and for a good price) and by Pierre Trudeau's talks 'about a more socialist-orientated society.' Some remarked that Canada was building a Great Wall of China along the frontier between them.

Barrons, the US financial journal, at the end of June commented editorially about '. . . a chill wind blowing from the north,' mentioned 'the anti-Americanism or fervent nationalism' being as 'rampant as ever,' and echoed the US retiring Ambassador's parting complaints 'of what he regarded as unfriendly policies . . . the forced deletion of US commercials from TV broadcasts picked up on Canadian cable TV, taxes penalising concerns for advertising in US-owned magazines and the perennial threat in one province or another of nationalisation.'

Barrons also disliked Trudeau's 'wretchedly timed wide-eyed goodwill tour of Cuba' where he 'missed no opportunity to lionise his Communist host.' And it cited his comments on Canadian TV that 'We haven't been able to make it work, the free enterprise system,' and that 'every reasonable person now recognises the duty of the federal government to manage the country's economy . . . ' This it took as meaning 'taking an increasingly hard, unneighbourly attitude towards the United States,' and said Trudeau's economics 'derive their inspiration from old Socialist John Kenneth Galbraith.' But it concluded that the chief victims were likely to be Canadians and not Americans, and it ended by quoting the Institute of Strategic Studies in London that 'Canada has grown shockingly weak to the point of inability to track the movement of foreign ships through Arctic waters or to keep predatory nations from looting its Atlantic fisheries.'

The tone of these complaints explains the annoyance caused in Canada over US reactions to, and efforts earlier to curb, Canada's trade relations with Russia and China and Vietnam and Cuba and other matters in the realms of both domestic and foreign policy, not to mention reactions of the old China lobby through the US Olympic committee to Canada's ruling over Taiwan at the games this summer. The most arousing criticisms come not from within but from without the country, in the feedback from abroad.

On either side of the frontier there is never any lack of commentary likely to worsen rather than to improve relations between the two nations, and it is remarkable that they remain such good friends and understand each other so well.

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[Brian Meredith, M.B.E., a Canadian journalist now living in England, and formerly a career official in the UN Secretariat, has recently returned from a visit to Canada. He will contribute a second article to the February 1977 issue, 'A New Ploy in Partnership.']

# SIBERIA—LAND OF PROMISE

## by Edgar Cheporov

SIBERIA has become a land of promise for some two million people from European Russia over the past 20 years. For centuries this fabulously rich land, as big as the USA, attracted only wanderers, fugitive serfs, adventurous Cossacks and traders.

Times have changed, and today the wonders of Siberia beckon to a whole cross-section of the population west of the Urals. And it is not only young men and women workers who are packing their tools and heading east in response to the call of the big construction sites. University graduates, experienced specialists and eminent scientists, too, see in Siberia the horizons of a new vast land with untold and challenging prospects.

For Siberia, one of the world's great treasure stores of nature, remains virtually untapped despite the pace and scope of industrialisation there. It possesses practically all the elements of the Mendeleyev table, with oil and gas, coal, peat, asbestos, copper, timber, gold and diamonds in super-abundance. Much of it is already under exploitation.

As Vladimir Pervago, who heads the main economic planning department of the Ministry of Geology, put it: 'Siberia is so rich in minerals that it is easier to say what there isn't than what there is. Having become tired of distributing minerals over the vast expanses, God apparently gathered them all together in a heap and scattered them at random.'

For 25 years I have been back and forth across Siberia. Yet each time I am taken aback by the progress made. Another giant has joined the cascades of some of the world's biggest hydro-power stations on the great rivers Yenisei, Ob and Angara, feeding new industries and the towns that are mushrooming throughout the east. New pipelines of oil and gas have wound their way across the wilderness, new roads and railways have penetrated the taiga. And only recently the Soviet Communist Party's congress has made the further industrialisation of Siberia a top priority task for the coming years.

In the conditions of a planned society, however, and conscious of the interests of conservation, ecology and social factors, the scientists and engineers have necessarily been the spearhead of the migration to the east. Centres of advanced science have been hewn from the wilderness and are not only studying problems of world significance but also ways of taming the wild in the best interests of man and nature.

But Siberia, with its severe continental climate and temperatures ranging from 40 deg. C. in summer to 60 deg. C. below in winter, with its areas of permafrost and bogs, seasonal floods, seismicity, towering mountain ranges and vast virgin forests, is not so easily tamed.

I talked with Lev Shureyev, a foundryman at the aluminium works in the area of Lake Baikal, one of the early pioneers who went east from Central Russia.

'At 19', he said, 'I wanted probably what every young man wants, to become independent as soon as possible and stand on my own feet. Life in a tent in the taiga, a real man's work, and good pay—that was my notion of independence. So one fine day found me in a Siberia-bound train with five of my friends.

'But life in the taiga was much harder than any one of us could have imagined. Those who counted on easy money were soon buying return tickets. I must admit that I too felt the urge to return to the comfort of my family home. I was strong and healthy, however, and I suppose my pride wouldn't let me appear weaker than my mates.

'Then my fiancée arrived and we got married, and from then on it was plain sailing. We were given a little cottage to start with but by now a town of 30,000 has grown up and we have a modern flat with all the comforts. We have become real Siberians and wouldn't think of going back west. Where else could I have become a "town elder", a member of the local government, at 24?

'Today, when I see fresh groups of ambitious youngsters arriving, I understand their feelings—I recognise myself at their age. Yet some of the adventure has gone out of it. Little do they know what they would have had to put up with before the town went up; they may well have thought, as I did, of making tracks for home.'

What has become known as the 'project of the century' is now well underway in East Siberia. This is the great rail artery (BAM) running for over 2,000 miles from Lake Baikal to the Pacific coast with meridional lines to the northern mining areas and to the existing trans-Siberian railway about 300 miles to the south. Construction entails building 3,000 bridges and viaducts, an average of eight every five miles, and a ten-mile tunnel through the Muisk mountains and a four-mile one through the Baikal range.

To be opened to traffic early in the 1980s, BAM's economic and social effects will be incalculable. It will not only promote trade with the West and Pacific countries and carry away the riches of new industries all along the line but will also create a flourishing tourist industry for spas, outdoor sports and nature reserves. One of the biggest reserves is already being developed around Lake Baikal, the world's biggest body of fresh water with unique animal and plant life, including the famous Baikal seals and omul.

The lake was beginning to suffer from the ravages of lumbering before the scientists stepped in. Now no industry is allowed to operate before pollution-prevention installations are put in and the water is again as clear as crystal. Similarly, along the railway where townships will be built in mountain valleys with little natural ventilation, industrial plants will be sited well away from the valleys and will be equipped with purifiers and filters to prevent pollution.

There is no one more conscious of conservation than the young people going east. Nearly all of them are members of the Russian Nature Protection Society. The sable, elk, bear and other native animals that roam the nearby forests have no greater friends.

In Siberia the old and the new often meet in exotic combination. Until quite recently fur was Siberia's major export. As early as the 17th century furs contributed half of the revenue of the Moscow state. The coat of arms of Irkutsk still shows a tiger, which has long since disappeared from the area, holding in his teeth a Siberian sable. Irkutsk region today supplies

one-third of the country's fur, but it is also a major heavy industry centre.

The railway builders have lit the flame of pioneering in the depths of the taiga, disturbing the tranquillity of the villages of ornately carved hunters' huts amid wooded mountainsides. The reindeer farms have been preserved, and there are about 5,000 Evenk reindeer breeders and hunters. They can shoot a squirrel between the eyes at a distance of 50 yards and drive a reindeer sleigh at 30 m.p.h. Although they usually wear their skilfully hand-made fur attire, once in a while one comes across an Evenk proudly sporting a shirt with a huge BAM insignia on the back.

While protecting the environment man has also to protect himself. A taiga tick as small as a match-tip carries a virus causing encephalitis and there are other disease-carrying pests. A map of the distribution of dangerous pests has been made and the medical scientists are seeking effective therapy against them. They have already found a method of preventing the breeding of the encephalitis virus.

What is most noticeable in Siberia is the strong camaraderie and community of purpose and spirit that have grown up among the pioneers. You can't pull 'rank' in Siberia! The success of such a vast project depends no less on the worker performing the humblest task than on the eminent scientist, engineer or administrator. As Lev Shureyev told me: 'This is no place for the high-handed. We are all dependent on one another. If anyone has illusions of grandeur he'll soon find he's booking his ticket home.'

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[Edgar Cheporov is London correspondent of Novosti Press Agency.]

# THE LATIN MASS

## by Suzette Coote

SINCE the Second Vatican Council there has been, to a greater or less degree, much controversy within the Roman Catholic Church. In recent months the argument regarding the Roman Liturgy has aroused a great deal of interest both within and without the Church.

Dissatisfaction, particularly with the new form of the Mass—the *Novus Ordo* or *Missa Normativa*—has existed since its inception. This dissatisfaction is popularly believed to be centred on the use of the vernacular instead of Latin which has, from the time of the Early Fathers, been the language of worship in the Universal Church of Rome. While Traditionalists believe, as did Pope John XXIII, that 'for the Church, precisely because it embraces all nations and is destined to endure until the end of time . . . of its very nature requires a language which is universal, immutable and non-vernacular,' (*Veterum Sapientia*, Apostolic Constitution of Pope John, 1962) their antipathy to the New Mass lies far deeper than the use of the vernacular.

The New Mass, composed by a Commission whose membership included, perhaps significantly, six Protestant ministers, was first celebrated for the Episcopal Synod meeting in Rome in October, 1967. That the Bishops found it unacceptable is demonstrated by the fact that, out of 187 voters, 43 voted *'non placet'*; 62 had very many substantial reservations (*juxta modum*) and four abstained. However the *Novus Ordo*, as instituted by Pope Paul on April 3rd, 1969, was substantially identical and was not, apparently, re-submitted to the Episcopal Conferences for approval in the intervening period.

A group of Roman Theologians, liturgists and priests under the leadership of Cardinal Ottaviani published a Critical Study of the *Novus Ordo* in September 1969. They considered that it represented 'a striking departure from the Catholic theology of the Mass' as formulated by the Council of Trent. The fear was also expressed that 'truths which have always been believed by the Christian people, can be changed or ignored without infidelity'. Their main objection to the New Mass was that the Catholic belief that the Mass is the perpetuation of the Sacrifice of Calvary offered in an unbloody manner by the priest for the living and the dead had become lost in the presentation of the *Novus Ordo* as the assembly of the people under a president celebrating a communal meal—a memorial of the Lord. It is this seeming acceptance of Protestant teaching which has led inevitably to the present conflict. It is significant that, while no alteration in the Mass itself resulted from the publication of the Critical Study, some changes were made in the *Institutio Generalis* which restored, to some extent, the interpretation of the Mass as a Sacrifice.

While the *Novus Ordo* does not deny the Catholic teaching of its purpose to re-enact the Sacrifice of the Cross, its presentation and the changes,

particularly in the Offertory prayers, have rendered it so ambiguous that, although the vast majority of Catholics still hold to the Catholic teaching, doubts have arisen in the minds of many and Protestants have welcomed the changes as bringing the Catholic Church into line with Protestant teaching. Evidence of this is apparent in the fact that the Anglican, Bishop Mervyn Stockwood, can publicly state, in an article in a Catholic paper, that he uses the *Novus Ordo* in private and express the hope that it will be used more extensively in the Church of England. A declaration by the Superior Consistory of the Church of the Confession of Augsburg of Alsace-Lorraine, issued after its meeting in Strasbourg (8th December 1973) states that:

> Given the present forms of the eucharistic celebration in the Catholic Church, and by reason of convergences in theology, many obstacles which might have prevented a Protestant from participating in its eucharistic celebration seem to be disappearing. It should be possible for a Protestant today to recognise in the Catholic Eucharistic celebration the Supper instituted by the Lord. We attach great importance to the use of the new prayers with which we feel at home and which have the advantage of giving a different interpretation to the theology of sacrifice than we were accustomed to attribute to Catholicism.

Was the New Mass then instituted to bring the Catholic Church closer to the reformed churches? This is what many Catholics are asking and why they are calling for the restoration of the Mass of St. Pius V.

The Mass of St Pius V, or the Tridentine Mass, was promulgated in 1570 in pursuance of the Decrees of the Council of Trent but its antiquity predates Trent by many centuries, The prayers of the Canon of the Mass are found in the treatise *De Sacramentis* of the 4th/5th centuries and, in fact, the Mass without essential change can be traced back to its development from the most ancient Common liturgy. The Roman Canon which, with some changes is still in optional use, dates in its entirety from the reign of Pope St. Gregory the Great. The Mass of St. Pius V was therefore not a new Mass; it was codified, removing various local accretions and devotions which had been adopted, so that the Universal Church would celebrate the same liturgy throughout the world and, of course, to confirm the Mass as a Sacrifice and the doctrine of Transubstantiation in the face of the Reformation. The institution of the New Mass seems to have completely reversed both objectives.

The method of celebration varies, not only between countries with different languages but between individual priests even within the same parish, with resultant chaos. The 'Do-it-yourself' liturgy is by no means uncommon. Pop and folk Masses to encourage the young abound, resulting only in the dispersal of the elderly and middle-aged and those who do not find guitars and ill-sung popular or revolutionary songs conducive to the worship of God. There is no longer an opportunity for individual prayer as there was in the silence of the Old Mass; increasing regimentation in bodily position and participation makes prayer impossible for many, while the banality of the English translation, the grammatical convolutions and the condensation and poor English of the few remaining ancient prayers offend many a sensitive ear.

Has the Old Mass been abrogated is a question that is asked repeatedly and to which no satisfactory answer has yet been given. Certainly no authoritative document of abrogation has been issued by the Vatican. The mandatory introduction of the *Novus Ordo* was left to the discretion of the Bishops' Conference of each country and the period between its institution by the Pope and the order for its use by the Bishops has varied considerably; in Germany, for instance, it was made mandatory only this year.

The authority invoked in the Encyclical *Quo Primum* with which Pope Pius V introduced the Old Mass would certainly seem to demand an abrogation of equal authority and force but the *Constituta Apostolica* with which the present Pontiff introduced the *Novus Ordo* hardly meets that requirement. A comparison between the relevant extracts from the two makes this very evident.

*Encyclical Quo Primum.* Pius V.

> 'By this our decree, to be valid in perpetuity, we determine and order that never shall anything be added to, omitted from, or changed in the Missal. We specifically warn all persons in authority, of whatever dignity or rank, Cardinals not excluded, and command them, as a matter of strict obedience, never to use or permit any ceremonies or Mass Prayers other than ones contained in the Missal ordered by the sacred Council of Trent, and encompassing all that is necessary to preserve a pure and universally uniform way of worshipping God.
>
> At no time in the future can a priest, whether secular or Order priest, ever be forced to use any other way of saying Mass. And, so as to preclude once and for all, any scruples of conscience and fear of ecclesiastical penalties and censures, we herewith declare that it is in virtue of our Apostolic authority that we decree and determine that this our present order and decree is to last in perpetuity and can never be legally revoked or amended at a future date.
>
> And if anyone would nevertheless ever dare to attempt any action contrary to this order of ours, given for all time, let him know that he has incurred the wrath of Almighty God and of Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul.

*Constituta Apostolica.* Paul VI.

> When our predecessor St. Pius V published the first edition of the Missale Romanum, he presented it to the Christian people both as an instrument of liturgical unity and as a witness to the truth and devotion of the Church's worship.
>
> Ourself no differently; even though by decree of Council Vatican II we have admitted legitimate variations and adaptations. We none-the-less still trust it to come about that this same Missal will be accepted by the Christian faithful as an aid to witnessing to and strengthening the mutual unity of all.

This can by no means be termed an abrogation or an authoritative promulgation; the tone is diffident and the resultant impression is of a plea for acceptance. It would seem that the introduction of the New Missal is not exclusive of the Old.

The final clause reads:

> We wish, moreover, that these decisions and ordinances of Ours should be stable and effective now and in future, notwithstanding—in so far as may be necessary—Constitutions and Apostolic Regulations published by Our Predecessors and all other Ordinances, even those deserving special mention and exceptional treatment.

Once again, there is the diffidence and hesitancy which permeates the whole.

A clause which was not in the first edition of the Constituta but inserted later is admittedly authoritative but questionable.

> *Quae Constitutione hac Nostra praescripsimus vigere incipient a XXX proximi mensis Novembris hoc anno, id est a Dominica I Adventus.*

As Father Bryan Houghton remarks in an article published in *Christian Order* (January 1976):

> No criticism would be possible if it read *Quae de Constitutione hac Nostra praescripsimus*; but then it would mean 'What we have written above concerning this Our Constitution.' Without the 'de' one is obliged to understand *praescripsimus* in the figurative sense of 'we have prescribed'. But this produces two difficulties: 1, it is the wrong word to use and 2, it is in the wrong tense.... The verb should be in the present tense '*praescribimus*', 'what we are ordering by this Our Constitution'; not in the perfect, 'what we prescribed'.

In his book, *A Crown of Thorns*, the late Cardinal Heenan wrote:

> the bishops were under the impression that the liturgy had been fully discussed. In retrospect it is clear that they were given the opportunity of discussing only general principles. Subsequent changes were more radical than those intended by Pope John and the bishops who passed the decree on the liturgy. His sermon at the end of the first session shows that Pope John did not suspect what was being planned by the liturgical experts.

It is only a minority of Traditionalists who do not accept the validity of the *Novus Ordo*. The majority who do not deny its validity, nevertheless, are working for the restoration of the Mass of Pius V. In their opinion, the Old Mass celebrated in parity with the New would guarantee the validity of the latter and erase the question marks which surround it.

Pope Pius V was surely more perceptive than the present Pontiff in allowing all Rites of over 200 years' existence to continue alongside his Mass. Had Pope Paul been as wise, the present conflict would not have arisen. It is impossible to predict the outcome but, of course, the Church of Rome has survived many such crises in her long history and Catholics can only hope that this present crisis will be of short duration.

# MAN AND THE ENVIRONMENT: COLLUSION OR COLLISION?

**by David W. Williams**

IF activity can be measured by the production of 'papers' or the enunciation of good intentions, then the problems of the environment should be solved. My final ten years as a scientist in the Civil Service were as Director of the Agricultural Scientific Services laboratories of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland and there my role extended beyond Agriculture where the environment was concerned. For twenty years before that, my work was mainly on pest and disease control, often by chemicals, with a sharp watch on pesticide residues and possible side effects. I read thousands of pages of reports to or by governments, and the good intentions so often expressed therein made me fear the road our planet was following.

How seriously are we really taking the problem if, of course, there is one? I had reasonable hopes when the June, 1972, Stockholm Conference was being arranged. Masses of paper, meetings etc. seemed to point to a real world resolution. But what happened? Diplomats somewhere, decided that East Germany could not be a member. East Germany has pollution and might have had useful information. Alas for all the work. The other Communist countries stated that they wouldn't participate if East Germany was not to be a member. This really puts Governments' reaction to our environment into perspective. Principle is less important than politics, protocol or precedent.

The conference took place but it must surely have been regarded as an apology for a conference, based on its initial ideals and hopes. Useful resolutions were passed, working parties etc. set up but about half the world was not there!

I had the opportunity at the International Entomological Congress in Australia in August, 1972, of discussing our environment with some of the top biological scientists in the world. I also managed a partial world tour where I could see and discuss pollution with experts in Delhi, Bangkok, New Zealand, Hawaii and San Francisco. Also visitors to our station at East Craigs, in Edinburgh, from some sixty different countries were keen to exchange views with me.

The first point that I feel must be made is that we are still really without definitions. Ask a man what he means by 'the environment' and he usually uses his hands, as he would to describe a spiral staircase but less accurately. It also takes about a page to define a 'pollutant.' I want to give my own definitions as my views are related to them and could be misinterpreted otherwise. First, the environment: this, I regard as the entire earth, surface and below; the sea, the sky, the sun and the moon.

I want to reduce 'pollutant' to the simplest (undoubtedly oversimplified), term. It is a chemical in the wrong place and in insufficient quantity to

make its recovery economic. The comprehensive 'environment' definition is because I find that many people restrict the term to earth alone. One of my serious fears though, is that we still don't pay anything like enough attention to the fact that we continue to burn carbon or hydrocarbons, thus creating large quantities of carbon dioxide but, at the same time, remove a fair amount of forest or other green land annually. The conversion of carbon dioxide to oxygen by photosynthesis in green plants is well known. The question is one of balance. Here too, is where the sun comes in. If we obscure it through smoke, smog or some forms of haze which can affect its efficiency, then we lessen the plant's ability to function most effectively. A side effect, too, of smog is the coating of the green material with a sooty layer.

What would be the effects of an ever-increasing rise in fuel burning? (Our worry seems to be simply that we can't get enough fuel.) We could easily increase the carbon dioxide content of our atmosphere. Scientists have been divided on the possible effects of this. Some have said that we shall roast; others, that we'll freeze. Whatever may be, I don't think that the risk should be taken lightly. Recently, fears have also been expressed about the greatly increased use of Freon in aerosols and their effect on the ozone layer in the upper atmosphere.

The moon in the environment is obvious. But for its creation of regular tides, cleansing our filth away, we should soon be a septic isle in a polluted sea. Even with the invaluable help of the moon, which puts off the evil day, we must consider, as my Fisheries colleagues are strong to point out, that there is a limit to the extent that the sea can act as a sump.

As all matter is chemical, I use the word for all pollutants. A simple aspect of the economic aspects of recovery can be seen by looking back at sugar refining. At one time, 'waste products' were piped out to sea. Today we get these as treacle and syrup in tins and I understand that it pays!

Waste paper can be a pollutant but it rarely appears as newspapers, magazines and such. It is the cigarette packet, the paper or crisp bag and the iced lolly wrapper that induce the 'couldn't care less' attitude. Would we ever consider cigarettes sold loose or always bringing one's own container for ice cream or going back to using one's own jug for milk? The present shortage of milk bottles and the use of plastic ones doesn't inspire one. The addition of further non-biodegradable plastic into the environment must be regarded as a retrograde step. So far as waste paper etc. is concerned, I feel that although we don't care that much, these materials hardly constitute dangers. They are disfigurements and nuisances, little more.

Should we, though, consider more drastic remedies for some of the pollutants that worry most people? It can be done. One firm, that I know of, was prevented from polluting a river with carbon dioxide and a spent plant material. Now it makes 'Dry-cold' and the spent material has become a valuable high protein product.

Suppose that all firms producing liquid effluent had to take their own water from below their outflow point. I wonder how long it would take to

improve the state of the outflow. Maybe, instead of building higher chimneys to pour black smoke into the sky, we should reduce the chimney height, possibly to that of the factory windows. How long would it take to produce non-toxic, non-filthy fumes? Some research would be necessary but we already know of ways which would effect great improvement. It might help if those who pollute had to live at the site. Doctors can often find ways of improving the taste of their own medicine.

I've mentioned my involvement with 'officialdom': what about other scientists? There is a gulf. Biologists generally fear one or more of a number of catastrophes; chemists believe mainly that although one may get an occasional local tragedy, a world one is almost out of the question.

I have felt, for some time, that unless mankind changed his ways, then his existence on earth really was threatened and I hazarded about two centuries as the crucial point. Although I regarded myself, reluctantly, as a 'doomsday man', I was shocked on my travels to find that I am regarded as an optimist. Many senior scientists say, 'about one century.'

We can look at two examples and then at a sort of analysis of what we have done recently and are doing which makes the word 'environment' the 'in word' that it is.

The large reptiles disappeared because the environment became unsuitable for them. For how long can we change our environment before we make it unsuitable for us?

The second case is one which, I believe, many people have forgotten and fear that most non-biologists could never have heard of. In 1919-1920, the flower Musk lost its scent all over the world. As far as I know, we still don't know why but here is an example of a species losing a fundamental physiological feature which might have been fatal. What was the change in the environment and what caused it?

What are the factors which cause biologists most concern? They each have their ideas on how mankind could disappear—obviously a nuclear holocaust by design or accident; radiation by additional uses of nuclear material without knowing all the risks or even some of the most serious ones. Remember, we are thinking of a couple of hundred years ahead. Others fear over-population and lower food production; more resistant pests and diseases and newer chemicals until, one day, a tragedy occurs.

Have we any grounds for fears about new substances? I believe we have. We learn from mistakes we've made but cannot learn from those not made before. We know now, that the offspring of an animal has to be considered. A drug taken during pregnancy gave us the thalidomide case. Again, how many deaths from overdoses of barbiturates may not have been quite that? Did we know the synergystic effect of alcohol on barbiturates when they were first used as sleeping tablets? I don't think that it is a secret that many 'overdoses' wouldn't have been fatal had they not been taken on a stomach full of alcohol. We don't test chemicals on rabbits which have been drinking gins and tonic.

A study of the woolly aphid and the red spider in the U.S.A., years ago, should also make us think. Woolly aphid was a problem and D.D.T., a

solution. Red spider was no problem as it was kept in check by predators. Unfortunately, D.D.T. killed the predators and soon red spider was a bigger problem than woolly aphid. Then, with other pests and diseases, resistance, etc., some apple orchards were using over ten chemical formulations in just over ten weeks. Owners admitted that, should further resistant strains occur, the hope would lie in a new chemical.

My fear, shared with many biologists, is simply that we can produce one or more chemicals whose long-term effect, or where there can be synergism with others, are not fully known.

Should man, though, be in especial danger? More important, to me, is why shouldn't he be? The brine shrimp will die in water containing 1 part of D.D.T. in 100,000,000 of water. Man can have 12 p.p.m. in his body fat (this is about the current U.S.A. figure). On the other hand, man is infinitely more susceptible to cyanide than are many insects. We just don't know enough about the mechanisms of all species to all chemicals, nor can we ever do so.

Also, how far ahead can we look? Is there remotely a danger of producing a chemical which, though safe in its application to adults and which produces no teratogenic effects on offspring, could yet produce sterility in those offspring? It could be sixteen plus years before we should know for humans, considering our normal breeding age.

We know that some chemicals can affect bird life even though the birds survive and lay fertile eggs. In many cases, the effect has been on the eggshell which has become fragile. Some species, generally birds of prey, have been reduced to what some ornithologists believe are dangerously low levels because of this.

Some chemicals are lethal only to one or two varieties or cultivars of plants. The amount of variation in different life forms is too frequently ignored. Man cannot test every chemical against every species!

My personal fears on this subject are twofold. Firstly, man is practically omnivorous; flesh, fowl, fish, eggs, molluscs, vegetables and fruit of all kinds. He is often at the end of many food chains, i.e. he gets an accumulation of toxic material. Secondly, the problem of synergism between the chemicals which man ingests with his food and with other chemicals which he takes deliberately or accidentally, must concern us. I've mentioned the effect of two non-pesticides; alcohol on barbiturates.

What else does man put into himself, voluntarily or otherwise? Today's life stresses are dealt with, not only by tobacco and alcohol but also by tranquillisers, sleeping pills and 'pep' pills. Anodynes, tonics and various other drugs could also be possible synergists. We have the chemicals we put on ourselves; hair dyes, anti-perspirants, all kinds of lotions, etc. Are they all safe? The recent alarm about some materials used in ladies' hairdressing salons possibly being carcinogenic should make us think again.

Add to this, mankind's way of life, shattered by noise, inhaling diesel fumes and atmospheric factory effluent, water pollution in stream and sea and one gets some idea of what I feel could be his greatest dangers in this field.

Often men disagree over the problem. For instance, there will probably continue to be debates over whether Concorde should have been built or not. This, I believe, is sterile and what I prefer to ask is, 'What next?' Have we the technology to build a larger Concorde with quieter engines and a better economic return? If so, then the whole prospect changes and we could now consider ourselves as being in the teething stage of a valuable development. The technologists must be able to say whether a larger quieter plane is feasible and surely Government has enough experts to do a cost benefit analysis.

We frequently don't know all the details of a possible danger, nor can we. Britain reprocesses used nuclear fuel and returns it together with radioactive waste to the original country for which she was doing the reprocessing. As the waste will remain radioactive for half a million years and, of course, will be cumulative, elaborate precautions are taken. We can accept that every precaution is taken but they are within the context of today's world. I should not, as a biologist, like to attempt a prediction on what environmental changes on or under the sea, or land, might take place within half a million years. I doubt if anyone can predict the temperature change, subterranean plate shifts, etc.

We don't seem to learn enough from the past. Instructions for the disposal of toxic materials on land or in the sea have often led to embarrassing results. We can echo Macbeth's cry over these:

> Bloody instructions which, being sent, return
> To plague th' inventor.

Even if we forget the half a million years, we must still concentrate on the next few centuries in dealing with every case. We can be fair and remember that such things as DDT in a world of hunger helped to increase food output. It also killed the vectors of some diseases, thus saving many who would have died and thus possibly aggravated the food supply problem. I believe we should always try to save life but also try to ensure an adequate food supply.

I and many of my colleagues fear population explosions and regard some kind of control as essential. On the 24th March 1976, the Cabinet produced a discussion paper which projected a future of war, famine and disease if a stringent check is not made on population. By the figures produced in this Cabinet Paper my two centuries and my colleagues' one century predictions would appear to be optimistic. The Cabinet special committee think that, in physical terms, the world could meet its food needs for the next 30 or 40 years. Even this is not likely to be realised because of economic, political and social problems leading to maldistribution, etc. Unless action is taken by, e.g. contraception or by a greatly increased feed supply, 'the effective check to world population will be the Malthusian triology of war, famine and disease.'

My 200 years forecast was for a world without man unless we mend our ways. Without population checks we could be, well within a century, in a disaster period.

We should learn from the mistakes we have made but it is unlikely that

we shall take steps to prevent tragedies of which we had no warning. We can see this in new substances introduced in recent years. We now know that the offspring of the test animal has to be considered, but it took the thalidomide tragedy to teach us.

My observations have been that in some areas we are improving but that we are not in others. I doubt if, even now, it is realised that it takes years of biological testing or observation to prove the safety of a chemical introduced years earlier. I got a shock on reading a newspaper announcement that on October 1st, 1974, the U.S. government, through its Environmental Protection Agency, has placed an immediate ban on further production of the pesticides Aldrin and Dieldrin because of evidence that they may cause cancer. These chemicals have been in use for years. I believe that I first used Dieldrin in 1956. The use of both chemicals was widespread though, mainly because of their supposed effect on wildlife, they are hardly used in the U.K. at all now. Aldrin breaks down to Dieldrin and what is fairly certain is that most, if not all people in the world, will at some time or other, have had Dieldrin residues in their bodies. I doubt if there is great danger but it shows that biological work is throwing up grave doubts almost twenty years after the introduction of one of the world's most successful chemicals.

The environment must be looked at as a whole and should be given a high degree of priority by all nations. Fairly immediate action on some known solutions should be instituted; e.g. river pollution needs, not so much more research, but more action.

New chemicals, such as substitutes for Warfarin against resistant rats; organo-phosphorus insecticides instead of organo-chlorine ones, all need to be treated with care. As I have said, one cannot test every chemical against everything. Usually, two mammal, two birds and two fish species are used in 'required' tests, though firms may use far more. One hopes that man is never more susceptible, to any serious degree, than any of the test species.

There have been frights with new pesticides since Rachel Carson wrote *Silent Spring* in 1962. Some apparently 'safe' chemicals are not without risk. Birds have been found dead after ingesting treated grain. Maybe some birds have been deliberately poisoned with a supposedly safe chemical. This is another bit of the 'pollution jigsaw' presented to the scientist. I have seen a distressing result of the use of a so-called 'safe' seed dressing. Was it safe or was it wrongly used?

If we want to find a consolation in this apparent catalogue of misery, let it be this. The world was once a more beautiful place with clear streams, cleaner seas and smog-free skies and mankind could make it so again but it will take more resolution by all nations acting as one, than they have ever shown in the past.

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[Dr. D. W. Williams was formerly Director of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland's Agricultural Scientific Services.]

# LESSONS FROM OPEC

## by Andrew Liddell

THE places in the world where there is a generally acceptable standard of living are few: North America, Europe, Japan, Australia and some other favoured parts. In most cases there are clearly discernible reasons for their economic success: natural resources, favourable climate, response to a challenge, high educational standards, an appropriate ethic and a share of luck! Economic success is not really a function of virtue, although it is but human nature for the successful so to believe. Economic failure is not the result of vice or even of laziness or lack of spirit; for economic progress the conditions must be just right.

In many cases conditions militate against economic advancement; the climate is too harsh; there is a complete lack of natural resources. Indeed if the challenge is overwhelming, social evolution becomes stultified so that there are societies like the Laps, fossilised at the stage of living in symbiosis with, but not having domesticated, the reindeer and the Bushmen of the Kalahari still living as primitive hunters. Much of the third world is at the stage of peasant cultivator or herdsman; few countries have reached the stage of spontaneous economic growth although industry is being grafted, sometimes painfully, onto their primitive economies.

Certain countries have been so dominated by foreign influences that their societies were dormant for long periods: Latin America, India, Africa and the Balkans. The progress of the successful countries has sometimes aggravated the problems of the poor. Medical science has increased the survival rate in communities which are conditioned to resist voluntary population control, so that the pressure of population upon resources has been enormously increased. The invention of synthetics has kept up the momentum of growth in successful societies but put a ceiling on the price of raw materials which were, and still largely are, the livelihood of the third world.

The rich countries cannot, therefore, shrug off responsibility for the poor. Without the prairies, the immigration and the high rate of economic growth in Europe, even the United States would not have succeeded in raising itself by its exertions. The idea that physical energy, the protestant ethic and a high rate of savings can do for Chad what it did for the United States is to misunderstand the problem completely . . . 'Let them eat cake.'

In theory, there used to be a mechanism by which the fruits of prosperity were disseminated. The economically successful required raw materials, tropical products. This call for raw materials led the successful to explore round the world, to purchase and to invest: there was an automatic current of wealth from the rich to the poor. Within a national economy, wealth will tend to spread out as the capital accumulated in the successful zones overflows and seeks profitable employment in its own markets; and this will also obtain internationally. Planet earth is still, after all, a closed

market. But this process has been substantially modified.

The call for raw materials from the industrial countries, impatient of the slower processes of nature, encouraged by political or mercantilist theories, led to the invention and exploitation of synthetic materials and investment which would otherwise have been directed overseas, was devoted to the creation of artificial raw materials, the self-sustaining industrial machine. The synthetics revolution which burgeoned in the 1920s and 30s, was greatly accelerated by the compulsions of the Second World War. No doubt the economic growth achieved in the industrialised countries since the war could not have been sustained without synthetic raw materials; natural resources could never have been expanded fast enough to meet demand, but the effect of synthetics was to divert the natural flow of payments and investment. If all motor cars, trucks and aeroplanes were equipped with real rubber tyres, the price of raw rubber would be astronomically higher than it is today, and Malaysia would be a rich country.

The same principle applies to a wide range of commodities, the fibres, metals, even foodstuffs and beverages. The demand for synthetic materials in recent years has increased four times as fast as the demand for the natural materials which they replace. In the years since World War II, excluding war scare stockpiling—Korea, Vietnam—raw material prices remained within the same price range until the 'oil price hike' of 1973, a revolution in producer techniques of importance far beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict by which it was prompted.

The effect of joint action was a transfer in the first year, 1974, of approximately an additional US$50 billion in share of world product to the petroleum exporting countries. Fortunately for the world monetary system, the beneficiaries held their new liquidities with the banks of the major consumers, the developed countries, so that the money was lent back to the main contributors. But the poor nations, unendowed with oil, suffered a violent deterioration in their terms of trade, largely unmitigated. Robin Hood did not give to the poor, but rather lent his booty to the Sheriff of Nottingham!

The major consumers have adapted speedily to the brusque change in the rules of the game. Oil consumption has been curtailed to the embarrassment of several oil producers, new high cost sources of oil are being brought into production and inflation has also eroded some of the new-found purchasing power. But even so the accretion of resources has provided a massive source of development funds to the oil producers: development funds without interest charges, repayment instalments or strings attached. These development funds are being applied towards raising the standards of living, infrastructure, educational and social improvements, and to the diversification of narrow economies to provide a livelihood when the oil runs out. In some countries, the oil bonanza has been used to implement ambitious industrialisation projects, in some to buy up foreign industries, and for others to lay the foundations for financial service centres. The successful co-operation of the members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries has given an impetus to development within their economies which would never

have come from normal trade or overflow investment. It may not have been a popular move so far as the buyers were concerned, and some poor countries have been plunged into dire straits, but for oil-producing countries it has given the impetus for self-sustaining economic growth.

The developing countries have long pleaded for trade not aid: for a fair price and an open market for their products, rather than for loan capital even on charitable terms. The increasing burden of debt service payments in the developing countries and the growing reluctance of the developed nations to meet even the modest targets of aid recommended by the World Bank, demonstrated the validity of their plea. In a good, old-fashioned capitalist way, the developing nations would prefer to earn their resources on a free market, provided that it is in fact free from the distortions imposed by closed economic communities and protected manufacturers of raw material substitutes. Karl Marx could have written some interesting additional and inflammatory chapters on the pre-emption of wealth from the proletarian nations by the rich nations (whether of capitalist or socialist persuasion) if he had studied the middle part of this century.

As has been demonstrated by the OPEC countries, the way to claim a fair share of world national product is through syndicalisation. The Nairobi meeting of the United Nations Committee for Trade and Development was reaching towards some way by which developing nations could obtain the resources to set up commodity support schemes. Apart from oil, where there is as yet no satisfactory substitute, the only successful commodity schemes have been operated in tin and diamonds, but the principles which those successful schemes have established are probably sound for most commodities. The principles are that the producers should have the means to hold their product off the market in times of failing demand, with the object of recouping their capital stock when demand is strong; the buffer stock concept.

Production has to follow a steady pattern, but consumption is whimsical. Somehow the two must be kept in cadence for uninterrupted economic growth. As in monetary management, the reserve plays the co-ordinating role. Indeed, since the world has now abandoned the one-commodity standard for monetary reserves—gold—a case could be made to adopt a multi-commodity standard, so that copper, cocoa, wheat, oil or whatever could be traded for Special Drawing Rights. Accretion of international reserve currency in terms of surplus production other than pure hard currency balance of payments surplus would make economic and capitalist sense.

The OPEC lesson was clearly expounded and will inevitably be learned. Co-operation in the natural transfer of a reasonable share in world product to the primary producing countries should be facilitated, not resisted, by the developed nations. This may mean a reduction in the individual standards of living of rich countries, a reduction which will be needed if we are not to face an interglobal civil war.

# SCOTLAND'S GYPSIES

## by A. Christopher Tucker

BY their very connotation, the Wandering Folk of Scotland, commonly and derisively known as tinkers (due to one of their occupations, hammering tin objects), are part of the ancient Romany race known as gypsies.

Of an Indo-European antiquity and genesis, they spread, gradually diversifying throughout Europe, and acquiring particular and distinct traits and habits. In the British Isles, they became the English Gypsy, the Welsh Gypsy, the Irish Gypsy and lastly the Scottish Travelling People. And in Scotland, this once 'pure gypsy' came in contact with an ancient Celtic tinsmith caste and blended with it.

There is a marvellous picture of the striking basket-weaving, horse-dealing dover, combining fortune-telling with adventure in the lines of James Hogg (1770-1835), the celebrated Scots poet and novelist, designated as 'The Ettrick Shepherd' (from the site where he was born[1]):

> Their swarthy hue, and mantle's flowing fold,
> Bespeak the remnant of a race of old:
> Strange are their annals!—list and mark them well—
> For thou hast much to hear and I to tell.

These were a hardy race, who withstood suppression and persecution and yet remained friendly and contented during centuries.

The problem that besets them now, in the 20th century, although of different nature, is equally distressing. For the free life lies in their veins, and modern conditions of habitat and society have put a barrier to their traditional forms of travel and occupation. Therefore, for an accurate picture of the Travelling Folk I must describe their mode of living and their employments.

In the difficult question of the survival of their race both questions are nearly allied. It is becoming impossible for them to continue living in a horse-drawn caravan, now changed to a trailer, and towed by car or lorry.

In these vehicles, they have established annual circuit routes of travel, each of a pattern appropriate to the season. And after they have been on the road for days, where can they stop in the closed and guarded land tenancy of today? Their problem has been receiving consideration from Scotland's Development Board.

We now have a first problem to contend with; what shall be the residential facilities for them on the successive stages of their travel, with adequate hygienic facilities? And beside this question, and inextricably related to it, is the possibility of employment, for how is the non-stationary individual to be given work?

The bulk of their traditional occupations have been dealt with by modern industry. Once they were able to live by peddling such things as pot-

scrubbers made from heather, along with hand-made paper flowers, and also to make some money by doing odd jobs around the houses. The days are now gone when the women went from door to door, with the paper baskets they had made, crying out for their sale, together with pots, pans, bootlaces, sharpening knives and scissors.

> Here ye are mistress—a roaster, a toater, a tinny,
> a tander, and help me God, yer gitten a bargain.

Once these problems are solved, we could enjoy the folklore. There is their speech in the 'canty' tongue of their exploits and the songs of their fascinating lives. 'Barri, barri', (that is, 'lovely, lovely'), the gypsy may exclaim, or something like 'Dik the barri gray!', or 'look at the beautiful horse!'

Their music and religion have fascinating characteristics. Strong superstitions govern their habits and lives, preserved through the centuries. Most authentic travellers believe in the existence of a supernatural being, a deity who both created and sustains the universe, and is the pervading force which prevents it from disintegrating. It is sufficient for the individual to acknowledge this and, coupled to having led a sinless life, he will surely reach heaven. Death is the negation of life for the traveller, and he fears its power. Beyond death lies judgement, followed by Heaven, or Hell.[2] And the traveller tries to enjoy life here and now, expressing himself colourfully in music and song.

The secret language of the traveller evolved in a distinctive and fascinating style; after a day of berry picking an informal *ceilidh*[3] would take place. Among the repertoire, when traditional Scottish folk songs were played, a change would be noted. For the travelling singer would not only preserve old tunes and ballads, but enhance them with a colourful flavour of his own.

> O, come a' ye tramps and hawker-lads an' gaithers o' bla'
> That tramp the country roun' and roun', come listen one and a'
> I'll tell tae you a rovin' tale, an' places I hae been
> Far up into the snowy north or sooth by Gretna Green.[4]

And so on and on they went with their bagpipes, mouth-organs and accordions, while the wine flowed. Their feelings throughout were 'human in their sadness, thrice human in their eloquence, and often wild and passionate in sublime instinct'.

Thus, it was an ancient custom for the fiddlers to travel and give musical entertainment from place to place. In return for a farmer's benevolence to give 'a cap of corn to the horses', the travellers would play a few tunes. It was after the evening meal, when they played their instruments 'roond the hearth', that 'hornpipes came from their pockets and the dancing commenced in all its glee'.[5]

Although they are no longer persecuted today, there can still be found feelings of prejudice towards them. The gypsies constitute a minority in the population of Scotland (August 1969: 344 families, 1,998 persons mainly concentrated in Perthshire, Kinross and Lanarkshire), and are obliged to

accept what is available, however poor may be the conditions. The common attitude that they have towards their own future seems to be a desire to be accepted by the community at large, and not be merely seen as a curiosity or tourist attraction. Therefore, their values to society must be encouraged. They can play, for example, a valuable role in the collecting of raw material (scrap from cars, etc., for recycling). The public should be provided with accurate news of the life and activities of gypsies throughout all the British Isles. In this manner, conflicts with the resident population would be diminished. It would establish a better harmony between the three parties, i.e., the local authorities, the local population and the travellers themselves.

It would be most appropriate to conclude with a gypsy song.

You ask then, what is the gypsy life?
Hark then, and I will tell:

Tra, la la la, Tra la la la, A gypsy gay and free,
Tra, la la la, Tra, la la la, A roving life for me.
Tra, la la la, Tra, la la la, Thro' the world I roam,
I sleep beneath the greenwood tree, I have no other home;
And at night, when the star shines out bright in the sky,
Then with song and guitar every care I defy. Ah, Tra, a la . . .

Hola, hola hola hola, someday I'm sure to die,
Hola, hola hola hola, and not a soul will sigh,
Then 'neath the greenwood tree,
You'll find for me a grave;
Then at night who can say but my spirit may roam
Through the glade in the shade where I once had a home.[6]

Further information regarding gypsies or 'travelling people' in the British Isles may be obtained from the local authorities concerned; in Edinburgh, dealing with the Scottish travelling-folk, there is The Central Research Unit of The Scottish Development Department. Other useful sources are the books mentioned below, or going to the local libraries in your area, or speaking to and knowing the travellers themselves, and creating a friendly atmosphere. Two books that fascinated me, as a poet, on the subject, were *Folk Songs of Britain and Ireland*, by Peter Kennedy, and *Exploits and Anecdotes of the Scottish Gypsies*, by William Chambers, LI.D.

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NOTES

[1] Author of the book, *Confessions of a Justified Sinner*.

[2] A variation on the traditional Christian creed.

[3] *ceilidh*, Gaelic for social evening of entertainment, often musical.

[4] *Tramps and Hawkers*, David Stuart, Dundee, Angus, Scotland.

[5] fr. *Charlie Taylor; a Prince among Gypsies*, by George Steele.

[6] *Through Romany Songland*, by Laura Alexandrine Smith.

# NO PROGRESS REPORT ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

## by P. W. Birnie

IT is generally agreed that the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (hereafter referred to as UNCLOS III) is the most crucial and important international conference ever held. It is certainly proving to be the largest (up to 150 states have attended) and the longest, having already run to 5 sessions, the last of which ended inconclusively on September 17th. It is to resume in 1977. Many observers are wondering why progress towards the adoption of a new comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty—the objective of the Conference—has been so slow and whether a successful conclusion can ever be reached. This article will explore the magnitude and scope of the issues involved and analyse the developments to date.

70% of the earth's surface is covered by the oceans. They are vital to our life support systems and contain a web of interrelated eco-systems and food chains. 40% of this area is underlain by continental shelves which contain resources of minerals, including oil and gas, and also sustain most of the world's fisheries which provide 14% of our protein. The seas are also a main traffic highway, especially for oil, food and other supplies and for navies, although the movement of many hazardous cargoes in the modern superships is worrying states whose coasts and straits they navigate. They are also increasingly the receptacle of the world's wastes, particularly the effluents of industrial society whether discharged from land, into the air or directly dumped therein. The rapidly increasing world population, the rising living standards of our technological age, make ever-increasing demands upon the ocean, tax its living and non-living resources to a point of exhaustion, bring its pollution to harmful levels, and intensify its uses in many ways. The advent of large distant water fishing fleets, built up quite legitimately by the Russians and Japanese, for example, and the development of industrial fishing in which all sizes and species of fish are processed into meal, has resulted in an unprecedented rise in the world catch from 20 million metric tons in 1950 to 70 million metric tons in 1970; many over-exploited species have suffered drastic declines which existing Fisheries Commissions, based on the voluntary cooperation of member states which have a vital national interesting in maintaining their catch levels, have been unable to halt, still less reverse. States off whose shores the big fleets fish have become increasingly alarmed at the results of the present legal regime based on the freedom of the high seas.

Many states are also concerned by the effects of the increasing exploitation of the minerals on and under the seabeds as technology advances. Exploitation of oil can now take place at 300-600 ft. and exploration at 2,000-3,000 ft. Only 7% of world resources lie beyond those depths. Recently, however, it has become both economically and technically feasible to exploit the manganese nodules which lie on the seabed, particularly richly

concentrated at depths of 6,000-11,000 ft. as in the Pacific where 90 billion tonnes are estimated to exist. They are poly-metallic lumps containing such metals at manganese, copper, nickel and cobalt, essential to many industrial processes and currently becoming increasingly expensive to acquire from land-sources which may eventually run out. There could be 20 nodule mining operations by 1985 and about 200 by the 21st century if a legal regime can be devised which would permit and encourage such developments.

At the same time that the technologically advanced states have been intensifying their uses of the oceans there has appeared on the international scene a large number of newly independent states, mostly small and poor, with growing populations, and few resources and a legacy of narrow maritime limits inherited from, and suitable to, their former colonial governors. Many are land-locked but nonetheless anxious to share in the seas' resources; most are members of the Group of 77 (105 in fact) states who count themselves poor, and some are amongst the 24 poorest states.

It is not surprising that these developments have strained a regime based on freedom which was developed in an age of simpler uses of the seas, when fewer ships plied their trade, fishermen used unsophisticated gear, there was little chemical, oily or radioactive waste, and coal was the only fuel recovered from under the seabed.

The old customary doctrine of the freedom of the seas was codified by the First UNCLOS at Geneva in 1958. It adopted 4 major Conventions which formed the basis of the law until recently, although none has been ratified by more than 50 states. They give rise to many ambiguities and open-ended definitions which have led to disputes such as the Icelandic 'Cod War' and the recent Aegean Sea-bed conflict.

An understanding of the weaknesses of the Geneva Conventions is essential to comprehension of the UNCLOS III approach. The law was based on two major divisions of maritime jurisdiction— the territorial sea within which the coastal state exercised full sovereignty subject only to a right of innocent passage for foreign vessels (passage being innocent unless it threatened the security of the coastal state) and the high seas which remain free to all.

The Territorial Sea Convention was concerned with methods of drawing its baselines and did not fix any outer limit. A Second UNCLOS in 1960 held solely to fix a limit for fisheries also failed to agree. States customarily had adopted narrow limits mostly of 3 miles, though some took 6 or 12. The above Convention introduced a Contiguous Zone of 12 miles in which limited functional jurisdictions, e.g. for customs, could be exercised.

The High Seas Convention codified 4 freedoms of the seas—fishing, navigation, overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines—although it did refer unspecifically to others 'recognised by international law' and required that all be exercised 'with reasonable regard to the interests of other States.' In recognising fishing as a freedom the Convention endorsed the common property status of fish, treating them as a *res*

*communis* to which all states must be given access; any restriction on catch can only be imposed with the consent of states concerned, generally through Fisheries Commissions in which political interests tend to override scientific considerations.

This convention permits all states to register ships to fly their flags and subjects ships on the high seas to the exclusive jurisdiction of the states whose flags they fly. The only criterion for issuance of a flag is that there be a 'genuine link' between the ship and the flag state. The Torrey Canyon disaster highlighted the weakness of this as the ship flew a Panamanian flag but neither its owners, shareholders, captain, crew or builders had any connection with that country. Pollution, such as that resulting from the Torrey Canyon or from seabed operations is dealt with in very general terms, states being required to 'draw up regulations' to prevent it.

The Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas recognised the coastal state's special interest in maintaining fish stocks off its coasts and required states to cooperate in conservation: if agreement cannot be reached the coastal state can act unilaterally in taking urgent measures as long as they are based on scientific findings and do not discriminate against foreign vessels. Most states, however, including Iceland, never ratified this Convention and even before it Chile, Ecuador and Peru had joined in the Declaration of Santiago asserting jurisdiction over all resources in a 200 mile zone off their coasts. This Declaration was prompted by President Truman's Proclamation in 1945 whereby he propounded the exclusive right of the U.S.A. to exploit the resources of the continental shelf contiguous to its coast, the limit of which was not defined.

The fourth Geneva Convention, on the Continental Shelf, endeavoured to clarify the resultant situation. It confirmed the coastal state's sovereign right to explore and exploit the natural resources of the submarine areas adjacent to its coasts, to a depth of 200 metres (656.17 feet) but added that shelf rights could go beyond that limit to where the depth of the water above it admits exploitation. The outer limit was therefore left open to be determined by advancing technology. Shelf rights were also said to apply to islands, although these were not defined, but the waters above the shelf specifically retained their status as high seas, free to all states, though research related to the shelf was made subject to coastal state consent, on certain conditions.

It is not surprising that the Geneva Conventions gave rise to complaint and conflict in the light of the developments described earlier. Questions left unanswered included the point at which the exercise of a freedom of the seas becomes 'unreasonable', particularly in relation to fisheries and pollution; whether dumping of wastes and scientific research are unwritten freedoms; the limits of the territorial sea, fisheries zones and the continental shelf; the legal regime for the seabed areas beyond the shelves—is it the same as the high seas above it?; when does passages cease to be innocent in the light of the hazardous cargoes now carried and the size of ships?

Some states began to provide their own answers to these questions even

before UNCLOS III opened:

In 1960 only 34 states claimed limits exceeding 3 miles. By 1973 80 states had done so, 15 exceeding 12 miles and 7 claiming fisheries zones of up to 200 miles. Groups of South American and Caribbean states joined in the Declarations of Montevideo and Santiago proclaiming the concept of a 'patrimonial sea', a 200 mile zone in which the coastal state was to exercise jurisdiction over both living and non-living resources, including those of the sea-bed, marine pollution and scientific research, on the grounds of its special ecological relationship to this area. African states soon developed a similar concept approved by the O.A.U. in 1973—that of a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone, including a 12 miles Territorial Sea, which would retain the residual high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight and cable laying but subject to the coastal states' jurisdiction over all resources, pollution and research. Land-locked states of a region would be given access to the living resources of the zones.

Encouraged by the decision of the International Court of Justice in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases which supported the coastal states' right, independent of the Geneva Convention, to exploit the 'natural prolongation of their land mass under the sea' many shelf states claimed that their rights extended beyond the shelf as known to geographers and included all areas that had some 'natural' link with the land in terms of geology, geophysics or geo-morphology and that as both the continental slopes and rises contain mineral bearing rock and sediments they were part of the shelf, even though in some areas they extend 900 miles from the coast and plunge to depths of 16,000 feet. The whole area is now referred to as the 'continental margin.'

As multi-national companies, such as the American Deep Sea Ventures, began to develop the technology and know-how to exploit the manganese nodules, many poorer states began to fear that a few companies, based in the richer countries, would exploit all the best sites before the poorer states could participate and that those among them which produced the same minerals from land-sources might have their export earnings drastically cut if the market was flooded with minerals from sea-bed sources. Zambia, Zaire, Morocco, Gabon, Ghana, Indonesia and Cuba might be most affected but the actual effects are much disputed as developed countries also are land producers and cheap, plentiful supplies would benefit all countries. There is at present no international body with authority to control and regulate such developments.

The proposals to put pollution within the coastal states' jurisdiction in Economic Zones have already been referred to. Only one state so far has declared a zone exclusively concerned with pollution prevention. In 1970 Canada, alarmed by the prospect of vast oil tankers on their way to Alaska traversing her Arctic Waters (particularly vulnerable to oil pollution), in spite of American protests, enacted a 100 miles pollution zone to control both the passage and type of ship entering that area.

States bordering international straits such as Malaysia and Indonesia,

whose Straits of Malacca form the main oil route from the Middle East to Japan, were equally concerned about the threat of major accidents to supertankers, liquid natural gas carriers and by the passage of nuclear ships, submarines and warships. They welcomed a 12 miles territorial sea which would bring under coastal state control over 100 straits less than 24 miles wide, limiting passage to innocent passage and possibly subjecting the passage of certain ships to coastal state consent. Submarines would have to navigate on the surface. Needless to say the major naval and maritime states such as the USSR, Japan, USA, UK and France objected to this proposal and demanded free transit rights through international straits.

In 1967 Malta urged the General Assembly to reserve the deep sea-bed for peaceful purposes and to establish an international agency to control its exploitation for the benefit of all states. The U.N. established a Sea-bed Committee to study the problems. It reported that these questions were related to many other law of the sea questions which should be discussed together. The Committee was divided into 3 sub-committees: Committee I discussed the establishment of an international regime for the deep-sea-bed; Committee II considered all the issues covered by the Geneva Conventions and others; Committee III dealt with the preservation of the marine environment, later extended to include marine pollution, scientific research and transfers of technology. In 1970 the General Assembly, 'conscious that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole', decided to convene the Third UNCLOS to adopt a single 'package deal' treaty comprehending all the issues. The hope was that the confusion and uncertainty resulting from the four separate Geneva Conventions, with their varying ratifications, would be avoided and that states would be induced to compromise and agree, trading-off their interests in different issues. The USA, UK and USSR might be prepared, for example, to accept an International Seabed Regime, and the sharing of its revenues, in return for free transit through international straits. The General Assembly by 1970 had adopted two important resolutions—the first calling for a Moratorium on exploitation of the International Area (left undefined) pending establishment of a regime, and the second a Declaration of Principles Governing the Area 'beyond national jurisdiction,' which was said to be 'the common heritage of mankind,' to be exploited only under an international regime (which was to be established) for the benefit of mankind as a whole, taking into account particularly the interests of developing states. The legal status of 'common heritage,' the nature of the regime, the limits of the area, the means of benefiting all, were left obscure. Are states and companies to exploit the area or only an international authority?

The Conference opened in New York in 1973 with an agenda of over 90 items. The Seabed Committee in which over 90 states took part, acted as the preparatory committee but it was a political and not a legal committee and though it received a large number of proposals in the form of draft treaties and articles from states and groups it was unable to agree on a single article so the Conference began with 6 volumes of texts containing articles in as many as 5 alternatives. It organised its work on the basis of

3 committees following the earlier pattern. Up to 150 states have attended UNCLOS III. Their interests are as diverse as their geography and faced with the complexity and number of issues progress has inevitably been slow. The first session in New York in 1973 considered only voting procedures. This question was resolved at the second session in Caracas in 1974 by a 'gentlemen's agreement' to proceed by consensus and avoid voting if at all possible. There is even to be a 'cooling off period' if a vote is called for. A vote on matters of substance is taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting but must include a majority of states participating in the session. This does not make agreement easy. How then can states achieve the elusive consensus?

At the second Session in Caracas states did not seriously negotiate. About 100 made general statements of their positions on issues important to them but they did begin to group themselves according to those perceived interests which cut across their usual groupings of North/South, Rich/Poor, East/West, Socialist/Capitalist, and even disturbed regional groups such as the EEC, OAU or Warsaw Pact. Instead groups formed round the interests of Straits States in controlling navigation; an Archipelaegic Group demanded that baselines be measured from the perimeter of their outermost islands; Oceanic Islands got together; the Group of 77 (105) tried to concert its interests in development and maximum participation in exploitation and revenues; the Maritime (Shipping) States Group resisted control of navigation via inclusion of pollution control in wide economic zones; Coastal States on the other hand favoured broad and exclusive jurisdictions in such zones, to protect their coasts. Many states had difficulty in deciding on their positions as their interests, as do the UK's, allied them with many groups.

An interesting new grouping was formed under the title of Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged States (hereafter referred to as LL & GDS) by states which are cut off from, or have reduced access to, the resources of the proposed economic zones. The group includes such varied land-locked states as Lesotho, Botswana, Nepal, Afghanistan, Austria and Switzerland, and shelf-locked states such as both East and West Germany. States which for geographical reasons cannot claim an EEZ, or would have one which is less than 30% of the area claimable in a full EEZ, or have an EEZ which for biological or geographical reasons they cannot get advantage from are also eligible for membership. 51 states are in this group and could, if they cohere, represent the blocking third if a vote is ever called for and their interests are not met. Their objectives include access to all living and non-living resources in the EZs, a maximum international area with correspondingly restricted shelf rights, a fair share of seabed revenues and participation in any International Regime. But many states do not look favourably on their case, arguing that disadvantage in land resources and geography etc. have never been compensated and that the New Economic Order called for by the General Assembly should not be implemented solely at sea.

At the Third session in Geneva in 1975 these groups began to consolidate their positions but not seriously to negotiate with each other. There was

progress in defining issues and alternatives. Most meetings were informal and unrecorded and the most progress was made in a group known as the Evensen Group (after its leader, Jens Evensen of Norway) devoted to drafting a compromise text, eliminating most of the alternatives, by use of drafting and other skills. Two weeks before the end of the session the President of the Conference, Mr. Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, called on the Chairman of the three Committees each to produce a single text as a basis of negotiation, abandoning all alternatives. Taking account of the Evensen progress and their own assessment of developments the Chairmen, to their credit, succeeded in delivering three Informal Single Negotiating Texts. ISNT is a singularly appropriate acronym for them as each proclaims that it is 'a procedural device and only provides a basis for negotiation. It must not in any way be regarded as affecting either the status of proposals already made by delegations or the right of delegations to submit amendments or new proposals' though 'it takes account of all formal and informal discussions held so far.' Differences were not resolved by the ISNT but negotiation was facilitated. The President later added a fourth ISNT concerning Dispute Settlement Procedures.

The fourth and fifth Sessions held in New York in spring and summer 1976 gave a reading to the ISNT and a Revised Negotiating Text (RISNT) was produced at the end of the fourth session, consisting of 317 articles and 11 Annexes. Part I proposes the establishment of an International Seabed Authority (I.S.A.) which would itself exploit the international area through an Enterprise body, but would also join in contracts, under its full control, with states and corporations. The common heritage area is still vaguely defined as 'beyond national jurisdiction.' Mining areas would be allocated on a double banking system—contractors would be allotted only half the area applied for, the other half being reserved for future exploitation by the Enterprise. Adverse effects on developing country economies would be protected by a variety of means. The I.S.A. would consist of 5 organs (Assembly, Council, Secretariat, Tribunal and Enterprise) aided by Technical and other Committees to review demand, supply and prices of minerals. Every participating state would have one vote in the Assembly, the supreme organ, but the Council would be limited to 36 members, in groups of 6, representing special interests and groupings (the LL & GDS being allotted two places). Surplus revenue would be distributed equitably among States parties.

Part II of the RSNT proposes a 12 miles territorial sea within a 200 miles EEZ. Innocent passage is redefined in terms of the acts, including wilful pollution, that render it non-innocent. Within the EEZ, the coastal state is given sovereign rights over living and non-living resources of the sea-bed and water column, over the construction of artificial islands and the production of energy from the water and over scientific research. It is merely given 'jurisdiction' concerning preservation of the marine environment, Part III of the text being more specific on this point. The high seas are defined as starting beyond the EEZ, by implication the EEZ is *sui generis* in status. Residual high seas freedoms do not continue as such but

are guaranteed within the EEZ 'subject to the relevant provisions of the Convention.' Fishing would no longer be free; the legal status of fish thus becomes obscure. The coastal state alone would determine the total allowable catch within its EEZ, though required to take conservation and management measures to avoid over-exploitation. It is, however, only if and when the coastal state itself determines that it has not the capacity to harvest all the catch that it would be obliged to give to other states, through negotiated agreements, access to the surplus. If stocks cross EEZs the states concerned would be required to seek agreement on conservation measures —the role of Fisheries Commissions would be vastly changed. If the EEC and other regional groups adopt policies on the lines of the proposed Common Fisheries 'Pond' the text will need to be amended to accommodate this.

Highly migratory species like whales and tuna are given little international protection, only the coastal states whose nationals fish them being required to cooperate to ensure conservation, backed by international organisations. Optimum utilisation is to be promoted. States which nurture anadromous species like salmon are given preferential catching rights.

The LL & GDS get few concessions in this text. Only the needs of developing coastal states dependent for their food supplies, for geographical reasons, on the EZs of neighbouring states, or without EZs of their own, are recognised. They are limited to negotiating agreements for access to living resources only, and developed LLS can only do so for access to EZs of developed states.

The RSNT permits archipelagic states to draw the baselines of their zones from the perimeter of their outermost islands but couples this with a guaranteed right of regulated passage through the waters thus enclosed. International straits are also subjected to a qualified right of free transit. Islands are defined and permitted territorial seas, EEZs and continental shelves of their own but 'rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or continental shelf.' Rockall type claims would thus be excluded.

Part III of the RSNT deals more specifically with coastal states' rights to control marine pollution and circumscribes the jurisdiction conceded in the EEZ and Territorial Sea in Part II, confining it to dumping, sea-bed operations and certain internationally agreed standards for discharges from vessels. Enforcement is still left mainly to flag states backed by limited port state jurisdiction i.e. the state into whose port a ship calls can take action against an offending vessels if the flag state does not soon do so. Areas specially vulnerable to pollution for various reasons can be designated by coastal states within their EEZ and special mandatory standards can be enforced within them, subject to some international overview.

Scientific research in the EEZ is also dealt with in more detail in Part III. It is made subject to the consent of the coastal state but this should not be withheld unless the research is directed to exploitation of resources, or certain other specified purposes.

Part IV of the RSNT is limited to the provision of Dispute Settlement Machinery. In addition to existing means such as the International Court of Justice and arbitration, a controversial new Law of the Sea Tribunal is envisaged, as well as Special Procedures and Committees for Fisheries, Pollution, Scientific Research and Navigational disputes.

The fifth session of UNCLOS III which ended on September 17th, 1976, did not further revise the texts, nor did it make any perceptible progress towards agreeing on their more controversial aspects. Virtually all the discussions were informal and inconclusive.

It must be asked what now is the legal significance of the texts although this is a difficult question to answer at this stage when it is impossible to say whether or not a treaty will be adopted on their basis in the foreseeable future. Undoubtedly the texts do in parts represent real progress, and even, where they substantially represent agreement, crystallise emergent new customs of international law formulated within and outside the Conference debates and by state actions subsequent to them. International law can be made by custom and application of general principles as well as by a formally concluded and ratified treaty, and the relevant General Assembly Regulations must not be overlooked as part of the customary law process.

To what extent do the texts represent consensus? It is evident from the outcome of the Icelandic Fisheries dispute, from recent Canadian and American legislation, and from the pronouncements of Norway, the U.K. and the EEC that an exclusive fisheries jurisdiction of 200 miles is now accepted, but other aspects of economic zonal jurisdiction, e.g. pollution and research control, and 200 miles seabed rights, are not, at least in the form proposed in RSNT.

The 5th session of UNCLOS concentrated on the 'key' or 'priority' issues which are still disagreed and controversial. In relation to these, failing consensus or widespread state actions, new laws cannot yet be said to have emerged. What are they?

In Committee I the main issue is still who should exploit the International Area? Should states and private firms have a guaranteed role? Developed states say 'yes'; the Group of 77 still favours an exclusive role for the Enterprise and tight international control. Mr. Kissinger has elsewhere pointed out that United States technology is the most advanced in the world 'and our Navy is adequate to protect our interests', but added that 'law has here an opportunity to civilise us in the early stages of a new competitive activity.' He has offered, as a compromise, that if a regime acceptable to the U.S. is agreed, parallel exploitation by the Enterprise will quickly be made possible by finance being provided, and the necessary technology being transferred under the treaty, the arrangements being reviewable within 25 years.

Committee II concentrated on the unresolved issues of the legal status of the EEZ, the rights and duties of coastal states within it—especially in relation to living resources, the sharing of revenue derived from the continental shelf beyond 200 miles, and the definition of the outer limit of the

continental margin. The extent of the rights of straits states to regulate transit passage was also discussed, as well as the methods to be used for delimitation of the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf between opposite and adjacent states. What value is to be given to the median or equidistant line method as against the application of 'equitable principles'?

Committee III regarded the key unsettled issues as the competence of coastal states to establish laws and regulations for the prevention and control of pollution from vessels in the Territorial Sea, EEZ and special areas, and the problem of enforcement—the relative roles of coastal, flag and port states. The degree of international acceptance needed for establishment of international rules and standards is still controversial and the requirement of prior and express coastal state consent for scientific research in the EZ is still opposed by the few states with the necessary oceanographic vessels and trained personnel.

There is still opposition by some developed states to the creation of a new Law of the Sea Tribunal, though the Group of 77 regard this as an essential part of the package. The LL & GDS group are still dissatisfied with the few concessions made to them in the RSNT and oppose the wider and extended jurisdictions conceded in it.

Will there ever be a Caracas Treaty on the Law of the Sea? Will the Seabed Authority ever be able to open its offices in Kingston, Jamaica? The Chairmen of all three Committees have in their reports pointed the way to the necessary compromises and are not unhopeful, but they emphasise that real changes of position will now have to be made if any agreement is to be reached. Is any group going to do this? Can they negotiate with other groups? Mr. Engo, Chairman of the First Committee, was undoubtedly correct when he said 'the real and final solution will be in a package,' but what is to be the shape of the package? He also affirmed his 'strong personal convictions about the crucial importance of a successful and universally accepted Convention . . . for the very survival of man on this planet.' Without a treaty the poor are likely to become poorer and the rich richer, conflicts over resources will abound, and these will quickly be depleted; the seas may continue to be degraded without any admission of international responsibility and disputes are unlikely always to be settled peacefully. It is a gloomy picture. A treaty is still undoubtedly worth working and waiting for in the interests of mankind as a whole.

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[Mrs. P. W. Birnie is Lecturer in Public International Law at the University of Edinburgh. Publications include *The Legal Regime of North Sea Oil and Gas* in *Political Implications of North Sea Oil and Gas* ed. Saeter & Smart; *International Standards for Vessel Source Pollution* in *Environmental Law: A Symposium* pub. B.I.I.C.L.; *A Role in Search of An Organisation* and *Vessel-source Pollution: Is there a Single Negotiable Solution?*, working papers for the U.N. LOSC; pub. Sierra Club, U.S.A.]

# HOW OLD WAS JOSEPH?

## by Neville Braybrooke

HOW old was Joseph when Jesus was born? Poets, saints and biographers have given different answers down the centuries, ranging from 18 to 91. W. H. Auden, in his Christmas oratorio *For the Time Being*, presents him as a decidedly young man with his shoes shined and his pants pressed, who waits anxiously in a bar for Mary to come and explain the secret of her pregnancy. Only after the angel had appeared, does he learn that he must possess his soul in patience and

> Be silent, and sit still.

In an Anglo-Saxon dialogue preserved in the 10th century Exeter Manuscript Joseph is told by Mary also to wait patiently until the time comes for the mystery of her conception to be revealed to him. Nor can there be much doubt about his youth from the forceful tone in which he questions her: 'Much bane have I borne by this conception', he begins—and then goes on:

> How can I silence this hateful talk,
> Or find an answer against my foes?

The curious thing, though, is that in English literature between the 10th century and our own, all Joseph's other appearances have been in the role of a man well advanced in years. Why should this be? There is nothing in the Gospels themselves to bear it out.

On the contrary, had Joseph been the aged, stooping, partriarchal figure he has so often been made out to be, Mary would certainly have been regarded with the utmost suspicion. Probably she would have been 'stoned by stones' (as the anonymous Anglo-Saxon poet suggests), since that was the punishment then meted out to unfaithful wives. Yet, anxious as the scribes and Pharisees were to discover any irregularity in Christ's birth and hence his claim to be the Messiah, they never once hinted at anything improper about the union between his parents. In St. John's Gospel they simply state: 'Is this not Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know?' Again, had there been a really exceptional age-gap between Mary and Joseph, this would have inevitably focused undue attention on the family, and Jesus's hidden years of essential preparation for his public ministry would not have been possible.

The notion of an aged foster-father for Jesus sprang from outside the Gospels; because, with the spread of the Four Gospels, there came into being what might be best termed 'a Fifth Gospel', written in many tongues, in which numerous authors let their imaginations have full rein, in an attempt to fill in gaps left by the Evangelists. In these apocryphal writings some inventions may well be true: the ox and the ass, for instance. Others are within the bounds of miraculous happenings: bare staffs which suddenly burgeon, or cherry trees which bow down to Mary in homage to the Child within her womb. Even the most fanciful tales have a certain charm—a

charm which those who composed the miracle plays were quick to borrow and adapt. Besides, these apocryphal fabrications often made for excellent theatre—especially as far as stage effects were concerned, as witness one 14th century version of the flight into Egypt.

Just outside Bethlehem a band of robbers ambush the Holy Family. They are disappointed when they find no money on them, and the head robber decides to sell Mary as a slave and to kill 'ancient Joseph'. Yet, no sooner has he the dagger in his hand, than the Child smiles so winningly at him that he changes his mind and invites the family to his home. There, his wife prepares a sumptuous banquet for the parents and a bath for the Child. Later, when the Child is being rubbed dry, the robber's son, who suffers from leprosy, puts his hands into the water and is instantly cured. In an epilogue, it is suggested that the robber, or perhaps his son, may have been the Good Thief.

The first reference to Joseph's age occurs in the 2nd century. In a 'gospel' attributed spuriously to St. James the Less he is made to say: 'I am an old man.' In a later 5th century 'gospel', now commonly known amongst biblical scholars as the *Pseudo Gospel of Saint Matthew*, Joseph is congratulated thus by the local people: 'Thou hast been blessed in thy old age . . .' Another work of devotion of the same period, called *The History of Joseph the Carpenter*, maintains that the saint married when he was 40 and was widowed when he was 89: at the age of 91 Mary became his ward. This story first circulated among the Copts, but by the end of the 10th century had been widely translated and adapted into plays of the period. Dramatists now automatically assumed that Joseph had a long white beard and had need for a stick.

The wisdom associated with age may be one reason why so many writers have invested Joseph with never less than three score years and ten. Also, it must be added that the medieval Church had a direct interest in fostering such an image. Only Mary and the Child appear in *The Wakefield Second Shepherds' Play*: Joseph is kept entirely in the background. Or, early in *The Coventry Nativity Play*, he is given one brief soliloquy:

> Husband in faith, and that acold;
> Ah well away, as thou art old!

His remaining lines do little more than bridge the gap between scene and scene:

> Now to Bethlehem strait will I go—

or, after the angel has warned him of Herod's plans:

> Arise up, Mary, hastily and soon!
> Our Lord's will needs must be done,
> Like as the angel bade.

But more often than not his role is that of a silent actor—someone who shuffles off to fetch a midwife; to collect faggots for a fire which he lights with difficulty; or to lead on a donkey at a slow trot.

At the time when these miracle plays were first performed there were many heretical views circulating about Christ's divinity, and there were

those too who were anxious to deny it; the idea of a white-haired, patriarchal figure who usually said nothing only helped to strengthen the doctrine of the virgin birth. Yet to read these plays today in the light of recent discoveries made through the Dead Sea Scrolls is to be brought back sharply to the question—How old *was* Joseph?

Among the findings brought to light by the Dead Sea Scrolls are a number concerning the Jewish marriage customs of the 1st century. The Essenes, it is now known, held that a man should postpone his marriage until he was at least 20. But they were an ultra-conservative sect, so it would be safe to assume that Joseph was espoused to Mary at an earlier age—probably 18. And to remember this is to be reminded of something that has a particular relevance for our own time—namely, Joseph's virginity was not brought about by an enfeebled body, but by a silent belief that with God's grace he would not be tested beyond his strength.

The January 1977 issue of the *Contemporary Review* includes *The State of the Nation's Youth* by John Ewen, *Latin America Today; the View from Washington* by Gordon Connell-Smith, *Patriots and Howe!* by Donald Baker and *Man of the Year is an Italian* by Vernon Bartlett.

# FROM CANAAN TO ISRAEL

## by Gerhard Schmidt

> For the Lord thy God bringeth thee into a good land, a land of brooks of water, of fountains and springs, flowing forth in valleys and hills, a land of wheat and barley, and vines and fig-trees and pomegranates; a land of olive-trees and honey; a land wherein thou shalt eat bread without scarcity, thus shalt not lack anything in it; a land whose stones are iron, and out of whose hills thou mayest dig copper. (5 Moses, 8,7-10.)

If there ever was a paradise, it must have been the land of Canaan: 'the land where milk and honey flows', the land praised to be 'a good land and a large' (2 Moses,3,8). Thousands of people went from Europe to Palestine in the Middle Ages; millions of men in our day go to Israel, but the country has changed its character. Israel, which comprises only a part of old Canaan, is a country today where only 40% of the land can be cultivated. Fifty-one per cent of its soil can be used for agriculture, meadows or pasture. Large areas are desert, the desert of Judaea and the Negev. Although acknowledgment has to be given to the industry and agricultural activity of the inhabitants, nobody could say today: 'Thou shalt not lack anything in it.' The deserts are a wretched piece of the earth. Their emptiness is depressing, and the words 'thou shalt not lack anything in it' are, unfortunately, no longer true. Israel needs help from outside, without which she would be lost. In the Negev, which is half of the country, on the average only 5 inches of rain or less fall in a year. In the Middle Ages, Palestine was still part of the 'fertile crescent'. There was a time when the surface of the Dead Sea was 400 m. higher than today.

What happened? Nobody can answer positively. There are three possible explanations. Some of them may be correct:

(a) A change of the climate. It has been said that the country became very dry at the beginning of the 4th century and possibly at the end of the 6th century, whereas the climate of Palestine was generally extremely damp in antiquity. The fact that the deserts were used as pasture-land points to this assumption. The dryness may have caused the destruction of the forests. In contrast to this, the opinion has been expressed that the precipitation of Palestine in antiquity was about the same as today. A very important adherent of this theory assumes that there were no large forests in Palestine at that time. The quantities of snow were about the same as now. It is hardly possible to say definitely which opinion is right, because there are no reliable meteorological measures available. We have to be satisfied with general descriptions. The change-of-climate theory has more probability, because we know that adjacent Arabia was once known as *Arabia felix*. Therefore, it had to be a fertile land, whereas today it is also a desert to a great extent. (Usually people develop an opinion about a change of climate by studying the plants which grew in different periods. Plants in general require a certain temperature but, like animals, can become acclimatised.)

(b) There is the possibility that Palestine lost her fertility through man's

exhaustion of the soil. We know that forests in the area of the Mediterranean Sea were often cut down recklessly. If this was also done in Palestine, deserts may have increased, because the soil was washed away by violent showers of rain. Moreover, it is often stated in the historical records that the country was badly administered under the Ottoman government. It is certainly an undisputed fact that the fertility of the country declined.

(c) We might believe that the population has increased so much today that the fertility of the country per head has been reduced. In 1969 the population of Israel amounted to 2,919,200. The country of Canaan was much more extensive than the territory of Israel today. In the North it reached far beyond Damascus, almost to the town of Homs in Syria at the geographical latitude of Palmyra. Unfortunately the area cannot be calculated exactly in square kilometres. Perhaps we can say that Old Israel covered nearly twice as much territory as New Israel.

Now we have a hint concerning the population under David in the second book of Samuel 24,9. There we are told that the men of Israel who were fit for service numbered 800,000 and the men of Juda 500,000, together totalling 1,300,000. If we add the women of the same age, the population of the age of 20 to 50 years was 2,600,000 people, i.e. for 31 years. Per age group per year there were 83,870 persons. The people not fit for service of 0 to 20 years and of 51 to 70 years, i.e. for 40 years, would therefore be estimated at 3,354,800, altogether 5,954,800.

The increase of the population during the time from Moses (1250 B.C.) to David (1000 B.C.) was more than 100% (4 Moses 1,46): (the men fit for service were 603,550). That implies, therefore, that the population of the area of Israel today (if it can be assumed to be half of the size of old Israel) amounted to 2,977,400, that is greater by 58,200 people than in our time! A very amazing fact! Of course, statistical figures which have been given 2,500 or 3,000 years ago, have to be critically examined.

With this we come to the conclusion that the reduced fertility of Israel in relation to that of Canaan, which nobody will deny, cannot be caused by an increase of the population but only by a change in the climate and man's exploitation or negligence of the soil or by one of these factors.

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# QUARTERLY FILM REVIEW

## by James Morton

SOME years ago I wrote that the younger directors were in eclipse and the current saviour was Martin Scorsese. This year he has taken the giant step from 'younger director' to major director. His film *Taxi Driver* starring Robert de Niro won the Best Film Award in Cannes and it has, so far, been the major film to open this autumn.

De Niro, a veteran of the Vietnam war, suffers from insomnia and to while away the dark hours he takes a job driving cabs on the night shift in Harlem. During the day he spends his still waking hours looking for company in flop house cinemas and in writing letters or entries in his journal. This latter seems to be a current fad with American directors.

Already quirky, he finds the nightly garbage he has to carry in, and clean out of, his taxi increasingly repellent. From time to time he meets his co-drivers but he is a man apart. He is the last to arrive, the first to leave and sits on the edge of the circle taking little part in the conversation.

In Harlem one evening Jody Foster, a twelve-year-old child prostitute, gets into his cab in a futile gesture against her pimp who instantly retrieves her. De Niro's mind, already unbalanced, definitely starts to creak at this point. He is further disorientated by Cybille Shepherd, a campaign worker for a candidate for the New York primary. He manages to date her and is immediately rejected when he takes her to one of the pornographic movie houses he frequents.

From that minute his mind snaps and he sets himself the role of avenging angel. This is a two-fold role. He decides to kill the candidate whom he does not believe to be taking a sufficient interest in cleaning up New York. He also determines to rescue Jody Foster.

The results are cathartic and he ends up a minor hero apparently restored to sanity.

This is Scorsese's fourth film and the second in what is to be a trilogy about New York. He has always been forceful in his use of images and in *Taxi Driver* he presents a series of frames which, whilst not as visually shocking as the final frames from *Boxcar Bertha*, nevertheless have a tremendous impact. He has from the start been an impressive director in the handling of his actors and the performances of De Niro and Jody Foster are quite outstanding. The film is by no means a pleasant one. The sight of mental and physical deterioration never is. But is is an impressive film and one which is essential viewing to anyone who is at all interested in the contemporary cinema. Only the ending is perhaps less than sure. If the final sequence is to be accepted at face value then Scorsese has taken a soft option. If the film is to be taken as an allegory with De Niro standing for, say, America then it is disturbing indeed.

The other revelation of the autumn is the continual improvement of

Clint Eastwood as a director. Eastwood it will be remembered was a TV actor who was the nameless hero of the first Italian Western, *A Fistful of Dollars*. That film spawned a whole series and in addition to rejuvenating the careers of some American heavies, notably Lee Van Clief, made Eastwood an international star.

His first film as director, *Play Misty for Me*, is still circulating and gaining in reputation. His second, *High Plains Drifter*, was a Western as is his latest film *The Outlaw Josey Wales*: this is a film which, starting out as a simple revenge western on the lines of the Randolph Scott *Ranown* cycle in the middle 50s, suddenly doubles back on itself and becomes a picaresque adventure—albeit a fairly violent one. Eastwood is himself the eponymous hero whose wife and child were murdered by marauders during the last months of the Civil War. He joins a group of Southern Raiders, half brothers to Quantrill. At the end of the war they are tricked into surrendering and slaughtered. Eastwood escapes but there is a price on his head and not only is a Union Officer sent after him but almost every bounty hunter in the South West is on his trail.

Despite this he begins to amass, Pied Piper fashion, a collection of has-beens, misfits and unfortunates who travel with him to New Mexico to start a small commune. Even when they reach this New World all is not well and their troubles continue.

Eastwood takes this two-hour film along at a fine pace treading the lines between comedy, adventure and pathos in a most assured manner. The acting of the supporting players is again uniformly good, particularly that of Chief Dan George as the ageing Indian chief who is the Sancho Panza to Eastwood's rather less than head-in-air Quixote.

The latest and what should be the last Hitchcock, *Family Plot*, is doing creaky duty around the cinemas. For a major director his handling of his actors has always been less than miraculous. At times the acting in this film is almost unbelievably bad. The plot concerns a charlatan fortune teller hired to find a long lost nephew who is revenging himself on society by being a professional kidnapper. Hitchcock films have been getting steadily worse since the early fifties. Even *Psycho* does not stand up to viewing again and this is really the end of the line.

Twenty years ago Robert Enrico made the enchanting short film *Incident at Owl Creek*. Since then he has been making documentaries for French television and a few French gangster films. Now *Le Secret* has crossed the Channel and if the others are anywhere near as good we have plenty of treats in store over the next years. The French and indeed the Italians are particularly good at making this sort of film. Very few do manage to get over here and when they do they are often retitled, such as Alain Jessua's film which became *Doctor in the Nude* in an endeavour to sell a political thriller to the macintosh brigade.

Jean Louis Trintignant has killed a guard to escape from a government establishment where he has been imprisoned after accidentally discovering 'the secret'. Or has he in fact killed a nurse in a mental hospital where he

was receiving treatment? He travels to Paris, borrows money from a girl friend, and flees to the country where he runs into Philippe Noiret and Marlene Jobert, who have dropped out of society and are living in comfortable if eccentric conditions. Noiret is suffering from an unspecified disease and is looking for some excitement. Jobert is at first both frightened and sorry for the fugitive. Later as the friendship develops between Trintignant and Noiret her pity for the former turns sour. She sees him as a threat not only to their physical security but also to her relationship with Noiret. Meanwhile the latter has decided to try and get Trintignant across the Spanish border.

This is the sort of film at which the continental directors excel and which when tried by the English or American directors turn out usually to be extremely silly. Thinking back it is hard to recall a really exciting English thriller of recent years and certainly not one which is genuinely thrilling but also contains a study of an involved Chabrol type relationship.

Enrico plays very fair as to whether Trintignant is mad or is really in terror. He keeps the pace along at a smart trot. The acting of the principals is uniformly good and that of Noiret is outstanding. He is a physical successor to that great French actor Michel Simon. At the end of the film he stands on a deserted sand dune, his rubber face registering a gamut of emotions merely by twisting a small muscle. Of all the films reviewed if only one can be seen this should be it.

*Stay Hungry* is the latest film of Bob Rafelson to be shown in this country. The eternally young Jeff Bridges has inherited an immense mansion and fortune to go with it. He is idly involved in property speculation and his part is to purchase a rather run down gymnasium. This is to be the cornerstone of a redevelopment scheme. Unfortunately for the speculators but fortunately for the film he becomes besotted by the sweat and grease of the weight lifters who are preparing for some version of the World title. He also falls in love with a girl, Sally Field, who is the receptionist. For the first time in his life he becomes involved with 'real people' as opposed to the 'frauds' of the social set.

Rafelson also plays honestly by the film. The weightlifters and their life are not all good. The speculators are bad but not wholly so. All are portrayed with a good deal of affection and humour. Bridges has always had a great deal of charm and he oozes it here. The girl Sally Field is pleasantly unwashed as the receptionist and all in all it makes an amiable two hours or so. With luck the spring season will soon start to disgorge more of the heavy stuff rather than these lightweights.

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## FOX—AND HEDGEHOG?

*Mankind and Mother Earth. A Narrative History of the World.* Arnold Toynbee. Oxford University Press.

The contrast between the fox and the hedgehog comes much into mind as we rise, staggering a little, from what is presumably the last of the mighty works of the late Arnold Toynbee. The fox, it will be recalled, knows many little things; the hedgehog knows one big thing. On these definitions no one of our time has a clearer title of fox than Arnold Toynbee. His width of knowledge was colossal and at the end of his life he was still showing his old mastery of his material.

On one occasion Professor Trevor-Roper attacked him vehemently; Philip Toynbee—a son as loyal as he is gifted—retorted that it was the jealousy of the man of the small book for the man of the very big one. It is certainly not for me or perhaps for any other individual to challenge Arnold Toynbee on matters of detail over his whole area, though each of us will be prepared to do battle with him on our selected ground. But Arnold Toynbee was not content with this kind of supremacy. Like all the greatest foxes he longed to establish his claim to hedgehoghood. In this remarkable history of man and the earth he insists that he has discovered underlying principles. In this respect he is utterly unlike the late H. A. L. Fisher who confessed at the beginning of his classical History of Europe that he could find no pattern or design. The special interest in Toynbee's book is the question he leaves us with. Do we or do we not accept the case that he seeks to make out for his enunciated principles?

Toynbee concentrates our attention throughout on two conceptions: man and the biosphere.

> 'The word biosphere,' he tells us, 'was coined by Teilhard de Chardin. It is a new word, required by our arrival at a new stage in the progress of our scientific knowledge and our material power. The biosphere is a film of dry land, water, and air enveloping the globe (or virtual globe) of our planet Earth. It is the sole present habitat—and, as far as we can foresee today, also the sole habitat that will ever be accessible—for all the species of living beings, including mankind, that are known to us.'

That is how he begins his book. This is how he ends it:

> 'Will mankind murder Mother Earth or will he redeem her? He could murder her by misusing his increasing technological potency. Alternatively he could redeem her by overcoming the suicidal, aggressive greed that, in all living creatures, including Man himself, has been the price of the Great Mother's gift of life. This is the enigmatic question which now confronts Man.'

Toynbee writes with such a charming serenity that as one reads one hardly feels as gloomy as one ought to. Yet gloomy is the only word that can be applied to the final answer which he offers, by implication at least, to the question just presented. It is true that he gives Man a theoretical chance of avoiding catastrophe, but to do so Man has to become a very different animal from hitherto. There is nothing in Toynbee's narrative or analysis to suggest that the leopard will in fact change his spots. The only hope is, I suppose, that man will revolutionise his nature when at last he realises his appalling peril.

Turning to the past, Toynbee emphasises that there is no precedent for the power that Man has acquired over the 'biosphere' in the course of the last two centuries. But that power can be used for good or for ill. As a spirit, man possesses consciousness. He distinguishes between good and evil and in his

acts he makes choices. In the ethical field in which Man's choices are either for evil or for good his choices produce a moral credit and debit account. But the gap has widened faster and faster between man's social morality and his technological prowess.

Toynbee does not deny that in the last two hundred years there are important items to be set on the credit side. The recogniiton

> that governments have a duty to provide for their subjects' welfare was a beneficent ethical advance in the field of politics. The state has now become a welfare organisation, besides continuing to be a law-enforcing and a war-making organisation, in most of the world's industrialised countries.

Even here, however, his enthusiasm is qualified; he finds the welfare state 'still a controversial issue.' He condemns the course of human history more than he praises it. He seems to feel (though he does not quite say this) that if Man continues to be driven forward mainly by greed he will not only in fact be destroyed but will deserve his fate.

The two developments that make this so certain are first the using up of the resources of the biosphere and secondly the production of nuclear weapons which at a moment's notice could blow us all to pieces. That is how he presents the immediate prospect, but he seems to be saying that this has always been 'coming to us' unless we mended our ways.

Not long ago I reviewed in these pages a comparable book by a far younger but in his own way an equally arresting writer, Paul Johnson. I pointed out, as have others, that Paul Johnson does not mention St. Francis of Assisi in his History of Christianity. Professor Toynbee in a sense goes to the other extreme though not a great many pages are devoted to the Saint explicitly. Before coming to St. Francis he presents us with two persistent ideals. The first comes from the first chapter of the Book of Genesis (verse 28):

> Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the Earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air and over every living thing that moveth upon the Earth.

The second is from the New Testament (Matthew 6, 28-29):

> Whosoever will come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall save it. For what shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?

Man has dedicated himself since the outbreak of the industrial revolution more obsessively than ever before to the pursuit of the objective set out in the first chapter of Genesis. For Toynbee the only hope is for man to accept 'as necessary practical rules of conduct for people of ordinary moral stature the precepts preached and practised by Saints.' He takes St. Francis of Assisi as personifying the right alternative and St. Francis's father, the successful cloth merchant, the wrong one.

It would be unfair to ask how far he would really carry this antithesis. How is the institution of the family to survive if everyone acted like St. Francis? Let us interpret Toynbee with reasonable charity. I take him to mean that greed, the desire to be rich and, if possible, richer than one's neighbours, has been a much stronger force in human history hitherto than the appeal of self-sacrifice, and that unless this relationship is reversed we shall all perish. Without sharing his extreme pessimism we can all go along with his ethical message.

It remains to add a word about Toynbee's attitude to religion in general and Christianity in particular. If he has an intellectual fault it is dogmatism, and it comes out strongly here. He has devoted many years of his life to comparative

religion and yet he can treat the arguments for a personal God as no longer acceptable to anyone of good intelligence. His dismissal of Christ's claims to Divinity is remarkably superficial. There is a point here which might interest him as he reads reviews of his book in a better world than this. He holds up St. Francis of Assisi as providing the highest possible inspiration to mankind in the future. Yet Francis was described by a great agnostic as the only perfect Christian. Certainly he based his whole life, after his conversion, on an exact imitation of Jesus. No one believed more totally in a personal God or recognised him in all things animate and inanimate. Strange if the Christian religion were capable of producing the highest type of human being and yet itself was false or fraudulent.

Toynbee's difficulty arose surely from his inability to believe that anything or anybody or any spiritual power was unique. Always there had to be a comparison with something or someone else. When he falls below his best, as sometimes in dealing with Christianity, his comparative method runs away with him, so that he is not a hedgehog and not always a genuine fox. But when all such criticisms are finished with, this book and others of his will remain the noble legacy of a generous, potent and indomitable mind.

FRANK LONGFORD

## TWO VIEWS OF NUREYEV

*Nureyev: Aspects of the Dancer.* John Percival. Faber and Faber. £5.95.
*The Nureyev Image.* Alexander Bland. Studio Vista. £8.95.

It may seem extraordinary but, after the Royal Family, the Russian ballet dancer Rudolf Nureyev is probably one of the best known people in this country today. Stop anybody in the street, whenever and wherever, and ask who Nureyev is, and nine times out of ten the answer would almost certainly be that he is a Russian dancer. He is, of course, far more than that. Since his arrival in the West fifteen years ago it would be fair to say that he has done much to transform our ballet scene. Some would say he dances far too much, and his standards can certainly be uneven—such is the nature of the man. But invariably he puts all that he has into everything he does, and his contribution, not merely to dancing but to production and choreography, has been of immense value to companies throughout the Western world. Unquestionably he made the right decision in 1961: he would never surely have been permitted to achieve so much in the Soviet Union. His pre-eminence perhaps explains the fact that two studies of the man and his work should recently appear well before his fortieth birthday and any signs of his retirement from dancing. On the other hand it says rather less for the planning and liaison of publishers that both books, covering much the same ground, should appear within a week of each other. Presumably both houses were aiming at the Christmas market, but it remains a somewhat self-defeating operation.

To be fair, the books are of different kinds, though both are written by leading ballet critics of national newspapers. John Percival is ballet critic of *The Times* and a man of immense knowledge and boundless enthusiasm for the dance. His study of Nureyev is biographically comprehensive—indeed, Alexander Bland in the other book acknowledges assistance from Percival—and contains chapters on Nureyev's roles and productions, as well as two other chapters which concern Nureyev on a Royal Ballet tour of Israel and rehearsing in London and the author's impressions of watching the subject in various roles. This latter might seem redundant as the author deals with such impressions, in some detail, in the rest of the book. There is also a section containing the views

of others on Nureyev. These short essays come from fellow dancers and choreographers and the designer Nicholas Georgiadis, and range, predictably, from the eulogistic to the bitchy. Perhaps Margot Fonteyn's appraisal, in its very brevity, is the most powerful, ending: 'Very occasionally one can give him a new idea, but his brain is so quick that it is usually way ahead.' Although there is much that is rewarding, the overall impression is a somewhat fragmentary one. The initial chapter, comprising nearly half the book, 'A Dancer's Life', is admirable in its documentation of the Tartar upbringing in Ufa, the struggles and success in Leningrad, the defection in Paris in 1961, and the ever-growing popular and artistic success in the West thenceforth. The author's knowledge and judgment are well displayed. Thereafter the book becomes something of a law of diminishing returns—one almost feels it has been padded out to achieve full length status. There are also two sections of photographs which are rather small scale and not of consistently ideal quality. This is unfortunate in a subject who so thoroughly merits photographic treatment.

Alexander Bland who, assisted by his wife, the former dancer Maude Lloyd, is ballet critic of *The Observer*, goes for pictorial treatment first and foremost. The book is of much larger format—coffee table size—and is beautifully as well as copiously illustrated. As well as over 300 magnificent photographs there is a delightful drawing by David Hockney as frontispiece, and staggering reproduction of Nureyev's agent's diary for 6 months from September 1975 which shows just how packed a life he leads: spread across half a dozen dancers it would still seem a heavy schedule. The photographs could be better captioned: too often one is left trying to guess who appears in the picture alongside Rudi. This is a pity as the effect in the theatre so often depends equally upon those with whom he dances, and Margot Fonteyn has been far from being his only regular partner. The text comes in short chapters on the man, the dancer, the choreographer and the interpreter, all succinct and well written, and presenting perhaps an even more vivid picture of the subject volatile personality than Mr. Percival's study. The photographic section places the ballets in alphabetical order and has a short, well judged appraisal of Nureyev in each major role introducing the shots of him dancing it. This treatment is not only a pleasure to look at, but also an extremely useful study of Nureyev's art and technique, and one that will be of considerable assistance to ballet students now and in the future.

Both books have their merits and make pleasurable reading, but, on the level either of Christmas present or serious appraisal, I am left in little doubt that Alexander Bland's is the more enjoyable to read and look at and helpful to come back to, and well merits the extra £3 it costs. DAVID FINGLETON

## EVELYN WAUGH'S DIARIES

*The Diaries of Evelyn Waugh*. Edited by Michael Davie. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £7.95.

Evelyn Waugh's position in English letters seems assured, but were his diaries—340,000 words covering 789 printed pages and fifty-four years—worth publishing *in extenso*? Does their publication add to, or detract from, his stature? It is difficult to give a clear-cut answer to the first question. It depends whether or not you subscribe to the critical school which believes that the man is nothing, the work everything. The second question is more easily dealt with. The diaries do not affect Waugh's literary standing either way. Their chief interest lies in the unvarnished self-portrait which they present of a very unhappy human being. A Hamlet who played the clown through sixty-three years of self-indulgent sadness.

The diaries have been generally well edited, and most usefully annotated, by Michael Davie, but, it must be said, woefully indexed. That is a great pity, because a book of this kind relies very heavily upon its index. There are, too, many inconsequential and arid tracts which could well have been omitted, for completeness need not necessarily, or even often, be a virtue.

The diaries fall into six main periods: *Boyhood* 1911-1916, *Schooldays at Lancing* 1919-1921, *The Twenties* 1924-1928, *The Thirties* 1930-1939, *Wartime* 1939-1945, *Post-war* 1945-1956, and there is a further six-year period of *'Irregular Notes'* 1960-1965. The entries covering Waugh's life at Lancing College, reveal an unusually mature schoolboy; those relating to the years which followed his coming down from Oxford with a bad third, expose an unusually immature young man, preoccupied with his excessive drinking habits and their disagreeable consequences, and tediously meticulous in his recording of social non-events. The diaries of his travels and his war years are more satisfying, and there is a fascination in pairing actual occurrences with the transformation scenes presented in the novels. Even so, the main interest of the diaries is, as I have already indicated, the revelation of Evelyn the man, rather than Waugh the artist.

It is not pleasant to write disparagingly of those who are no longer in a position to correct one's impressions, but to laud Waugh's personal qualities would be to practise the hypocrisy which he so despised. He emerges as a compulsive bully and a repulsive drinker, a brave loser and a cruel winner. He overcame his early homosexuality; and he overcame, by strenuous tuggings at his bootlaces, what he regarded as the accident of his comparatively humble birth. After the success of *Decline and Fall*, he achieved acceptance, albeit on sufferance, on the fringes of the tight ranks of the blue bloods whom he so obsessively admired. He cultivated his prejudices most assiduously and, alas, his induction into the Roman Catholic Church does not appear to have taught him the meaning of contrition, the exercise of charity or the need for humility. In defiance of the faith of his new faith's *fons et origo*, he continued rabidly anti-Semitic. His value judgements of people are so grotesque that it is sometimes tempting to suppose that what we are reading are fragments of the demented scribblings of Gilbert Pinfold, which have somehow become mixed up with the authentic papers of the author of *Brideshead Revisited*.

Having settled himself in his squirearchal rôle, having acquired his modest competency of broad acres, one might think that Waugh was set fair to play out the closing scenes with a pretence of dignity. Unfortunately, it did not work out like that. His daemon was never exorcised, and, port-empurpled, pompous and choleric, fenced in behind the pale of his preposterous delusions, he hastened himself to his self-appointed end. It is all very, very sad, but the happy thing is the transformation that took place on paper when Waugh the alchemist transmuted the guilt of life into the gold of literature.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

## NEW YORKER CARTOONS

*The New Yorker Album of Drawings*, 1925-1975. Andre Deutsch. £7.50.

Books today are so expensive that it is only the richest of us who can afford to buy hardback editions. The rest must wait the statutory year or two before a paperback slips onto the shelves. This is particularly sad at Christmas time which has been a traditional moment for buying books as presents.

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Publishers now charge £4.50 for a middle-sized novel. Thrillers are priced at £3 and more, yet these are the most ephemeral of all books. This is why the New Yorker book of cartoons ranging over the last half-century is so welcome. Here is a book which need not be abandoned half way through Boxing Day as unreadable or finished propped up against the leftover turkey two days later and then put in the second guest bedroom. Here is a book which will repay its cost over and over again.

Evelyn Waugh in his books was always keen on his characters reading old and bound volumes of Punch at the dinner table. Ryder's father does it in *Brideshead Revisited* and old Colonel Blount snuffles happily during the lunch he has with Adam Sykes when the latter tries to tell him of his impending marriage to Nina. Sadly, it seems just as great rugby heroes fade, so has Punch. The trouble started when they messed about with the cover. What was good enough for our grandfathers was too good for us. The New Yorker, although it has always had a changing cover, had always maintained a house style. Punch's downslide came when it tried, like Caesar, to be all things to men; the New Yorker has remained, like that emperor's wife, above suspicion.

Its self-sufficiency contributes to the one or two minor annoyances of this book. There is no index, the cartoons are not dated and there is nothing but a list of the cartoonists on the outside of the dustcover. Mine is already becoming frayed and before the end of the year will have turned to dust. Those minor carpings dealt with, the book is a delight; the cartoonists range from the gothic Charles Addams through the famous and lesser known contributors to Jack Ziegler. There are very few cartoonists who have contributed to British magainzes, a notable exception being David Langdon. Some of the cartoonists' work is easily recognisable; Thurber stands out and one soon learns to recognise Mary Petty's heavily shaded drawings.

Everybody will have their favourites from the hundreds of reproductions. Perhaps the publishers were right not to date the cartoons for it is amusing trying to date them. Martians are a favourite subject and may well be timeless but there is a reference to a betting shop in New York which places the cartoon firmly in the seventies. I think my favourite is one of the saddest. By James Stevenson, it shows an elderly dressing-gowned lady waving to her television and saying: 'Night-night. See you in the morning.' This is a book which can be turned to again and again, just like those old copies of the New Yorker itself.

JAMES MORTON

## SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES

In **Triumphs of Medicine**, edited by Professor Harry Keen and Dr. John Jarrett (Paul Elek, £12.50), seventeen internationally eminent specialists review the progress and achievements of medical science. By the terms of its brief, this is a wide-ranging, as well as an authoritative book, directed at the intelligent layman who wants to know exactly what medicine has, and has not, accomplished to date, and precisely how it has been affected by the technological revolution of the last hundred years. Written in simple language, and splendidly illustrated, the book is both optimistic and realistic in its evaluations. The editors feel, quite rightly, that an outstanding area

of success is that of preventive medicine and the containing of infectious diseases, made possible by the discoveries of the nineteenth century pioneers. The introduction of revolutionary surgical techniques, enormous advances in biochemical understanding, and the ceaseless search for ever more effective drugs, have all contributed spectacularly to the present highly encouraging state of medicine. It has, as this book clearly demonstrates, evolved from a static art to a restless, critical discipline, in which the complexities of molecular biology, biophysics, bioengineering and increasingly sophisticated instrumentation are constantly transforming not only the philosophical background, but also the therapeutic landscape. (R.W.-E.)

**Royal Westminster Abbey** (Hale. £5.00). In his latest book, Mr. Bryan Bevan has devoted his attention to the close relationship between the Abbey and the monarchy. This interest mainly flowed from his experience as a temporary marshal in the Abbey during the spring and summer of 1974. For over 900 years, from the reign of Edward the Confessor until the present, there has been continuity of close royal links. Mr. Bevan describes over these centuries the coronations, royal weddings, funerals and other ceremonies and events in which the monarchy has been directly involved. Inevitably this book is to a great extent a concise catalogue of events, briefly but pleasantly and vividly described. He has been helped and advised by some leading authorities on the history of Westminster Abbey, including Dr. L. E. Tanner. There are a number of illustrations.

**Dickens' England** (Dent. £3.95). Michael and Mollie Hardwick have written a new book on Dickens. It 'conducts the reader to every English scene and building connected by any significance with Dickens which is still to be seen today, a century after his death'. Their method is to write a biography in terms of place, related both to where he lived and travelled in Britain and to the scenes in his novels. Restriction to surviving buildings has its obvious limitations. For example the Temple in London is sadly neglected, so much having been destroyed in the last war. Nonetheless it preserves in many ways the Dickensian atmosphere. *Great Expectations,* for example, will still be enjoyed the more by a visit there. The same must apply to many other places. Nonetheless the book is well worthwhile, and the photographs are an asset.

**Joseph Conrad: The Modern Imagination** (Dent. £1.50). This penetrating study by Professor C. B. Cox, first published in 1974, is now reprinted and issued as an Everyman Paperback. 'My purpose in this book', he writes, 'has been to describe this courageous effort of Conrad's imagination to bring together experiences of alienation and commitment in a single work of art'. Professor Cox relates Conrad's almost paradoxical outlook with his novels which he outlines and discusses in some detail. It is a perceptive and erudite contribution to Conrad criticism which well deserves the wider readership of a paperback edition.

**Home Booze** (Macdonald & Jane's. £4.50). This 'complete guide for the amateur wine-maker and beer-maker' by Mr. H. E. Bravery contains the best from his three most widely read books on home brewing and home wine making, together with many 'ultra-modern, tried and tested recipes' and 'foolproof methods' of production.

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